A socio-economic history of coffee production in Mbinga District, Tanzania, c. 1920 - 2015 by Komba, Yustina Samwel
A Socio-economic History of Coffee Production in Mbinga 
District, Tanzania, c.1920 – 2015 
by 
Yustina Samwel Komba 
Dissertation presented for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy (History) in the 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at 
Stellenbosch University 
Supervisor: Dr Anton Ehlers (University of Stellenbosch) 




By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained 
therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly 
otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not 
infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it 
for obtaining any qualification. 
March 2021
Copyright © 2021 Stellenbosch University 




The research focused on the foundation, development, fortunes, and socio-economic impact of the 
coffee industry on smallholder coffee producers in the Mbinga District for the period from 1920 to 
2015. Drawing on archival and oral sources, it analysed the historical interactions between the 
coffee actors in the coffee industry, namely the state, the co-operatives, private coffee enterprises, 
and smallholder coffee producers. In the process, Gavin Fridell’s “coffee statecraft” and James 
Scott’s “weapon of the weak” approaches are utilised as theoretical points of departure.  
While the colonial state laid the foundation for state control of the coffee industry through the co-
operative marketing system, the postcolonial state’s interventions shaped the trajectory of the coffee 
industry between the 1960s and 1990 under the Ujamaa policy. The European Economic 
Community grant for the coffee-improvement programmes between 1977 and the late 1980s 
influenced the expansion of the coffee industry in the Mbinga District. From the late 1980s, the 
Tanzanian government implemented economic liberalisation which marked the end of Ujamaa 
principles and the transition from state monopoly to the free-market system. The research 
demonstrates how the transition from the state monopoly of coffee production under co-operative 
societies to co-existence with the private enterprises has resulted in entrenched hegemonic and 
exploitative practices at the expense of smallholder coffee producers between the 1990s and 2015.  
There is also a focus on the role of women in coffee production and marketing in the Mbinga District 
over time. While coffee has been regarded as “man’s crop”, the complexity of women’s 
participation in coffee production and marketing is revealed in the findings. This thesis argues that 
the history of the coffee industry in the Mbinga District evolved through the interaction between 
the state, the coffee producers, co-operatives and later private coffee enterprises, all of which have 
impacted on the socio-economic livelihood and fortunes of the smallholder coffee producers in a 
variety of ways.  
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Die navorsing het gefokus op die ontstaan, ontwikkeling, wedervaringe en sosio-ekonomiese impak 
van die koffie-industrie op die kleinboer-koffieprodusente in die Mbinga-distrik van 1920 tot 2015. 
Die historiese interaksie tussen die rolspelers in die koffie-industrie, naamlik die staat, die 
koöperatiewe verenigings, privaat koffiemaatskappye en die kleinboer-koffieprodusente is ontleed 
met behulp van argivale en mondelinge bronne. In die proses is Gavin Fridell se “coffee statecraft” 
en James Scott se “weapons of the weak” as teoretiese vertrekpunte gebruik.  
Die grondslag vir die staatsbeheer van die koffie-industrie in Tanzanië deur middel van die 
koöperatiewe bemarkingstelsel is tydens die koloniale tydperk gelê. In die post-koloniale tydperk, 
dit is van die 1960’s tot 1990, het staatsinmenging die koffie-industrie deur middel van die Ujamaa-
beleid beïnvloed en gevorm. Die Europese Ekonomiese Gemeenskap se skenking vir die 
finansiering van koffie-verbeteringsprogramme tussen 1977 en die laat 1980’s het die uitbreiding 
van die koffie-industrie in die Mbinga-distrik beïnvloed. Sedert die laat 1980’s het die regering van 
Tanzanië ŉ beleid van ekonomiese liberalisering ingevoer. Dit het die Ujamaa-beginsels vervang 
en ŉ oorgang van staatsmonopolie tot ŉ vryemarkstelsel ingelui. Die navorsing het aangetoon dat 
hierdie oorgang van staatsmonopolie oor koffieproduksie onder koöperatiewe verenigings tot ŉ 
stelsel van medebestaan met nuwe privaat maatskappye tussen die 1990’s en 2015 gelei het tot die 
verskansing van bestaande uitbuitende en dominerende praktyke tot nadeel van die koffie-
kleinboere. 
Die rol van vroue in koffieproduksie en bemarking in die Mbinga-distrik en hoe dit mettertyd 
verander het, kom ook onder bespreking. Navorsing het getoon dat, ten spyte van die feit dat koffie 
as ŉ “man’s crop” beskou is, vroue se aandeel in koffieproduksie en bemarking baie meer kompleks 
is as wat algemeen aanvaar is. Die proefskrif argumenteer dus dat die geskiedenis van die koffie-
industrie in Mbinga-distrik ontwikkel het deur ŉ interaksie tussen die staat, koffieprodusente, 
koöperatiewe en later ook privaat koffiemaatskappye wat die bestaansmoontlikhede en ervarings 
van koffie-kleinboere op verskeie maniere beïnvloed en bepaal het.  
Sleutelwoorde: Tanzanië; Mbinga; koöperatiewe verenigings; staat; Matengo Hoogland; Ngaka; 
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Chapter One  
Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
Coffee is one of the favourite drinks in the world. Its use ranges from households, learning 
institutions, subways, workshops, drive-ins, and even working places. It has dominated 
people’s cultures to the extent that it is normal to hear things like “coffee-break”, “evening 
coffee”, “coffee talk” during academic engagements such as conferences or workshops. While 
the history of coffee production has become important worldwide, it also gives historians the 
chance to navigate the social history of the stakeholders – the farmers. Therefore, this study 
uses coffee production in the Mbinga District to navigate the more in-depth history of 
smallholder coffee producers in the Matengo Highlands in the Mbinga District, Southern 
Tanzania, historically from the 1920s to 2015. The history of coffee has intertwined with the 
lives of these people since the beginning of the 20th century. Coffee has been the primary source 
of income in the Mbinga District. Whatever affects the coffee industry directly or indirectly 
affects the livelihoods of coffee producers. As coffee producers, they have experienced the 
influence of the colonial and post-colonial states in the production and marketing of this “global 
product” – coffee. This study researches the socio-economic history of coffee production in the 
Mbinga District. 
Coffee is one of the most valuable agricultural commodities in the world. It is estimated that 
that over 25 million smallholder farmers produce 80% of the coffee in the world.1 Its history 
began in the 14th century when a wild Arabica coffee was discovered in Ethiopia.2 By the end 
of the 18th century, coffee became one of the most valuable commodities in the world. In 
German East Africa,3 Arabica coffee was believed to be introduced by French Roman Catholic 
 
1 2016 Fair Trade annual report available at www.fairtrade.org.uk/Farmers-and-Workers/coffee, Accessed on 5 
April 2018.  
2 M. Tuchscherer, “Coffee in the Red Sea Area from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century,” in W.G. Clarence-
Smith and S. Topik, (eds.), The Global Coffee Economy in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 1500-1989, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 51. 
3 German East Africa comprised of Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanganyika from 1885 to 1918. After 1918, Burundi 






Missionaries of the Holy Ghost Fathers in the second half of the 19th century.4 By the turn of 
the 20th century, coffee experiments proved successful, and the coffee-growing knowledge 
started to be imparted to the church followers. 
During the German colonial period, the earliest efforts consisted of experimenting with 
different crops in the coastal areas before expanding to the hinterland.5 Their focus was on the 
plantation economy. The German East African Plantation Company (Deutsch-Ostafrikanische 
Plantagengesellschaft) or DOAPG introduced the first tobacco and later coffee plantations at 
Lewa in Bonde in 1887. The German East African Company (DOAG) established another two 
coffee plantations in Derema and Nguelo in Usambara in 1887.6 
Labour issues in the coastal plantations forced the German colonial government to introduce 
measures to solve it. Taxation was one of the important measures of pushing Africans to 
provide labour in colonial enterprises and adjust themselves to the new demands. It was also 
aimed at raising state revenue. The first Taxation Ordinance was issued in November 1897 and 
became effective in 1898.7 House and hut taxes were introduced and were based on the number 
of dwellings. The amount per house or hut was 6 to 12 rupees in urban and 3 rupees in rural 
areas.8 With the increasing demands of taxes, people were forced to intensify the collection of 
wild products such as beeswax and wild rubber. They worked as porters, labourers in the 
plantations, in railway construction sites, or in colonial provincial or district administrative 
headquarters, popularly called Bomas9, to get money for taxes. Most of the early colonial 
 
League of Nations and later the United Nations. In 1961Tanganyika got its independence, and in 1964 united 
with Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania.  
4 The Holy Ghost Fathers started their missionary work in Zanzibar in 1863 from where they established various 
mission stations in the mainland including Bagamoyo, Mandera, Mhonda Morogoro, Kilema and Bura; A.J. 
Kieran, “The Origin of Commercial Arabica Coffee Production in East Africa”, African Historical Studies, 
The African Studies Centre of Boston University, 2, 1, (1969), 51-67. 
5 J. Koponen, Development for Exploitation: German Colonial Policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884 – 1914, 
(Helsinki/Hamburg, 1994), 204. 
6 Ibid., 215. 
7 Ibid., 216. 
8 J. Koponen, Development for Exploitation, 216. Rupees were Indian currency used in both mainland Tanganyika 
and Zanzibar islands in the late 19th century. Germany adopted rupees between the 1890s and 1905 as the 
German East African rupee. The value of rupees to the German Marks was fixed in 1905 when three rupees 
were exchanged to four German Marks whereby 15 rupees had a value of 20 German Marks or one UK pound; 
J. Iliffe, Tanganyika Under German Rule, 1905-1912, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), ix.  






economic units were established along the railway line or the coast for easy shipping. The 
southern part of Tanzania, including the modern Mbinga District – the setting of the study at 
hand – was designated as a labour reserve area.10 
Although the German colonial government under the Albrecht Freiherr von Rechenberg’s 
governorship (1905–1911) changed its policy of over-relying on plantation agriculture by 
allowing African commercial crop cultivation in what he called a “gradual expansion and 
reform of indigenous agriculture,”11 the southern part remained primarily a labour-supplying 
zone with no strong commercial crop. Its remoteness and transportation challenges could be 
the reasons for the German cessation of experimenting with cash crops in the region. The 
Benedictine missionaries were the only group that introduced coffee and wheat as a commercial 
crop to be spread to their followers.12 In Southern Tanzania, missionaries did not establish large 
commercial farms compared to Northern Tanzania, particularly the Kilimanjaro region.13  
During the British colonial period (1920–1961), coffee as a commercial crop was officially 
introduced in the Mbinga District.14 In comparison with other Arabica coffee-growing areas, 
Mbinga seems to be a latecomer in the arena of coffee production.15 The Mbinga District, 
specifically in the Matengo Highlands,16 experienced a remarkable expansion of coffee 
production from the 1950s onwards due to increasing demand in the world markets. By the end 
 
10 Labour reserves were areas with no strong economic activities such as the production of food and cash crops. 
These were mainly associated with the poor climatic zones such as central Tanzania but also remoteness – a 
result of the absence of better transport. Mbinga was one of them; J. Iliffe, “Agricultural change in Modern 
Tanganyika”, Historical Association of Tanzania, 10, (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1971), 30-33. 
11 J. Iliffe, Tanganyika Under German Rule, 1905-1912, 49-81. 
12 Fr. Ludger Breindl was the first missionary to introduce wheat in Umatengo in 1915 at Litembo; L. Doer, 
O.S.B., (ed.), Peramiho 1898 – 1998: in the Service of Missionary Church, Vol. 1, (Ndanda – Peramiho: 
Benedictine Publications, 1998), 81. 
13 A.J. Kieran, “The Origin of Commercial Arabica Coffee Production in East Africa”, 64-67.  
14 J. Iliffe, The Modern History of Tanganyika, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 278.  
15 Chief Fumba of Kilema (Kilimanjaro) started the coffee field in 1901; A.J. Kieran, “The Origin of Commercial 
Arabica in East Africa”, 61. Coffee as a commercial crop was introduced in the Mbinga District in the 1920s 
under the British colonial government; J. Iliffe, The Modern History of Tanganyika, 287.  
16 The Matengo Highlands is an area with hilly highlands and an altitude range of 2 000 meters maximum, and an 
average annual rainfall between 1 200 and1 400mm. The soil is dark brown to reddish-brown clay loam and 
clay sandy loam with the Hyparrhenia parinari wooded grassland vegetation. All these attributes have made 
it to be a suitable area for growing Arabica coffee; United Republic of Tanzania (URT), Ruvuma Socio-







of British colonial rule in 1961, coffee production had become popular among the African 
smallholder farmers of the Mbinga District. The number of coffee growers increased from eight 
in 1929 to 4 420 in 1952.17 Coffee from the Mbinga District was traded through the co-
operative societies, including the Ngaka society formed in 193418 under the auspice of the 
Ngoni-Matengo Co-operative Union formed in 1936 by the colonial government.19 The amount 
of land under coffee cultivation expanded, mostly under the tenure of the local population since 
there were neither settlers nor coffee plantations in the Mbinga District. Coffee remained the 
most important source of income in the district throughout the colonial period. This thesis, 
among others, seeks to examine the role of the colonial state in the foundation and development 
of the coffee industry in the Mbinga District, Tanzania. 
During the post-colonial period (from 1962 onwards), various new policies were introduced, 
such as the Ujamaa20 policy of 1962 that was cemented by the Arusha Declaration in 1967, 
Villagisation policies (1973–1976)21, the Structural Adjustment Policies of the 1980s, and the 
coffee market liberalisation from the 1994/95 coffee season. These policies had a multi-layered 
impact on the production of coffee in the Mbinga District. The coffee production in the district 
experienced several changes – in both production and marketing. Primary co-operative 
societies and co-operative unions under the Coffee Marketing Board were responsible for 
coffee production (input and credit provision) and marketing between 1962 and 1975. The 
production of coffee stagnated in the 1970s, and the quality of the coffee produced in the 
District declined too. The occurrence of Coffee Berry Disease (CBD)22 that spread in all coffee 
 
17 D. Schmied, Subsistence Cultivation, Market production and Agricultural Development in Southern Tanzania, 
Bayreuth African Studies (Eckhard Breitinger: Bayreuth University, 1989), 72.  
18 J. Iliffe, The Modern History of Tanganyika, 294. 
19 Tanzanian National Archive (TNA), 504/9/8, Coffee, “Marketing of Matengo Native Grown Coffee”, Folio 43; 
S. Ponte, Farmers and Markets in Tanzania: How Policy Reforms Affect Rural Livelihoods in Africa, (Oxford: 
James Currey, 2002), 41. 
20 Ujamaa is a Swahili word that represented a socialist ideology in the post-colonial Tanzania between the 1960s 
and early 1980s; J.K. Nyerere, “Ujamaa –The Basis of African Socialism” in J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and 
Unity/ Uhuru na Umoja: A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1952–65, (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University 
Press, 1966), 162. 
21 Villagisation was the process of forcing people to live in the planned villages for “development” purposes. 
Villagisation was similar to the “collectivization campaigns” as in the Soviet Union 1928–1940, and China 
between 1952 and 1961; H. Holland “Soviet Agricultural with or without collectivization, 1928–1940”, Slavic 
Review, 47 (2), (1988), 203–216; J.Y. Lin, “Collectivization and China’s Agricultural Crisis in 1959–1961”, 
Journal of Political Economy, 98 (6), (1990), 1228-1252. 






producing areas in Tanzania in the 1970s and poor coffee husbandry were among the reasons 
for the decline. This thesis also explores state intervention in the coffee industry and its socio-
economic impact on the smallholder producers in the district. 
On the marketing side, from 1976 to 1983 the co-operatives were replaced by the Coffee 
Authority of Tanzania. However, due to the economic crisis which faced the country between 
the late 1970s and 1985, the co-operatives were re-instated in 1984. The coffee industry in the 
Mbinga District survived through the coffee development programme (1977–1986) that was 
jointly financed by the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Tanzanian government. 
In this respect, this thesis examines the role of the post-colonial state in shaping the trajectory 
of the coffee industry in the Mbinga District between the 1960s and 1990, and its impact on 
the socio-economic aspects of the smallholder coffee producers in the district. Compared to 
other coffee-producing areas in Tanzania, the Mbinga District seemed to be consistent in 
producing coffee even in periods when the world was experiencing a decline in price.23 This 
study is also an attempt to explain the persistence of coffee production in the district. For 
instance, following the collapse of Mbinga Co-operative Union (MBICU) in 1999 and the 
decline of the world coffee price in 2008, coffee producers still embarked on the expansion of 
coffee fields.  
Globally, from the end of the 1980s, the coffee industry experienced many changes. The focus 
was on sustainable coffee production based on organic and eco-friendly production, fair trade 
and the operations of major coffee-trading and branding companies including Nespresso and 
Starbucks.24 The standard, certification, and labelling systems were developed targeting the 
coffee market. The operation of sustainable coffee production focused on economic, social and 
 
23 M. F. Lyakurwa, “The Decline of Coffee Prices and Farmers’ income Diversification Strategies: A Case Study 
of Rombo District in Kilimanjaro Tanzania”, MA Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, (2007); E. Kabwoto, 
“Causes of Decline in Major Crop Production in Bukoba: Banana, Coffee and Tea”, MA Thesis, University 
of Dar es Salaam, (1976); J. Joseph, “Kilimanjaro farmers embrace Vanilla”, The Citizen, Sunday, 22 October, 
2017, available at www.thecitizen.co.tz accessed on 16 April 2018. The north and western coffee-growing 
areas experienced competition from other crops including Sunflower and Vanilla. This, as well as a general 
discouragement of coffee farmers, has led to the uprooting of coffee trees.  
24 D. Giovannuci and F. J. Koekoek, The State of Sustainable Coffee: A Study of Twelve Major Markets, (London 
and Winnipeg: International Institute of Sustainable Development, International Coffee Organization, United 






environmental aspects in the coffee industry. Labels like Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliances, 4C 
(Common Code for Coffee Communities), and Utz dominated this period. This thesis traces 
the involvement of smallholder coffee producers in certification schemes and its socio-
economic impact on their livelihood. 
From 1994 to 2017, Tanzania’s coffee-marketing system was operated through three different 
channels: the internal market where farmers sell their produce at the farm gate to private buyers, 
farmer groups, and co-operatives; through coffee auctions which were conducted weekly at 
Moshi-Kilimanjaro (the headquarter of the Tanzania Coffee Board) where licensed exporters 
bought coffee from suppliers, including farmer groups, co-operatives, and private buyers; and 
through direct export where growers of premium top-grade coffee were allowed to bypass the 
auctions and sell their coffee directly.25 In the 2018/19 season, the coffee-marketing system 
was co-operative-based only with the Agricultural Marketing Cooperative Societies 
(AMCOS), collecting coffee from producers and selling it through auctions in Moshi. Private 
coffee buyers were not allowed to buy from smallholder producers. The coffee free-marketing 
system exposed the co-operative unions and societies to the competition with private coffee 
buyers. This thesis uses the Mbinga Co-operative Union (MBICU) to examine the fluctuating 
fortune of the coffee industry in Tanzania. 
Tanzania has about 265 000 hectares of arable land under coffee cultivation, supporting some 
450 000 households.26 Smallholder farmers with an average of 0,5 hectares contribute over 
90% of the country’s production, while the remaining 10% of coffee comes from the estates.27 
In Tanzania, coffee is produced in three main geographical areas: Kilimanjaro, Arusha, Tanga, 
and Mara in the north; Kigoma and Kagera in the west; and Mbeya, Iringa, and Ruvuma in the 
 
25 www.coffeeboard.or.tz/tzcoffee_%20profile.php, accessed on 22 May 2018. 
26 Tanzania Coffee Board Report available online at www.coffeeboard.or.tz. Accessed on 11 March 2018. 
27 B.D. Parrish, V.A. Luzadis, W.R. Bentley, “What Tanzania’s Coffee Farmers Can Teach the World: A 
Performance-Based Look at the Fair Trade-Free Trade Debate”, Sustainable Development 13, 3, (2005), 179. 
The estates were owned by the European settlers during the colonial period. After independence, particularly 
in 1973, some of the coffee estates were nationalized to be owned by primary societies while the remainder 
were run by the private individuals or companies under the Tanzania Coffee Growers Association; J. Baffes, 







south. Coffee accounted for about $162 million of Tanzania’s export earnings in 201528 and 
during the 2015/16 coffee season, produced a total of 60 188 metric tons of coffee,29 while in 
2017/18, Tanzania produced about 43 625 metric tons of coffee.30 Tanzania exports 90% of its 
coffee, while 10% is consumed locally.31 This shows that the coffee culture in Tanzania 
focused mainly on export and not local consumption. In the International Coffee Organization 
(ICO), Tanzanian coffee was categorised in a group of Mild Arabica, named “Colombian 
Milds”, which comprised of Colombia, Kenya and Tanzania.32 Major markets are Japan and 
Germany (for Arabica), Italy, Belgium, and France (for Robusta). The focus of this thesis is on 
the Mbinga District that annually produces about 10 000 tons Mild Arabica.33  
1.2. Mbinga District: Location and People 
The research for this thesis was conducted in the Mbinga District, one of the six districts in the 
Ruvuma region. Other districts are Namtumbo, Nyasa, Songea Rural, Songea Urban and 
Tunduru. The Mbinga District is situated at the South West of the Region, bordered by the 
Songea District to the East, Nyasa District to the South and West and Ludewa District to the 
north. The district was established in 1963. During the colonial period, the District used to be 
 
28 G. Lamtey, “Coffee Board looks for east in drive to access new markets”, The Citizen, Wednesday, 23 March 
2016, accessed from www.thecitizen.co.tz , on 28 March 2018. 
29 Tanzania Coffee Board, “Midterm Evaluation Report of the Tanzania Coffee Industry Development Strategy 
2011–2021” (May 2017), available at www.coffeeboard.or.tz. Accessed on 11 March 2018. 
30 In 2017/18 coffee production seemed to decline. One of the reasons was the withdrawal of some of the 
smallholder coffee producers from coffee production; S. Maghimbi, “Recent changes in crop patterns in the 
Kilimanjaro region of Tanzania: The decline of coffee and the rise of maize and rice”, African Study 
Monographs, Suppl. 35, (2007), 73-83. 
31 G. Sembony, “Tanzanians only drink 10 percent of coffee grown locally”, The Citizen, Monday, 6 June 2016, 
available at www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Tanzanians-only-drink-10-per-cent-of-coffee-grown-
locally/1840340-3234226-7m38dxz/index.html, accessed 22 May, 2018. 
32 Coffee is divided into Arabica and Robusta species (Coffea arabica and Coffea canephora). The coffee cherry 
can be processed through ‘dry’ or ‘wet’ (washed) methods. The dry method involves the drying of the ripened 
coffee cherries to get ‘estate coffee’ or buni (a Swahili word), while the wet method involves the pulping, 
fermenting, washing, and drying of the coffee cherries to get ‘parchment coffee’. Both ‘estate’ and ‘parchment’ 
coffees pass through a curing process to get ‘a clean or green coffee’ for export or roasting for local 
consumption. The Arabica coffee produced by the wet method is called ‘Mild Arabica’ and ‘Hard Arabica’ 
results from dry methods. Brazil and Ethiopia are the major producers of the Hard Arabica, termed as 
‘Brazilian Naturals’. Robusta coffee is mainly processed through dry methods. The International Coffee 
Organization has divided coffee into Colombian Milds, other Milds, Brazilian Naturals, and Robusta; 
www.ico.org/coffee_prices.asp?section=statistics accessed 22 May 2018; J.G. Brown, “Agro-industry 
Profiles: Coffee”, Economic Development Institute (EDI) Working Papers. Washington DC. World Bank, 
1991, 3-7.  
33 United Republic of Tanzania (URT), Tanzania Coffee Industry Development Strategy 2011- 2021, (Tanzania 






part of the Songea District in the former southern province. After the independence of Tanzania 
in 1961, new administrative regions, as well as Regional Commissioners, were created under 
State Circular No. 14 of 1962. In 1963, the Ruvuma region was made a full separate region 
with its headquarters at Songea Urban, and Mbinga became one of its districts.34 In 2012, the 
lakeshore area of Mbinga was reduced to create the Nyasa District.  
The Mbinga District covers an area of 7 585 square km, divided into six divisions, 48 wards, 
167 villages and 1 086 hamlets with 75 499 households.35 The district operates under two 
Councils: The Mbinga Town Council consists of one division (namely Mbinga Urban) with 19 
wards in a 904 km2 area, and the Mbinga District Council consists of five divisions, namely 
Hagati (1 010 km2), Kigonsera (1 876 km2), Mbuji (878 km2), Mkumbi (913 km2), and 
Namswea (1 924 km2) with 29 wards.36 In both Councils, with the exception of Kigonsera and 
Namswea who produces coffee in low quantity, the remaining divisions are the main coffee-
growing areas in the Mbinga District and are commonly referred to as the Matengo Highlands. 
This is because coffee does not grow everywhere – it requires certain climatic and topographic 
conditions. 
According to the 2012 National Population and Settlement Census, the district has a total 
population of 353 683 people consisting of 172 402 males and 181 281 females.37 The district 
is sparsely populated, except in the Matengo Highlands where there is a high population density 
of 118 people per km2 compared to the district population density of 48 people per km2. The 
main ethnic groups in the district are Matengo, Ngoni, and Nindi. The Matengo are mainly 
found in the Matengo Highlands and a few in the lowlands. The Ngoni and Nindi, who are few, 
are found in the lowlands of the Mbinga Town Division (Kihungu and Mpepai Wards) and also 
in Kigonsera and Namswea Divisions.38 
 
34 University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM), Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land-use Planning, “Economic 
Report of Ruvuma Region”, Research Report 36, (1971), 1-2. 
35 Mbinga District Council (MDC), “The Rolling Strategic Plan 2015/2016 -2019/2020”, December 2014, 1. 
36 (MDC), “The Rolling Strategic Plan”, 2. 
37 United Republic of Tanzania (URT), 2012 Population and Housing Census: Population Distribution by 
Administrative Areas, (Dar es Salaam: National Bureau of Statistics, 2013), 99. 







Figure 1: Mbinga District: Administrative and Coffee-producing Areas39 
 






1.2.1. Climate and Agro-ecological Zone 
The rainfall pattern in the district is unimodal40 with an average annual rainfall of 1 224mm.41 
The wet season extends from December to April leaving the rest of the year dry. The growing 
period extends over six to seven months with the exception of Hagati Plateau, which extends 
up to nine months. The onset of the rains is reliable and begins typically at the end of 
November. The average maximum temperature is between 29 °C and 31 °C, while the average 
minimum is between 19 °C and 23 °C. Sometimes the temperature in Matengo Highlands goes 
down to 13 °C during the cold season in June, July, and August. 
Mbinga District is divided into two agro-ecological zones, namely Matengo Highlands and the 
Lower Plateau. The Matengo Highlands are divided into four sub-zones namely the Mountain 
Area, the Hagati Plateau, and the North and South Rolling Hills. The North and South Rolling 
Hills are the two largest agro-ecological zones in the Matengo Highlands. The elevation lies 
between 1 100 metres and 1 400 metres above sea level. Two-thirds of the area is devoted to 
agriculture; the remaining area is mainly wooded grasslands, degraded Miombo Woodlands 
and Eucalyptus plantations on top of deforested hills. The coffee-growing area is concentrated 
on such hill slopes. Other crops grown in this area include maize, finger millet, sweet potatoes, 
beans, bananas, wheat, and tobacco. In the South Rolling Hills, only one-third of the area is 
cultivated, leaving other areas with wooded grassland and secondary Miombo woodlands. The 
average altitude of this zone is 1 200 metres above sea level, slightly lower than that of the 
North Rolling Hills. There are more flat valleys in the South Rolling Hills where finger millet 
is produced by clearing pit cultivation, ridge, or ridge cultivation for maize and beans. Coffee 
growing is not common in the South Rolling Hills because of unreliable rainfall and higher 
temperatures.  
The mountain zone is characterized by a strongly dissected mountain range and narrow valleys 
where the elevation ranges from 1 400 to 2 000 metres above the sea level. The average annual 
 
40 The annual distribution of the rainfall has one peak – between December and April. 






rainfall is between 1 200 and 1 400mm.42 The original vegetation was most probably mountain 
forest which was destroyed except for a small forest reserve. This is the most densely populated 
area in the Matengo Highlands. The area is called the Heart of Matengo Highlands where 
people are involved in a unique grass fallow system known as “Ngoro” or the Matengo Pits 
system, which is essentially a tied ridge system with strict crop rotation. The system ensures 
that, during heavy rains, water is trapped in these pits and seeps into the ground, thereby 
minimizing runoff and soil erosion. The system also ensures soil fertility. The Matengo 
Highlands is the primary coffee-growing area in the district. 
The Hagati Plateau is a dissected plateau with an average elevation of 1 250 metres. It is located 
between the mountain zone and an escarpment facing down to the Livingstone Mountains. This 
area is quite similar to the mountain area. Unlike other areas where deep red soils are common, 
the soils of Hagati Plateau are shallow soils developed in granite. The area is favourable for 
coffee, maize, beans, finger millet, wheat, and sweet potato production.  
The Lower Plateau occupies the eastern side of the North and South Rolling Hills. Altitude 
ranges from 900 to 1 200 metres above sea level. Further east to the Ruvuma River valley it is 
almost flat. The area is covered with Miombo woodland. The major crops grown in the zone 
include maize, beans, and finger millet.  
 
42 United Republic of Tanzania (URT), Ruvuma Socio-economic Profile, (Dar es Salaam: The planning 






1.2.2. Mbinga during the German Colonial Period (the 1890s to 1920)  
Following the Berlin Conference of 1884–85, Tanganyika was proclaimed as German East 
Africa.43 The period from 1885 to 1890 was a period of “theoretical administration”44 with the 
German’s interests coastal-centred as previously explained. This attitude changed after the 
outbreak of coastal resistance in 1889, and they extended their administration and occupation 
inland. Before the German occupation, the southern part of the territory (the modern-day 
Songea and Mbinga Districts) were commonly referred to as Ungoni and Umatengo 
respectively. The Songea District was established in 1905, after the German occupation in 
1897.45 
In the Matengo area, the German colonial government divided the area into two parts, one 
under Tukuyu (Neu-Langerburg) and the other under the Songea District. The German 
occupation of the Matengo area did not go without resistance, especially with the introduction 
of forced labour and taxation. The most memorable incident was that of March 1902, when the 
inhabitants refused to pay taxes and burnt down the school built by the Benedictine Fathers at 
Litembo.46 The German colonial government sent a punitive expedition to Litembo, and the 
area was placed under colonial rule from 1904. In 1905 both Ungoni and Umatengo formed 
the Songea District. During the Maji Maji War (1905–1907), Matengo did not participate as 
 
43 The idea of an international conference to settle territorial disputes arising from European activities in the Congo 
region was first suggested by Portugal out of fear of being pushed out of Africa. This idea was later taken up 
by Otto von Bismarck (a German Chancellor who convened the meeting after sounding opinions of other 
powers) was encouraged to bring it about. The Conference was held in Berlin between 15 November 1884 and 
26 February 1885. Two articles of the Berlin Act namely Article 34 as a doctrine of spheres of influence, and 
Article 35 as a doctrine of effective occupation, facilitated the colonization process in Africa. The German’s 
sphere of influences was later negotiated through bilateral treaties, particularly the Anglo-German treaties 
between 1885 and 1893 that set the recognition of both British and German colonies in East Africa. G.N. 
Uzoigwe, “European partition and conquest of Africa: an overview”, A. Boahen, (ed.), General History of 
Africa, VII, Africa under Colonial Domination 1880 – 1935, (Heinemann, California: UNESCO, 1985), 31-
35; J. Iliffe, The Modern History of Tanganyika, Chapter 4.  
44 J. Iliffe, Tanganyika Under German Rule 1905 – 1912, 11. 
45 The Ngoni chiefs, led by Nkosi Mlamira Gama and chief (Nduna) Songea Mbano, were forced to surrender 
their authority to German colonial power in 1897. The negotiations turned into military occupation whereby 
five Ngoni nobles were killed by German military officers during the occupation in 1897 in the so-called 
“Boma massacre”; Fr. E. Ebner OSB, History of Wangoni and their Origin in the South African Bantu Tribes, 
(Benedictine Publications Ndanda-Peramiho, 1989). 







their neighbour Ngoni did, probably because of the historical enmity that existed between the 
two groups.47 They continued producing food crops which later were sold to Ngoni at inflated 
prices during the famine in the aftermath of the war. 
Throughout the German colonial period, there was no dominant cash crop in the Matengo area. 
Africans had to provide labour in the colonial plantations in coastal areas or worked as porters 
in colonial offices for cash to pay taxes. The First World War marked the end of German rule, 
and in 1919, the British occupied the territory. It was during the British colonial period that 
coffee was introduced as a commercial crop in the Mbinga District. Ever since coffee has 
remained the primary source of income among smallholder producers in the district. 
1.3. Literature Review 
This thesis intends to reconstruct and analyse a socio-economic history of coffee production in 
the Mbinga District, Tanzania, between the 1920s and 2015. In doing so, this thesis explores 
specifically firstly, the role of the colonial state in the establishment of coffee production in the 
Mbinga District, secondly the influence of co-operatives on coffee production and marketing, 
thirdly, the influence of the post-colonial state on the coffee industry, fourthly, the coffee 
industry during the liberalized economic period, and finally, the role of women in the coffee 
industry. This section provides a review of the mentioned themes. 
The existing literature on agricultural change in Tanzania, especially on coffee production, has 
focused on northern and western coffee-producing zones.48 Many scholars have been attracted 
to the two zones for three reasons. Firstly, coffee cultivation was initially concentrated in the 
western and northern part of Tanzania as Robusta coffee is the indigenous crop in tropical 
 
47 Wangoni fought with Matengo several times but the most remembered war was that of 1885 whereby Wangoni 
under Mharule send their warriors to fight with Matengo and chief Makita (Matengo) was killed; Fr. E. Ebner, 
OSB, History of Wangoni, 103-104.  
48 The northern zone represents Kilimanjaro, Arusha, and Mara producing Arabica, while the western zone 
represents Kagera regions producing Robusta. Some of the literature on coffee includes A. Eckert, “Comparing 
Coffee Production in Cameroon and Tanganyika, c. 1900 to 1960s”, in W.G. Clarence-Smith and S. Topik, 
(eds.), The Global Coffee Economy, 286-311, (focusing in Kilimanjaro region); K. R. Curtis, “Smaller is 
Better: A Consensus of Peasants and Bureaucrats in colonial Tanganyika”, in W.G. Clarence-Smith and S. 
Topik, (eds.), The Global Coffee Economy, 312-334, (focusing in Kagera region); B. Weiss, Sacred Trees, 







Africa, and was believed to be introduced in north-western Tanzania by Bunyoro conquerors 
more than 300 years ago.49 Arabica coffee has been cultivated in the northern zone 
(Kilimanjaro) from the end of the 19th century by Germany missionaries and later by Africans, 
compared to the southern zone where coffee was first introduced in the 1920s. Secondly, the 
existence of large coffee estates in the northern part with well-documented records attracted 
more scholarship than the south where smallholder coffee producers dominated it. Lastly, the 
geographical area plays a more significant role in either attracting or discouraging scholarship. 
For instance, the Mbinga District is in the southern part of the country with a distance of more 
than 1 200 kilometres from Dar es Salaam (locus of power, business and transport centre in 
Tanzania). The major transport means is by road, which takes almost 20 hours compared to the 
northern and western part accessible via air transport. Distance and transport challenges were 
some of the reasons for the German colonial government to withdraw from cash crop 
experiments in the Mbinga District. Hence, the literature on coffee production has focused on 
the northern and western parts of the country, including Kilimanjaro, Arusha, and Kagera. 
Consequently, little was known about the Arabica coffee from the Mbinga District. The few 
scholars who wrote about coffee production in Tanzania, in general, were not historians but 
anthropologists and economists. Simon Mbilinyi’s study in the 1970s examined the economics 
of peasant coffee production in Tanzania.50 Mbilinyi’s focus was on economic diversification 
possibilities in the coffee-growing areas to maximize farm income. The study was based on an 
economic analysis of peasant production and not a historical analysis of coffee production in 
the Mbinga District as this study does. This thesis acknowledges the different regional 
trajectories of coffee production and economic diversification in coffee-growing areas in 
Tanzania.  
Brad Weiss,51 an anthropologist, focused on coffee as a symbol of value and power among the 
Haya people in north-western Tanzania. Weiss uses the Sacred tree52 to show how coffee was 
used in cultural rituals before becoming a commercial commodity. The Haya people had tried 
 
49 TNA/266/ABOACOF Vol. VIII, Coffee Board of Tanganyika. 
50 S. Mbilinyi, Economics of Peasants Coffee Production in Tanzania, (Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1976). 







to retain their values and order that was threatened by the global forces. For instance, during 
the colonial period, the rationalisation of the gender-based space of agriculture between the 
banana zone for perennial crops managed by men and grassland for annual food crop 
production managed by women lead to resistance from the Haya. They wanted to protect the 
social structure of their labour. As the colonial cash crop, coffee became a centre of conflict 
between the Catholic missionaries, colonial government, and coastal traders whom they 
believed to be a threat to the growth of Christianity among Africans. The book is vital to this 
study because it provides some cultural conceptions on coffee among Africans and how coffee 
values changed over time. However, Weiss’s work is the product of a 1980s interview he 
conducted with the use of the White Fathers missionaries as an archival source while ignoring 
the use of other archival sources, including the German and British colonial archival record. 
Hence it lacks a historical analysis of coffee production. The work is based much on the role 
of co-operative unions without taking into consideration that the globalized coffee market went 
hand in hand with market deregulation by allowing private coffee buyers in Tanzania since 
1994.  
During the colonial period, the state has been viewed by historians as an institution for ensuring 
production and accumulation of capital. It was the role of the state to use its power in creating 
and sustaining capitalist relations of production. The state mobilized and controlled labour 
supply in the colonial economic units. This was common in all settler colonies but also in non-
settler colonies like Tanganyika. B.J. Berman and J.M. Lonsdale’s work explores how the 
colonial state in Kenya acted as an apparatus for “reproduction and accumulation of capital and 
political reproduction”.53 Though this work focussed on colonial Kenya, it is important to this 
thesis as, in colonial Tanganyika, the southern region where the Mbinga District is situated, 
was designated as a labour reserve supplying labourers in plantations and mines. This thesis 
demonstrates the transformation from labour reserve to peasant production. Kenneth R. Curtis54 
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focused on a conflictual relationship between the colonial state and coffee producers over the 
implementation of rules and regulations. By using the Haya society in north-western Tanzania, 
Curtis shows how the coffee growers refused the coffee rules in 1937 and 1953.  
The existing literature on co-operatives in colonial Tanzania has focused on the debates on the 
dynamics of the colonial marketing system focusing on the relationship between the state, co-
operatives and local politics. Scholars such as Susan Rogers55 and Kenneth R. Curtis56 have 
focused on the colonial coffee-marketing systems in northern and north-western Tanzania, 
respectively. Susan Rogers focused on the role of the colonial state in the decline of the first 
African co-operative society Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association (KNPA) (1925–1931) 
and the introduction of the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU) in 1933. Similarly, 
Curtis stressed the colonial co-operation and co-optation of the African coffee association in 
north-western Tanzania. Both studies asserted that the state intervention in the development of 
the peasant co-operatives had an influence on the colonial crop-marketing systems. Studies on 
Southern Tanzania have focused on the tobacco-marketing system in the Songea District. 
Patrick Redmond57 and Hebert H. Ndomba58 have focused on the Ngoni-Matengo Marketing 
Union Limited. While Redmond focused on the colonial marketing system of tobacco, Ndomba 
went further analysing the complicated relationship between the state and marketing bodies 
including Ngoni-Matengo Co-operative Marketing Union (NGOMAT) and Songea Native 
Tobacco Board in controlling peasant tobacco production. These studies, however, did not 
explore the dynamics of the relationship between NGOMAT and the coffee co-operative 
societies as this thesis does. Therefore, drawing from the experiences of both northern and 
north-western, as well as the Songea District, this thesis arguably examines the rise of co-
operative societies and its dynamic relationship to the coffee growers in the Mbinga District 
during both the colonial and post-colonial period.  
 
55 S.G. Rogers, “The Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association: Administrative Responses to Chagga Initiatives in 
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Tanganyika”, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 25, 3, (1992), 505-538. 
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Andrew Coulson examined state influence on peasant agriculture in Tanzania through different 
policies.59 Coulson used the political, economic approach to indicate a conflict of interest 
between peasants and the state. Various policies between the 1940s and 1970s have been 
highlighted. These policies included the groundnut schemes of 1940 to 1950s, the white 
settlement programme, land and conservation schemes of the 1950s and progressive farming 
policy and settlement schemes. He also points out the post-independence policies such as the 
Ujamaa Policy of 1967 and Villagisation in 1969-1976. These policies had a wide-ranging 
impact on the establishment and development of peasant production in which coffee featured. 
Coulson also explores the role of the state in the development and failure of Ujamaa and Self-
reliance in Tanzania.60 The use of top-down initiatives and force were among the reasons for 
the failure of Ujamaa and the Villagisation Policy in Tanzania. However, Coulson’s articles 
focus exclusively on the role of the state’s policies on agricultural change while ignoring the 
peasants’ reactions to state control. This thesis demonstrates the socio-economic impact of 
these policies with a specific focus on coffee production and marketing in the Mbinga District. 
This thesis goes beyond state-peasant dichotomy by employing the concept of coffee 
landscapes, hereafter “coffeescapes”, to demonstrate the influence of coffee during the 
implementation of both Ujamaa and Villagisation Policies in the Mbinga District.  
In post-colonial Tanzania, the state was an instrument that extracted surpluses from peasant 
production. Deborah Bryceson’s article explores the relationship between peasant commodity 
production and the state in post-colonial Tanzania.61 Peasant production is an important sector 
for national economic development. The state acquires the foreign exchange reserves by 
exporting cash crops. Also, peasants produce food for the non-food producing population. The 
state extracts surpluses from peasants through the imposition of crop levies, taxes and price 
control over cash crops. However, Bryceson’s work emphasizes the unequal relationship 
between peasants and state. This thesis extends on Bryceson’s analysis to explore the socio-
economic impact of the relationship between the state and smallholder coffee producers in the 
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Mbinga District from the colonial period to 2015. Furthermore, Andreas Eckert,62 a historian, 
focused on the role of the state during the colonial and early years of independence in 
controlling peasant production and the use of co-operatives as a conduit of channelling the 
interests of the state to the peasants. Eckert argued on the continuity of elements of colonial 
state control over peasant production in the post-colonial period. This thesis extends the debate 
of the state monopolies through crop parastatals, including the Coffee Authority of Tanzania 
(CAT) after the abolition of co-operatives in the 1970s.  
Moreover, coffee is one of the most regulated crops in the world. This has been revealed 
through the operation of the co-operatives and Tanzania Coffee Board as the major marketing 
bodies before the economic liberalisation in the 1990s. Most of the economists focus on the 
impact of the coffee market reforms on market structure, policies that show market 
performance and price volatility on the Tanzanian coffee industry.63 These studies show that 
the reforms have led to the deterioration of coffee quality due to deregulation of the marketing 
processes, the uncompetitive nature of the coffee auction, a marketing shift from the public to 
private sectors and increasing capacity in coffee processing. Anna Temu et al. examines the 
impact of the liberalisation regarding the coffee auction process in northern Tanzania.64 It is 
evident that the participation of private coffee buyers in both domestic and export level had 
contributed to the decline of the competitive coffee auction. These scholars did not focus on 
private coffee buyers who were solely participating in domestic markets. Neither did they 
explore the competition between the co-operatives and private coffee buyers at the domestic 
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level as this thesis attempts to do. Brian Cooksey65 and Stefano Ponte66 examines state 
intervention as a reason for the failure of liberalisation in export crops. Their focus on the 
failures of the economic reforms in northern Tanzania ignored the success aspects of the 
reforms. In this regard, this thesis explores both the success and challenges of the co-existence 
of private coffee enterprises and co-operative unions in the Mbinga District, Southern 
Tanzania.  
The 1990s economic reforms coincided with the breakdown of the International Coffee 
Agreement (ICA) in 1989. The ICA was the price stabilisation organ in the international coffee 
market through the quota system. Its decline exposed the coffee producers to price vulnerability 
as they shifted the coffee control power from the public to private agencies. This shifting of 
power resulted in the decline of the coffee price in the international market. Poverty increased 
among coffee producers in the world. The responses to these changes vary from one country 
to another or even from one district to another within the same country. For instance, in 
Colombia, the breakdown of the ICA was associated with increased poverty and the failure of 
the National Coffee Federation to provide economic stability and social services. As a result, 
it created the opportunity for illegal armed actors, cultivation of illegal crops and drug 
trafficking. There were increasing incidences of homicides, kidnappings, attacks by armed 
actors and illegal transport of weapons in the coffee-growing area.67 This kind of response 
shows that there is a relationship between economic underdevelopment and economical as well 
as political decision-making.  
The existing literature shows that the reactions towards the decline of the coffee price in 
Tanzania vary from one coffee producing area to another. In Kilimanjaro and Bukoba there 
was the conversion of coffee lands to other crops. An anthropological study by Sam 
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Maghimbi68 in the Kilimanjaro region, shows the decline of coffee producers in favour of maize 
and rice. In the Mbinga District, the situation was different. People have continued cultivating 
coffee despite its price decline. This thesis, among other things, seeks to explore the 
peculiarities of the history of coffee production in the Mbinga District in comparison with other 
coffee-producing regions in Tanzania.  
Scholars such as David G. Mhando69 and Ryugo Korasaki70 have studied the coping strategies 
among the smallholder coffee producers in the Mbinga District. Korasaki studied the multiple 
uses of small-scale valley bottomland resulting from socio-economic and environmental forces 
in the Mbinga District. The study focuses on one village of Kitanda.71 On the other hand, the 
study by Mhando was based on the two villages of Kindimba and Kitanda.72 Both studies focus 
on the coffee producer’s responses to the decline of the coffee prices and the collapse of 
MBICU in 1996. The responses ranged from the expansion of the coffee fields to the 
diversifications of the income-generating sources. However, the two studies are silent on the 
period before the 1990s and beyond 2003. Their conclusions were based on oral interviews 
with no backup of other historical accounts such as archival sources. As a result, they lack 
historical continuity. The two scholars also make certain generalisations. Korasaki, for 
instance, states: “in the past, coffee production was supported by the MBICU which provided 
agricultural inputs and marketed coffee”.73 This generalisation ignores the dynamics of coffee 
marketing in the district from the 1920s to 1989 (when MBICU was established). This thesis 
found that Matengo coffee farmers have been trading their coffee through various marketing 
boards which have been changing from time to time depending on the economic and political 
policies. A study based on one village cannot be taken as the general trend for the whole district. 
This thesis uses both archival and oral sources to challenge the generalisation tendency and to 
explore the socio-economic history of coffee production in Mbinga District from the 1920s to 
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2015 focusing on the major coffee-growing areas of the Matengo Highlands. Most of their 
respondents were men whom they claim were the majority of people involved in coffee 
production and marketing in the Matengo society.74 By doing so, the studies fail to give a 
nuanced analysis of the gender dynamics among coffee farmers as this thesis will attempt to 
demonstrate in Chapter Six. 
Some ecological studies have focused on how coffee production affects the ability to maintain 
forest cover or on the conservation of biodiversity. For instance, Emily Benton et al.’s study in 
Oaxaca in Mexico shows the historical transformation of coffee landscapes and its impact on 
tree biodiversity.75 The natural-human system framework was used in examining the impact of 
smallholder coffee producer’s responses to the changes in coffee price and policies. As a result, 
the high price and supportive policies both at national and international levels, have stimulated 
the conversion of agricultural fields and forests into coffee farms. However, in the absence of 
supportive environments, the coffee farmers abandoned the coffee farms or converted to annual 
agricultural fields.76 However, the study ignores the outcomes of management practices that 
increase small producers’ income, such as organic and agroforestry coffee production. 
Although the study was conducted in Mexico and was based on social and quantitative 
ecological methods, it gives insights on how smallholder coffee producers respond to the 
market forces and the possible impacts on the environment. 
Coffee production has been considered traditionally as a “man’s crop”. Consequently, women’s 
participation in the coffee economy has been given less attention in the current scholarship. 
The idea of crop separateness was presented by Ester Boserup in 1970.77 According to her, the 
women performed most of the agricultural activities in food production, hence “female 
farming” systems. The women’s labour declined with the shift from cultivation to the 
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permanent agricultural system. Other scholars such as Jane Guyer78 and Candice Bradley79 
joined the conversation on criticising the idea of the decline of women’s labour due to 
mechanisation in agriculture. While Guyer showed the flexibility of women in food-crop 
farming, Bradley argued on the increasing women’s labour due to mechanisation. They all 
agreed on the aspect of women as food-crop producers. 
Other scholars had categorised crops as either men’s or women’s crop. Paul Sillitoe, the 
anthropologist, studied the division of crops among the Wola community in Papua Guinea.80 
Crops were divided as female (wiy) or male (hae) based on the erectness or recumbency. The 
erect crops, such as banana and sugarcane, were “men’s crops” while hibiscus and tobacco 
were “women’s crops”. Sweet potatoes (creepy crop) was a staple. As a result, sweet potatoes 
were “men’s crops”. Therefore, a crop was termed as a “man’s crop” due to its importance. 
Gisela Geisler,81 in responding, examined the validity of the separateness as to cash crop and 
food crop. She argued that what separated food crop from cash crop had, in fact, nothing to do 
with the nature of the crop or with gender division of labour, fields, or land, but with what 
appeared to be a gender division of control”.82 According to her, it was the control of the 
income or surplus of the produced crop that defined whose crop it was. This thesis draws from 
the Giesler analysis of the division of gender control over the income to demonstrate the 
women’s participation in the coffee-marketing system over time.  
 Furthermore, in Ghana in West Africa, Martina Padmanabhan83 wrote about the making and 
unmaking of the new crops based on the cultural belief of gender roles. For instance, when 
new, improved cowpeas were introduced in northern Ghana, it was assigned as men’s crop. 
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The reason was the need for chemical spray in which men owns the knowledge. Moreover, 
Alastair Orr et al.84, attributed the division of men’s or women’s crop to the value of the crop 
at the market. Cotton had high market prices. Based in Zambia groundnuts was women’s crop 
because of its low price, while cotton was termed as men’s crop due to the high price at the 
market. The commercialisation of groundnuts in Zambia created conflict between men and 
women over its control. However, this thesis draws from these scholars and goes beyond these 
dichotomies of men’s or women’s crop since the assignment of a new crop to a particular 
gender differs from one cultural setting to the other. The Mbinga District presents different 
settings in this regard. Coffee has been produced mainly for export and not as part of the food 
crop. The cultural settings had allowed some of the women, albeit a few to penetrate what was 
claimed to be men’s domain. However, with the changing political economy, women have been 
able to resist and even manipulate male dominance. Therefore, the argument over man’s crop 
should not be understated.  
However, this thesis suggests that irrespective of the scale of production, the role of women in 
the coffee economy should not be underestimated in historical scholarship. Coffee production 
is a labour-intensive activity. Globally women have been engaging in the coffee economy in 
production, processing and exporting. In some cases, they have played an important role in the 
state revolutions that lead to a fundamental changes through associations and unions.85 Also, 
they have been performing unpaid labour and even when paid, they get less compared to men. 
Despite their role in coffee production, women are often excluded when it comes to production 
benefits and decision-making. Heather Fowler-Salamini’s study in Veracruz, Mexico, shows 
how women were paid low wages compared to men. This was also revealed in 1850 when 
women workers in the coffee plantation in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) were paid half the men’s 
salary.86 
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Elizabeth Dore’s study in Nicaragua explains how patriarchal authority was exercised through 
the debt peonage system whereby cash was received in advance, and in return, one had to work 
in coffee estates during the harvest season.87 Through the debt peonage system, men could use 
a wife and children as a peonage when signing the contract with the coffee estate owner. On 
the contrary, women were not allowed to receive cash or sign contracts without their husbands’ 
permission.88 However, Dore’s study exclusively focused on the coffee estates where labourers 
were employed and being paid. This thesis focuses on gender role dynamics among smallholder 
coffee producers. 
Traditionally, in most patriarchal African societies where land belongs to men, women have 
been considered as food producers for household consumption while men have been regarded 
as the breadwinners. For instance, in the Santa region of Cameroon, coffee production, being 
the primary source of family income, was seen as the men’s occupation.89 The 1980s economic 
liberalisation affected some changes in the male dominance of cash crops by allowing women 
to own land and by commercialising food crops. Similarly, Patrick Mbatura’s90 study on Nyeri 
Kenya shows that women became economically more powerful than their male counterparts in 
the 1990s. A. Tibaijuka,91 however, focused on the agricultural structural change in the Kagera 
region in Tanzania where men began to cultivate horticultural products on the grassland areas 
that were traditionally used by women for food-crop production. This thesis draws from this 
experience to show that women in the Mbinga District failed to strive and replace men’s control 
over the coffee economy despite the economic crisis.  
Studies show that, in the Mbinga District, land is owned by men and the division of labour on 
both food and cash crop are complementary. The coffee cultivation supports the ngolo system 
(food-crop farming system) to remain economically viable. Nives Kinunda focused on the 
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negotiation of women farmers’ labour between women farmers, the state, and society.92 
Although Kinunda’s study shows the historical dynamism of women farmers’ labour-power in 
the southern highland of Tanzania in various historical epochs, it focuses more on the general 
women’s labour power with little emphasis on cash crops. However, this thesis explores the 
role of women in coffee production with a specific focus on their involvement in the production 
and marketing from the 1920s to 2015. 
Coffee certification schemes that emerged globally in the late 1980s have stimulated women’s 
participation in the coffee industry. Studies show that the number of women in the coffee 
industry has increased in Mesoamerica.93 In African coffee-producing countries, more 
emphasis is recently placed on the empowerment of women through various sustainable coffee-
production programmes, including Fair Trade and Utz Certification. Eveline Dijkdrenth94, 
Annamrie G. Kormelinck,95 and Felix M. zu Selhausen96, examine the participation of women 
in the coffee co-operatives in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda, respectively. In these three 
countries, women were facing the challenge of becoming a member of a co-operative, since 
one of the criteria was land ownership. Social and cultural norms have classified land 
ownership as a man’s domain, and this has also contributed to the co-operatives being regarded 
as men’s domain. However, the three studies focus on the co-operative level and, more 
specifically, the introduction of coffee-certification programmes, while ignoring the historical 
involvement of women in coffee production in different historical periods. This thesis traces 
the historical gender role dynamics in coffee production in the Mbinga District, by showing 
the historical roots of the exclusion or inclusion of women in different activities in the coffee 
industry. 
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Historians had written very little on coffee production (Arabica) in the period before 1963, 
during which Mbinga was part of the Songea District. Most of the studies on coffee in the 
Mbinga District have focused either on the colonial period or the post-colonial period. For 
instance, in 1993, Osmund M. Kapinga conducted a study in the Mbinga District, focusing on 
the impact of colonial commodity production on pre-capitalist social formations. The study 
shows how both the German and British colonial governments introduced various crops, such 
as in the Ruvuma region, which included sugarcane, cotton, citrus fruits, tobacco, and wheat. 
Although these crops failed, the colonisers managed, to some extent, to incorporate the 
Matengo people into cash-crops production by introducing coffee production in the Mbinga 
District. Kapinga’s study shows that colonial cash-crop production initiated the transition of 
people in the Matengo Highlands from pre-capitalist to capitalist production relations. 
However, the focus was confined to the social formation, specifically from 1885 to 1960.97 On 
the contrary, this thesis focuses on coffee, which is the main cash crop in the Mbinga District 
from the 1920s to 2015.  
Furthermore, Yustina Komba’s study98 examined the socio-economic impact of coffee 
production in the district, covering the period from 1950 to 1990. Komba used a political-
economic approach to link the coffee production and socio-economic status of the people in 
the Mbinga District. This author’s previous thesis does not give enough information on coffee 
production before the 1950s and after the 1990s. The study solely focused on the Mbinga 
District while this thesis, among other things, assesses the similarities and peculiarities of the 
history of coffee production in the Mbinga District in comparison with other coffee-producing 
regions in Tanzania. It also comprises the wider range of sources of information on coffee 
production since 1920, accessed from the National Archives of Tanzania (secretariat files) and 
in the East Africana Section of the University of Dar es Salaam. Also, archival sources from 
the National Record Centre (NRC), Tanzania Coffee Board, Tanzania Coffee Research 
Institute (TACRI), Ministry of Agricultural and Co-operatives, private coffee companies and 
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the Co-operative Union Headquarters which the researcher did not consult during her study. 
The combination of both new archival and oral sources enabled this thesis to revisit the findings 
of the MA study by exploring the history of coffee production in the district from its onset to 
2015. 
With regards to the historical writings, Tanzanian agrarian historiography has been categorised 
into four phases, namely colonial, nationalist, Marxist, and post-Marxist historiographies. The 
colonial historiography dominated the period from the 1930s to the 1950s. This was the phase 
characterised by consolidation of colonialism and its ideology. It was the phase full of 
racialised arguments trying to maintain white superiority over Africans. The central argument 
was the denial of the existence of African history. The studies in this phase focused on African 
culture, local languages, ethnic groups, as well as subsistence agriculture. Scholars who 
dominated this phase were mainly anthropologists such as C. Seligman99, and R. Coupland100 
whom both denied the existence of history in Africa. The history that was produced from this 
phase explained the activities of Europeans in Africa. Under this phase, African agency was 
invisible. It brought about new developments in African scholarship, starting at the end of the 
1950s and gaining momentum in the 1960s.101 
The nationalist tradition, rather than Africanist historiography, was developed and maintained 
as an ideological response to colonial historiography.102 The focus was on political 
developments and centralisation. Much effort was made in the recovery of what was termed 
“African initiative”,103 centred on political power to organise around and control the influence 
of nature. The nationalist phase was dominated by mass nationalist movements with the aim of 
ending colonial exploitation. For instance, Isaria N. Kimambo, Arnold Temu, and Steven 
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Feierman demonstrated the African past through their works by stressing the pre-colonial state 
formations, long-distance trade, the peasant protest over colonial exploitation, and the 
emergence of African rural capitalism.104 However, a concentration of nationalist writings on 
political developments, power, and leaders failed to address economic problems in the 
societies. As a result, in the late 1970s, the materialist emerged. 
The materialist historiography dominated the third phase. The “underdevelopment” and 
Marxist tendencies resurfaced in historical writings in Tanzania in the 1970s. Scholars such as 
Walter Rodney wrote on the root cause of African economic underdevelopment as the 
integration to the world capitalist system under which surpluses were extracted through 
unequal exchange systems.105 Other scholars, such as Martin J. Kaniki, A. Sheriff, and Issa 
Shivji, also focused on the root cause of underdevelopment and class struggle between the 
exploiters and exploited.106 Materialist historiography marked the turning point of peasant 
studies in Tanzania. This was the period where scholars discussed the concepts of class, labour 
relations and modes of production in agrarian societies. For instance, the concept of “African 
Peasantry” was brought into existence by various scholars. Goran Hyden defines African 
Peasantry as an agricultural social class whose autonomy depends on direct access to land and 
the use of family labour.107 Peasants produce for their subsistence and contribute to the 
economic systems through the payment of taxes and rent. The conception of “peasants” has 
attracted various scholars with different discipline orientations. The debate dominated on the 
definition of “peasant” and whether peasants exist in African societies. For instance, Teodor. 
Shanin, a sociologist, defines peasants as small agricultural producers, using simple equipment 
and family labour to produce for their consumption and the fulfilment of obligations to those 
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with economic and political power.108 L.A. Fallers, a social anthropologist, writing in 1961, 
viewed “peasant society” as “a society whose primary constituent units are semi-autonomous 
local communities with semi-autonomous culture”.109 The semi-autonomous culture was 
viewed in terms of economic, political and cultural dimensions. He denied the existence of 
peasant society in traditional Africa because according to him, Africa lacks a “version of high 
culture” and wherever literary culture has entered in Africa, they might be called “proto-
peasants” or “incipient peasants”.110 Political economists, such as John S. Saul also viewed 
“peasants” as an exploited class who could lead to revolution.111 Saul agreed on the existence 
of peasantry in Africa. To him, African rural peasantry had been trapped between the colonial 
and post-colonial states, as well as international capitalism to produce for both subsistence and 
market exchange. However, he argues that “‘peasant-hood’ is the potential ground for shared 
consciousness and political action against the broader structure that has come to dominate and 
exploit them”.112 According to M. Klein, a historian, most of the Africanist scholars agreed on 
the term “peasants” as referring to agriculturalists who control land, work as tenants or 
smallholders, and who are organised largely in households to meet their subsistence needs and 
ruled by other classes who extract surplus either directly or through the control of state 
power.113 However, the term “peasants” has been used to refer to rural African producers, 
regardless of its conception and dynamics. This thesis is aware of the complexity of 
conceptualising the term “peasants” in the African context. Therefore, it proceeds with Hyden’s 
view of “peasants” as smallholder producers because coffee in the Mbinga District was 
dominated by smallholder producers. The materialist historiography did not last long. In the 
1980s a new paradigm emerged as post-materialist historiography (referred to as “post-
modern” in Tanzanian context). The post-materialist historians focused on the power imposed 
by the colonial regimes and the post-colonial state while accepting the African agency. It 
combines the socio-economic, political and ecological aspects in studying African history, 
placing more emphasis on the interdisciplinary approach. Themes like diseases, environment, 
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gender, agrarian crisis and peasantry dominated this period. This ecological approach in East 
African history was first employed by a political scientist, Hedge Kjeshus, in his work on 
human nature relationship, Ecology Control, and Economic Development in East African 
History: Case of Tanganyika, 1850–1950. His main argument is based on the balance of 
ecological control between the pre-colonial societies in Tanganyika and the colonial period. To 
him, the pre-colonial societies were able to control the ecology, but with the introduction of 
colonial policies, it led to ecology collapse.114 Although his study did not focus on the socio-
economic impact on peasant production, it shows how pre-colonial societies were coping with 
environmental challenges. It also contributes to the understanding of the shifting trends in 
writing Tanzania’s history. Other scholars who wrote under this paradigm were Steven 
Feierman who wrote on the involvement of peasants in political discourse in the Shambaa 
Kingdom by using the term “peasant intellectuals”.115 James Giblin wrote on marginalised 
peasant society in the Southern Highland of Tanzania.116 During the colonial period (both 
German and British), the Njombe District provided migrant labourers for the mines and 
plantations within and outside Tanganyika. They also produced food for estate workers. They 
found themselves being excluded from agricultural markets, schooling, from access to medical 
services, and all opportunity to escape the impoverishing trap of the migrant labour. The writer 
used social analysis to provide the voice of the marginalised group of peasants. It focused on 
social and cultural changes in the Njombe District while ignoring the economic changes. 
However, this thesis demonstrates the socio-economic aspects by highlighting the voice of the 
marginalised smallholder coffee producers and by incorporating the aspect of gender in the 
Mbinga District. Although this thesis engages in some aspects of the coffee production in the 
Mbinga District that has been touched on in this historiography, it attempts to differentiate 
itself in terms of the period it covers, geographical area, and the extensive archival source base 
utilised – hopefully resulting in a more rounded and nuanced historical narrative and 
perspective. Finally, it hopes to bring a more nuanced gender perspective with its focus and 
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analysis on the role of women in coffee production in the Mbinga District. The thesis introduces 
the concept of “coffeescapes” and “coffeescapes of resistance” to demonstrate various 
landscapes that enabled the coffee producers to respond to the state policies and specific focus 
on women’s resistance to male dominance in the coffee industry.  
1.4. Theoretical and Methodological Issues 
Given the fragmented information that exists on the history of coffee production in the southern 
part of Tanzania, with a case of the Mbinga District, this thesis aims to explore the socio-
economic history of coffee production in the district from the 1920s to 2015. It examines the 
fortunes of coffee production over time and its multi-layered impact on the district and its 
people. It demonstrates the impact of the introduction of a new cash crop into an existing rural 
economy embedded within a specific political, social-economic and cultural context. 
This study specifically answers the following questions: What was the role of the state in the 
establishment and expansion of coffee production in the district from the 1920s to 2015? How 
did the relationship between smallholder coffee farmers and co-operative societies in Mbinga 
District change over time? What role did private enterprise, local and global market forces play 
in the production, distribution, and marketing of coffee in the Mbinga District? What has been 
the gender division of control over coffee production and marketing and in what ways has it 
changed over time? What was the multi-layered impact of coffee production on the district and 
the livelihoods of its people? How did people in the district react towards those impacts over 
time? To what extent did coffee production and its impact in the Mbinga District correspond 
or differ from coffee production in the rest of Tanzania over time?  
The thesis drew on Gavin Fridell’s “coffee statecraft” and James C. Scott’s “Weapons of the 
Weak” approaches in exploring the founding, expansion and the impact of coffee production 
in the Mbinga District and on its people. The “coffee statecraft” approach focuses on the role 
of the state in the coffee industry through policies and regulations governing the coffee sectors, 
provision of inputs and credits, production, processing, and marketing. Based on Fridell’s 






and reproduces the market.117Although “coffee statecraft” emphasised the capitalist and class 
nature of coffee production in Vietnam, its ideas can be applied in a broader context to other 
coffee-producing countries, such as Tanzania. The approach is significant to this study because 
it provides the framework for not only examining the role of the state in the introduction, 
expansion, and marketing of coffee produce and its impact but also in assessing the plight of 
coffee in the global marketing systems. The rationale for applying this approach is that it 
stresses the fact that the complex nature of the modern capitalist states and global coffee 
marketing can best be understood through the idea of coffee statecraft. 
The study also drew on Scott’s “weapons of the weak” approach which focuses on the non-
revolutionary forms of peasant resistance in response to the exploitation by capitalist and 
changing agricultural relations in the rural settings, and thus complements the limitation of the 
coffee statecraft approach towards the role of the coffee growers in coffee production. The 
approach stresses the need to consider the everyday forms of peasant struggle against any forms 
of exploitation by the wealthy farmers and state in their community. Scott argues that “… it is 
rare for peasants to risk an outright confrontation with the authorities over taxes, cropping 
patterns, development policies, or onerous new laws; instead they are likely to nibble away 
such policies by noncompliance, foot-dragging, deception …”118 This approach is significant 
to this study because it provides the framework for analysing the forces for agricultural change 
and a tool for exploring the smallholder coffee producers’ reactions to the impacts of coffee 
production in the Mbinga District over time.  
Scott’s analysis focuses on the socio-economic and political context of Sedaka village in 
Malaysia. This limits the model to a village level and ignores the broad structural context of 
the agricultural dynamics. However, despite this focus, Scott’s model can be applied to a wide 
range of agricultural societies and settings in the world, including the coffee-growing societies 
in the Mbinga District in Southern Tanzania. The rationale for applying this approach is 
embedded in its argument that agricultural changes are best understood within the context of 
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the dynamics of rural livelihoods. In this way, one will be able to understand the experience 
and perceptions of the smallholder farmers in relation to the broader agricultural system. 
Chapter Two of this thesis demonstrates how the colonial government has regarded smallholder 
coffee farmers as “weak” in comparison to the white settlers. The smallholder coffee producers 
reacted differently to the state policies, ordinances, and regulations, the compulsory co-
operative movements that coincided with the Ujamaa ideology from 1967 to 1986 as discussed 
in Chapter Four, as well as the economic dynamics in the coffee-marketing system, ranging 
from ambivalence to compliance over the period from the 1920s to 2015. Also, weapons of the 
weak can be applied in examining the gender relations in the coffee-production economy, 
especially on how women react to the inequalities in agricultural relations. 
This thesis drew from literature produced by two different approaches because the issue of 
coffee production and its impact is complex. It involves various stakeholders from different 
classes with different interests in society. Therefore, no single universal theory can offer a 
complete solution to the complexity of coffee production and its impact. 
Apart from the two adopted theoretical frameworks mentioned previously, this thesis 
developed a novel theoretical framework - best bescribed by the term “coffeescapes” - distilled 
from the coffee landscapes.  “Coffeescapes” also focuses on and includes the responses of the 
smallholder coffee producers to state policies and co-operative officials therefore 
“coffeescapes of resistance”. It involves the influence of coffee as plant on coffee producers 
and their reactions to the implementation of state policies. For instance, Chapter Two shows 
the colonial state discouraged the production of Arabica coffee by the Africans. Chapter Three 
shows how coffeescapes shaped the relationship between coffee co-operative societies and the 
Tobbaco Marketing Union [NGOMAT]. The use of gendered geographical coffee landscapes 
enabled women to challenge male power over coffee. It was from these landscapes the 
researcher developed the term “coffeescapes”, and because these “coffeescapes” were used to 






The thesis was based on a qualitative strategy. The qualitative strategy seeks to gain an in-
depth understanding of social phenomena within their natural settings.119 It pays special 
attention to specific events and issues to gain a deeper understanding of their meaning and 
significance. This thesis adopts the qualitative strategy to provide greater insight and in-depth 
analysis of the coffee producer’s experience and reactions regarding the founding, 
establishment, fortunes and the multi-layered impact of coffee production in the Mbinga 
District. 
The study area was the Mbinga District, which consists of six administrative divisions, namely 
Mbinga Urban, Mbuji, Mkumbi, Hagati, Kigonsera, and Namswea. However, this study 
focused on the four divisions of Mbuji, Mkumbi, Hagati, and Mbinga Urban, which forms the 
Matengo Highlands and, indeed, these are the major coffee-growing divisions in the district. 
The focus was on smallholder coffee producers, the Agricultural Marketing Cooperative 
Societies and Co-operative Union’s headquarters, the coffee research centre, coffee curing 
mills, and centres for private coffee companies in the district. 
The thesis is also a product of primary sources – both archival and oral sources. It also uses 
secondary sources as discussed in the literature review and in supporting arguments within the 
thesis. The body of archival sources was collected from the National Archives of Tanzania 
(TNA) housed in Dar es Salaam, the National Record Centre (NRC) in Dodoma and East 
Africana Section of the University of Dar es Salaam. At TNA four categories of archival 
sources were found. The first category consists of correspondence among the government 
officials on coffee production from the 1920s to the early 1960s. The second consists of 
monthly and annual reports on coffee production. The reports consist of Provincial 
Commissioners’ Annual Reports, Agricultural Departmental Reports at both national and 
district level under the Ministry of Agriculture. The third category consists of legal documents, 
such as coffee ordinances and legislation. The last category comprises of coffee co-operatives 
and marketing reports consisting of minutes of the Coffee Board of Tanganyika and later the 
Coffee Board of Tanzania, Ngoni-Matengo Co-operative Marketing Union Limited 
 






(NGOMAT), and Matengo Native Co-operative Union Limited (MANCU). These documents 
enabled the researcher to understand the foundation and development of the coffee industry in 
colonial Tanganyika. Also, information on the interactions between the state, co-operatives and 
smallholder coffee producers were obtained. Information obtained from TNA covers the period 
from the 1920s to the early 1960s. 
However, from Tanzania National Archives, three challenges were encountered. One of the 
challenges was the scarcity of data on coffee production for post-colonial Tanzania. The 
available files cover the period from the 1920s to the early 1960s. Researcher was told the files 
on the post-colonial period could be found in Dodoma (National Record Centre). This forced 
her to request an access permit from the Director of the National Archives which enabled her 
to visit and access information on the post-colonial period at the National Record Centre. The 
second challenge was the incompleteness of the files found in the Tanzania National Archives 
– some of the files shown in the list could not be found. This caused difficulties in getting 
complete information on coffee production and marketing during the colonial period. After 
consulting the archival officials, the researcher was told that some of the files were in transit to 
Dodoma (National Record Centre) for appraisal. With the access permit, she was able to visit 
the National Record Centre. 
From the NRC housed in Dodoma, information on co-operative development from the British 
colonial period to independent Tanzania, specifically to the late 1990s, was found. The Coffee 
Marketing Board’s Reports were also obtained. With the NRC files, the researcher was able to 
explore the dynamics of co-operative development in Tanzania [and Mbinga in particular] and 
how smallholder coffee producers reacted as co-operative members or sometimes as 
individuals. Moreover, these files were important as they brought into light what transpired on 
matters such as the dissolutions and disaffiliation of some co-operatives in the Mbinga District. 
The information on the transition from the state-owned coffee marketing co-operatives to the 
individual or private enterprises was also obtained from these files.  
However, challenges encountered in the Tanzania National Archive in Dar es Salaam were not 






few. Of those limited files on women, some were empty. This forced the researcher to rely on 
oral sources exploring the role of women in coffee production and marketing in the Mbinga 
District. Secondly, the access to the post-colonial files was limited by the repository law.120 
This law requires the information to be declared public after 30 years. This study covers the 
period between the 1920s and 2015; therefore it was difficult to obtain data on coffee 
production and marketing beyond the 1990s. The author was able to acquire permission from 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives to visit the Tanzania Coffee Board Headquarter 
in Moshi, Kilimanjaro, and Tanzania Coffee Research Institutes (TaCRI), Lyamungo Station 
(Kilimanjaro) and Ugano Sub-station (Mbinga).  
The other archival sources were obtained from the then Ministry of Agriculture and Co-
operatives of Tanzania, specifically from the Tanzania Coffee Board (TCB) in the Moshi 
District in Kilimanjaro region. TCB offered a body of information on coffee marketing through 
the auctions system, statistics on production and marketing trends in Tanzania from 1981 to 
2015, which assisted in understanding the dynamics of coffee production and marketing. TCB 
also offered useful information on coffee buyers (co-operative and private companies). The 
Tanzania Coffee Research Institute Centre (TaCRI) at Lyamungo in the Hai District and Ugano 
Sub-station in the Mbinga District were also visited, whereby information on coffee research 
from the 1930s to 2015 was obtained. Mbinga Coffee Curing Company Limited (MCCCO) in 
Mbinga provided information on coffee production, processing, and marketing. Files on the 
marketing systems that were auctioned, as well as those directly exported, were accessed. 
Archives of Peramiho Abbey (APA) provided information on the early activities by 
missionaries in introducing cash crops in both Ungoni and Matengo area before the 1920s. 
 
120 The United Republic of Tanzania (URT), The Record and Archives Management Act, 2002. Section 16.4 (1) 
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Director or in place of deposit appointed under section 15 of this Act, shall be available for public inspection 
after the expiration of a period of thirty years from their creation … (2) at the expiration of the period of thirty 
years prescribed in subsection (1) above, any record which has been classified as confidential or secret shall 
cease to be so classified and subject to the National Security Act …”, for more details see Part IV of the Record 







Two private coffee companies, Dan and Associates Enterprises Limited (DAE LTD), and 
Coffee Management Services Limited (CMS LTD) were also consulted. Information on their 
involvement in coffee production and marketing was obtained. Changes in the coffee-
marketing system in Tanzania, particularly in 2017, preventing the involvement of private 
coffee buyers with smallholder producers, have affected this study. During the fieldwork 
(2018), out of 37 coffee buyers existing in the 2017/2018 season,121 only two were in operation. 
Both companies operated as coffee curing factories, but DAE Limited also operated as coffee 
buyer/exporter from the auction in Moshi. The documents obtained from these companies were 
complemented by interviews with workers who worked with different private coffee companies 
and Non-Governmental Organisations such as TechnoServe, Tchibo Estate (T) Ltd, BAM (T) 
Contractors Ltd, Soochack Bush & Co Limited, LIMA Ltd, and Uniexim (T) Ltd.122 
Oral interviews constituted the second core of sources for this thesis. It is the product of 
interviews conducted in Kilimanjaro and Ruvuma regions from November 2018 to January 
2019. Some interviews were conducted in January 2020. A total of 42 people was interviewed. 
The larger number of the interviewees came from the Mbinga District in the Ruvuma Region 
as the area of study. Because of the geographical distribution of the district, a motorbike was 
used to visit villages in Matengo Highlands. Geographically, the Mbinga District consists of 
rolling hills, mountains, and plateaus, as explained earlier in this chapter. In Matengo Highland, 
most of the coffee producers are mountain dwellers. To reach them, one has to pass through 
different ranges of elevations. Transport has been challenging in mountainous areas, especially 
during the rainy season. The only available transport to reach them was by motorbike.  
 
121 District Executive Director’s Office Mbinga District Council, 2019. 
122 Angelus Kinunda was interviewed on 27 December 2018 at DAE LTD. As an agricultural officer, he was 
employed from 2008 to date. He was once a government employee (1983–1995). After retirement, he worked 
with other private companies, such as Soochack Bush Limited (2000–2007) and LIMA Limited (2008); Wendo 
Sudayi was interviewed on 27 December 2018 at DAE Limited as project manager being employed in 2016, 
but he worked with Technoserve from 2012 to 2015; Suzo Komba was interviewed on 8 January 2019 at CMS 
Limited as an Assistant Manager (employed in 2015). He worked in various private coffee companies since 
1998: in 1998 with UNIEXIM (T) LTD as zone supervisor, from 1999 to 2002 with TCHIBO Ltd in Mbinga 
Branch and from 2003 to 2005 in Moshi and Kikuyu (Kenya) coffee estates, from 2006 to 2015 he worked 
with BAM Contractors (T) Limited as a manager, and from 2015 to date, he is working with CMS as an 






In-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with coffee growers, government and non-
governmental officials, coffee companies and farmers’ co-operative officials in the Mbinga 
District. The snowball sampling technique was used in the selection of the key informants from 
the four administrative coffee-growing divisions, namely Mbinga Mjini (urban), Mbuji, 
Mkumbi, and Hagati. Key informants were selected by visiting the headquarters of Mbinga 
Farmers’ Cooperative Union (MBIFACU) and getting two experienced informants, and after 
the interview or short conversations, they were able to direct me to other useful informants. 
The coffee growers were interviewed to get their experiences and responses on coffee farming 
and its multi-layered impact. Among the coffee growers, women were also interviewed to get 
information on their experiences and their roles in the coffee economy in the district. One 
challenge with women was their readiness to talk about coffee production as they kept directing 
the researcher to talk to men. In their mind, coffee was a “man’s crop”. Because of that context, 
only twelve women were interviewed of whom the most were widows and unmarried women. 
Although this demonstrated that coffee production and marketing was regarded a man’s 
domain, it also demonstrated a power relation in the household on who should give information 
on agricultural production and marketing. This prevented a researcher from obtaining more 
information from women. Through informal conversations, more information about women 
involvement in coffee production in the Mbinga District was obtained. 
Government officials, such as the General Director of Tanzania Coffee Board and the 
Marketing Director were interviewed on the role of the state in the coffee industry, whereas 
non-government officials, particularly from private coffee enterprises, were also interviewed 
on the role of their enterprises in coffee production, processing, and marketing in the Mbinga 
District.  
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the thesis, reviews the 
literature and discusses the theoretical and methodological approaches employed in the thesis. 
Chapter Two demonstrates the foundations and development of coffee production in the 
Mbinga District from the 1920s to 1945. The chapter shows how the colonial state was involved 
in the establishment and development of coffee production in the Mbinga District. It argues 






1930s was largely influenced by the British colonial government attempts to generate state 
revenue by reducing tax defaulters and promoting the production of export crops. It also 
discusses other factors that enabled the introduction of the coffee economy in the district, 
including geographical, faith-related reasons, as well as the local people’s desire to get rid of 
labour migration as the way of acquiring cash. It further examines the attitudes of the colonial 
state to the introduction of Arabica Coffee to African smallholder farmers in the late 1920s. 
This chapter also demonstrates the expansion of coffee production in the 1930s. The chapter 
proceeds with the decline in the demand for coffee in the world and the responses of the Empire 
of the United Kingdoms and its colonies in the wake of the Great Depression in the 1930s. It 
examines the coffee industry in the Mbinga District during the Second World War. The chapter 
also explores the African’s responses (coffeescapes of resistance) to coffee production and 
marketing by both compliance and noncompliance ways.  
Chapter Three traces the co-operative movement and the dynamic relations with smallholder 
coffee farmers from the 1930s to 1976. The chapter assesses the changes in the relationship 
between smallholder coffee farmers and co-operative societies in the Mbinga District over 
time. It argues that the rise of co-operative societies and its dynamic relationship with the coffee 
growers in the Mbinga District has influenced the development of smallholder coffee 
production and marketing in the district, particularly in the post-war period. The chapter 
examines the emergence of the co-operative movement in the district between 1930 and 1945. 
It further examines the formation of the Matengo Native Co-operative Union in 1954. It 
assesses the challenges faced by the co-operative movement and its subsequent dissolution in 
the 1976.  
Chapter Four explores the influence of the Tanzanian independent state on coffee production 
and the marketing of coffee between the 1960s and 1990. It argues that the trajectory of the 
coffee industry between the 1960s and 1990 in the Mbinga District was mainly shaped by the 
post-colonial state interventions on agricultural production and marketing. This intervention 
had some impact on the socio-economic aspects of the smallholder coffee producers in the 
district. The chapter focuses on the influence of the state on coffee production and marketing 






Villagisation) in the 1960s to 1990 in the Mbinga District. It demonstrates the monopolistic 
state control over peasant production in Tanzania and Mbinga in particular. The chapter also 
shows the responses of the coffee producers to the state interventions, specifically on the 
implementations of Ujamaa Policy in the district. Regarding the expansion of coffee 
production, the chapter examines the implementation of the Coffee Improvement Programmes 
between 1977 and 1986. Moreover, the chapter examines the newly established co-operative 
movements for the coffee-marketing processes between 1984 and 1990. 
Chapter Five demonstrates a transition from state monopoly to the free and competitive 
marketing in the coffee industry in the Mbinga District between 1990 and 2015. It argues that 
the transition from a strict state monopoly under co-operative societies to co-existence with 
private enterprises in the coffee industry did not lead to free and fair competition but rather 
entrenched hegemonic and exploitative practices at the expense of the smallholder coffee 
producers. The chapter discusses the challenges faced by the Mbinga Co-operative Union 
(MBICU) and its demise in the late 1990s. It also explores the emergence of the independent 
co-operative societies and farmer groups between 2000 and 2015. The chapter also engages 
with the struggle and survival of the co-operatively owned coffee curing factory in the wake of 
private enterprises.  
Chapter Six explores the women’s role in coffee production in the Mbinga District with a 
particular focus on production and marketing between the 1920s and 2015. It argues that, 
notwithstanding the scale of production, the role of women in the coffee economy cannot be 
underestimated. It examines the influence of the colonial state on the role of women in coffee 
production in the district. The chapter demonstrates the participation of women in the co-
operative coffee markets during both colonial and post-colonial period. It also examines the 
women’s role in the coffee industry during the free-marketing period, 1994-2015. Moreover, 
it examines women’s “coffeescapes of resistance” over the control of the coffee proceeds 
during the coffee free-marketing system. 







Chapter Two  
Coffee Production: Foundation and Development in Mbinga District, c. 1920s–
1945 
2.1. Introduction  
This chapter explores the foundation of coffee production from the 1920s to 1945 in the Mbinga 
District, Tanzania. In the period after the First World War, the Tanganyika territory which was part 
of German East Africa became a mandatory territory with Britain as mandate holder under the 
supervision of the League of Nation. The mandatory status was a result of the 1919 Peace Treaty 
of Versailles. This status ended soon after the Second World War, in June 1945 at the United 
Nations meeting when the United Nations Charter was signed to mark the beginning of the 
trusteeship system.1 During the General Assembly on 13 December 1946 the United Nation 
approved the proposed agreement of Tanganyika territory as a trusteeship colony.2 The period 
between the 1920s and 1945 featured two crises, namely the Great Depression and the outbreak of 
the Second World War. The British economy was ruined by the First World War, the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, and the Second World War. Consequently, it influenced the colonial 
economic development policymaking and development plans in the colonies. The colonial state 
responded to these crises by dictating to the colonies what to produce and how to produce it. The 
economic development was defined by the “political imperative” to serve the interests of the 
metropole economy first and then that of the colonies.3 The weaknesses of the German colonial 
economic policies also played an important role in shaping the British economic development 
policies in Tanganyika. For instance, the coercive nature of German administrative systems in the 
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labour recruitment processes, tax collection, and the use of direct rule had been the cause for the 
frequent African resistance in the territory. Therefore, Tanganyika territory was theoretically a 
mandate territory but was practically treated as a source of capital to rehabilitate the British ruined 
economy. 
This chapter uses the “coffee statecraft” approach to examine the role of the colonial state in the 
foundation and development of the coffee industry in the Mbinga District, Tanzania, from the 1920s 
to 1945. The chapter argues that the introduction and expansion of coffee production in Umatengo 
in the late 1920s and 1930s was largely influenced by British colonial government attempts to 
generate state revenue by reducing tax defaulters and promoting the production of export crops. 
Other factors such as missionaries, indigenous people and geographical factors have played 
important roles in the foundation and development of the coffee economy in the district. In 
exploring the Africans’ responses, this chapter uses the “coffeescapes of resistance” conceptual 
framework showing that African coffee producers had been responding variably through 
compliance and noncompliance. The chapter further shows that missionaries, European planters 
and a few Africans started commercial coffee production in the northern and north-western parts of 
Tanzania during the late 19th and early 20th centuries), while in the Mbinga District started coffee 
production much later.  
This chapter uses mainly archival sources and a few oral sources.4 The archival sources were 
obtained from the Tanzania National Archives Housed in Dar es Salaam and University of Dar es 
Salaam, East Africana Section. Oral sources were gathered from coffee producers and former coffee 
co-operative society officials in the Mbinga District. From these sources, the theme of the 
foundation and development of coffee production emerged. As mentioned earlier, the Mbinga 
District was part of the Songea District during the colonial period (German and British). It was 
called Umatengo while the Matengo Highlands was the coffee-growing area. 
 
4 The period under study (the 1920s to 1945) limits the possibilities of having more oral interviews with the earliest 
coffee producers (from the 1920s). As a result, the few interviews were conducted with the people above 80 years 






The chapter begins with the historical overview of coffee production in colonial Tanganyika 
(currently Tanzania) to contextualise the introduction of the coffee economy in Tanzania and 
Mbinga specifically. Also, it examines the forces behind the introduction of coffee production in 
the district. The chapter discusses the attitude of the colonial state in the introduction and expansion 
of the coffee industry, specifically on Arabica coffee. The chapter also examines the expansion of 
coffee production in the 1930s. Furthermore, it proceeds with the decline in the demand for coffee 
in the world and the responses by the Empire of the United Kingdoms and its colonies in the wake 
of the Great Depression in the 1930s. Finally, it examines the coffee industry in the Mbinga District 
during the Second World War. 
2.2. Historiographical Note 
Several scholars focus on the role of the state on cash-crop production. Goran Hyden shows how 
colonial states transformed the African societies into peasant economies.5 He argued that peasantry 
in Africa was the creation of colonial powers and stressed that rural producers in most parts of 
Africa are still in the process of becoming peasants.6 What is happening in Africa is 
“peasantization”, which is the process of becoming a peasant.7 According to Hyden, the colonial 
state used coercive measures, such as taxation, to compel African peasants to produce cash crops. 
However, taxation became a less effective way to sustain productivity once production had been 
established.8 He then claimed that African peasants remained independent from the state as they 
owned the means of production. As a result, they could seek to withdraw from production. However, 
drawing from Hyden’s book, this chapter shows that the independence was somewhat relative since 
peasants in Tanzania between the 1930s and 1940s were curtailed to the extent of remaining 
dependent on the colonial economy. The coffee production was backed with rules and regulations 
 
5 G. Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and Uncaptured Peasantry, (Nairobi: Heinemann 
Education Books, 1980). 
6 Ibid., 11-12.  
7 K. Post, “‘Peasantization’ and rural political movements in Western Africa”, Archives europeennes de sociologie, 13, 
2, (1972), 223-54. 






to the extent that any attempt to withdraw was subjected to penalties, including fines and even 
imprisonment.  
B.J. Berman and J.M. Lonsdale stressed how the colonial state in Kenya played a double role in the 
reproduction and accumulation of capital as well as in political reproduction.9 Other scholars focus 
on the responses of African peasants to the colonial state. Andrew Coulson focuses on the conflict 
between the state and peasants over the implementation of various agricultural policies in colonial 
and post-colonial Tanzania.10 However, Kenneth Curtis contended that state interference in coffee 
production through the imposition of coffee rules and regulations created tension among the coffee 
producers. The Haya demonstrated their anger by protesting the colonial coffee rule of 1937 and 
1953 by using the phrase “twaiyanga” [we refuse].11 The 1937 coffee rules aimed to keep the coffee 
farms clean from weeds, long grasses, diseased trees, intercropping with maize and by reducing the 
number of plantain plants. On the other hand, the 1953 rules were directed to the plantain plants to 
curb the spread of plantain weevil.12 On both rules, coffee producers were against inspection of 
their farms. In line with Curtis, the anthropologist Brad Weiss13 focused on the symbolic and 
material value of coffee in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Haya society in western 
Tanzania. The coffee tree has been associated with power and value. The coffee farmers tried to 
retain distance from global forces that threatened their values. This was shown during the colonial 
period when coffee production and marketing became a centre of conflict between the Catholic 
missionaries, colonial government, and coastal traders whom they believed to be a threat to the 
 
9 B.J. Berman & J.M. Lonsdale, “Crisis of Accumulation, Coercion and the Colonial State: The Development of Labour 
Control in Kenya”, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 14, 1, (1980), 55-81.  
10 A. Coulson, “Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1946–76”, Review of African Political Economy, 4 (10), 
(1977), 74-100. 
11 K.R. Curtis, “Smaller is Better: A Consensus of Peasants and Bureaucrats in Colonial Tanganyika”, in W.G. 
Clarence-Smith and S. Topik, (eds.), The Global Coffee Economy, 322; K. R. Curtis, “Cooperation and Cooptation: 
The Struggle for Market Control in the Bukoba District of Colonial Tanganyika”, The International Journal of 
African Historical Studies, 25, 3, (1992), 505-538. 
12 K.R. Curtis, “Small is Better”, 325. 







growth of Christianity among Africans.14 Weiss argued that “the articulation of attachment and 
separation, inclusion and exclusion, intimacy and restraint is a critical process in establishing the 
symbolic and material dimensions of precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial relations.”15 The book 
is useful to this thesis as it provides the changing cultural value of coffee over time and space. 
However, the work by Weiss is normative in nature in representing the Haya society. It uses an 
idiosyncratic assessment of individual history in the Kagera region to support its description. 
Weiss’s failure to use archival sources on the German and British colonial period made him use a 
generalised conversation as an ethnographic source while ignoring other historical accounts.  
Therefore, the existing agrarian historiography focuses on the emergence of African peasants, their 
protest to the colonial state interferences, as well as the unequal relationship between the state, 
estate and peasants. As a result, the study of the Arabica coffee grown by the smallholder Africans 
has been given little attention in agrarian scholarship. This chapter contributes to the historiography 
of African peasant production focusing on the debate on the role of the colonial state in the 
introduction and development of coffee production in the Mbinga District from the 1920s to 1945. 
2.3. Introduction of a Cash-crop Economy in Mbinga District, 1900–1919 
Before the introduction of any cash-crop production in the Mbinga District, the German colonial 
administration was engaged in the collective economy revolving around ivory, beeswax and wild 
rubber trade.16 By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as explained in Chapter One, the Germans 
conducted various cash-crop experiments, specifically on tobacco, coffee, sisal, and cotton in the 
 
14 B. Weiss, “A Religion of the Rupee: Materialist encounters in North-West Tanzania”, Africa, 72 (3), (2002), 391-
419. 
15 B. Weiss, Sacred Trees, 3. 
16 Collective economy focused on the collection of forest products by hunting and gathering. The Germans had been 
engaging in the forest products trades even before the colonial period. The operation of German trading companies 
such as O’Swald and Hansing since 1847 and 1853 respectively in Zanzibar, facilitated the trading activities along 
the coast and in the hinterlands. It was easy for the German colonial government to adapt to the pre-existed economy 
before the introduction of the agricultural economy in Tanganyika; J. Koponen, Development for Exploitation: 






coastal areas.17 During the early colonial days in Tanganyika, the Mbinga District (as part of the 
colonial Songea District) was categorised as a labour reserve,18 supplying labourers for the sisal 
estates in Tanga and along the central railway line, as well as for coffee estates in the Northern 
Province. In the Ruvuma region, Germans also engaged in experiments with coffee and sisal 
production before the outbreak of the Maji Maji War of 1905–1907.19 Sisal production was tried 
along the shore of Lake Nyasa and was successfully grown; however, it was abandoned due to 
distance and the lack of a railway connection to the coast.20 The German colonial government 
unsuccessfully tried coffee plantings in the Matengo Highlands and on the hills around Songea.21  
Traders were also involved in the introduction of coffee in the Songea District. According to 
archival sources, the first coffee was planted by Arab traders at Kikole (18 miles south of Songea) 
in 1900. The seed was obtained from Indian traders at Lindi although its origin is unknown. About 
20 coffee trees, which were believed to be of the Arabica type, flourished for five or six years. 
However, due to neglect, they were burnt by bush fires during the Maji Maji War in 1905.22  
 
17 J. Koponen, Development for Exploitation, 215. 
18 The early colonial economic establishment created development inequalities in the territory. By the 1930s, 
Tanganyika was divided into three economic zones; the production for export zone consists of the sisal estates, the 
main cash-crop producing areas, and towns; the second zone was food-production areas supplying to the estates 
(parts surrounding the coastal sisal estates and central railway line such as Uluguru, Kondoa); the last was a 
remoteness area beyond the export and food-producing areas supplying migrant labour; J. Iliffe, “Agricultural 
change in modern Tanganyika”, 30-33. 
19 Maji Maji War was the resistance of Africans against the German colonial rule in Southern Tanzania between 1905 
and 1907. The war started in July 1905 in the Matumbi Hills north-west of Kilwa. By August it had spread 
southwards to river Ruvuma and westward to Lake Nyasa. The term Maji Maji was coined from the Swahili word 
maji meaning water. The Maji Maji fighters obtained their inspiration from the Matumbi Prophet Kinjekitile who 
possessed the hongo spirit as war medicine. It was believed that the medicine would protect Africans during the 
fight by turning the European bullets into water (maji); Fr. E. Ebner OSB, History of Wangoni and their Origin in 
the South African Bantu Tribes, (Benedictine Publications Ndanda-Peramiho, 1989); J. Koponen, Development for 
Exploitation, 230. 
20 D. Schmied, Subsistence Cultivation, Market Production and Agricultural Development in Southern Tanzania, 
Bayreuth African Studies, (Eckhard Breitinger: Bayreuth University, 1989), 64. 
21 TNA, 504/9/8, Coffee, a report from the District Agricultural Officer, Songea, Ref. No. 19/75, “Coffee of Songea” 
to the Senior Agricultural Officer, South-western Circle, Lindi, 1932.  






Moreover, missionaries were an important group of people who pioneered the introduction of the 
cash crop in the Songea District. Between 1900 and 1909, the Benedictine Missionaries of German 
origin experimented with coffee and citrus fruits in Kigonsera and Litembo in Umatengo and 
Peramiho in Ungoni. The experiment with citrus fruits in Litembo was successful but commercially 
a failure due to the transport challenges and perishability of the fruits, which made it difficult to get 
it to the German market. In 1915, Fr. Ludger Breindl introduced wheat in Umatengo at the Litembo 
mission station.23 Although wheat was not produced on large scale, it became an importance source 
of income for most of the people before the start of coffee production. The primary market was 
missionary mills at Peramiho in Ungoni.  
As to coffee, the little success obtained by the missionaries in their centres were interrupted 
following the outbreak of the First World War (1914–1918). The forcible deportation of the 
Benedictine Missionaries of German origin resulted in the coffee plots being abandoned. Most of 
the cash-crop experiments in the district conducted before the 1920s were either abandoned or 
destroyed by bush fires during the wars (Maji Maji War in Ungoni and First World War in 
Umatengo). The Maji Maji War created fear among both missionaries and communities 
surrounding mission stations. For instance, both Peramiho and Kigonsera Mission stations were 
burnt by Ngoni warriors in 1905.24 Also, missionary archival sources show that during and after the 
Maji Maji War, a local troop commonly known as rugaruga was campaigning against Ngoni. 
Rugaruga was led by an Arab trader, namely Rashid bin Masudi of Kikole.25 During its operation, 
it was involved with food plundering and the destruction of houses and crops. The wars therefore 
hampered a successful crop experiment.  
 
23 APA, Chronicle of Litembo Foundation to 31 December 1914. 
24 L. Doerr, O.S.B., (ed.), Peramiho 1898-1998 in Service of the Missionary Church Vol. I, (Ndanda-Peramiho: 
Benedictine Publications, 1998), 45. 






2.4. Forces Behind the Introduction of Coffee Production in the Mbinga District in the 
1920s 
The emergence of coffee production in Mbinga was a gradual process with many challenges, both 
natural and human-made. Natural challenges refer to environmental forces, such as geographical 
and climatic forces, while human-made forces were primarily attributed to the discouragement from 
the colonial state. The success story of the emergence of coffee production in the district can be 
contributed to various forces. John Iliffe states that “one of the factors for successful adoption of 
commercial crops was the policy of the colonial government of compulsion”.26 This policy was 
applied by both German and British colonial governments in introducing agricultural cash crops. 
Cotton was introduced as a commercial crop in the coastal regions and Sukumaland. As it was under 
compulsion, it was met by resistance and discontent by the Africans. The most notable resistance 
was the outbreak of the Maji Maji War between 1905 and 1907. The colonial policy in the Songea 
District had a dual character regarding the introduction of cash crops. During the Depression of the 
1930s, the British colonial government introduced tobacco in the Songea District. This followed 
the impoverishment caused by the increasing migrant labour recruitment, as well as the economic 
crisis facing the plantation economy.27 The fall of wages in sisal plantations from Shs.30/- in 1927 
to Shs.12/- to Shs.18/- by 1935, as well as poor working conditions, made the migrant labour 
economy less profitable.28 Mbinga District (by then Matengo Division of the colonial Songea 
District) had a different experience. Despite several attempts of discouragement in the late 1920s, 
the “grow more crops” campaign of 1932 led to Africans accepting the growing of Arabica coffee. 
 
26 J. Iliffe, “Agricultural change in Modern Tanganyika”, Historical Association of Tanzania, 10, (Nairobi: East African 
Publishing House, 1971), 20. During the German colonial period the policy of compulsion was dominant on 
taxation, labour recruitment, and compulsory cotton cultivation in communal fields commonly known as “village 
shamba”; J. Koponen, Development for Exploitation, 230.  
27 H.H. Ndomba, “A History of Peasant Tobacco Production in Ruvuma Region, Southern Tanzania, c. 1930-2016”, 
PhD Dissertation, Stellenbosch University, (2018); G. P. Mpangala, “A History of Colonial Production in the 
Songea District, Tanzania, 1897-1961”, MA Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, (1977). 






Colonial taxation was another force behind the introduction of coffee production in Umatengo. The 
colonial state was not merely an instrument for supervising colonial production, but also an 
instrument for accumulating capital from the colonies.29 The German colonial administration 
introduced various forms of taxes, including hut and poll taxes. These taxes were to be paid in either 
cash, grains or cattle. Tax defaulters were indirectly forced to work in the plantations in Tanga and 
Morogoro. Local Africans from the labour reserve areas had to engage in the migrant labour system. 
Taxation was one of the reasons for the Matengo resistance of 1902 – during the German colonial 
occupation in Umatengo.30 The Matengo resistance was, firstly, the reaction of people against 
forced labour, such as Matengo being forced to carry lime to Songea for the construction of the 
military station in 1901, and secondly, the colonial taxation imposed by the German colonial 
government. In March 1902 they refused to pay tax, tore off the badges of the askari (African 
soldier) and sent him back to Songea. They then burnt down the school which had been built by Fr. 
Yohannes Hafliger at Litembo. As a result, German Sergeant Müller arrived with 14 askari to fight 
the Matengo who retreated to the mountains after losing about 40 people. 31Throughout the German 
colonial period, Wamatengo was facing difficulties in paying taxes to the colonial authority due to 
the lack of a reliable source of income. It was their labour-power as porters, plantation and estate 
labourers or in public works that served as the source of income to pay taxes.  
 By 1921, the British colonial state, through the Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance of 1921, provided for 
compulsory paid labour for tax defaulters on government works.32 The burden of paying taxes 
became worse for Africans in the late 1920s and 1930s following the global economic crisis. The 
crisis affected the general economic life of people in the territory. It affected the wages in the 
colonial estates and plantations where the Matengo were working as migrant labourers. Some of 
the labourers became redundant due to economic hardship facing the plantation and estate sectors. 
 
29 B.J. Berman and J.M. Lonsdale, “Crisis of Accumulation, Coercion and the Colonial State: The Development of 
Labour Control in Kenya”, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 14, 1, (1980), 55-81. 
30 Rev. E. Ndunguru, Historia, Mila na Desturi za Wamatengo, (Dar es Salaam: East African Literature Bureau, 1968), 
18; J. Iliffe, The Modern History of Tanganyika, 117. 
31 J. Iliffe, The Modern History of Tanganyika, 117. 






The introduction of coffee as the cash crop came as an opportunity for Matengo people to obtain 
money without becoming migrant labourers. During the 1930s, both hut and poll taxes were used 
as incentives to increase the production.33 The introduction of coffee production in the Mbinga 
District was therefore not just an attempt of the colonial state to increase production of the export 
crops, but at the same time was an indirect way of capital accumulation through tax payments. 
Another factor for the emergence of coffee production in the Mbinga District was the local people’s 
desire of getting rid of labour migration as the way of getting cash. Before the introduction of coffee 
in the Mbinga District, people eligible to pay taxes were forced to go out of the Matengo territory 
to work and obtain money. The slogan was “go to Coast”.34 The migrant labour economy created 
problems among the Matengo society. Among other things, the migrant labour economy accelerated 
hardship in families, specifically for the wives and children of the absentee men. Family 
disintegration, adultery, divorce, and poverty were the outcomes of the increasing number of 
absentees in Umatengo country. To fulfil their desire of having a local economy, some of these 
migrant labourers, especially those who were working in the coffee estates in Moshi or Arusha, 
tried to smuggle with coffee seeds on their return to Mbinga. Although the colonial state, through 
the Department of Agriculture, intensified the cash-crop experimentations in the district in the 
1920s with the aim of increasing production of the export crops, it was also responding to the 
Africans’ desire to promote the local economy. 
Along with the local people’s desire, there were individual people who pioneered the introduction 
of coffee production in the Mbinga District. Christostomus Makita, the son of the Matengo chief, 
was the most prominent person in the coffee industry in Matengo Highlands in the 1920s. Makita 
worked as a clerk in a sisal estate in Tanga in 1924. On his return to Mbinga in 1926, he persuaded 
the District Commissioner to order some coffee seeds from Moshi. He saw in coffee production an 
opportunity to produce a cash crop. He pioneered the establishment of the first coffee nursery in 
 
33 TNA, H1/21527 Circular No. 36 of 1931, from Secretary to the Government, Dar es Salaam, to all Provincial 
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Matengo highlands at Myangayanga in 1927, the year acknowledged as the official starting point 
of coffee production among the local Africans in the Mbinga District. 35 
Missionaries also played an important role in the introduction of coffee as a cash crop in the Mbinga 
District. As explained in Chapter One, missionaries pioneered the introduction of coffee in 
Morogoro, Kilimanjaro, as well as in Mandela in Kenya since the late 19th century. From about the 
1900s, the Benedictine Missionaries of the St. Ottilien pioneered the introduction of coffee in 
Peramiho (Ungoni) and later in Umatengo at Kigonsera and Litembo. Despite the disasters caused 
by the Maji Maji Uprising and the First World War, they were dedicated to the re-introduction of 
coffee production in the district in the 1920s. Mission stations played the role of distributors of 
coffee seeds to the government nurseries established in the early 1920s. The involvement of 
missionaries in the introduction of coffee production in the Mbinga District was motivated by three 
factors: local consumption, coffee production as an income-generating activity, and maintaining 
Christianity among their followers.  
Although the missionaries in the Mbinga District did not establish large coffee farms, they were 
aiming to distribute the seedlings to their followers. The Matengo territory was among the areas 
designated as a labour reserve area. Matengo people had to go and supply their labour in the sisal 
plantations in Tanga and Morogoro and coffee estates in Arusha and Moshi. One of the major 
activities of the missionaries was evangelisation. With the migrant labour economy, it was a 
challenge to sustain newly converted Christians. The primary concern with missionaries was that 
the period which migrant labourers spent in the plantations or estates could relapse their Christian 
faith. The situation was more challenging with those working on the coast where Islam (which they 
referred to as “mohamadanism”) was the dominant faith.36 The introduction of cash crops was 
necessary for Umatengo in order to discourage the Christian followers from going to the coast. They 
 
35 TNA, 155/CO-OP.27/XI, Maendeleo ya Umatengo Mkinga Factory Umatengo, Mkutano wa ukulima 17 June 1953; 
Interview with Denis Ndunguru, Myangayanga village, 20 December 2018; He is the grandson of Chief 
Christostomus Makita (the pioneer of the coffee production in the Matengo Highland).  






believed that the production of coffee would provide Matengo people with a permanent source of 
income and, therefore, reduce the rate of absentees. At the same time, converts would have more 
time for practising Christianity.  
Geographical factors played a significant role in the introduction of coffee production in the Mbinga 
District. The Matengo Highlands is the area with hilly highland, as mentioned in Chapter One. The 
altitude range is 2 000 meters maximum, and the average annual rainfall is between 1 200-
1 400 mm. The soil is dark-brown to reddish-brown clay loam and clay sandy loam with the 
Hyparrhenia parinari wooded grassland vegetation.37 This was already confirmed in the 1920s 
through the outcomes of the experimentations conducted by the Department of Agriculture from 
the early 1920s to the late 1920s. It proved that the soil content, altitude, rainfall, and vegetation 
found in Matengo Highlands were suitable for coffee production – specifically for Arabica coffee 
production, not Robusta coffee.38 The suitability of the area for coffee production was again 
confirmed many years later in 1971 when a team of the Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land 
Use Planning came up with 13 agro-economic zones in the Ruvuma region out of which only two 
were suitable for coffee production, namely the Matengo Highlands and Ubena Highlands in the 
northern part of the Songea District bordering the Njombe region.39 
2.5. Colonial State vs Arabica Coffee Production in the 1920s 
After the First World War, the missionaries re-introduced coffee production in mission stations at 
Peramiho in Ungoni, Kigonsera, and Litembo in Umatengo. It was from these stations, coffee seeds 
were collected and redistributed to local Africans. In the 1920s, some coffee seeds believed to be 
obtained from Bukoba, were planted at Peramiho in a sheltered valley with moist, dark to red loam 
soil in which cattle dung, grass, and wood ashes were incorporated. Although Bukoba was known 
 
37 United Republic of Tanzania (URT), Ruvuma Socio-economic Profile, (Dar es Salaam: The planning Commission & 
Ruvuma Regional Commissioner’s Office, 1997), 20; (UDSM), D. Conyers, “Agro-economic Zones of Southern 
Tanzania”, Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, Research Report, 49, (1971), 42-46. 
38 TNA, 504/9/8, Coffee.  






to be the home of Robusta coffee, in 1928 it was discovered that the coffee at Peramiho was of the 
Arabica type. More coffee plantings were conducted at Peramiho, and in 1932 there were about 380 
coffee trees growing at Peramiho.40 
From Peramiho, missionaries took coffee seedlings to Kigonsera mission in 1920.41 Coffee was 
planted on a gentle slope with an irrigation fallow for irrigation during the dry season. In 1926, 
approximately 20 trees were in existence. However, with no proper care, they were severely 
attacked by borer beetles. Seeds were obtained from these 20 trees for more plantings, and in 1932, 
there were about 300 mature coffee trees at Kigonsera mission station.42 In 1922, one of the 
administrative officers, namely Vickers Haviland, ordered 20 coffee seedlings from Kigonsera and 
planted them at Lipumba.43 In 1928, the trees were attacked by borer beetles and died. Eight coffee 
trees survived but were neglected.44 Litembo Mission was not left behind in experimenting with 
coffee-growing. As was the case with their fellow missionaries of Peramiho and Kigonsera, several 
attempts were unsuccessful until in 1929 when coffee-growing was established. One of the reasons 
for the earlier failures was the low temperature of the area.  
After the First World War, there was a growing desire among the Africans in colonial Tanganyika 
to cultivate Arabica coffee as an economic crop. For instance, in Kilimanjaro, there were 14 000 
African-owned Arabica coffee trees. The number increased to 125 000 in 1922 and 375 000 in 
1924.45 The rapid expansion of coffee-growing during the period of 1922 to 1926 aroused 
opposition on the part of European planters in the Northern Province. They were afraid of the danger 
of pests and diseases spreading to the European estates and also of coffee theft by Africans. 
Resolutions were passed, asking for the prohibition of Arabica coffee-growing by Africans. It was 
presented to the Governor, Sir Donald Cameron, and read that “the growing of Arabica coffee in 
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East Africa shall be confined as far as possible to the areas where it is already being grown and that 
any extensions be discouraged excepting in areas where no European coffee estate exists.”46 This 
resulted in Government Circular No. 77 of 1927, that stipulated that no assistance was to be given 
to African Arabica coffee growers throughout the territory.47 Exceptions could only be granted by 
the Governor. By 1927, such approval was only given to the Kilimanjaro Native Planters 
Association in the Northern Province.48 The southern part of the territory, including the Mbinga 
District, was not approved by the Governor. This was the period when “coffee statecraft” was 
applied by the colonial state. The colonial state became the political instrument for maintaining the 
domination of European coffee planters in the Northern part of the territory where coffee settler 
farms were prominent by suppressing the development of smallholder African coffee growers.  
B.J. Berman and J.M. Lonsdale contended that the colonial state was an ultimate institutional 
apparatus for ensuring the reproduction and accumulation of capital while, on the other hand, it 
functioned as an agency of political reproduction.49 The colonial state applied the ideological 
justification for the distribution of property and the maintenance of the class relations of production. 
This was common in the settler colonies, such as Kenya and Southern Rhodesia. Political 
instruments were used to sustain labour supply in colonial economic units, such as mining and 
agriculture. In Southern Rhodesia, for instance, the colonial state applied various measures to 
discourage peasant agriculture in the early 1900s. The legal system, for example, was used to 
dispossess and exclude Africans from land to sustain labour supply to settler farms.50 The idea of 
discouraging smallholder African coffee growers was a reaction of the estate coffee planters to the 
shortage of labour on their estates. The expansion of Africans growing coffee was regarded as a 
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threat to the existence of estate farming. Mbinga District was free from the settler’s pressure 
compared to the northern coffee producing zones where settlers were prominent. 
More emphasis was placed on the production of Robusta coffee than Arabica. As explained before 
that coffee estate planters felt insecure with the growing number of African coffee (Arabica) 
producers. It created labour shortage and competition in marketing. District officers were supposed 
to encourage Africans to grow Robusta. From 1927 onwards, the “Coffee statecraft” was 
implemented through the district officers who were supposed to encourage Africans to grow 
Robusta. The district officer in Matengo Highlands received numerous consignments of Robusta 
coffee seeds from Amani research station for distribution to Africans. The coffee seeds failed to 
germinate. The 1929 consignment from Bukoba germinated fairly at Lipumba, but most of the 
seedlings died out after being transplanted.51 The soil and climatic conditions in Umatengo did not 
favour the growth of Robusta coffee. In the Matengo Highlands, the Robusta seedlings died out 
during the cold season. For instance, in Litembo Mission station, the Robusta seedlings were 
planted alongside with Arabica coffee and given equal care. The Arabica coffee survived while the 
Robusta seedlings died. 
The planting of Arabica coffee was never encouraged in the Mbinga District before the 1930s. 
Arabica coffee that was planted, was done so by mistake and usually the result of incorrect 
identification of the coffee variety. In 1929, for instance, the District Officer, under the impression 
that the Peramiho coffee was Robusta, planted the seeds from that source and the seedlings were 
distributed to local Africans. Later it was discovered that the Peramiho coffee was of the Arabica 
variety. The discouragement of Arabica coffee-growing by the colonial government, following 
circular No. 77 of 1927, created a sense of fear among local Africans and even among the Native 
Authorities. The local African individual growers were in fear of their crops being uprooted once 
identified as of the Arabica variety. 
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2.6. “We must leave no stone unturned”: Smallholder Coffee Production in the 1930s  
The period between the 1930s and 1940s was characterised by expansion of coffee production in 
the Mbinga District. The colonial economic development policies and plans were more focused on 
economic rehabilitation in the wake of the Depression. In Tanganyika territory, the period was 
characterised by the so-called “Grow More Crops” campaign.52 Under this campaign, the colonial 
government aimed at promoting and increasing crop production. It was a British colonial state 
agricultural strategy introduced in the 1930s with the aim to produce more crops for export. During 
the campaign, the Agricultural Director Ernst Harrison rationalised the use of force to make 
peasants work.53 
Following the decline of prices of crops during the Great Depression, the colonial government 
thought that the cash crops would fall away altogether unless early steps were taken to avoid this 
contingency. The thinking was that Africans would revert to the production of a crop only for their 
sustenance. By letting Africans free to decide on what to produce, would mean the sharp decline in 
incomes from hut and poll taxes and other sources. The colonial government aimed to maintain 
incomes by increasing production through the deliberate “Grow More Crops” campaign from 1932 
in order to maintain public revenue and preventing Africans cash-crop producers from abandoning 
the commercial economy entirely. The government was desperate to increase the production of 
crops as underlined by the directives of the Chief Secretary of the government to the Provincial 
Commissioners, stating that “we must leave no stone unturned to increase the export of native-
grown cash crops”.54  
 
52 TNA, H1/21527, Cooperation between Agricultural Department and Provincial Administration, from the Chief 
Secretary, Dar es Salaam, Ref. No. 13044/162, to all Provincial Commissioners, 21 November 1932. 
53 K.I. Tambila, “The Great Depression and Peasant Societies in Tanganyika 1930–1937”, in Die Weltwirtsschaftskrise 
der dreißiger Jahre in der Dritten Welt; Sonderfall oder Einstieg in die Strukturse der Gegenwart?, (Universitat 







In 1933 the British colonial government introduced a change of policy. The ‘coffee statecraft’ took 
a different direction. Through the Department of Agriculture Circular No. 3 of 193355 the 
restrictions on the growing of Arabica coffee by local Africans were withdrawn. It was, however, 
stressed that Arabica coffee should be cultivated with care and knowledge, and pests and diseases 
that were often induced by cultural errors should be avoided since a diseased plot could spread the 
infection to neighbouring cultivators.  
According to the Department of Agriculture, the coffee production had to be introduced in an 
approved area with adequate water supply, adequate or potentially adequate communications, and 
sufficient population to secure cultivation on a scale that would justify inspection and supervision 
by officers of the Agricultural Department.56 As a result, the southern provincial commissioner 
recommended that Matengo Highlands of the Songea District be accepted as an approved area for 
Africans to grow and develop Arabica coffee. Efforts of encouragement were concentrated on the 
Matengo Highlands, which appeared to offer the best chance of success. No planting was allowed 
in other areas.57  
In its quest for economically viable coffee production, the Department of Agriculture prescribed a 
minimum requirement for the size of production units. A minimum acreage of half an acre 
populated with not less than 250 coffee trees planted nine feet apart was considered an economically 
viable unit.58 The Department argued that it was within range of the average peasant cultivator to 
handle and sufficiently large to prevent indiscriminate planting or abandonment of planted areas. 
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The experience proved that closer spacing often resulted in poorly developed coffee trees, and wider 
spacing was a waste of land for peasant producers. 
The coffee production expanded following the approval of the Matengo Highlands for growing 
Arabica coffee in 1933.59 In April 1933, two men, namely Hendrich Limka and Karistus Kayuni, 
were sent to Moshi to be trained as an agricultural assistant and senior African instructor, 
respectively. The government provided a grant-in-aid of £90 for the one-year training.60 They were 
trained on matters concerning coffee, such as the choice of land, seeds, preparation of nurseries, 
planting distances, lining out, holing, shade planting, compost pits, manuring, capping, topping, 
pruning and handling, insect and pest control and the timetable of seasonal work. They also learned 
about the work of African associations on the marketing of coffee.61 
In 1933, the Matengo Native Authority passed rules to guide the coffee plantings and growers. The 
most important of these rules was the restriction on the planting of the Kent variety which tended 
to be more resistant to Hemileia vastatrix disease than ordinary Bourbon.62 The seed of selected 
Kent was obtained from Lyamungo Coffee Research Station and planted in various nurseries 
established in the Matengo Highlands. Coffee nurseries were established in Myangayanga, 
Wallanzi, Pilakano, Lipumba, and Litembo areas under the supervision of the Native Authorities 
and Agricultural Department. More Matengo was integrated into coffee production in the Matengo 
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Highlands, and by 1935, coffee plantings already totalled 17 551 trees.63 Following is the summary 
of the coffee plantings as obtained from various nurseries in Umatengo: 
Table 1: The Coffee Seedlings in Umatengo in 1935.64 
Coffee Nursery Coffee Plantings Distributed 
Myangayanga, Ugano 6 082 
Wallanzi 4 400 
Pilikano and Lipumba 4 569 
Litembo 2 500 
Total 17 551 
These initiatives manifested in the further expansion of coffee production after 1935. The number 
of coffee growers increased from eight in 1929 to 230 in 1935.65 The Department of Agriculture 
was able to realise the expansion of coffee production in the district following the enactment of the 
Coffee Industry (Registration and Improvement) Ordinance, 1936. The Ordinance required the 
owner or a manager of the coffee plantation and nursery to register annually. The coffee plantation 
owned by African smallholders was registered under the Co-operative names, paying one shilling 
as registration fee.66 Failure of registration was considered as an offence. This translated into coffee 
growers increasing to 587 by 1937 with 154 949 coffee trees.67 The Kent variety dominated with 
145 958 coffee trees of which 13 400 were in the bearing stage. All non-Kent varieties (8 991) were 
in bearing stage. It was clear that the Kent variety was popular and dominant in the Matengo 
Highlands. 
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The growth also manifested in an increase in coffee nurseries. Apart from the six managed by the 
Native authorities, more than 22 nurseries were established in 1935.68 Demonstration coffee 
nurseries were also established by the Roman Catholic missionaries at 12 schools, and 200 seeds 
were issued to each school.69 Through school gardens, students learnt about seed selection, planting, 
spacing, pruning, and other coffee production practices to apply to their family farms. These 
nurseries were subjected to the Native Authority Rules and under the control of the Department of 
Agriculture. Before 1935, the small amount of coffee obtained was disposed of locally and 
unrecorded due to the lack of an organised market. In 1935, the small coffee crop obtained from the 
older plantings in Matengo Highlands was disposed of locally. Two tons of parchment coffee was 
sold to Europeans and Indians at the rate of 50 cents of a shilling (East African shilling) per 
kilogram.70  
2.7. “Too much coffee”: Coffee Production and Marketing in the Wake of the Great 
Depression of the 1930s 
The international economic crisis which started in 1929 in the USA caused a crisis in European 
countries by reducing production, consumption, and employment in the metropole and then in their 
colonies. Tanganyika, being under British rule, was not spared the impact of the Depression. As the 
production fell in European countries, so the market for primary products collapsed, and 
Tanganyika was unable to sell its export crops at a reasonable price. 
The economic crisis led to a decline in the demand for coffee in the world market. The Morning 
Post expressed the situation in one of its articles as “too much coffee continental demand stopped 
…”71 The coffees from the colonies of the Empire were imported by the United Kingdom (UK), 
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and then half of the imports were re-exported to other European countries. The imposition of import 
duties by European countries caused the collapse of the British re-export trade to other countries 
and at the same time caused anxiety among the East African coffee planters. For instance, in 1931, 
the Morning Post reported that a “large quantity of the previous crop understood to amount to some 
1 000 tons remain unsold in the warehouses of London agents.”72 Table 2 summarises the imported 
and exported coffee from Tanganyika between 1930 and 1934. 
Table 2: Tanganyika Coffee: Imports and Exports from UK, 1930–1934.73  
Year Imports Exports 
Quantity (Cwt) Value (£) Quantity (Cwt) Value (£) 
1930 59 877 350 204 12 893 58 566 
1931 51 276 262 782 22 805 91 788 
1932 44 151 206 130 11 339 46 687 
1933 56 732 240 105 10 988 73 785 
1934 32 313 134 259 21 306 72 010 
The table above shows the decline of the coffee imported by the UK. The export of coffee from the 
UK reached the lowest quantity in 1932 and 1933. 
Britain had an excellent asset during the Great Depression regarding her foreign trade, namely the 
Empire of dominions (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland) and her 
colonies. The British had to protect her Empire with tariffs following the detachment from the gold 
standard in September 1931.74 During the Ottawa Conference in 1932, the British Empire was 
renamed as the British Commonwealth of Nations and “reciprocal preferences” (imperial 
preferential duties) were introduced for commonwealth products, including coffee receiving tariff 
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immunity.75 The system of preferential rates that existed between the UK and its dominiums was 
focused on assisting East African producers of the Empire in competing with foreign coffee from 
countries such as Costa Rica. The preferential tariffs that existed in Canada and South Africa were 
aimed at assisting East African coffee growers in competing with coffee from Brazil. Following the 
Ottawa Agreement of 1932, the remainder of the chief British dominium markets, such as New 
Zealand, operated under the preferential rates of duty. Table 3 summarises the imperial preferential 
duties in various East African coffee markets in 1932. 
Table 3: The Imperial Preferential Tariff Rates in Five Chief British Coffee-consuming Countries 
by 1932.76 
Country Amount of duty per Cwt. Preferential tariffs 
per lb. in favour of 
British coffees 
 General Preferential  
United Kingdom 14s 4s 8d. 1d. 
Canada $3.36 (14s) Free  3cts (1 ½ d.) 
South Africa  9s 4d. 2s 4d. 3s 4d. 
Australia  37s 4d.  37s 4d. NIL 
New Zealand  9s 4d. Free  1d. 
  
 
75 The Ottawa agreements were the series of agreements on trade and tariffs between the United Kingdom and the 
commonwealth nations signed in 1932 at the Imperial Economic Conference held in Ottawa under the policy of 
imperial preference based on the principle of “home producers first, Empire producers second, and foreign 
producers last”. The agreement came as a result of the effect of the Great Depression and the search for markets for 
the Empire products following the spread of the protectionism spirit, especially after the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act 
of 1930 by the United States on trade; https://www.britannica.com/topic/imperial-preference, accessed on 2 August 
2019; K.I. Tambila, “The Great Depression and Peasant Societies in Tanganyika 1930–1937”, 134 -135.  
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The history of the UK tariffs on coffee can be traced back to the 1870s when all coffee entering the 
UK home market was subjected to import tariffs for the first time. For instance, on the 2 May 1872, 
a duty of 14s per cwt. was imposed on all coffee entering the UK home market, irrespective of the 
country of origin of the coffee.77 From 1872 to 1919, British grown coffee had not received any 
preferential treatment. The first step towards preference was made on 1 September 1919, when the 
duty on coffee from Empire sources was reduced from 42s per cwt. to 35s per cwt., thereby creating 
a preference of ¾ d. per lb. in favour of British growers. This started a trend that continued into the 
1930s as demonstrated in Table 4.  
Table 4: A History of the United Kingdom Tariffs on Coffee.78 
Date duty  Amount of duty per 
cwt.  




Preference General Preference  
2 May 1872  14s 14s 1 ½ d. 1 ½ d. Nil 
22 September 
1915 
21s 21s 2 ¼ d. 2 ¼ d. Nil 
5 April 1916 42s 42s 4 ½ d. 4 ½ d. Nil 
1 September 
1919 
42s 35s 4 ½ d. 3 ¾ d. ¾ d. 
15 May 1922 28s 23s 4d. 3d. 2 ½ d. ½ d. per 
lb. 
5 May 1924 14s 11s 8d. 1 ½ d. 1 ¼ d. ¼ d. 
17 November 
1932 
14s 4s 8d. 1 ½ d. ½ d. 1d. per lb. 
 







On 17 November 1932, as a result of the Ottawa agreements, the duty on coffee was reduced from 
11s 8d. (1924) to 4s 8d. per cwt. for Empire coffee and the duty on foreign coffee remained 
stationary at 14s per cwt., therefore favouring the Empire product.79 Between 1933 and 1934, the 
percentage of coffee from Empire growers consumed in the UK rose from 48,2% to 52,5%, 
indicating that the preference of 1d. per lb. of coffee had resulted in an increase of approximately 
5% in the share of the Empire growers in the United Kingdom home market.80 This increase was 
also attributed to the existence of the sterling bloc that emerged in the early 1930s. These were 
countries whose currencies were tied to the pound sterling under the Bank of England in London. 
It consisted of the members of the British Empire and the commonwealth who formed a large 
portion of the foreign currency reserve in London.  
The “Eat More Fruit” Campaign was introduced in the 1930s to increase the consumption of coffee 
in Great Britain.81 The main objective was to popularise the East African Coffee (Empire coffee), 
hence increasing the consumption rates in the UK. The Coffee Board of Great Britain in London 
expressed the idea of increasing the consumption of coffee in Great Britain through a major 
advertising campaign. Coffee brokers, bankers, shipping companies wharfingers, wholesalers and 
retailers were involved. The Board set to raise a sum of £50 000 per annum for five years for the 
advertising campaign. Coffee-producing countries that were part of the Empire were expected to 
contribute £6 000 a year for five years, spread as follows: £2 500 each from Kenya and Tanganyika, 
£500 from Uganda, £250 each from Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The advertising campaign was 
entrusted to Messrs. Saward Baker & Co. Ltd, one of the leading advertising agencies in Europe.82  
The decline in the demands for coffees in the world was also attributed to the competition from 
Brazil as the largest “hard Arabica” coffee producer. Before 1937, the increasing consumption of 
“Mild Arabica” coffee was at the expense of Brazilian coffee. The Brazilian government’s policy 
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to maintain the price of its coffee by destroying its surplus production was primarily responsible for 
the turn from Brazilian coffee. It was learned that the destruction programme of Brazilian coffee 
led to the production of low-quality coffee because coffee producers paid little attention to quality. 
The low-quality Brazilian coffee turned the public’s taste to mild coffee. Following the growing 
tension between the Brazilian government and the naval and military authorities on the funding of 
the surplus coffee destruction programme, it was agreed that from 30 June 1938 no further funds 
should be allocated for the destruction. The Brazilian government decided to rather change their 
policy towards the improvement of the quality of the coffee to secure their position as a supplier of 
70% of the world’s coffee.83 The change of policy towards quality improvement, brought 
competition to the mild coffee in East Africa. The price of Kenyan coffee declined between 20% to 
25%, and Tanganyika and Ugandan coffee prices declined by 28%.84  
In Tanganyika, the reaction to the decline of coffee prices was a sharper, focus on the improvement 
of the quality of coffee in an attempt to regain the market share lost to Brazilian coffee. The 
Department of Agriculture, using Agricultural Field instructors, supervised the implementation of 
coffee production practices, stipulated through various pamphlets and government circulars.85 Crop 
diversification was also encouraged by the colonial government through the Department of 
Agriculture. In 1938, the Chief Secretary wrote a letter to all Provincial Commissioners, 
encouraging the cultivation of subsidiary crops to supplement the income from coffee production.86 
The coffee growers converted into non-agricultural activities, including basketry, pottery, and 
trading activities between the Matengo highlanders and the Nyasa Lakeshore community. 
In the Mbinga District, following the decline of the coffee prices in 1937/38, the number of coffee 
producers who sold their coffee through the Ngaka Coffee Co-operative Society declined from 60 
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in 1937/38 to 15 in 1938/39.87 The coffee price declined from 53 cents per kilogram in 1936/37, 50 
cents in 1937/38, and 40 cents for grade I and 36 Cents for grade II in 1938/39.88 There were signs 
of peasant withdrawal from the coffee-marketing system (through Co-operative Societies) as they 
disposed of their coffee through private traders. Goran Hyden in his book stresses that African 
peasants were autonomous from the state because they owned the means of production.89 They 
could withdraw from the market system and survive on subsistence production. The trend was that 
a fall in the price of an agricultural product led to peasant withdrawal from the production of that 
crop. It was the opposite in Tanganyika. The failure to withdraw was due to the following reasons: 
firstly, the demands imposed by the colonial state, required peasants to look for money. For 
instance, they needed money to pay taxes. So, the extent to which peasants had been woven into 
the Tanganyika colonial economy made it difficult for them to withdraw. 
Secondly, the colonial state applied force through the “Grow More Crops Campaign” initiated in 
late 1931. The use of state force was justified by the Director of Agriculture to encourage peasants 
to increase production. The enforcement of coffee rules and regulations with minimum acreage 
rules were among some of the forced state measures to promote and improve coffee production.90 
The reaction of coffee growers to the low prices of the late 1930s can be considered a “weapons of 
the weak” reaction. Instead of confronting the authorities, some abandoned their coffee farms, while 
others decided to divert their product to private buyers instead of the co-operative society. The 
Matengo coffee producers in the 1930s had no voice to confront any form of exploitation either by 
the colonial authorities or private coffee dealers. James Scott regarded the withdrawal of peasants 
from production as a “sign of great desperation” from those scattered across the countryside without 
formal organisation.91 This was not the case in Kilimanjaro. Under the Kilimanjaro Native Co-
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operative Union (KNCU), small coffee producers expressed their anger following the failure to get 
the coffee payments for 1934/35 and general dissatisfactions with KNCU operations. They went 
into open rioting, involving destruction of the co-operative buildings.92 
In 1938, the Matengo Native Authority, in order to improve the coffee quality, decided to bolster 
the 1933 Coffee Rules, as explained before, by adding a fourth rule to prevent the coffee producers 
from abandoning their farms. The rule stated that “one has to take care of the coffee plot by keeping 
it clean (eight days in a month) and anyone who does not comply to the regulation is liable on 
conviction whereby the coffee plants must be uprooted and fined up to Shs.10/-.”93 It was learned 
that the 1933 rules were, however, not strict enough to prevent coffee growers from neglecting their 
coffee farms in tough times, as in periods of fluctuating and low prices. It left room for the neglect 
of coffee farms that then became the breeding ground for coffee pests and diseases. The imposition 
of a fine as part of the penalty for neglecting of coffee farms was aimed at encouraging coffee 
growers to keep on growing coffee even when the price was low. However, the enforcement of the 
1933 and 1938 Coffee Rules and Regulations by the Matengo Native Authorities and the 
Department of Agriculture created fear among the coffee producers. As a result, some Africans, 
especially the youth, decided to engage in the migrant labour economy. The migrant labour 
economy became one of the ‘coffeescapes of resistance’ among the youth in Mbinga district. This 
reaction was different compared to the reaction in other coffee-growing areas, such as Kagera 
where, as mentioned earlier, open revolts were witnessed from smallholder coffee producers in 
1937.94 In the Kagera region, the coffee producers reacted to rumours that coffee rules were 
associated with land alienation.95 
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The economic depression and its aftermath also stimulated the number of absentees in the Matengo 
Highlands in the 1930s. People left the district to perform wage labour as migrant labourers in the 
northern, coastal and eastern Provinces. There were increased demands for labour in the sisal 
industry in the 1930s. In 1937, about 2 400 contracted labourers left the Songea District for estate 
work. Of these, 1 400 labourers were from the district, while the remainder were immigrants from 
Portuguese East Africa who came to Songea according to a contract between the “Native” 
Authorities and the recruiting agencies.96  
Furthermore, tax demands imposed by the colonial states forced people into the migrant labour 
economy. The taxation rate which was reduced from Shs.7/- in 1932 to Shs.5/- between 1933 and 
1936 was restored in 1937 to the pre-depression rate of Shs.6/-.97 Taxation from its onset had been 
the force behind the involvement of many Africans in the migrant labour economy. The British 
colonial government aimed at increasing revenues through taxation and increasing production of 
the export crop, regardless of the decline of the prices. People in Umatengo produced wheat, 
European potatoes, and other cereal crops, but there was a limited market for the products. The 
primary market was the local Roman Catholic Mission. Prior to the Great Depression, people in the 
Matengo Highlands could raise their tax money of seven shillings by making two or three journeys 
to the market with a load of food.98 It had been necessary, during the 1930s, to make four or five 
journeys, and they found this challenging to do. While trying to cope and adjust to the decline of 
the coffee prices, the Second World War broke out in 1939. The next section will discuss the coffee 
production and marketing during this war. 
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2.8. Coffee Production during the Second World War (1939–1945)  
In the period between 1939 and 1945, the world experienced the Second World War. Although the 
war was not fought on Tanganyika soil as it was with the First World War, the economy responded 
to the war requirements. Britain influenced the economies of both metropole and colonies by 
imposing various regulations on the production and marketing of agricultural products during the 
war. In 1940, the British Ministry of Food ceased issuing licenses for the importation of coffee into 
the UK. This decision was firstly based on the oversupply of coffee in the UK at the time. The UK 
had stocked the equivalent of two and a half year’s consumption at its disposal. Secondly, the 
reduction in coffee imports was necessitated by the need for shipping space for the transport of war 
necessities.99 Although the Ministry of Food initially granted a coffee quota of 7 500 tons to East 
Africa for 1940, shipping transport difficulties led to a suspension of the license for the importation 
of coffee into the United Kingdom in November 1940.100  
The provisions of the Defence (Coffee Control Board) Regulations, 1940, which was published as 
Government Notice No.252/40 of 1 October 1940, under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 
1939 governed coffee control in Tanganyika. These regulations established a Control Board and 
Coffee Control (Sales) Order in 1940.101 The primary function of the Control Board was to police 
coffee prices and to liaise with the Kenyan control authorities through a liaison officer in Nairobi 
to ensure that there was no drastic undercutting of selling prices to the detriment of the producers 
in both territories. They also had to administer the Tanganyika portion of the East African United 
Kingdom import quota. The Board controlled all the sales of raw coffee grown in the Northern and 
Southern Highlands, and Southern and Eastern Provinces. Non-native grown coffee was directed 
through the Tanganyika Coffee Growers’ Association (TCGA), and the Kilimanjaro Native Co-
operative Union (KNCU) directed native-grown coffee). All sales made, other than through the 
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agency of the TCGA or the KNCU had to receive the approval of the Control Board to ensure the 
maintenance of price.102  
In June 1943 the colonial government appointed the TCGA as an agent for the purchase of the mild 
coffee crop.103 The TCGA monopolised and controlled the bulk disposal to the Ministry of Food 
and the United Kingdom commercial corporations. The intervention of the colonial state in the 
production and marketing of coffee demonstrated the deliberate attempt of the state to promote the 
monopoly of the European firms in the exportation of agricultural products, including coffee. There 
was an agreement between the TCGA and the group of mild coffee exporters, whereby the crop 
received commission on the following basis: on direct overseas sales 5%, on sales to the Ministry 
of Food in the UK 1 ½%, and sales to the military and similar government orders, a rate of the 
commission was mutually agreed upon from time to time in the East African Territories.104 All co-
operative societies had to seek approval of the Board in disposing of the coffee crop. For the 
exportation of seven tons of the 1945 Matengo coffee crop to Johannesburg, South Africa had to 
obtain approval from the TCGA.105 Since the Matengo coffee was not yet under the Tanganyika 
mild coffee control, the request was referred to the Director of Agriculture in Dar es Salaam.106  
The centralisation and monopoly of marketing systems established during the war period 
discouraged the operations of private companies, specifically the Asian-owned companies. In 
Matengo Highlands, for example, the Indian traders applied for coffee export licenses from the 
Department of Agriculture, but up to 1944, none of them obtained the license.107 On the other hand, 
the colonial state control of production and marketing promoted the operation of European 
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companies in colonial Tanganyika. The mild coffee group of exporters formed in 1943, continued 
to operate in the Northern Province. The exporters comprised of the following companies: The old 
East African Trading Company Limited (38 ½ % quota), A. Baumann & Company (25%), Leslie 
& Anderson (Nairobi) Limited (18%), J.G. Aronson Limited (7 ½ %), Sharif Jiwa & Company (3 ½ 
%), R.S. Campbell & Company (3 ½ %), Gibson & Company (2%), and Nauman, Gepp, Dorman 
& Company (2%).108 The centralisation and monopoly of the coffee-marketing system impacted on 
the effective operation of the market. The lack of competition from other coffee buyers and sellers 
under the new marketing arrangement between the TCGA and the Ministry of Food created delays 
in decision making by the colonial government. There were also delays in the registration of new 
primary co-operative societies, such as Ngaka Coffee Society, and the issuing of coffee buyers and 
dealers’ licenses. When this resulted in the stockpiling of coffee, the colonial officials’ only reply 
was that “coffee takes no harm from keeping and can be marketed by the union in due course”.109  
The colonial state, through the Department of Agriculture, also extended its control to food crop 
production in Matengo Highland during the Second World War. Although the co-existence of food 
crop and cash-crop production lessened the occurrence of open discontent from peasants during the 
introduction of the cash crop economy, it was learned that it was difficult to maintain the balance 
between food crop and cash-crop production, especially when one of the two fetches a higher price 
in the market than the other. During the 1940s, Matengo coffee growers were more concerned with 
coffee production than food-crop production. As a result, the colonial state, through the Department 
of Agriculture, had to introduce the minimum acreage (one acre) for food crops to be produced by 
each household under the supervision of agricultural instructors.110 This caused tension on a local 
level. The food crops were required for local consumption by the coffee growers, while the surplus 
was required for serving the war, as well as to feed the sisal plantation workforces. Families were 
allowed a minimum of one acre for food crop production. The agricultural instructors inspected the 
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implementation of regulations on coffee production, as well as the production of food crops. During 
the inspections, the African coffee producers regarded the inspectors as “colonial watchdogs” and 
compared them with the colonial police. As a result, some of the instructors were attacked during 
their inspections. In one such incident in February 1944, an agricultural instructor (Karistus Kayuni) 
stationed in the Myangayanga area of Umatengo, was confronted by an angry mob during his 
inspection in Ngima area.111 The instructor found that people had planted coffee without the 
approval of an agricultural officer. They had also not planted food crops as it was demanded under 
the minimum acreage policy. The Agricultural Instructor uprooted eight coffee trees from the 
unapproved field.112 The uprooting of coffee trees upset the group. In reacting to that, they beat up 
the instructor. The coffee producers, therefore, were not passive recipients of the colonial policies. 
Despite the setbacks, the number of coffee growers had increased from eight in 1929 to 487 in 
1942.113 This also contributed to the increased coffee production from two tons in 1935/36 to eleven 
tons in 1944/45.114 Table 5 summarises the total production from 1935 to 1945. 
Table 5: Coffee Production in Mbinga District, 1935–1945115 









111 TNA, 504/9/8, Coffee, from Agricultural Officer, Songea, Ref. No.4/15/20, to the District Commissioner, Songea, 
8 February 1944. 
112 Ibid. 
113 TNA, 504/9/8, Coffee, from the coffee instructor, Umatengo, to Agricultural Officer, Songea, 26 February 1942.  
114 TNA, 504/9/8, Coffee, from the agricultural officer, Songea, to the Senior Agricultural Officer, Southern Highlands 
Province, Mbeya, 15 January 1945. 










The review of this table shows that during the period from 1935 to 1945, coffee production was in 
its foundation stage. It was also clear that the operation of private traders (mainly Asians) for the 
retail and local consumption had contributed to the unavailability of production statistics from 1939 
to 1943. Figure 2 is an illustration of the coffee-marketing system/chain between 1936 and 1945.  
 
Figure 2: The Coffee Marketing Chain in Umatengo, 1936–1945 
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Messrs Leslie & Anderson (Nairobi), The Old East African Trading Co. 
Ltd, A.Baumann & Co., J.G. Aronson Ltd.7, Sharif Jiwa & Co. Ltd., R.S. 
Campbel & Co., Gibson & Co., Nauman, Gepp, Dorman & Co. 
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inputs
Smallholder African coffee 








This chapter has explored the foundation and development of coffee production in the Mbinga 
District, since the 1920s to1945. It expanded the historical debate on the role of the state in the 
introduction and expansion of the cash-crop economy in Africa by focusing on coffee production 
in Mbinga. In exploring the factors behind the introduction of coffee production in the Mbinga 
District, the chapter argued that the introduction of coffee production in the Mbinga District did not 
result exclusively from the colonial state. Rather, missionaries and individual Africans’ initiatives 
played an important role in the foundations of the coffee economy in the district. However, the 
geographical advantage of the Matengo Highlands contributed to the success of the initial trials and 
eventually, the growth and expansion of coffee production from the 1920s to 1945. In exploring 
Africans’ responses, this chapter shows that African coffee producers had been responding variably 
through compliance and noncompliance. It demonstrates the ‘coffeescapes of resistance’ in 
implementing the coffee rules and regulations.  
It explored the context in which the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Second World War 
influenced the coffee production and marketing in the Mbinga District. It also examined various 
measures taken by the colonial state and the reactions from the coffee growers between the 1920s 
and 1945. The chapter also explored the centralisation and colonial state monopoly on the coffee-
marketing system during the Second World War. It argued that the state was not only supervising 
coffee production but also acted as an instrument of political reproduction by promoting the 
domination of European companies in the coffee-marketing system. Consequently, the chapter 
argued that coffee production had a significant impact on the socio-economic livelihood of the 
people in the Mbinga District. The district experienced the co-existence of coffee economy, as well 
as the migrant labour economy. It also led to the co-existence of both food and cash-crop 
production, although it created economic imbalances in agricultural production in the 1940s. The 
chapter adopted Gavin Fridell’s “coffee statecraft” in exploring the role of the state on the 
foundation and development of coffee production in the Mbinga District from the 1920s to 1945 by 






Highlands. Also, James Scott’s “weapons of the weak” analysis had been employed in exploring 
how coffee producers reacted to the changes in the coffee-production and marketing systems 
between 1920 and 1945. Lack of formal organization among the smallholder coffee producers 
forced them to divert their coffee sales to private buyers instead of co-operatives societies and 
sometimes they attempted to withdraw from the coffee economy. The chapter, therefore, explored 
the foundation and development of coffee production in the Mbinga District. The next chapter 
proceeds with the discussion to examine the co-operative movements and dynamic relationship with 






Chapter Three  
The Co-operative Movement and the Dynamic Relations with Smallholder 
Coffee Farmers, 1930–1976  
3.1. Introduction  
During the 1930s, the foundation was laid for the further expansion of the coffee industry in the 
Mbinga District. It was also a period during which the coffee growers started experiencing a 
transformation from a free coffee-marketing system to a state-controlled period under the co-
operative societies. The heyday for the development of co-operative societies in colonial 
Tanganyika was the period after the Second World War. As explained in Chapter Two, coffee 
produced in the Mbinga District (by then Umatengo-part of the Songea District) between the 1920s 
and 1945 was mostly consumed locally with Indians and Europeans being the main buyers. After 
the Second World War, the Mbinga District experienced the dominance of the co-operative societies 
in the coffee marketing system. The movement developed from a single Primary Co-operative 
Society, namely Ngaka, to eighteen co-operative societies affiliated to Matengo Native Co-
operative Union Limited (MANCU) in the 1970s. The co-operative societies were established to 
arrange the joint sale of all marketable coffee handed over to the society by the members, purchasing 
coffee seed and agricultural implements on behalf of the members, raising loans, and providing 
office, storage and transport services to the members. 
The existing historiography on agricultural co-operatives in colonial Tanzania helps to understand 
the debate on the changing nature of the colonial marketing system, especially on the relationship 
between the state, co-operatives, and local politics. However, most of the studies have focused on 
the northern and north-western part of Tanzania.1 As a result, little has been written about co-
 
1 K.R. Curtis, “Co-operation and Cooptation: The struggle for market control in the Bukoba district of colonial 
Tanganyika”, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 25, 3, (1992), 505-538; and S.M.L. Seimu, “The 






operative movements among the smallholder coffee farmers in Southern Tanzania. Historians such 
as Susan G. Rogers2 and Kenneth R. Curtis3 focused on the colonial agricultural marketing system 
in northern and north-western Tanzania, respectively. Rogers used the formation of Kilimanjaro 
Planters Association (KNPA) and its demise to show how African independent initiatives were 
hijacked by the colonial state to maintain its monopoly in marketing systems. KNPA was formed 
by coffee growers to protect their interest from exploitation. The colonial state relationship with 
KNPA changed from assistance (1923–25), neutrality (1926–27) to state intervention and 
manipulation (1928–32).4 KNPA was dissolved in 1931 due to its strength and independent 
tendencies in economic aspects and because it was seen as a political threat to the colonial state.5 
Similarly, Curtis focused on North-western Tanzania (Bukoba) and illustrated the relationship 
between the state, African and Asians traders and local politics. Both historians show that the 
colonial state aimed to eliminate intermediaries and centralise its monopoly in the marketing 
system. The colonial state was able to co-opt the African coffee producers’ initiatives into the 
marketing system. Drawing from Rogers and Curtis, this chapter goes further by analysing the 
dynamic relationships between a state, co-operative movements, and smallholder coffee producers 
in Southern Tanzania. 
Somo M.L. Seimu6 explores the growth of the coffee and cotton marketing co-operatives in the 
northern and north western provinces in Tanzania from 1932 to 1982. The study focuses on the 
formation of the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU) and Bukoba Co-operative Union 
(BCU) for coffee in Kilimanjaro and Kagera regions respectively. 
 
 
2 S.G. Rogers, “The Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association: Administrative Responses to Chagga Initiatives in the 
1920’s”, Transafrican Journal of History, Vol. 4, No. ½, (1974), 94-114. 
3 K.R. Curtis, “Co-operation and Cooptation”. 
4 S.G. Rogers, “The Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association”, 95. 
5 Ibid, 111. 
6 S.M.L. Seimu, “The Growth and Development of Coffee and Cotton marketing Co-operatives in Tanzania, c.1932-






The mentioned scholars failed to address adequately the historical development of the co-operative 
societies in the southern part of Tanzania. Seimo also analysed the formation of the Victoria 
Federation of Co-operative Unions for cotton marketing in the Western Cotton Growing Areas in 
the Lake Province. Although Seimu did a comparative study on coffee and cotton from 1932 to 
1982, his focus on north and north western Tanzania left the southern part of the country neglected 
in the history of the co-operative movement. Additionally, Seimu neglected the strained relationship 
between the co-operative societies and unions handling different crops – an aspect this chapter 
attempts to address by referring to the conflict between NGOMAT (tobacco) and Ngaka (coffee) 
societies. This chapter expands the analysis further by examining the co-operative movement in the 
Mbinga District focusing on the small coffee producers from the 1920s to the 2015.    Some have 
focused on peasant tobacco in the Songea District, specifically on the hegemony of the Ngoni-
Matengo Co-operative Marketing Union in the tobacco industry.7 Patrick M. Redmond8 and Hebert 
H. Ndomba focus on the complicated relationship between the state and African peasant tobacco 
production in the Ruvuma region from the early 1940s to the 1950s. By using Songea, Native 
Tobacco Board Ndomba argued that “the colonial state has created SONTOB to control tobacco 
production”.9 However, studies in the Ruvuma region ignored the dynamic relationship between 
co-operative societies and smallholder coffee producers. This chapter, therefore, draws and builds 
on both Redmond and Ndomba to draw out the conflicting relationship between NGOMAT and the 
Ngaka Coffee Society and its impact on smallholder coffee producers in the Mbinga District.  
This chapter attempts to fill this historiographic gap by tracing the history and influence of the 
coffee co-operative societies in Mbinga between the 1930s and 1976. It focuses on the first phase 
of the existence of co-operative societies in Tanzania before the dissolution in 1976. The chapter 
 
7 The most referred Co-operatives in Ruvuma region is the Ngoni-Matengo Co-operative Marketing Union Limited 
(NGOMAT) formed in 1936 to handle tobacco production and marketing in Ruvuma region; H.H. Ndomba, “A 
History of Tobacco Production in Ruvuma Region, Southern Tanzania, c. 1930-2016”, PhD Dissertation, 
Stellenbosch University, (2018); P.M. Redmond, “The NMCMU and Tobacco Production in Songea”, Tanzania 
Notes and Records, 79, (1976), 65-98. 
8 P.M. Redmond, “The NMCMU and Tobacco Production in Songea”. 






assesses the changes in the relationship between smallholder coffee farmers and co-operative 
societies in the Mbinga District over time. It argues that the rise of co-operative societies and its 
dynamic relationship to the coffee growers in the Mbinga District have influenced the development 
of smallholder coffee production and marketing in the district, particularly in the post-war period. 
It further argues that, despite the rhetoric that the imposition of the co-operative movement by the 
colonial authority in the 1930s was to eliminate the exploitation of the African coffee growers by 
the middlemen traders, the co-operative societies became the state instruments in controlling and 
monopolising coffee production and marketing in the Mbinga District. 
The chapter begins with contextualising a historical overview of co-operative societies in Tanzania 
between the 1920s and 1976. Secondly, it uses the Ngaka Coffee Co-operative Society and its 
subsequent relationship with NGOMAT to examine the emergence of co-operative movements in 
the Mbinga District between the 1930s and 1945. Thirdly, the chapter examines the co-operative 
movements in the post-war period, focusing on the formation of the Matengo Native Co-operative 
Union and its affiliated societies. Finally, the chapter assesses the challenges faced by the co-
operative movement and subsequent dissolution of the co-operative societies in 1976. Moreover, it 
also examines the reactions by the coffee farmers to conflicts emanating within and among the co-
operative societies between the 1930s and 1976. This chapter, therefore, analyses the rise of the co-
operative movement in colonial and early postcolonial Tanzania and its impact on the production 
and marketing of coffee, as well as its dynamic relationship with smallholder coffee farmers.  
3.2. Historical Overview of Co-operative Societies in Tanzania (1920s–1976) 
The history of coffee co-operative societies in Tanganyika started in the 1920s, specifically in the 
Northern Province in Kilimanjaro. The Chagga people established the Kilimanjaro Native Planters 
Association (KNPA) in 1925 to protect the interests of the African coffee growers against the 
middlemen who were mainly Asians. The formation of KNPA was opposed by both Indian traders 
and the colonial government to protect the interest of the white settlers. KNPA was the voice of 






Africans, was issued by the British governor Sir Donald Cameron.10 In 1931, KNPA was dissolved 
following the bankruptcy and the arrest of its leaders by order of the Provincial Commissioner for 
fraud.11 In 1932, the first co-operative union in Africa was formed, namely the Kilimanjaro Native 
Co-operative Union Limited (KNCU). KNCU was registered on 29 December 1933, following the 
enactment of the Co-operative Society Ordinance, 1932 (No. 7 of 1932).12 In 1936, Ngoni-Matengo 
Co-operative Marketing Union Limited (NGOMAT) was formed in the Songea District to handle 
tobacco production while the Bugufi Coffee Co-operative Society was formed in the Ngara 
District.13  
The period between the 1930s and 1940s was characterised by state control of the production and 
marketing of agricultural products. The co-operative societies were formed to promote agricultural 
production among Africans. This was facilitated through the appointment of the (non-African) Co-
operative Society managers and the registrar of co-operative societies to monitor the registration 
and administration of the African peasant Co-operative Societies. The formation of control Boards 
in the 1940s, such as Moshi Native Coffee Board (MNCB) and Songea Native Tobacco Board 
(SONTOB) in 1940, promoted the state monopoly of the production and marketing process. By 
1944, colonial Tanganyika had three co-operative unions (KNCU, NGOMAT, and Bugufi Co-
operative Union) dealing with coffee and tobacco. 
3.2.1. The rise of the Co-operative Societies in Tanzania, 1930–1976 
The development of co-operative societies in Tanzania (1930s–1976) can be divided into two major 
phases. The first phase covers the period from the 1930s to 1945, and the second phase from 1946 
 
10 TNA, H5/11160, Arabica Coffee Growing by Natives, Government Circular No. 77 of 1927, “Coffee Growing by 
Natives” from General Secretary, Dar es Salaam, Ref. No. S.M.P. No. 11160/15, to all Provincial Commissioners, 
20 December 1927. 
11 A. Coulson, Tanzania: A Political Economy, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 62.  
12 TNA, H1/19595, Agriculture General: Co-operative Societies Ordinance, (No. 7 of 1932).  
13 NRC, 249/ 27, Ngoni-Matengo Co-operative Marketing Union Limited, “Tanganyika Territory-Certificate of 
Registration No. 27”, 7 May 1936; TNA, H1/37192/Vol. II, Co-operative Development Annual Reports, 
Tanganyika Territory, Report on Cooperative Development for the Year 1948, (Dar es Salaam: The Government 






to 1976. During the first phase, there were only a few co-operative societies established, mainly for 
crop-production supervision and marketing. Coffee and tobacco were among the earliest crops to 
be handled by the co-operative societies. There were several forces that led to the establishment of 
the co-operative societies in Tanzania between the 1930s and 1945. 
One of the landmarks towards the establishment of the co-operative societies in colonial 
Tanganyika was the 1929 Memorandum by the Secretary of Native Affairs. The memorandum 
argued for the establishment of co-operative societies in Tanzania. During the conference of the 
senior administrative officers held in October 1929, the problems of marketing the African produce, 
including the lack of an organised marketing system and crop adulteration, were discussed. It was 
discovered that when marketing was failing, the petty dealers adulterated crops to recoup 
themselves for the losses they incurred.14 The conference recommended that these problems could 
be solved through a co-operative movement – a suggestion the government supported. Financial 
constraints, however, prevented the implementation of the recommendation.15  
The “Strickland’s Committee” of 1931 also played an important role in the development of co-
operative societies in the 1930s. The British colonial government secured the services of Mr C.F. 
Strickland, C.I.E. who had considerable experience of the co-operative movement in British 
colonies, including India, to advise on the application of the co-operative principle to local 
conditions. The committee held its meeting in the Northern and Tanga provinces. The committee 
recommended the need for adopting the co-operative marketing system in Tanganyika. The draft 
legislation to affect this was submitted to the government with some similarities to that of India and 
Ceylon. The legislation was enacted into a Co-operative Societies Ordinance in 1932.16 The Co-
 
14 TNA, H1/10138/Vol. I, System of Marketing of Produce, Marketing of Native Produce, a letter from the Director of 
Agriculture, Morogoro Ref. No. 3/8848 “Marketing of Native Crops”, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam, 
December 1931. 
15 TNA, H1/10138/Vol. I, System of Marketing of Produce, Marketing of Native Produce, 1927–1932. 
16 Tanganyika Territory, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report of the year 1931, (Dar es Salaam: The Government 
Press, 1932), 8; Colonial Office, Report by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Tanganyika Territory for the 






operative Society Ordinance was designed to ensure government control over the movement. The 
registrar was given a legal power over the co-operatives regarding registration, auditing, and 
liquidation.17 
The Colonial Development Fund (CDF) and the Carnegie Trust Fund also supported the promotion 
and development of Co-operative societies. The CDF was established by an Act of 1929 of the 
British Colonial Empire to finance economic developments in the colonies, protectorates and 
mandated territories in the form of grants or loans.18 Apart from promoting trade and industry in 
the United Kingdom, CDF was aimed to promote development through various schemes in 
agriculture and industry in the colonies. As explained before, the recommendations by some of the 
committees were not implemented due to financial problems. The government, therefore, applied 
for a grant from the Carnegie Trust (Carnegie Corporation of New York) to facilitate the Co-
operative Societies. Through the grant, the British colonial government was able to send Mr R.C. 
Northcote, District Officer, to attend a course in co-operative organisation in Ceylon from 
December 1934 to May 1935. Later, he proceeded to India and Burma for further investigation into 
the co-operative movement.19 On his return, he was able to survey various parts of the colony, 
assessing the possibilities of establishing co-operative societies.20 By using the Colonial 
Development Fund, some co-operative unions were able to borrow money for the development of 
Co-operative Societies. For instance, NGOMAT established a scheme No. 357 dealing with the 
 
17 TNA, HI/19595, Agriculture General: Co-operative Societies, The Co-operative Societies Ordinance, 1932, Sections 
9,18 &45. 
18 The Colonial Office, Report by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Tanganyika Territory for the Year 1935, 
Colonial No. 113, (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1936), 42. 
19 The Colonial Office, Report by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Tanganyika Territory for the Year 1934, 
Colonial No. 105, (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1935), 39. Mr Northcote played a consultative role in 
the organisation and formation of co-operative societies. 
20 In 1936 the British colonial government sent R.C. Northcote to North-western Tanzania to study the possibilities of 







development of African co-operative societies between 1935 and 1938. The sum of £1 253.14.6 
equivalent to Shs.25 074.45 was acquired as a loan, which was repaid through instalments.21  
Before 1936, the development of the was confined to the Northern Province, specifically to KNPA. 
The formation of societies in other areas was deferred due to lack of resources (both human and 
capital) to facilitate the co-operative movement, including the training of co-operative officers by 
visiting countries with experience in co-operatives, such as India and Ceylon. The 1932 Co-
operative Societies Ordinance was enacted with no Co-operative Development Department and 
staff to deal with the co-operative matters. For instance, the first District Officer (Assistant 
Registrar) of the co-operative societies in the Songea District, including Mbinga, was only 
appointed in 1936.22 
After 1936, the rate of registering new co-operative societies was slow, and even the few established 
societies were not operating independently from private firms. The colonial government was 
nervous about promoting co-operative societies following the coffee riots in Kilimanjaro and 
Kagera in 1937.23 The war conditions (WWII) also acted as an inhibiting factor for the promotion 
of co-operative societies. This was demonstrated by the slow progress during the war period. 
Among the reasons was the scarcity of enough staff and funds. Some of the co-operative officers 
were assigned war tasks. For instance, in 1940, the Department of Agriculture suffered labour 
shortage following the release of 17 officers for military service to the extent that a call was made 
 
21 TNA, 155/C/2/2, Native Affairs Co-operative Societies Songea District Vol. III. 
22 TNA, 155/C 2/2, Native Affairs- Co-operative Societies Songea District, Vol. III, The assistant registrar of co-
operative societies (District Officer) Songea, January 1937. 
23 Coffee riots in Kilimanjaro in 1937 was a result of several factors: compulsory coffee sales through the Union under 
the Chagga Rule of 1934; the low coffee price for African-produced coffee compared to German settler-produced 
coffee; the deductions from the years’ payments; Fabian Colonial Bureau, Co-operation in the Colonies: A Report 
from the Special Committee to the Fabian Colonial Bureau (London: Gorge Allen & Unwin Limited, 1945), 77-79; 
The “Twaiyanga” resistance in Bukoba in 1937 was aimed at opposing the imposition of the coffee rules on Robusta 
coffee growers; K.R. Curtis, “Cooperation and Cooptation”; Speech by Lord Winster in the House of Lords, 
Tanganyika Hansard of 29 February 1944, Vol.130, cc1012-32 available at 






in May 1940 for the release of the officers from military services.24 There were 48 co-operative 
societies in 1939, and by 1945 they increased to 51 co-operatives.25 The British colonial government 
had more focus on serving the war by directing most of the capital in terms of both human and 
finance to the war requirements.  
Opposition to the co-operative movement also emerged from Indian merchants from all over the 
territory. They opposed the enactment of the Co-operative Societies Ordinance of 1932. Indians 
intermediaries deemed the co-operative society’s legislation as a device to eliminate them.26 During 
the Indian merchants’ chambers conference held between 29 and 31 October 1933, the Indian 
community complained of having no representation in the marketing organising committee, 
appointed by the government in 1931, to consider the marketing scheme, the recommendations of 
which resulted in the enactment of the co-operative ordinance of 1932.27 The ordinance was seen 
as a way of controlling the import and export business and creating a monopoly for the government. 
The conference urged the government to repeal the ordinance as soon as possible.28 The ordinance 
was not repealed, and African smallholder coffee producers continued to establish co-operative 
societies in various places in the territory. An anti-Indian campaign was launched in Bukoba were 
Indian traders were buying Robusta Coffee. The Daily Tanganyika Herald of 23 October 1934, 
under the heading “Bukoba Indians in Danger”, reported how the coffee growers attacked Indian 
shops with bows and spears in trying to drive them away because they were allegedly not paying 
the growers a fair price for their coffee.29 
 
24 Tanganyika Territory, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report of the year 1940, (Dar es Salaam: The Government 
Press, 1941), 8. 
25 P. Ngeze, Ushirika Tanzania, (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1975), 15.  
26 TNA, H1/19595 Vol. II, Agriculture General: Co-operative Societies Ordinance, The Daily Tanganyika Herald, 
“Cooperative Societies Legislation: a device for eliminating Indians”, 11 October 1934. 
27 TNA, H1/19595 Vol. II, Agriculture General: Co-operative Societies Ordinance, Extract from the proceedings of the 
Indian Merchant Chambers Conference held at Dar es Salaam, 29, 30 and 31 October 1933. 
28 Ibid.  
29 TNA, H1/19595 Vol. II, Agriculture General: Co-operative Societies Ordinance, The Daily Tanganyika Herald, 23 






After the Second World War, there was a significant development in the co-operative movement in 
Tanzania. The British colonial government took deliberate initiatives to promote the co-operative 
movement in her colonies as a means of economic development, particularly in cash-crop 
production. There were various forces behind the colonial government’s decision in promoting the 
co-operative movement in post-war Tanzania. 
Firstly, the United Nations Conference in 1943 at Hot Springs, Virginia, on Food and Agriculture, 
stressed the improvement of agricultural production in all countries. Among the adopted 
recommendations during the conference was the encouragement of the co-operative movements in 
which members could work under the guidance and recommendations made through their co-
operative societies.30 The co-operative societies were supposed to operate in the interest of the 
members and the society in general. It was recommended that the legal and institutional obstacles 
be examined to make it possible.31 The conference also recommended education programs and 
improvements in marketing facilities, as well as increasing the efficiency and reducing the cost of 
marketing.32 
Secondly, the 1944 Campbell Report also played a role in promoting the co-operative movement. 
The Colonial Office sent Mr W.K.H. Campbell to investigate the possibilities of promoting the co-
operative movement in East African countries. Among his recommendations was the formation of 
co-operative societies by growers. However, he realised that growers did not have the knowledge 
to be able to form and run the co-operative societies without government support. Similarly, in 
Kenya, he also recommended the use of trained staff and the establishment of a separate Co-
operative Department to assist in these processes.33 Campbell also realised the potential dangers of 
returning World War II soldiers and their nationalist sentiments to the continued control of the 
 
30 The United States, United Conference on Food and Agriculture: Hot Springs, Virginia, May 18 – June 3, 1943: Final 
Act and Section Reports, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), 20. Resolution XVII was devoted to the 
Co-operative Movements. 
31 Ibid., 20. 
32 Ibid., 20-21, 28-30. 
33 Fabian Colonial Bureau, A Report from Special Committee to the Fabian Colonial Bureau: Co-operation in the 






colonial power. He, therefore, recommended the accommodation of these soldiers into the Co-
operative Societies. Against the background of these recommendations, the colonial government 
embarked on the promotion and development of the co-operative movement in the post-war period 
in Tanganyika. 
The 1944 Campbell report coincided with the Fabian Colonial Bureau Report to the Colonial Office 
in 1945.34 The report recommended the need to have a suitable co-operative law in the colonies and 
to have a fully trained registrar of co-operative societies with adequate power of control. The report 
also recommended the importance of establishing the Co-operative Advisory Committee in the 
Colonial Office and Co-operative Department.35 The Advisory Committee was aimed at examining 
the co-operative position and making recommendations to the Secretary of State.36 A Model Co-
operative Ordinance was also recommended to be drafted on efficiently elastic lines to cover the 
diverse conditions of British colonies. The British were expected to offer practical assistance in 
promoting the co-operative movements through technical assistance to colonial officers, allocation 
of scholarships to enable students to study in English at co-operative colleges such as 
Loughborough Co-operative College in England, visiting European countries with special co-
operative experiences, as well as raising funds for the co-operative movements in the colonies.37 
The recommendations made by the Special Committee influenced the British colonial policy in 
encouraging the co-operative movement after WWII. For instance, in 1947 the Co-operative 
 
34 A special committee was established in 1941 to investigate the position of the Co-operative Movement in British 
dependencies and encourage the future development of the movements. Members of the committee included Lord 
Winster (Chairman), Dr. N. Barou, Neil Beaton (chairman of the Scottish CWS), Sir Malcom Darling (Formerly 
Registrar of Co-operative Societies in Punjab), Margareth Digby (Secretary of the Horace Plunkett Foundation), 
R.G. Gosling (Director of the CWS), C.W. Greenidge (Secretary of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection 
Society), A. Creech Jones, MP, Percy Redfern, Rev. G.S. Woods, MP (Executive member of the Co-operative 
Union), Leonard Woolf, Dr. Rita Hinden (Editor and Secretary of the Fabian Colonial Bureau). The Fabian Society 
emerged in 1884 and became influential in UK politics, particularly with the formation of the Labour Party in 1900s. 
Fabian Society members dominated the 1945 parliament election where 229 were elected and become part of the 
ministers in the Atlee Administrative Reforms of 1945 under Labour government; www.fabian.org.uk.about-
us/ourhistory accessed on 29 may 2019. 
35 Fabian Colonial Bureau, A Report from Special Committee to the Fabian Colonial Bureau, 1945, 166. 
36 Ibid.  







Advisor, B. Surridge, who served as Registrar of Co-operatives in Cyprus between 1934 and 1943 
and later as the vice-chair of the Trustee of the Plunkett Foundation, was appointed by the Colonial 
Office. 
The victory of the Labour Party in Britain (1945) and the loss of India as one of the important 
sources of the British economy in 1947, prompted a sudden shift of focus and attention to African 
and Caribbean colonies. This coincided with the appointment of Arthur Creech Jones (a member in 
the Special Committee of the Fabian Colonial Bureau) as the Secretary of State for colonies who 
encouraged the changes in the colonies, including the development of co-operatives. As a result, 
the Co-operative Departments were established in the colonies to foster the development of the co-
operatives. 
Consequently, through these committee reports and recommendations, the colonial government 
made a great shift in the economic development policy in the post-war period by intervening in the 
development of the co-operative movement in Tanganyika. Marketing of African produce offered 
the first step in the co-operative movement in Tanganyika as there was a growing demand for more 
marketing societies. Marketing of African produce was organised in some districts by the 
administrative officers, and special accounts in the “Native” Treasuries were operated for this 
purpose; this was looked upon as an interim step to the formation of co-operative societies.38 
The Co-operative Legislation was amended in 1945 to allow the establishment of the Co-operative 
Department.39 The registrar of the co-operative societies, who was also the Director of Land and 
Mines, excused himself from Land and Mines to exclusively work on Co-operative Societies’ 
matters under the Department of Co-operatives housed in the same building in Dar es Salaam. In 
May 1947, the registrar’s office was relocated to Moshi where there were more co-operative 
societies. The office was relocated back to Dar es Salaam on 11 September 1953.40  
 
38 TNA, H1/37192 Vol. II, Co-operative Development Annual Reports, Tanganyika Territory, Report on Cooperative 
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39 TNA, H1/37192 Vol. II, Co-operative Development Annual Reports, Tanganyika Territory, Report on Cooperative 
Development for the Year 1948, (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1949), 1.  






The registrar of Co-operative Societies drafted a bill for the control and marketing of African 
produce under which Control Boards were formed in 1947. The function of Control Boards formed 
under such legislation was to foster the growth of agricultural and animal industries and to organise 
bulk sales. The co-operative movement was directly linked to such work. The boards assisted in the 
promotion of marketing societies and handing over functions such as the co-operative supply of 
consumer goods to societies that proved themselves able to undertake the work. 
Consequently, 16 new marketing societies with African membership were registered during 1947, 
making a total of 55 African marketing societies in colonial Tanganyika.41 In 1948, the number of 
co-operative marketing societies increased to 62 (58 African, two all races, and two African co-
operative unions). Of these, 56 were principally engaged in the collection and bulking of export 
crops (39 in coffee, and 17 in fire-cured tobacco) while the remaining six were engaged in crops 
consumed locally.42 Apart from marketing co-operatives societies, there were 15 other societies 
classified as follows: three consumers societies (two by Europeans and one by Indians), five credit 
societies (Indians), one bulk purchase (traders) society (African), one bulk (butchers) society 
(African), and one transporters society (African). No society was yet formed for the express purpose 
of exporting produce; however, Tanganyika Coffee Growers’ Association Limited acted as agents 
for the sale of all mild coffee under contract with the Ministry of Food – and NGOMAT affected 
export sales of heavy western fire-cured tobacco with the advice and assistance of the Songea 
District Native Tobacco Board.43 The total value of the crops marketed through societies in 1948 
amounted to approximately £990 000.44 The co-operative movement reached its zenith between the 
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1950s and 1960s. The marketing co-operative societies in Tanzania increased from 62 in 194845, 
117 in 195346 to 243 with 196 775 members in 1954, operating in seven of the eight territorial 
provinces.47  
After independence (1961), the co-operative movement intensified, and the number of registered 
co-operatives increased. In this period, the movement was dominated by problems related to 
mismanagement and corruption. As a result, the Special Presidential Committee of Enquiry was 
launched on 26 January 1966 to review the co-operative staff and structures of the co-operative 
movement and marketing boards in order to recommend the steps to be taken to ensure the 
maximum benefit to producers and consumers. The Committee Report identified co-operative 
shortcomings, including the lack of democracy at union level, lack of skilled workforce, the 
susceptibility of political interference, and uninformed memberships.48 One of the 
recommendations was the dissolution of some unions such as the Victoria Federation of Co-
operative Unions (VFCU) and Tanganyika Co-operative Trading Agency (TACTA) engaging in 
mild coffee sales since 1952. Following the Special Presidential Committee of Enquiry Report of 
1966, a substantial number of co-operative societies were dissolved between 1966 and 1976 when 
all co-operative societies in Tanzania were finally dissolved. For instance, in 1966, there were 1 616 
active co-operatives, and 122 were dissolved. The rate increased to 1 854 active co-operatives with 
275 dissolved in 1971.49 In future, villages were to perform the co-operative functions in the 
production and marketing of crops. 
 
45 Ibid. 
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48 The United Republic of Tanzania (URT), Report of the Presidential Special Committee of Enquiry into Co-operative 
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3.3. The Co-operative Movement in Mbinga District, 1930s–1945 
The history of the Co-operative movement in the Mbinga District can be divided into three phases: 
the first phase covers the period between 1930 and 1945, characterised by the formation of the 
Ngaka Co-operative Society and its relationship with NGOMAT. The post-war co-operative 
movement in the Mbinga District (1946–1953), characterised by the emergence of more co-
operative societies and the demand for a co-operative union was the second phase, and the third 
phase was dominated by the Matengo Native Co-operative Union Limited between1954 and 1976.  
3.3.1. The Formation of the Ngaka Co-operative Society in the 1930s  
The history of co-operative societies in the Mbinga District has its roots in the Ngaka Co-operative 
Society that operated in Matengo Highlands from the 1930s. As mentioned in Chapter Two, two 
men from Myangayanga, namely Hendrich and Karistus, attended a one-year course at Moshi in 
1933. This culminated in a spontaneous desire for the formation of a co-operative organisation in 
1934 to control coffee marketing, to foster good cultivation and to disseminate knowledge. The 
temporary meeting centre to discuss problems concerning coffee growers was located at Wallanzi.50 
One of the problems discussed was the lack of a mouthpiece through which coffee growers could 
speak in one voice about their coffee. The coffee growers in Umatengo decided to formalise the 
informal organisation at Ngaka (currently Kindimba village) with the hope of registering it as a 
coffee co-operative society. The co-operative society operated informally until 1936 when the 
Ngoni-Matengo Marketing Co-operative Union Limited (NGOMAT) was formed. NGOMAT was 
formed mainly to deal with tobacco in Ungoni and Umatengo. The registrar sanctioned NGOMAT 
to act as a marketing agent for Matengo coffee following the provision of Rule 16 of the Co-
 
50 Interview with Pilmin Lupogo, Kindimba Village, 9 January 2019. A smallholder coffee producer and a former 
Ngaka Coffee Society official (1957-1977, 1983-1993) also a Chairman of Ngaka Savings and Credit Co-operative 
Society (2007-2019); Tanganyika Territory, Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1934, (Dar es Salaam: The 






operative Societies Rules, 1932, even though the coffee growers were not a society affiliated to the 
union. 
Although Ngaka Co-operative Society was formed in the early 1930s, based on the example of the 
Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU), it remained unregistered up to the late 1940s. 
One of the reasons was the colonial government’s attitudes towards the co-operative movement, as 
explained before. This attitude prevailed until 1945. The Ngaka coffee society tried several times 
to apply for registration but to no avail. The government was reluctant to register the society. In 
1938 the Ngaka Co-operative Society applied for registration with the drafting of several by-laws 
to guide the society – a requirement of the 1932 Co-operative Societies Ordinance. The application 
was rejected because the content of some of the by-laws were deemed unacceptable. For instance, 
By-Law 30 stated that,  
Members may sell their coffee wherever they so desire except that any member who is in debt 
to the society shall deliver to the society or if so directed by the committee to the NGOMAT 
Co-operative Marketing Union, Limited, such amount of coffee grown by him to be marketed 
by the NGOMAT Marketing Union, Limited, as shall in the opinion of the society be 
sufficient to liquidate the said member’s debt.51  
This by-law was seen as only encouraging members to sell their coffee through the society when 
they were indebted to the society. The by-law was, therefore, considered unsuitable.  
The rejection of the Ngaka Co-operative Society registration did not go unnoticed by the coffee 
growers in Matengo Highlands. They wanted to know why other societies dealing with tobacco in 
Mbinga were allowed to be registered while the application of the coffee growers was rejected. 
They, therefore, questioned the registration of tobacco co-operative societies, namely Lipumba Co-
operative Society in 1937 and Mbinga Co-operative Society in the same year. On 14 June 1937, 
two applications for registration of Lipumba and Mbinga Co-operatives were submitted to the 
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registrar of co-operative societies, Dar es Salaam, and both were approved.52 Their unregistered 
status demoralised the Matengo coffee growers as it demonstrated a bias and unequal treatment by 
the colonial authorities of the co-operative movement in the district. 
The coffee growers in the Matengo Highlands reacted in different ways towards using NGOMAT 
as their marketing channel and agent. One of the reactions was a decline in the number of co-
operative members who sold their coffee through Ngaka Co-operative Society during the 1938/39 
season. Society members who marketed their coffee crop through the society declined from 60 in 
1937/38 to only 15 members in 1938/39.53 There were also signs of neglected coffee plantings in 
Matengo Highlands. The coffee growers considered the union (NGOMAT) as part of the 
exploitative organ created by the colonial state as they considered it to favour the Asian traders.  
By the late 1930s, the bulk of Matengo coffee was sold locally, primarily to the Benedictine mission 
and local traders, while the remainder was marketed through NGOMAT and sold on markets such 
as London. For instance, part of the 1936 (24 coffee bags) crop was placed on the London market 
for the first time and was sold as follows: Grade “A’ (10 bags) sold for Shs.72/- per cwt., Grade 
“B” (10 bags) for Shs.52/- per Cwt., Grade “C” (1 bag) Shs.46/- per Cwt., “PB” (2 bags) for Shs.60/- 
per Cwt., and Triage (1 bag) Shs.40/- per Cwt. All prices were in London Landed Terms.54 The 
coffee growers had to pay an agency levy and commission to NGOMAT. The coffee levy and 
commission were needed to offset clerical work. The union incurred no costs in this regard as they 
had no processing work to perform with regard to the coffee, and all charges, stationery, postage 
and telegrams regarding coffee were debited directly to the coffee account. Despite that, the 
commission was 2 ½ % of the net proceedings while a levy of 5 cents per kilogram was paid in 
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1936/37 and 1937/38.55 The levy was reduced to a nominal one cent per kilogram in 1939 due to 
the poor price received for the 1938/39 crop.56 The small amount of one cent per kilo barely covered 
the time of the manager and secretary of NGOMAT to prepare the accounts. Growers were paid 40 
cents for parchment grade I and 36 cents for grade II.57 The levy rate was increased to 3 cents per 
kilogram in 1942.58 
The outbreak of the Second World War further delayed the Ngaka Coffee Co-operative Society 
registration process. As already shown in Chapter One, the war period affected the co-operative 
movement. The colonial state centralised and monopolised the marketing system under the Control 
Board and Coffee Control (Sales) Order of 1940. In 1940, the registrar (Dar es Salaam) commented 
that he was “of opinion that the Ngaka Society should not yet be registered and that the Union 
(NGOMAT) should continue to sell the coffee merely as its agent.”59 Although the registration of 
the Ngaka Coffee Co-operative Society was postponed, when the union acted as agent (and 
collected levy and/or commission), the coffee was regarded as the property of an organised, 
although unregistered, body, and not that of individual growers. In 1942, the registrar of co-
operative societies further discouraged the registration of the society when he stated that the “Ngaka 
society is not a member of the union and should not become one. The main activity of the union is 
the sale of tobacco and should the Ngaka Society join at the present time certain complications may 
arise”.60 This illustrated the ultimate power given to the registrar in the registration process. As a 
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result, Ngaka Co-operative Society remained a “stepchild” to NGOMAT, and this affected their 
relationship as explained in the following section.  
3.3.2. “NGOMAT is dealing with tobacco and not coffee”: The Relationship 
between Coffee Growers (Ngaka) and NGOMAT in the 1940s  
NGOMAT was registered for tobacco marketing in Ungoni and Mbinga areas in 1936. Coffee 
growers in the Mbinga District had an association with NGOMAT through the Ngaka Coffee Co-
operative Society. The fact that the Ngaka Co-operative Society was not affiliated to the union 
widened the distance between the coffee growers and NGOMAT. The registrar considered the 
position of NGOMAT as an agent for the sale of coffee as a favour to the coffee growers. This was 
revealed when the registrar of the co-operative societies, on 25 August 1942, wrote to the manager 
of NGOMAT that:  
If they do not like to use the Union as their agent, they need not, but of course it is most 
convenient for them to have the services of the Union and more particularly those of the Manager 
at such a low cost. In future, however, a fee or agency commission should be charged by the 
Union, if not the coffee growers are receiving an economic price for their coffee.61  
The relationship between NGOMAT and Ngaka coffee society deteriorated in the 1940s. There was 
friction over the focus of the union on tobacco instead of coffee in the Mbinga District. The coffee 
growers in the Matengo Highlands also received conflicting instructions. The coffee instructors 
were encouraging the expansion of coffee growing while the tobacco instructors were encouraging 
the expansion of tobacco cultivation. This caused confusion among the coffee growers.62 The Ngaka 
Coffee Society found itself having no voice in the union. The archival sources also express the 
conflicting interest between the expansion of tobacco and other crops, which can be traced back to 
the late 1930s. There was a confrontation between the Department of Agriculture in the Songea 
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District and NGOMAT about the expansion of tobacco into Undendeule and Umatengo in 1938.63 
As a result, in 1940, the colonial government held an inquiry into the tobacco industry in Songea 
which uncovered the frustration of members of the Department of Agriculture with their declining 
influence in the tobacco industry, and the clash of personalities of those interested in co-operation. 
The inquiry recommended that the government place NGOMAT in the hands of a tobacco board 
dominated by government officials. The NGOMAT manager, Mr A.E. Twells was replaced by the 
assistant Agricultural Officer Mr J.N. MacGregor.64 The tension led to the creation of the Songea 
Native Tobacco Board, which was termed as “a mere puppet” of the Department of Agriculture to 
control tobacco production.65 The growing tension between NGOMAT and the Department of 
Agriculture also accelerated the conflict with coffee growers in the Mbinga District.  
By the 1940s, the tension between the union (NGOMAT) and Ngaka Coffee Society intensified to 
the extent that the union refused to handle coffee from Ngaka Coffee Society for the 1942/43 and 
1943/44 crops. The District Agricultural Officer informed the Ngaka Coffee Society as follows: 
“NGOMAT has been dealing with the marketing of Matengo coffee in the past because you had no 
ability to do so, but this year NGOMAT will not deal with your coffee”.66 The refusal came at a 
time when the coffee society was still struggling with the registration process, which had been 
delayed and discouraged by the colonial authorities. The coffee growers did not get any promising 
support from either the registrar of the co-operatives or NGOMAT. On 23 September 1943, the 
chairman of Ngaka Coffee Society wrote a letter to the union (NGOMAT) to ask about the price of 
the 1943 coffee crop. The feedback was “… chama kubwa kinahusika na kazi za vyama vya 
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tumbaku tu siyo na chama cha kahawa”, translated loosely as “the union is dealing with tobacco 
only and not coffee”.67  
This strained relationship was created by the refusal of NGOMAT to deal with the marketing of the 
Matengo coffee in the early 1940s. The result was the emergence of a coffee “black market” in 
Mbinga. It was reported by the Provincial Commissioner (Southern Province) that, in 1944, 19.13 
tons of coffee were exported from Lindi.68 The only source from which this coffee could come was 
Songea. Considering the tonnage, it was not a single year crop but was the result of the accumulation 
of coffee stocks from different years by the local traders in Songea district. The 1944 coffee crop 
that amounted to 11 tons were bought by Songea local traders. The problem with the local market 
was that the traders were not honest. The agricultural officer reported that in 1945, he prosecuted 
one of the largest coffee dealers in Songea for not reporting the information regarding his coffee 
dealings.69 The figure obtained from various Indian traders’ dukas in Mbinga and Songea can be 
summarised in the following table: 
Table 6: Coffee Stock in Mbinga and Songea Indian Shops (dukas) 1944/4570 
Name Place  Amount of coffee (Bags) 
Gulamhausen Jadhavi Mbinga  1 
Mohamed Ali Juma Mbinga  8 
Abdul Moossin Mohamed Mbinga  2 ½  
Gulamali Jadhavi Mbinga  ½  
Hausen Jadhavi Mbinga  1 
Gulamhausen Jadhavi Songea  32 
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Lajal Ladha Dimani Songea  40 
Lzde Souya Songea  55 
Total  140 Bags 
The 140 coffee bags showed in Table 6 were only the stock found in Indian shops (1944/45). They 
should not be taken as the actual total figure of all coffee bought by private retail sellers. Some of 
them refused to give any information about their coffee dealings. For instance, the District Officer 
reported that one of the largest coffee dealers in Mbinga (among those in the list) refused to give 
information about his coffee sales.71  
The deteriorated relationship between NGOMAT and Ngaka Coffee Society accelerated 
competition among private coffee traders in the 1940s. According to section 12 of the Coffee 
Industry (Registration and Improvement) Ordinance, 1936, traders did not need a license to buy 
coffee from registered planters for their own consumption or for retail sale.72 As a consequence, 
there were increasing competitions among local traders to buy the crop in the early 1940s. Coffee 
marketing in the Mbinga District was a complicated matter. While NGOMAT refused to act as an 
agent for the Matengo coffee, the applications for buyers and dealers’ licenses under the Coffee 
(Registration and Improvement) Ordinance received by the Agricultural Officer, Songea were 
rejected. Up to 1944, not a single license had been granted under the ordinance to the coffee buyers 
in the Mbinga District for wholesale or export. The coffee could only be bought directly from the 
growers for local retail trade and for private consumption by missions. Coffee was disposed of in a 
haphazard manner, regardless of the standard or quality. For instance, in 1944/45, approximately 
11 tons had been purchased by local traders at the price of one shilling per kilogram of the ungraded 
hulled coffee.73 The traders had no dealers’ license for trading coffee wholesale.  
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NGOMAT resumed marketing the Matengo coffee crop in 1945 through Rungwe Co-operative 
Society (Southern Highlands) where the coffee was hulled and graded and then exported to 
Johannesburg in South Africa. Fifteen tons of coffee were sold to the South African Committee of 
Coffee Importers.74 NGOMAT continued to play the role of an agent in the post-war period up to 
1954 when the Matengo Native Co-operative Union Limited was formed. Despite the strained 
relationship between Ngaka Coffee Society and NGOMAT in the early 1940s, the number of coffee 
growers increased from 487 in 194275 to 1 478 in 1947.76 The number of coffee trees also increased 
from 90 988 in 194277 to 246 735 in 194778, and 995 556 in 1952.79 Coffee production increased 
from 12 tons in 1941 to 32 tons in 1947 and 55 tons in 1949.80 
3.4. Co-operative Movement in Mbinga District 1946–1953 
The post-war period was the heyday of the co-operative movement in the colonies. The British 
colonial government embarked on the promotion of co-operatives societies. As a result, in 1947, 
the Ngaka Coffee Co-operative Society was re-registered as Mbinga Coffee Grower’s Co-operative 
Society Limited based at Mbinga Township.81 Coffee growers later complained about the distance 
between the coffee growing areas and the Co-operative Headquarters. The Mbinga Township also 
had few coffee growers. They agitated for the transfer of the headquarters to Ngaka where it used 
to be before the re-registration under the name of Mbinga Coffee Grower’s Co-operative Society 
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Limited.82 In 1951 the headquarters was moved to Mkinga. This coincided with the decision to 
rename the Co-operative the Ngaka Coffee Co-operative Society, the name they maintained until 
1976 when all co-operative societies were dissolved by the government.83  
From the 1950s onwards, the Mbinga District experienced a significant expansion in coffee 
production. The expansion was credited to the higher price for the mild coffee, determined by the 
Ministry of Food (£456 per ton in 1951),84 increased plantings, improved methods of coffee 
management, and planting of heavier bearing strains.85 The increasing number of coffee producers 
and acreage demanded more co-operative societies in the district. As a result, on 10 July 1952, the 
Pilakano Coffee Growers Co-operative Limited was registered in addition to the Ngaka Coffee 
Society.86 In 1952, the two Coffee Growers Co-operatives (Ngaka and Pilakano) also borrowed six 
instructors from the Moshi Native Coffee Board who toured the coffee-growing areas for six 
months.87 The borrowed coffee instructors were distributed among Myangayanga, Litembo and 
Pilakano areas, two to each station.88 As a result, the improvement in the preparation of coffee was 
immediately visible, and coffee sold through Tanganyika Co-operative Trading Agency (TACTA) 
on the Moshi auctions fetched higher prices than that of other co-operative societies. The Ngaka 
coffees were sold for Shs.4/45 per lb. equal to £498 per ton and Pilakano coffees fetched Shs.4/22 
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per lb. while Rungwe Co-operative Society (Southern Highlands) coffees fetched Shs.4/20 per lb.89 
The two societies (Ngaka and Pilakano) collected 134 tons parchment in 1951.90 
 In 1953, the number of co-operative members increased to 3 620, of which Ngaka had 2 603 
members and Pilakano 1 017 members.91 There was an increasing demand for establishing more 
co-operative societies. The expansion of coffee production in the Matengo Highlands increased the 
distance to the two existing co-operative societies. As a result, Mhagawa Asili Coffee Grower’s 
Co-operative Society Limited was registered in 1952, splitting from Ngaka Coffee Growers’ Co-
operative Society.92 The three co-operatives handled about 300 tons of coffee in 1952 and 1953.93 
In the 1953/54 coffee crop, the three coffee co-operative societies handled a total of 6 376 ½ coffee 
bags equivalent to 331 584kg (Ngaka 80 528kg), Pilakano (98 228kg), Mhagawa (152 828kg).94 
The expansion of coffee production demanded the formation of a co-operative union. The next 
section discusses the formation of the union. 
3.5. The Matengo Native Co-operative Union Limited (MANCU) (1954–1970s) 
MANCU Limited was established in 1954 with its objective of marketing the Matengo coffee crop. 
The headquarters of the union was at Mkinga, following the construction of a central coffee store 
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in 1953. To coffee growers in the Mbinga District, the formation of MANCU Limited was regarded 
as a new era of independence from the unstable marketing relationship with NGOMAT in the 1940s. 
This was expressed at the Co-operative General Meeting held on 15 June 1953, discussing the 
construction of the central coffee store. During the meeting, elders recommended a lamb and 
chickens to be slaughtered at the construction sites as a symbol of offerings according to Matengo 
customs. The Matengo chief, Yohanes Chrisostomus Makita, offered a lamb while each headman 
contributed one chicken. Apart from those contributions, every coffee co-operative society 
contributed Shs.25 000/- (Ngaka, Pilakano, and Mhagawa Asili) for a total of Shs.75 000/- for the 
construction expenses.95  
The formation of MANCU Limited acted as a catalyst to the co-operative movement and expansion 
of coffee production in the Mbinga District. For instance, in 1955, Hagati Coffee Grower’s Co-
operative Society Limited was formed, splitting from Mhagawa Asili Coffee Grower’s Co-
operative Society Limited. The number of coffee producers was also increasing from 1 478 in 1947 
to 6 300 in 1955: Ngaka 1 400, Pilakano, 1 400, Mhagawa, 1 900, Hagati, 1 600.96 Three co-
operative societies were registered in 1957, namely Mtuwa , Wukiro, and Nyoni Coffee Growers’ 
Co-operative Society Limited for a total of seven co-operative societies and 6 593 members.97 The 
union had assets of £67 756 consisting of £55 807 as share capital, reserves and surpluses and 
£11 949 as fixed assets.98  
MANCU Limited established a coffee culture section that comprised of coffee officers performing 
various duties in the coffee industry in the Mbinga District. The section consisted of a senior coffee 
instructor, assistant senior coffee instructor, and ten coffee instructors. Their duties were to inspect 
coffee farms and nurseries, to do training and give warnings, to guide the selection of coffee trees 
 
95 TNA, 155/CO-OP/27/X, Maendeleo ya Umatengo Mkinga Factory Umatengo, Mkutano wa Ukulima 17 June 1953. 
96 NRC, 532/265/D, Matengo Native Co-operative Union Limited: Affiliated Societies Accounts and Estimates, from 
Co-operative Officer, Songea, Ref. No. 91/16, to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Dar es Salaam, 7 
November 1957. 
97 Tanganyika Territory, Annual Reports of Provincial Commissioners for the year 1957, (Dar es Salaam: The 
Government Printer, 1958), 117. 






for a better seed, to supervise coffee processing (picking, pulping, fermenting, drying and sorting), 
coffee pests and disease control, coffee grading in primary societies. They also noted farmers’ 
concerns about farming implements and submitted it to the Co-operative Union. 
In 1958, the co-operative movement in the Mbinga District took a different turn by establishing the 
Probationary Co-operative Store at Ngima. This was the first experimental co-operative society 
among the coffee growers in the Mbinga District. The store was registered on 18 August 1958 to 
supply foodstuffs, clothes, pesticides/fungicides, and agricultural implements to the members and 
non-members. Ngima African Probationary Co-operative Store Limited was registered under the 
Co-operative Societies Ordinance, Cap.211, Laws of Tanganyika 1947. Different from coffee 
grower’s co-operative societies, the probationary society had unlimited liability. This means that 
the members could be called upon to meet the societies debts in full and above the value of the 
shares which they held in the society. The co-operative store was financed by the share capital of 
its members. The nominal value of a share was Shs.50/- from 1958 to 1963. The value of shares 
was considered too high by the coffee growers. As a result, by 28 February 1961, the society had 
only 80 members.99 The agitations on the value of shares were presented and discussed during the 
special general meeting on 19 June 1963. An amendment was registered and approved to reduce 
the nominal value of a share to Shs.25/-.100  
Between the 1950s and independence eve, the Mbinga District experienced a massive registration 
of coffee growers’ co-operative societies. The number of co-operatives increased from a single 
coffee co-operative society in 1950 to 15 in 1961. This spike was also reflected in the increasing 
number of co-operative members in the district, as well as coffee-production outputs (tonnage). 
Table 7 summarises this growth in the co-operative movement.  
 
99 NRC, 387/PROB/17, Ngima African Probationary Co-operative Store, from Ngima African Probationary Co-
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Dissolved Membership  Coffee (tons) 
1950 1 - NA 110 
1951 2 - NA 135 
1952 2 - NA 300 
1953 3 - 3 620 332 
1954 3 - 3 620 390 
1955 4 - 6 300 490 
1956 4 - 5 630 597 
1957 7 - 6 593 630 
1958 8 - 6 091 634 
1959 9 - 7 122 1 056 
1960 14 - NA 1 135 
1961 15 1 NA 1 500 
On 27 November 1961, the Co-operative Union of Tanganyika (CUT) was registered. The 
formation of CUT can be traced back to 1947 when it started its founding phase. The CUT’s duties 
included the promotion of the work of existing African co-operative societies, the organisation of 
further societies, training of staff, provision of accountancy and audit, bulk purchase and sale, and 
the provision of co-operative education and propaganda. Training of co-operative staff and 
instruction in co-operative practice were some of the chief needs of the co-operative movement, 
which was not possible for the registrar to provide in the late 1940s owing to insufficient staff. 
Evidence suggests that African societies who were not members of unions were ineffective in 
matters of accountancy and business procedure. By joining the territorial union, the necessary 
assistance could be provided.102  
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The registration of CUT was regarded as an important landmark in the history of the co-operative 
movement in Tanganyika. Coffee produce formed the largest part (55%) of the crops handled by 
the co-operative societies in 1960.103 It coincided with the attainment of Tanganyika’s 
independence. The co-operative movement was considered a means of achieving economic 
development among people. The Hon. J.S. Kasambala, the Minister for Co-operative and 
Community Development, stated the following during the first CUT meeting on 16 to 17 February 
1962: 
Co-operatives will be called upon to play an increasing part in the building up the economy 
of this country. Firstly, co-operatives will be used as a means to achieve our declared policy 
of creating greater wealth among our peoples … Secondly, and this equally important, 
government feels strongly that in many spheres of economic activity, such as local industries, 
the safety and best road to social security will be achieved through the medium of the co-
operative movement which will go further to redress the unhappy economic balance in which 
we find ourselves in this country …104 
Like any other member of the CUT, MANCU Limited had to contribute a subscription levy of 2% 
of its gross income. For instance, in 1963, MANCU had a gross income of Shs.321 825.28.105 The 
2%, therefore, amounted to Shs.6 436.50. Through the education facilitation, overseas scholarships 
to study the co-operative movement were made available. Students from various co-operative 
societies were able to study co-operative principles, business management, accountancy, banking, 
commerce, and agriculture. For instance, in 1962, about 22 students from different co-operative 
societies in Tanganyika obtained the scholarship for overseas studies. Among them, MANCU 
Limited sent one of its co-operative staff (L.L. Limuka) to K.F. Stockholm College,15, Sweden.106 
In 1964, Union Co-operative Instructor (Mr S.M. Kapinga) was offered a Swedish scholarship on 
 
103 TNA, 310/CCM/45, Co-operative Union of Tanganyika (CUT)Limited, the Tanganyika Co-operative Movement 
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operative and Community Development in opening the inaugural convention, 16 –17 February 1962.  
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co-operative studies for nine months while Mr W.D. Ndunguru, a bookkeeper, attended an 
advanced course on co-operative subjects for ten months at Moshi Co-operative College.107  
In 1961, the Agricultural Credit Agency (ACA) was formed under Act No. 65 of 1961. The aim 
was to provide loans for agricultural development. In 1964, ACA was renamed as the National 
Development Credit Agency (NDCA) focusing on the co-operative movement under the National 
Co-operative and Development Bank Act No.38 of 1964. The NDCA joined with the National Co-
operative Bank forming a twin holding company. The National Co-operative Bank operated for the 
Co-operative Union to finance the crop purchase, controlling overdraft facilities of the unions and 
ensuring the allocation of sales realisation between growers and co-operative management. On the 
other hand, the NDCA handled the short-term development finance for farmer’s working capital 
and the medium and long-term finance for assets on the farms both at co-operative societies and 
union level. 
The Co-operative Union in the Mbinga District in the 1960s focused on the construction of central 
coffee pulperies. By the late 1960s, MANCU Limited had a total of 11 central coffee pulperies.108 
These pulperies were established with loans acquired from the NDCA by the co-operative societies. 
By 1965, three central pulperies had been constructed, namely Lituru, Mtuwa and Ugano. The three 
pulperies acquired loans from the NDCA totalling Shs.215 000/-. The loans acquired were, 
however, not enough, and a further Shs.88 378.15 was eventually spent in establishing the 
pulperies.109 Mhagawa-Asili and Ngima societies followed a similar pattern and borrowed 
Shs.50 000/- from the African Loan Fund for the installation of central pulperies to be settled within 
seven years (from 1964–1971).110 In 1965, Ngima and Mhagawa-Asili applied for additional 
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amounts in order to construct drying tables at the central pulperies – Shs.5 000/- for Mhagawa-Asili 
and Shs.7 749/- for Ngima.111 In 1966, a further four central pulperies were constructed in the 
Mbinga District, namely Nyoni (Shs.120 000/-), Wukiro (Shs.88 000/-), Mhesa (Shs.100 000/-), 
and Ngaka (Shs.108 000/-).112 Ngaka Central Pulpery was opened by the Honourable First Vice-
President Rashid Mfaume Kawawa during his visit to the Ruvuma region in September 1966.113 
These pulperies enabled coffee growers to sell their coffee in two different forms, as parchment or 
cherry. In 1966, MANCU sold a total of 1 867 tons of dry parchment.114 The average price of 
parchment coffee offered to growers was Shs.2/- for grade I and Shs.1.50 for grade II per kilo while 
cherry was sold at 40 cents (grade I) and 20 cents (grade II).115 
Apart from pulperies, MANCU Limited also supplied infrastructure to the farmers in the form of 
implements. In 1963, MANCU Limited acquired a tractor from the government as Union’s 
property. The tractor was hired to farmers at the following rates: ploughing Shs.60/- an acre, 
harrowing Shs.30/-, driver’s wage Shs.180/- per month (Shs.6/- per day). Charges for a tractor to 
and from any shamba was Shs.2/- per mile. Charges for a trailer were Shs.15/- per hour whenever 
it was hired. Applications for the hiring of the tractor was always accompanied by a full cash 
payment in case of non-members. Members paid 25% deposit as advance payment and the 
remainder later on at the time of final payments. Payments were made directly to MANCU or 
through any convenient society.116 Despite the progress, the co-operative movement faced some 
challenges as the next section will explain.  
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3.6. Challenges of the Coffee Co-operative Societies in Mbinga District, 1950s–1976 
Despite the progress of the co-operative movement in the Mbinga District, its development was 
challenged by primarily four factors: lack of implementation of coffee production practices, 
logistical/transport challenges, corruption and a lack of skilled human resources. The massive 
expansion in coffee production driven by, among others, the higher coffee price was realised despite 
the fact that it became apparent that only a few coffee growers observed the statutory rules in coffee 
production practices. The only existing Native Authority Rules under section 15 of the Native 
Authority Ordinance was enforced in 1933 and for the Mbinga District was revised in 1938.117 The 
rules regulated aspects such as the selection of the coffee seedlings and the sites of plots and 
preparation of land to be subject to the approval of the Agricultural Department. The small number 
of agricultural and co-operative staff in the 1950s made it impossible to implement most of the 
binding rules. In practice, this manifested in unsound production practices such as the establishment 
of the coffee nurseries on the slopes or in a waterlogged area with no irrigation during the dry season 
and without windbreak. The increasing coffee plantings caused people to plant premature seedlings 
before reaching the age of 12 months in the nursery as recommended. The co-operative societies 
responded to this challenge by establishing central coffee nurseries under the supervision of 
MANCU coffee instructors. Also, coffee seedlings were given free to the growers.118  
The second factor was the logistical or transport challenges the Mbinga District suffered throughout 
the colonial period. As explained previously, one of the reasons for the delay in the introduction of 
cash-crop production in the district was the transportation problems. This problem continued to 
affect the coffee growers even in the 1960s. Lack of tarmac roads, railways or freight cargos 
affected the coffee sales due to delays in getting the coffee to the auctions, especially during the 
rainy seasons. 
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In the late 1940s, NGOMAT signed a transport contract with Mr Alimohamed Osman at a rate of 
Shs.1.15 per kilogram from Mbinga to Lindi for shipment to the Mombasa Auction.119 Following 
the formation of MANCU Limited in 1954, with the increasing number of primary co-operative 
societies, there was an increase in the demand for local transport that could collect coffee from those 
societies for delivery to the central store of the union at Mkinga and Mbinga. 
Transportation of crops and other items to and from the Mbinga District was faced with the 
challenge of the high cost of transport. In 1963/64, coffee from Mbinga had to be transported 
through roadways via Njombe to Moshi or from Mkinga/Mbinga to Mtwara, then via shipment 
from Mtwara to Tanga and then railed to Moshi. Road transport through Njombe to Moshi was 
expensive, ranging from Shs.470/- to Shs.490/- per ton.120 The Union Committee decided to use 
road transport from Mkinga/Mbinga to Mtwara at the rate of Shs.280/- per ton and from Mtwara to 
Moshi at Shs.250/.121 The local transport was rated at Shs.2/- per mile.122 In the 1964/65 coffee 
season, the Tanganyika Transportation Company Limited, after long negotiations with MANCU, 
agreed to offer the service for the rate of Shs.180/- instead of 260/- per ton Mkinga/Mbinga to 
Mtwara and Shs.1.75 instead Shs.2/- per mile for local transport.123 However, the lack of all-weather 
connected roads from the primary co-operative societies to the unions, and then from the unions to 
the shipping ports or curing factories, continued to affect the coffee production in the Mbinga 
District 
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The tendering process for transport contracts for both coffee and mixed goods were conducted by 
the union who had the power to select the transport contractors. The tender was open to all transport 
companies. The process was not without its problems. Some of the companies given a transport 
tender did not carry out their duties properly, which resulted in the delay of the coffee auction. For 
instance, in 1964, Messrs. Smith Mackenzie & Co. Ltd neglected their duties when transporting 
coffee from Mtwara to Moshi, and as a result, curing and sales were delayed considerably, resulting 
in low prices for the coffee.124 In some cases, contracts were awarded to bankrupt companies. In 
the 1963/64 crop season, MANCU Limited awarded a transporting tender to Messrs Haider 
Roadways and S.N. Jivraj, but it was revealed that Mr S.N. Jivraj had been awarded the contract 
while he was in a state of bankruptcy. This led to the failure of the contractor to fulfil the contractual 
requirements. It became clear that he attempted to use the contract as security to obtain trucks and 
licenses.125  
The unreliability of transport remained a challenge throughout, especially in collecting coffee from 
the primary co-operative societies for transport to the Union Central Store (Mkinga/Mbinga). The 
problem became acute in 1972/73, when the company given the transportation contract delayed 
collecting crops on time, to the extent that up to 4 November 1972, the coffee was still at various 
primary co-operative societies’ warehouses, as shown in the following table:  
 
124 NRC, 403/265/B/II, Matengo Native Co-operative Union Limited: Minutes-Committee Meetings, Minutes of the 
83rd committee meeting held at Mkinga on 17 February 1964.  
125 NRC, 403/265/B/II, Matengo Native Co-operative Union Limited: Minutes-Committee Meetings, Minutes of the 








Table 8: The Amount of Collected and Uncollected Coffee from Various Primary Co-operative 
Societies in the Mbinga District in 1972/73.126 
Co-operative Society Amount of coffee collected 
(Kg) 
Amount of coffee remained 
(Kg) 
Ngaka 185 340 84 390 
Mhekela 154 302 100 254 
Mhelo 309 840 179 025 
Mtuwa 175 189 115 162 
Langiro 119 019 78 979 
Kiwungi 177 880 123 310 
Lima 165 256 107 524 
Nyoni 172 204 140 839 
Mbuji 93 350 66 830 
Hagati 309 670 264 280 
Kitumbalomo 103 591 88 138 
Total  1 965 641 1 348 731 
 
Coffee transport became more difficult during the rainy seasons, which usually start by the end of 
November. In general, the delays caused the crops to fetch low prices at the Moshi auction. This 
further led to increasing of bank overdraft interests, and late payment to the coffee growers.  
Another important challenge the co-operative societies faced in the Mbinga District, was the 
presence of dishonest and corrupt co-operative officials. This was exacerbated by the lack of skilled 
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human resources to run the co-operative societies. This compounded the difficulties in handling 
farmer’s money, resulting in money theft and co-operative mismanagement being a common 
occurrence in the 1950s and 1960s. For instance, most of the co-operative secretaries were recruited 
in a matter of months and required to work with limited or no training. Although the use of untrained 
secretaries was justified by the scarcity of trained ones, their low remuneration made them easier 
targets for corruption. This was underlined when Wukiro Coffee Grower’s submitted their 
estimated expenses to the co-operative officer in 1957, showing the salary for a secretary to be 
Shs.130/ per month and Shs.100/- for the assistant secretary. The co-operative officer responded, 
“I think Shs.120/- and Shs.80/- are enough for untrained secretary and assistant secretary to start 
on”.127 Studies showed the salaries for secretaries varied from society to society, depending on the 
financial capacity of a particular co-operative society, ranging from Shs.400/- to Shs.130.128 Co-
operative employees had no permanent salary scales, since the rates of salaries and allowances 
depended on the income of the co-operatives. The recommendation in the Report of the Presidential 
Special Committee of Enquiry in 1966 was to have a Unified Co-operative Services Commission 
(UCSC) with salary structures, tenure terms, and employment security. According to Unified Co-
operative Service Regulations, co-operatives had a right to employ staff whose salaries were less 
than Shs.650/-.129 Co-operative staff, such as managers, secretaries and treasurers were termed as 
salaried staff under the UCSC, while other staff members, including committee members, were paid 
in terms of honoraria, ranging from Shs.5/- to not more than Shs.10/- per day.130 
Cases of money loss were reported in various co-operative societies in the 1950s and 1960s. For 
instance, in 1957, the Pilakano Coffee Grower’s Co-operative Society experienced a case of money 
theft by the co-operative officials. The chairman, secretary and assistant secretary were accused of 
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the loss of the co-operative society’s money. The first two accused persons, namely Magnus 
Ndimbo (secretary) pleaded guilty to two counts involving Shs.423.10, and Ignas Mathias (assistant 
secretary) to one count involving Shs.205/-. They were sentenced to a total of three months’ 
imprisonment on 23 June 1958.131 The third accused person was Peter Mauris Mbepela (chairman) 
who was arrested on 16 June 1958. They were charged on 16 counts of forgery, 16 counts of issuing 
false documents and one count of theft of Shs.11 171/-.132 Following the investigation on 1 August 
1958, the three accused persons (Magnus Ndimbo, Ignas Mathias and Peter Mauris Mbepela) were 
found guilty as charged and sentenced to two years imprisonment.133 In 1964, the MANCU 
storekeeper reported the loss of Shs.600/- from his safe box. The guilty person could not be 
apprehended; the Union Finance Sub-Committee ruled that the storekeeper (Mr P.B. Kinunda) had 
to refund the money. Shs.400/- was re-paid on 30 May 1964 and Shs.200/- in June 1964.134  
Most of the co-operative societies faced challenges with recovering the stolen money. Although 
civil cases were brought against guilty parties, the money recovered in most cases were less than 
the money stolen. Table 9 shows the extent of money stolen and recovered in co-operative societies 
in Tanzania from 1964-1969.  
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1964 37 8 6 12 - 69 698.00 1 929.00 
1965 44 11 6 12 - 99 371.00 711.00 
1966 61 19 4 9 - 629 488.00 66 434.00 
1967 60 9 3 10 - 949 634.00 4 339.00 
1968 118 33 7 23 56 1 396 563.04 47 775.25 
1969 62 6 2 1 53 1 254 710.82 60.00 
Total  382 86 28 67 109 4 399 464.86 121 248.25 
3.6.1. “Hatutaki ukoloni”! Anti-Co-operative Movement in Mbinga District in the 
1950s 
The formation of MANCU coincided with the formation of the Tanganyika African National Union 
(TANU) Party in colonial Tanzania in 1954. Under the Leadership of Mwalimu J.K. Nyerere, the 
activities of TANU in the country brought heightened political awareness among the peasants that 
strengthened the demand for independence from the British colonial government. The involvement 
of the colonial officials in the co-operative movement was regarded as an intensification of colonial 
exploitation of peasant produce. The enforcement of the coffee rules and regulations by both 
colonial government authorities and co-operative officers also culminated in the anti-co-operative 
movement in various coffee-producing areas in Tanzania.136 There were also a growing anti-
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colonial protest in other areas of the colonial Tanganyika including“anti-soil erosion campaigns” in 
the Sukumaland by the cotton growers against the tie-ridges, and cattle destocking.137 The peasants 
in Uluguru mountains in the Morogoro region protested the compulsory terracing.138 
In the 1950s, African coffee growers grew increasingly discontented with the way the co-operative 
officers graded the coffee. They saw the low prices offered to the lower grades it as a way of 
exploiting coffee growers. The coffee growers who were also co-operative members supported their 
respective co-operative committee members by rejecting the grading system undertaken by the 
union coffee instructors. This was reflected in many coffee marketing centres (gulio) during the 
1955/56 coffee season as demonstrated by a series of protests in October 1955 in Mapipili and 
Kipololo.139 These incidents led to the resignation of some co-operative members who decided to 
sell their coffee through Ngaka Coffee Growers’ Co-operative Society Limited. The African coffee 
growers’ dissatisfaction with the coffee-grading system dominated the whole period from the late 
1950s to the early 1960s.  
The coffee growers’ discontent towards the co-operative and agricultural departmental staff can 
also be associated with the peasants’ attitudes to the staff. Both archival and oral sources show that 
in the 1950s, both agricultural and co-operative officers were regarded as askaris (policemen), not 
only because they enforced the coffee rules and regulations, as well as the rules of the co-operative 
society and, as executive officers, they were involved in the grading of the co-operative society’s 
coffee.140 The “policemen” character was reflected in their harsh supervision during the 
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enforcement of coffee rules and regulations on the coffee growers. As explained in Chapter Two, 
the penalties for the offences included the uprooting of the coffee trees, fines, and imprisonment. 
The uniforms (khaki) used by the agricultural instructors were also the source of associating them 
with the colonial policemen. In response to the coffee growers’ dissatisfaction, the khaki uniform 
jackets were replaced with white or blue shirts in 1960 to win the confidence of the coffee growers 
as they were then regarded as teachers and not as policemen.141 The problem was that farmers did 
not regard co-operative unions as belonging to them but saw them as an arm of government. This 
perception was strengthened by the fact that committee members were elected by the union general 
meeting in which farmers had little influence. The committee members had considerable power but 
did not feel directly responsible to the farmers. They therefore failed to serve the interests of the 
farmers. To some of the co-operative officials, co-operatives were “steppingstones” in the race for 
upward social mobility since through co-operative societies, they were able to access economic 
benefits and social prestige compared to other African coffee growers. In the Bukoba Native Co-
operative Union, committee members were accused of living luxurious lives compared to the lives 
of the coffee growers.142  
The Mbinga District witnessed the growing “anti-union movements” in the late 1950s whereby 
some primary co-operative societies wanted to be independent. They portrayed MANCU as an 
exploitative organ working for colonial interests. The anti-union movement was at first not 
expressed openly. Some co-operative members acted silently by not complying with the co-
operative union’s requirements. In the 1960s, the conflict between primary co-operatives and the 
Co-operative Union became open, for instance, the conflict between Kitumbalomo Coffee Growers 
Co-operative Society Limited and MANCU Limited in the 1960s. Members of Kitumbalomo 
questioned the right of the union to issue instructions to the affiliated societies. During the general 
meeting held on 7 December 1960, attended by the Regional Co-operative Officer, they shouted 
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“Hatutaki ukoloni!” translated loosely as “they do not like to be colonised by the union.”143 The 
opposition arose from the new arrangements for coffee nurseries, under which every co-operative 
society was supposed to establish a central coffee nursery. A vote was eventually taken, and the 
overwhelming decision was that the society was under no obligation to abide by union instructions 
and would do so only when the society members agreed with the order.144 By denying the instruction 
from the union, they acted against their by-laws by refusing their own by-laws. The co-operative 
officer withheld the Certificate of Registration which was supposed to be handed over during the 
meeting. The meeting broke up in disorder.145 On 13 December 1960, the chairman of Kitumbalomo 
wrote a letter to apologise for what happened and asked the co-operative officer to attend another 
meeting scheduled for 16 December 1960. During this meeting, people who agitated in the previous 
meeting were brought before the meeting, apologised, and were given the choice of Shs.20/- fine 
or being stripped of their membership.146 Although the general meeting decided to punish the 
wachochezi (instigating) co-operative members, the permission of the registrar of the co-operative 
societies was required for the society to be registered or de-registered.  
The union was responsible for some issues such as the decision on the rate of advance payments to 
coffee growers and arranging the bank overdraft both according to primary society and union by-
laws. Therefore, the refusal to obey the instruction of the union would necessarily result in the 
disaffiliation by the union and cancellation of registration by the registrar of societies. The registrar 
agreed to issue the certificate with the warning that “similar display of defiance of the law and bye-
laws must result in cancellation of registration.” 147 The registrar also stated, “I am not prepared to 
issue a certificate of maximum liability to any society not affiliated to the union.”148 The assistant 
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co-operative officer, A.S. Kahawanga, eventually handed the Certificate of Registration to the 
Kitumbalomo Society during the general meeting held on 20 November 1961.149  
Other outward signs of anti-union movement were the disaffiliation of the Pilakano Coffee 
Grower’s Co-operative Society from MANCU in 1961. The movement was initiated by the co-
operative committee members demanding to be independent of union businesses. MANCU was 
regarded as exploitative because of various charges deducted from their coffee sales. These charges 
included a co-operative levy, transport charge from society to union, union levy, transportation 
charge from union to Board, Union Development Fund Levy, bank charges, Tanganyika Coffee 
Board export levy, National Development levy, and local Council levy. The range of these 
deductions caused complaints among coffee growers since they were imposed on them without their 
consent. For instance, the Coffee Board recommended and the Minister approved a levy for the 
period January to May (1958) of 10 shillings per ton of clean coffee exported from Tanganyika, 
eight shillings per ton of coffee in the parchment and five shillings per ton of dried cherry. From 1 
June 1958, these rates were doubled.150 From 1 June 1959, the export levy was increased to Shs.30/- 
per ton of clean coffee, Shs.24/-per ton of parchment coffee and Shs.15/- per ton of dried cherry. 
This increase was necessary to help close the gap between estimated income and expenditure in 
1959-60.151 These deductions increased the burden on coffee growers. The co-operative officer, 
however, considered the co-operative society’s demand as being the result of a lack of knowledge 
and claimed that the demand was initiated by “young troublemaking self-seekers”.152 Consequently, 
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Pilakano Coffee Growers Co-operative Society was disaffiliated from MANCU Limited on 21 
August 1961.153 
For a society to be independent of the union, it needed to have enough capital to run the daily coffee 
practices, both in production and marketing. The coffee growers found themselves tied to the co-
operative system because very few of them had the necessary capital to be able to perform these 
functions. Pilakano Coffee Growers Co-operative Society failed to operate independently after 
disaffiliation. As a result, on 7 November 1961, the Pilakano coffee growers, during a special 
general meeting, therefore, agreed to request MANCU to accept their 1961/62 coffee crop.154 
Coffee growers organised themselves together and came up with a new co-operative society in 
1962, namely Mhesa replacing “Pilakano”.155  
3.6.2. From Merging to the Dissolution of Co-operative Societies (1968–1976) 
The growing numbers of the newly registered societies, especially in the 1960s (after 
independence), resulted in the establishment of a number of societies which were riddled with 
problems. Membership was too small as they could handle only small crops and was characterised 
by friction between administrative and management staff and between the members. The societies 
were also struggling with poor financial management. These societies burdened their members and 
hurt the co-operative movement. An example is, Kipololo Coffee Grower’s Co-operative Society 
who collected only 60 tons of coffee during the 1971/72 coffee crop and was forced to collect a 
levy of 25 cents per pound from the coffee growers to cover the society’s expenses.156 The situation 
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was even worse in Ngima where coffee growers were charged a levy of 71 cents per kilo while the 
quantity of coffee collected was only 35 tons during the 1971/72 coffee crop.157 The levy was too 
high compared to 23 cents in 1970/71 when 60 tons of coffee were produced.158 It was clear that 
the survival of weaker co-operatives societies placed a heavier burden on the coffee producers. 
Two processes, therefore, characterised the period from 1968 to 1976: firstly, a co-operative society 
merger wave, and finally the dissolution of the societies. In 1968, during the union general meeting, 
the members proposed a change of name from Matengo Native Co-operative Union Limited to 
Mbinga Co-operative Union Limited. There was a fear that the name change would be interpreted 
as an attempt to escape the debts incurred by the union. Eventually, the name was changed, but the 
registration number (265) was retained.159 Mbinga Co-operative Union Limited only existed 
between 1968 and 1972. The registrar of co-operative societies ordered the merging of all three 
unions in the Ruvuma region namely NGOMAT, Tunduru Co-operative Union, and Mbinga Co-
operative Union Limited to form Ruvuma Region Co-operative Union Limited in 1972 
(RURECU).160 The aim was to strengthen the union at a regional level. 
To remedy the existence of unsustainable weak societies, the registrar of co-operative societies 
decided to merge some societies. The recommended co-operatives to be merged in the district 
included Ngaka and Liule, Mahenge-Mpalu, Ngwambo and Mhagawa-Timbwili, Lituru and 
Mhagawa Asili, Wukiro, Ngima and Kipololo, Mhesa and Longa. Wukiro, Ngima, and Kipololo 
Coffee Growers Co-operative Society Limited were merged on 24 September 1971 to form 
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KIWUNGI Co-operative Society Limited .161 Longa merged with the Mhesa (Umatengo) Coffee 
Co-operative Society Limited to form MHELO Co-operative Society Limited on 24 September 
1971.162 Lituru Coffee Growers Co-operative Society Limited and Mhagawa-Asili Coffee Growers 
Co-operative Society Limited merged to form LIMA Co-operative Society Limited on 24 
September 1971.163 The newly formed co-operative societies inherited all assets and debts of the 
merged co-operative societies. 
In 1975, the Tanzanian parliament passed the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Registration Act. In 
line with this act, the TANU National Executive Committee (NEC) decided to transform the co-
operative movement to revolve around the Ujamaa Villages in future, both in terms of its marketing 
and production functions. There was a need to move from the traditional system where co-
operatives were marketing-oriented instead of being producer-oriented. On 14 May 1976, all 
primary societies were dissolved by the government. Its marketing functions were taken over by 
the villages. All co-operative unions were also dissolved, and their buying function was taken over 
by the Coffee Authority of Tanzania (CAT) who in future would buy coffee directly from the 
villages. CAT operated from 1977 to 1984 when the Tanzania Coffee Marketing Board took over. 
This development will be explained in the next chapter. 
3.7. Conclusion  
This chapter analysed the relationship between smallholder coffee farmers and co-operative 
societies in the Mbinga District from the 1930s to 1976. It showed how the interactions between 
different co-operative actors shaped the co-operative development in the Mbinga District. The 
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interactions between coffee growers, colonial officials, co-operative officials, private coffee traders 
as well as the early independent government officials have influenced the co-operative development 
in the district from the 1930s to 1976. Before the imposition of the co-operative institutions by the 
colonial authorities, coffee producers in the Mbinga District initiated their co-operative organisation 
in 1934 under which they faced difficulties to be registered. The colonial authorities expected 
Africans to accept the imposed co-operative institutions and not to develop their own co-operative 
structures. However, coffee growers were not passive respondents. Their reactions varied from 
compliance to ambivalence. The 1950s anti-co-operative movements showed how coffee growers 
were not passive during the interactions and how the co-operative societies were used as a political 
platform for the nationalist movement in Tanzania. 
The chapter used Ngaka Coffee Grower’s Co-operative Society and later MANCU Limited, to 
analyse the influence of the colonial state in the control of African export crops. It shows how the 
co-operative movement that aimed to eliminate exploitation of the African smallholder coffee 
producers by the intermediary traders, became the state instruments in controlling and monopolising 
coffee production and marketing in the Mbinga District. 
The chapter has attempted to bridge the existed scholarship gap left by the historians on co-operative 
movements who paid more attention to Northern and North-western Tanzania among the Chagga 
and Haya coffee growers. It is, therefore, add to the existing work on co-operative history in 
Southern Tanzania, done by Hebert H. Ndomba and Patrick M. Redmond, which focused on 
tobacco in the Songea District, while taking no account of coffee co-operative societies in the 
Mbinga District. This chapter contributed to the historiography of co-operatives in Tanzania by 
tracing the history and context in which co-operative actors interacted and influenced the 
relationships between the smallholder coffee growers and the co-operative societies in the Mbinga 






Chapter Four  
State Monopoly and Coffee Production in Mbinga District, c.1960s–1990 
4.1. Introduction  
This chapter examines the state’s intervention in the coffee industry through co-operative societies 
and unions, coffee boards and coffee authorities between 1960 and 1990. It focuses on the 
implementation of the Ujamaa policy and its subsequent demise in the 1980s. Global coffee 
production in the period between the 1960s and 1989 was dominated by the International Coffee 
Agreement (ICA, 1962–1989). It was a period of extreme regulation in terms of the marketing of 
coffee following the overproduction of the crop that resulted in a surplus of coffee throughout the 
world in the late 1950s. This was a result of bumper crops in Brazil and Colombia and the increase 
in production of Robusta coffee in Africa. Coffee prices plummeted. During conferences attended 
by coffee-producing countries, held in Paris (France) and Washington DC (USA) in 1958, it was 
agreed to restrict exports of coffee by retaining a percentage of their production. For example, 
Brazil, which had the largest stock of coffee, decided not to sell 40% of their 1958/59 crop.1 Against 
this background, coffee growers had to maintain their income. The best way of doing so was to 
increase their yields per acre by using the best planting material and the best cultivation methods – 
pruning, mulching, and to endeavour to improve the quality of the coffee by careful attention to 
preparation on the farm – pulping, fermentation, and drying. In the case of Tanzania, the best coffee 
had to be exported, retaining the lowest coffee grades for the internal market.  
Apart from promoting coffee production, Tanzania through the coffee board had to expand coffee 
markets beyond the quotas allocated under ICA. The ‘new markets’ had to be secured in addition 
to the ‘traditional markets’. The new markets were also known as non-traditional coffee markets. 
These were countries in which coffee was consumed [in the 1960s] on a very low and in some cases, 
negligible per capita level. It represented the principal outlet for coffees which had to be withheld 
 






from sale in the traditional markets under the commitments also accepted by Tanganyika in terms 
of the ICA.2 Non-traditional markets consisted of the “Iron Curtain” markets, and the rest- 
principally the Middle East and the Far East and African countries south of Tanganyika. 
By focusing on smallholder coffee producers in the Mbinga District, this chapter demonstrates state 
monopoly in the production and marketing of coffee between the 1960s and 1990. It argues that the 
post-colonial state’s interventions mainly shaped the trajectory of the coffee industry between the 
1960s and 1990 in the Mbinga District in agricultural production and marketing, and this had some 
socio-economic impact on the smallholder coffee producers in the district. On the other hand, 
‘coffeescapes’ also shaped the implementation of the post-colonial policies in the district. The 
chapter focuses on the influence of the state on coffee production and marketing through the 
implementation of Ujamaa and Villagisation policies (1967–1980s).  
It drew on economist Gavin Fridell’s “coffee statecraft”3 and anthropologist, James Scott’s 
“weapons of the weak”4 approaches to explore the role of the post-colonial state on the coffee 
industry and the reactions of the smallholder coffee producers in the Mbinga District. In addition, 
the chapter uses the ‘coffeescapes and coffeescapes of resistance’ concepts to analyse the influence 
of coffee landscapes on the implementation of the postcolonial policies and the responses of the 
coffee producers.  
This chapter uses both archival and oral sources. The archival sources were obtained from Tanzania 
National Archives (TNA), housed in Dar es Salaam, the National Record Centre (NRC) in Dodoma, 
and the Tanzania Coffee Board (TCB) in the Moshi District in the Kilimanjaro region. Oral sources 
were gathered from ex-co-operative officials and coffee producers in the Mbinga District.  
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The chapter starts with a historiographical note on the dynamic relationship between the state and 
peasant production in post-colonial Tanzania. It proceeds with coffee production in the context of 
the Ujamaa policy and villagisation processes. It also demonstrates how the coffee development 
and improvement programmes between the 1970s and 1980s influenced coffee production and 
marketing in the district. It assesses the re-instatement of the co-operative societies in 1984, 
emphasising the ability to deliver a desired benefit to the coffee growers. The chapter also analyses 
the responses of the coffee producers to the state interventions, specifically on the implementations 
of the Ujamaa policy in the district. 
4.2. Historiographical Note 
The debate on the influence of the state on peasant production has attracted scholars from various 
disciplines, including political sciences, natural sciences and social sciences. Scholars such as 
Andrew Coulson5, Goran Hyden6, Deborah Bryceson7, and Andreas Eckert8 have focused on the 
post-colonial Tanzanian state and its influence on peasant production. Andrew Coulson, a political 
economist, focused on the influence of the state on peasants in both colonial and post-colonial 
period in Tanzania. He explored the development and failure of the Ujamaa and Villagisation 
policies. The failure was attributed to the use of top-down coercive forces by the state on the peasant 
producers. He argued that “for peasants to develop, struggle is inevitable”.9 He suggested the 
struggle to be directed to the exploitative co-operatives, as well as against the state bureaucratic 
class. According to Coulson, successful socialism had to be constructed from below (by peasants). 
Although the use of force was one of the reasons for the failure of the Ujamaa, Coulson does not 
focus on the reactions of the peasants to the state as this chapter attempts to use the concept of the 
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‘coffeescapes’ and ‘coffeescapes of resistance’ to show the reactions of the coffee producers 
including the maintenance of dual residence. However, this can be attributed to the limits of his 
article’s timeframe since it focuses on the period between 1968 and 1974, which was in the middle 
of the villagisation operation. Furthermore, Deborah Bryceson10 explores the unequal relationship 
between the state and peasant. The relationship was established through the extraction of surpluses 
from peasants in terms of levies and price control. The article shows how the decline of prices of 
cash crops on the international market made peasants in low-income regions to divert into 
subsistence production.11 This chapter draws from both Coulson and Bryceson on the impacts of 
top-down coercive forces on the peasant production in post-colonial Tanzania. The chapter attempts 
to take the conversation between Coulson and Bryceson further by showing the influence of the 
responses from below on bending the implementation of the top-down decisions. It extends the 
analysis to explore the socio-economic impact of the relationship between the state and smallholder 
coffee producers in the Mbinga District from 1960 to 1990.  
Andreas Eckert, a historian, focused on the influence of the state on the creation and abolition of 
local government, as well as co-operatives in Tanzania. Focusing on both the colonial and early 
postcolonial period, the tools that were depicted as democratic and educational to the masses turned 
out to be instruments of state control. He argued that “although those in power expressed fairly 
different political ideas over the course of time, there were strong elements of continuity between 
the late colonial period and the first decades of independence.”12 This chapter draws from Eckert’s 
analysis of the ambiguous role of the co-operatives. This chapter extends the debate of the state 
monopolies to the 1990.  
This chapter also draws from James Scott13 who focuses on the failure of the state-initiated 
development schemes in Germany, Soviet Union and Tanzania to improve human conditions. Using 
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Ujamaa villages, Scott associated the failure with little or no attention to the role of agricultural 
producers and livestock keepers.14 To him, villagisation was an instance of high modernity social 
engineering, and its failure was due to the failure of villagisation in imposing modern machinery 
for agricultural production.15 In line with Coulson, Scott attributes the failure of Ujamaa villages to 
the top-down approach. This chapter agrees with Scott on the failure of the state to recognise 
peasants as important to the successful implementation of the policy. However, Scott’s analysis 
focuses on the negative impact on African societies while ignoring the positive results of some 
development programmes, including the coffee improvement and development programmes of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s on which this chapter will be focusing. This chapter also shows that the 
implementation of villagisation in the Mbinga District did not exhibit the substantively modern 
traits as Scott attributes to them.  
Goran Hyden16 focused on the debate about the relationship between state and peasants in African 
societies. Goran Hyden provides a critique of the underdevelopment school of thought by attributing 
the African underdevelopment to capitalism. To him, the existence of local predicaments included 
ownership of the means of production and failure to traditionalise modern agricultural practices. He 
further shows the distinct position of African peasants from capitalism and the socialist mode of 
production. The presence of household production constraints, such as labour shortages, the 
autonomy of peasants and the rise of an “economy of affection”17 limit state control on peasant 
production. However, Hyden’s shortcomings included his generalisation on African peasants being 
powerful to defy, control and manipulate the state, and the recommendation on the use of force to 
control peasants. By placing all blame of underdevelopment on peasants, Hyden did not differ from 
the underdevelopment school of thought which placed blame on capitalism. Taking Coulson’s 
thesis of post-colonial state autonomy over peasants, and on the other hand Hyden’s thesis of 
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peasants autonomy, this chapter uses the two antagonistic views to show the dynamics of the state-
peasants relationship in the post-colonial period. This chapter contends that, through the co-
operative movement and Ujamaa policy, the Tanzanian post-colonial state was able to influence, 
directly or indirectly, the cash-crop production and marketing in the Mbinga District. Despite the 
autonomy of the post-colonial state over coffee production and marketing, the ‘coffeescapes’ in the 
Mbinga District had also made the post-colonial state to response to the needs of coffee production 
that did not conform to the implementation of the Ujamaa policy. These needs were such as 
ecological requirements, coffee production culture consisting of the nature of the plant, size of the 
land and pests and disease control.  
Other scholars focused on the impact of the post-colonial policies on the environment, particularly 
on the miombo woodlands in Tanzania. Historians such as Yusuf Q. Lawi18 examines how the state 
policies failed as a result of ignoring the local people’s knowledge in planning and implementation. 
Focusing on Operation Vijiji or the villagisation policy in the 1970s, the government failed to 
consider the long-term awareness development among villagers in their interaction with nature. For 
instance, in the eastern Iraqwland, windward side of the hills, top ridges and extreme lower slopes 
were associated with evil and diseases. Therefore, no settlements were established in these areas 
before Operation Vijiji.19 As a result, the implementation of villagisation violated local ecological 
principles in eastern Iraqwland in the Mbulu District. Similarly, natural scientist Idris Kikula20 
shows how the villagisation intensified land use in the newly established settlement in the southern 
highland of Tanzania. The programme ended with the highest experience of soil erosion and general 
environmental degradation in the southern highlands. Both Kikula’s and Lawi’s work focus on the 
failure of villagisation processes and its environmental impact while ignoring some positive 
outcomes. Their work remained useful to this thesis because as it was with Coulson and Scott, 
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discussed previously, they demonstrate the difficulties of the top-down approach in policymaking 
and implementation. This chapter explores further on both success and challenges of the state-
centred policies on the coffee industry in the Mbinga District. This chapter demonstrates the 
influence of coffee as a plant in shaping the implementation of Ujamaa in the Mbinga District. The 
nature of the plant and its political economy sometimes demanded bending of the Ujamaa policy. 
As it was stated that “plants are no longer the passive object of contemplation, but are increasingly 
resembling “subjects”, “stakeholders”, or “performers”, the plant now makes unprecedented 
demands upon the nature of contemplation itself.”21 
This chapter, therefore, uses the implementation of Ujamaa policy from the 1960s to the early 1980s 
to explore the power of the state to control the coffee industry. It demonstrates how the state 
dissolved the co-operative movement to create a monopolistic instrument, such as coffee authority 
to control the growing influences of coffee co-operatives in the production and marketing of coffee 
in the Mbinga District. Therefore, diverging from the existing scholarship, which focuses on the 
environmental impact of the state developmental policies, this chapter expands the debate on the 
state monopolies on African peasant production. The chapter contributes toward a reassessment of 
Tanzania’s historiography on the analysis of the socio-economic impact of the post-colonial 
development policies on smallholder coffee production in Tanzania. 
4.3. Ujamaa and Coffee Production, 1960–1973 
After independence in 1961, Tanzania inherited an export-oriented colonial economic structure. 
The focus of the government was to bring about development. They were, however, heavily 
dependent on foreign money in terms of gifts, loans and private investments to finance 
development. Of the total planned national expenditure budget of Shs.480 million of the Three-
Year Development Plan (1961-1964), Shs.380 million were expected to be obtained from external 
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sources.22 The independent government faced three major challenges of development, namely 
disease, poverty and ignorance.23 It required the government to come up with a clear policy to 
achieve the required development. In 1962, Nyerere came up with a paper titled, “Ujamaa: The 
Basis of African Socialism”. The paper laid the basis of creating a socialist society in Tanzania. 
Nyerere declared that “socialism is an attitude of mind”.24 This was also reflected in a section of 
the 1962 TANU constitution that stated the principal aims and objectives of TANU such as, to 
establish a democratic and socialist form of government devoted to consolidating national 
independence and ensuring a decent standard of living for every individual; giving equal 
opportunities to both men and women, eliminating poverty, diseases and ignorance, and eradicating 
all types of injustice, intimidation, discrimination, bribery and corruption.25  
Tanzania’s turn to socialism was cemented on 5 February 1967, with the Arusha Declaration by the 
National Executive Council (NEC) of TANU that opted for a socialist development path based on 
self-reliance (Ujamaa na Kujitegemea).26 It was an attempt to overcome the difficulties of securing 
development loans by mobilising local resources, such as the potential of its people, land, good 
policies and good leadership.27  
In September 1967, Nyerere issued a policy paper entitled “Socialism and Rural Development”. 
The paper was popularly known as “Ujamaa Vijijini”. It stressed the establishment of Ujamaa 
villages in which people were supposed to live and work together for the good of all. The Ujamaa 
policy was initiated as a response to the growth of social inequalities in the post-colonial society. 
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There were economic inequalities between urban and rural residents. There were growing 
inequalities within rural areas. The significant growth of kulaks or progressive farmers and their use 
of hired labour on privately owned farms were regarded as potential obstacles to the realisation of 
rural socialist transformation. This was expressed when Nyerere stated that “yet the present trend 
is away from the extended family production and social unity, and towards the development of a 
class system in the rural areas. It is this kind of development which would be inconsistent with the 
growth of a socialist Tanzania in which all citizens would be assured of human dignity and equality, 
and in which all were able to have a decent and constantly improving life for themselves and their 
children”.28 The policy called upon the peasants to organise into viable socio-economic and political 
communities (Ujamaa villages) to transform production that was private and scattered into 
communal and planned production. The objective was to create a society based on the principles of 
co-operation, equality, and freedom.29  
In Ujamaa villages, people were expected to live and work together. As Nyerere stated, “the land 
this community farms would be called ‘our land’ by all the members; the crops they produced on 
that land would be called ‘our crops’; it would be ‘our shop’ which provided individual members 
with the day-to-day necessities from outside; ‘our workshop’ which made the bricks from which 
houses and other buildings were constructed, and so on”.30  
In implementing the Ujamaa villages strategy, three steps were involved. The first step was to make 
people from scattered settlements to come together and live in planned villages. The step involved 
land distribution to the people who moved to new settlements. The new settlements were either 
unoccupied land or existing villages with less than 250 households and not more than 600 
households.31 This would facilitate the second step of working together on communally owned 
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farms and use social and economic benefits such as schools, healthcare, and water supply services. 
It is then registered as an agricultural association and thus entitled to a credit from financial 
institutions. The third step was when the village became a fully-fledged multipurpose co-operative 
society with security to attract commercial credit from any source, including the National Bank of 
Commerce and Marketing Boards.32  
In the early 1960s, Tanzania had experimented with the Ujamaa policy in which about 30 villages 
were established under Ujamaa principles. Out of these 30 villages, 15 were in the Ruvuma region.33 
A group of TANU Youth League members, under the leadership of Ntimbanjayo, a secretary at 
Peramiho, started an Ujamaa farm at Litowa in Songea in November 1960. In 1963, Raph Ibbott, a 
British expatriate from Southern Rhodesia, joined the Ruvuma Development Association (RDA). 
By 1969 the RDA had 17 villages with a total of 400 households. Although the initial focus was on 
food crops, and later tobacco as a cash crop, communal grain and sawmills, health centres, schools 
and water-supply projects were also implemented.34 
Between 1965 and 1970, the Ruvuma region witnessed an intensive agricultural campaign led by 
Edward Barongo, the appointed Regional Commissioner. The campaign aimed to promote the 
production of both food and cash crops, including tobacco, coffee, cashew nuts, oilseeds, coconuts, 
maize, cassava, sorghum and beans. Barongo played a leading role in giving advice, suggestions 
and directives to districts on how to promote agricultural production. He was named “Second 
Agricultural Officer” due to his participation in agricultural campaigns.35 Tobacco-growing areas 
in the region were most affected by this campaign. The campaign set a minimum acreage of one 
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acre for every tobacco grower, three curing bans, nine seedbeds and the use of fertilisers.36 As a 
result, tobacco production increased from 1 030 tons in 1965/66 to 1 525.5 tons in 1966/67.37 The 
bulk of the crop came from the Songea District with 1 442.5 tons, the Mbinga District with 80 tons 
while Tunduru produced only three tons.38 The “tobacco promotion committee” became a centre of 
the struggle between the RDA and the state. The RDA wanted to maintain its autonomy in 
agricultural production and marketing of tobacco without interference by the state. Consequently, 
in 1969, the RDA was banned, and all Ujamaa villages came under the control of the TANU 
government and party.39  
On the side of coffee production, more emphasis was placed on good agricultural practices on coffee 
farms, including weeding, pruning, mulching, timely responses to pests and disease and processing 
through central pulpery units, as well as individual processing. The production of coffee declined 
by 7% in 1966 to 1 867 tons compared to 2 049 tons produced in 1965.40 A small tonnage of 26 
tons of coffee was produced in the Songea District.41 The regional commissioner was strict, and 
coffee producers referred to him as a bwana tumbaku meaning a “tobacco master”.42 His interest in 
tobacco production brought confusion to agricultural officers, as well as to the coffee producers. In 
some villages such as Litembo, Myangayanga, and Kindimba, the farmers argued that for many 
years the NGOMAT had been trying unsuccessfully to expand tobacco production in the district. 
However, tobacco failed to surpass coffee production in the Matengo Highlands. The agricultural 
“campaign” showed the direct participation of the government bureaucrats in promoting agriculture 
on the one hand, and peasants who were not ready to be under strict supervision on the other hand. 
It showed the conflicting interests between peasants and state.  
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Figure 3: Coffee and Tobacco Production Trend in Ruvuma, 1965–197343 
The production trends shown in Figure 3 indicate that peasant production fluctuated between 1965 
and 1973. The production of both tobacco and coffee declined in 1968. Government reports showed 
a decline of 50% in cash-crop production in the region. There was a drop of 358 tons in the 
production of tobacco in 1968, compared to the 1967 crop (2 965,50 tons). The high incidence of 
diseases, such as tobacco mosaic, spot leaf and virus bushy top diseases was partly responsible for 
the decline in tobacco production. However, the diversion of the RDA members to food-crop 
production due to the labour demands and low price for tobacco also contributed to the decline. 
Coffee production followed the same trend and declined for about 432.295 tons in 1968 and 364.656 
tons in 1969, respectively. The decline was due to high incidences of coffee diseases such as leaf 
 































rust and antestia in 1968, and low-price incentives due to a decline in the price of coffee from 
Shs.2/- per kilo to Shs.1.50 for the Grade I in 1969.44  
In Ujamaa villages, numerous efforts were concentrated on advising villagers on the proper use of 
fertilisers, insecticides and fungicides. Farmers were trained through meetings, seminars and 
campaigns, direct visits to the groups, block farms, Ujamaa villages and individual farmers. Farmers 
were advised to work together in groups, including block farms for crops such, as maize, paddy, 
sorghum, and tobacco. For instance, a group of 32 paddy farmers ploughed 120 acres in Lituhi-
Mbinga in 1969.45 Ujamaa villages in the Ruvuma region increased in number from 26 in 1969 to 
126 by the end of 1970.46 
The implementation of the Ujamaa policy in the Matengo Highlands – the coffee-growing area in 
the Mbinga District – was not as extensive as it was in non-coffee-producing areas. The coffee 
growers in these areas were already living in populous villages. Thus, any attempt to move them 
into new villages would disturb their cash crops on a bigger scale, and such crops were vital in 
generating state revenues and foreign currency for the country. Coffee growers were encouraged to 
work on their coffee farms and sell their produce through the Matengo Native Co-operative Union 
(MANCU). In the late 1960s, in a few areas with a low population, such as the Mkumbi division, 
people were able to move to new villages while maintaining their original coffee farms. Nives 
Kinunda reports that a similar movement took place in the Mkumbi division in 1969.47 As a result, 
between 1967 and 1973, most of the villages registered in the Mbinga District were more “co-
operative villages” than Ujamaa villages. This was noted during the Ujamaa-campaign training in 
September and October 1969, at Mlale Farmers Training College. People from the Mbinga District 
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participated as co-operative societies and not as Ujamaa villages, compared to, for example, the 
Tunduru and Songea districts.48  
Instead of establishing the Ujamaa farms, the coffee producers in the Mbinga District established 
block farming, commonly known as “village farms”. Although agricultural extension officers were 
involved in the selection of the sites, most of the village farms were unsuitable for coffee production 
because they were located on a steep slope that had infertile soil. In Kindimba village, for instance, 
village coffee farms were established in Kindimba and Mungaka hamlets in the 1970s.49 Before the 
dissolution of Ngaka Coffee Grower’s Co-operative Society in 1976, the co-operation coffee 
instructors and extension officers were using the Kindimba coffee farm (at the headquarter) as a 
demonstration plot.50 The village was divided into six hamlets called Vitongoji (plural of kitongoji). 
The management of the two village farms was divided into three vitongoji each. A kitongoji had 
cells of ten houses called mashina. Cell leaders (Balozi) were responsible for mobilising labour in 
the village farms. Both men and women participated in the village farms. The response was not 
always positive as the coffee producers paid more attention to individual coffee farms than to the 
village farms. The lack of appreciable returns from the village farms was one of the reasons for the 
coffee producer’s unwillingness to participate in the village farms.51 Individuals who did not fulfil 
their assigned tasks were fined or punished with extra work. The size of village farms in the Mbinga 
District was one to one and a half hectares. Fines took the form of public work, such as road 
construction, building schools, and village office construction. This was different from what Huizer 
described as “block farms”, established in the Pare District in Kilimanjaro, in terms of size, 
ownership, and operations. The block farms in Pare consisted of 60 hectares divided among 86 
members, working communally in growing cotton while harvesting individually.52  
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Moreover, the nature of the coffee plant also shaped the way people reacted towards the Ujamaa 
policy. As a perennial crop grown in an area for many decades on varied farm sizes, created 
difficulties for people to move to another village. It was also was challenging to merge individual 
farms into large Ujamaa farms. Therefore, coffee planting altered the implementation of the Ujamaa 
policy. This also proved to be the case in the West Lake areas.53 In the Mbinga District, block farms 
were possible in the lowland areas that consisted of Ruhuhu, Ruhekei, and Mpepo administrative 
divisions. These divisions were mainly producing annual crops such as tobacco, sorghum, paddy 
and maize. Any attempt to merge coffee farms could lead to serious resistance from the farm 
owners. For this reason, Ujamaa policy was implemented through the co-operative coffee-
marketing system, working together in a village farm, or through joint income-generating activities, 
such as grain mills, trucks or village shops. 
The Ujamaa policy strengthened the communal mutual assistances (ngokela) that existed in the 
Mbinga District before the introduction of coffee production. Ngokela was organised by people, 
generally of the same clan, for specific work, including, farm clearance, tilling and planting, 
weeding and harvesting. With the introduction of coffee in the district, ngokela became limited to 
food crops. The main reason was that coffee was produced for the market while food crops were 
mainly for household consumption. Since coffee was the main cash crop in the district, any mutual 
assistance had to involve cash payment. The coffee industry failed to adopt the Ujamaa principle of 
working together in production. They did, however, retain the co-operative marketing system. 
Therefore, coffee as “culture” and an income-generating venture, agreed with some aspects of 
Ujamaa organisation but did not conform to Ujamaa in all aspects. As a result, coffee became a 
political crop. The next section will describe the coffee production under compulsory villagisation. 
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4.4. Coffee Production in the Context of Villagisation Policy, 1973–1979 
Following the slow pace of the Ujamaa policy implementation, the government, through the 
Presidential Circular of 1973, compelled all people to live in the villages by the end of 1976. This 
mandatory Act was called “Operation Vijiji” or villagisation. It was supervised by the regional 
commissioners, area commissioners, ward and division executive officers. Villagisation was aimed 
at promoting rural development. The implementation of Operation Vijiji was a coercive and hurried 
process. It was stated that “to live in a village is an order”.54 People who were living in remote areas 
were moved to the main road. As a result, many of the villages in the Mbinga District were located 
along the main and feeder roads, including the Mbinga-Songea road, Mbinga-Mbamba-Bay, 
Mbinga-Maguu-Mkoha, the Mbinga-Litembo road, and Mbinga-Longa-Kipololo. Villagisation 
reached its peak in the Ruvuma region in 1974. There were 61 villages in the Mbinga District with 
a total of 23 071 families – approximately 115 355 people.55 By the end of 1975, the number of 
villages in the region increased from 126 villages in 1970,56 to 315 in 197557 with some of the other 
districts contributing as follows: 111 villages in the Songea District with a total of 30 233 families 
involving about 151 165 people and 77 villages with 24 412 families of about 111 165 people in 
the Tunduru District.58 
Based on the villages and Ujamaa Village Act of 1975, two types of villages were established, 
namely villages and Ujamaa villages.59 The Act also placed all coffee-marketing processes under 
the agency of the village. A village was supposed to be made up of a minimum of 250 families and 
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to operate as a multipurpose co-operative society. People were expected to live and work together 
for the benefit of all. Individual farms were maintained. Crops that were produced were to be sold 
through the village. In Ujamaa villages, people were expected to work communally while the means 
of production were to be owned exclusively by the village. Between 1973 and 1976, people were 
forced to move to the planned village centres where the services, including schools, hospitals, and 
water, were located. Villages with a population of less than 250 were forced to merge with the 
neighbouring village to form a single village. The idea of the size of villages was for easy service 
provisions and security reasons, especially for the villages along the border with neighbouring 
countries.60 In Mhekela (Hagati Administrative Division), the dispersed population was compelled 
to move to Ilela to form Ilela Village in 1976.61 The settlement made the former area (Mhekela) to 
continue to be a food-crop producing area. It had a few coffee farms and new coffee farms were 
established in Ilela Village. People from Mhekela were given land in Ilela Village for residence and 
agricultural production of both cash and food crops. Land was distributed to households of a similar 
lineage in the new villages. Most of the households were male-dominated. Ilela Village proved to 
be a successful coffee-producing area. Despite the weaknesses of the villagisation process, Ilela 
Village became popular, and its success story was one of the successful agricultural village models 
in the district. It was named as one of the “best villages” in the district during National Farmer’s 
Day (Saba Saba) in 1978.62 Apart from acquiring a village tractor, a lorry, and a shop, the village 
purchased a plot of land in the Mbinga township and constructed a building named Ilela in 1980. 
The name became a living memory since the street was named after the building. The success of 
Ilela villages was primarily made possible with money obtained from coffee sales. The Ilela story 
provides another view of Ujamaa and coffee as a plant. Coffee shaped the landscape of the newly 
established areas. The newly established structures, such as new coffee farms, food crops, buildings 
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and the street name, represent the impact of coffee on the landscapes as the result of villagisation 
in the 1970s.  
During the compulsory villagisation, people were not well informed about the motives or ideas that 
informed their forcible relocations. As a result, people came up with different narratives about 
Ujamaa and villagisation. One of the disturbing narratives was the association of Ujamaa with 
expropriation of their coffee farms to form Ujamaa farms. Ujamaa and villagisation were regarded 
as the enemy of coffee development in the district. As recalled by most of the people interviewed, 
“we did not need Ujamaa in our district. The concept was not clear to us and when we asked the 
area commissioner and other officials to explain to us, they simply said ‘Ujamaa ni maendeleo’ 
meaning Ujamaa is development.”63 From this context, all villages established under villagisation 
processes in the 1970s, were commonly referred to as vijiji vya maendeleo meaning “developmental 
villages”. The state exercised its power over peasants by forcing them into new-planned villages. It 
failed to adhere to democracy as one of the principles of socialism. In this regard, peasants were 
not engaged in the planning stage of villagisation.  
Coffee farms required daily monitoring to control pests and diseases, as well as general 
management in both production and marketing. The coffee-crop calendar covered the whole year 
and this feature thus militated against relocations. The relocation during villagisation created 
difficulties to manage some of the coffee farms due to distance. As a result, antestia, white-stem 
borers, green scales, red-star scales, leaf miners and Coffee Berry Disease (CBD) became rampant 
in the 1970s in most of the coffee-growing areas in Tanzania, including the Mbinga District. Some 
coffee producers operated between the two settlements, old (Mahame) for coffee-farm management 
and new for residential purposes. This was the case in the Mbangamao and Kilimani villages. These 
were villages established during the villagisation process. Most of the residents were migrants from 
various villages in the Matengo Highlands. After they had established their food crop, tobacco and 
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some coffee farms, the villagisation forced them to reside in newly planned villages. Although 
villagisation minimised the walking distance to social service centres, at the same time, it increased 
the walking distance from residential areas to the established farms. As a result, it threatened the 
loss of crops to vermin, pests, and diseases, also discouraging crop-management practices. 
Therefore, coffee as a “culture” and way of life resisted villagisation. Andrew Coulson related a 
similar trend experienced in the Tanga and Mtwara regions where cashew nuts and sisal plantations 
were neglected.64 To reverse the situations, some coffee producers in the Mbinga District retained 
dual residence (both in the lowlands and highlands). Under dual residence, some family members 
were able to register as permanent residents in the lowlands while the rest could maintain the coffee 
farms in the highlands and migrate seasonally for food-crop cultivation to the lowlands. Dual 
residence represents another coffeescapes that refused to bend to Ujamaa policies. 
From 1976, villages replaced primary co-operative societies and unions as multipurpose co-
operative villages. All activities previously undertaken by the co-operative societies (collecting and 
selling export crops) were now provided by villages. The villages were caught unprepared. There 
was a problem with unskilled accounting and bookkeeping personnel in the newly established 
villages. The government launched a training programme for all village accountants (8 000 in total) 
for eight years (1978/79 to 1985/86). The total cost for the programme was Tshs.35 888 565/-.65 
The Mlale Community Development College, situated in the Songea District, was selected to be 
the centre for the training for the Ruvuma region. Mr S. Butha and A. Mwansasu were the 
facilitators of the training at Mlale training centre.66 
Operation Vijiji coincided with other “operations” in the 1970s with the aim of building a strong 
socialist society. Under the Village Act of 1975, villages became multipurpose co-operative 
societies by handling various services and economic activities, such as crop production and 
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marketing, grain mills, sawmills, village vehicles, and shops. In 1976, the government initiated 
Operation Maduka.67 The objective was to fight against capitalist exploitation by the private traders 
and intermediaries (walanguzi). The objective of the Ujamaa and self-reliance was to fight against 
exploitation as stated in the TANU constitution that: 
ni wajibu wa serikali ambayo ni watu wenyewe, kuingilia katika vitendo, maisha ya uchumi ya 
taifa, kuhakikisha ustawi wa raia wote na kuzuia mtu mwingine au kikundi kimoja kunyonya 
kikundi kingine na kuzuia limbikizo la utajiri kufikia kiasi ambacho hakipatani na siasa ya watu 
wote kuwa sawa.68  
Loosely translated as: 
it is the responsibility of the government to intervene in the national economy for the 
wellbeing of all citizens, to prevent the exploitation of one another, as well as the 
accumulation of wealth to the extent that is incompatible with the politics of equality.  
Similar to the party constitution, Julius K. Nyerere (the first president of Tanzania) in his speech in 
the General National Assembly in December 1962, stated, “mbali ya uhuru wa kutokana na ukoloni, 
tulitaka pia uhuru wa kila mwanachi, tulitaka kila mwananchi awe anatumia uhuru wake kwa 
kushirikiana na wenzake, kujipatia mahitaji yake ya kibinadamu”69 translated as “apart from 
independence from the colonial rule, we also wanted the freedom of every citizen to co-operate 
with others in obtaining their personal needs” (my translation). 
To maintain socialist principles in land use, communal ownership of all economic means of 
production, TANU in its 17th meeting in 1975, decided to establish village and Ujamaa shops to 
enable people in the rural areas to get essential needs. Apart from rural areas, Operation Maduka 
also focused on the estates, industries, and corporations. There was an expansion of the Ujamaa and 
village shops while discouraging and even closing private shops.70 Private shops were only allowed 
 
67 Maduka is a Kiswahili word referring to shops.  
68 NRC, 450/CCU/S/100/3/2, Village Settlement Co-operatives, “Ujamaa na Operation Maduka”. 
69 Ibid.  
70 The Prime Minister then Rashid Mfaume Kawawa gave an order on 16 February 1976 in Morogoro of closing all 






to operate in areas where no other shops existed until the village or Ujamaa shops were introduced. 
This aligned with what the President insisted on during his visit to Kilimanjaro on August 1975, 
that “it would be absurd to allow an individual to own a shop in an Ujamaa village because such an 
act would be tantamount to allowing the peasants who have accepted the ideology of socialism to 
be exploited freely.”71  
The established shops during Operation Maduka were owned by all villagers, selling items at a 
uniform price. The village committee was responsible for supervising the operation of the shops in 
registered villages. Capital for the establishment and construction of the shops was obtained from 
villagers by issuing shares of TShs.10 each with individuals not being allowed to own more than 
five shares per shop.72 Loans were acquired from banks at 5% interest.73 Operation Maduka 
involved the transformation of the previously owned co-operative shops into the Ujamaa or village-
owned shops. The co-operative shops were owned by co-operative members while Ujamaa or 
village shops were owned by all villagers.74  
By 1979, there were increasing numbers of village shops in the Mbinga District. There were 86 
village shops in 108 registered villages in the district. Nine villages had trucks, nine villages had 
grinding mills, 40 out of 72 village managers had attained training, and 21 village accountants out 
of 85 had attained the training.75 However, the archival data shows the 108 villages in 1979 
consisted of five divisions of the Mbinga District. The administrative divisions included Ruhekei, 
Ruhuhu, and Mpepo of the present-day Nyasa District, and Namswea, Mbinga and Mbuji divisions 
of the present-day Mbinga District. Mbuji division had more villages as well as village shops, 
vehicles and grain mills as summarized in Table 10. One of the reasons for the differences has to 
 
71 Sunday News (Dar es Salaam), 12 August 1975, 1.  
72 NRC, 446/CCU/C/230/60/18, Operation Maduka, “Semina ya Operation Maduka iliyofanyika Chuo Cha Ushirika 
Moshi”, 3 -10 April 1976. 
73 Ibid. 
74 NRC, 450/CCU/S/100/3/2, Village Settlement Co-operatives, “Ujamaa na Operation Maduka”. 
75 NRC, 4/CCU/A/140/3B, Standard Ujamaa Co-operative Societies Village Bookkeeping System (Training), a letter 
from District Ujamaa and Co-operative Officer, Mbinga, Ref. No. VU/V41/173, to Ujamaa and Co-operative 
Commissioner, Dodoma, “Takwimu za Mameneja, Wahasibu na Miradi mbali mbali ya Vijiji vya Wilaya ya 






do with coffee production. Mbuji and Mbinga divisions form the Matengo Highlands and the main 
coffee producing area in the district. The area demonstrated the ‘coffeescapes of power’.76 As a 
result, coffee production in the Mbinga District facilitated the establishment of multiple economic 
activities such as transport, agricultural processing and trade. The presence of co-operative shops, 
including those introduced as a probationary store as discussed in chapter three in the Matengo 
Highlands enabled the area to adapt easily (although not without problems) to Operation Maduka.  
Table 10: Number of Villages, Village Shops, Grain Mills and Trucks by 1979 in Mbinga District.77  
Division Villages Village 
shops 
 Grain mills Village 
trucks 
Ruhekei 20 18  2 0 
Ruhuhu 13 11  0 0 
Mpepo 8 3  0 0 
Namswea 6 6  0 0 
Mbuji 35 31  1  9 
Mbinga 26 17  5 0 
Total 108 86  9 9 
 
However, Operation Maduka was implemented with some chaos, especially in the initial stage. Like 
Operation Vijiji, Operation Maduka also began with the coercive government “orders”. The owners 
of private shops were regarded as exploiters, commonly named as kupe (ticks) and forced to close 
their shops. As a result, it created a shortage of essential goods, such as sugar, salt, soap, kerosene 
and cooking oil.78 Although Operation Maduka was part of the implementation of the Ujamaa 
policy, its implementation required more training and orientation to village authorities. The 
 
76 The ‘coffeescapes of power’ derived by the researcher from the coffee landscapes that proved more powerful in 
transformation. 
77 NRC, 4/CCU/A/140/3B, Standard Ujamaa Co-operative Societies Village Bookkeeping System (Training), “Orodha 
ya Vijiji, Maduka ya Vijiji na Miradi mingine hadi kufikia 28 July 1979” (A list of villages, shops and other 
economic activities by 28 July 1979).  






authoritative nature of the state officials in implementing Operation Maduka created 
misunderstanding and confusion among the private traders. For instance, the order from the Prime 
Minister, Mr Rashid Mfaume Kawawa, on 16 February 1976, in Morogoro to close all private shops, 
created chaos for all private traders in almost every part of the country.79 Although the order was 
directed to the Morogoro region, it was taken as an order to the whole country. The village 
authorities implemented the order by closing all private-owned shops to the extent of creating 
shortages of essential commodities. As one of the informants described the situation: “It was 
difficult to get salt and soap in the village unless you had a missionary friend. From morning to the 
evening, queues formed outside the village shops, called as Maduka ya kaya, sometimes you can’t 
get even a single matchbox.”80 Shortage of consumer goods in 1979 was also a result of the global 
oil crisis. The shortage of oil to run automobiles and industries exacerbated the difficulty of goods 
supplies and coffee production in the district. Shortages of farm implements and agricultural inputs 
due to transportation difficulties were experienced.  
In the process of the making, re-making and unmaking of the state identity through villagisation, 
the coffee industry was able to conform to some of the aspects, such as the marketing system 
through the Ujamaa policy. In other aspects, coffee production created new landscapes through its 
rejection to fully conform to the Ujamaa policy. The prevalence of coffee diseases also required the 
state to re-think how to intervene in the coffee industry to make it profitable to the producers as 
well as to the state. The next section turns to the coffee developmental programmes from the late 
1970s to the 1980s. 
4.5. Coffee Development and Improvement Programmes, 1977–1986 
Coffee production in Tanzania showed a rapid expansion in the 1950s, as demonstrated in Chapter 
Three. This trend was sustained with a rapid increase in production in the 1960s. The increase was, 
 
79 Daily News (Dar es Salaam), 10 March 1976, 5. 
80 Interview with Edward Ndunguru, Myangayanga Village, 20 December 2018; Maduka ya Kaya is a Swahili term 






however, not sustained beyond that as a result of the decrease in the planting of new coffee trees 
while the earlier plantings became aged and less productive. The drought of 1973/74 also affected 
coffee production in the northern coffee-producing zone. The coffee production in Kilimanjaro 
region declined from 14 133 tons of clean coffee in 1972/73 to 10 504 tons in 1973/74.81 The 1973 
drought had less effect in the Mbinga District since the coffee production increased from 3 515.145 
tons to 3 622.786 tons in 1973/74.82 The Tanzania Coffee Board’s statistics show that coffee 
delivered to the TCB from the Ruvuma region increased from 2 174 tons of clean coffee in 1972/73 
to 3 046 tons in 1973/74.83 Apart from drought, the spread of Coffee Berry Disease (CBD) badly 
affected the northern zone and later the southern highlands in the early 1970s. All these incidences, 
coupled with the poor standard of coffee husbandry, reduced yield levels. To increase the level of 
coffee yields and quality in Tanzania, the government embarked on different programmes, namely 
the Coffee Improvement Programme (CIP), 1977–1981 and the Coffee Development Programme 
(CDP), 1982–1986. The two programmes demonstrated what Fridel termed ‘coffee statecraft’.84 
Despite the fact that the Arusha Declaration was based on Ujamaa and self-reliance, Tanzania 
attracted more aid from donor communities during the 1960s and 1970s. This period was 
characterised by the following “guidelines” or perceptions about received aid and the relationship 
with donors: they would accept aid without conditions to protect state autonomy; they would accept 
grants for free or low interest; they would accept aid that supported projects and programmes that 
were important for state development.85 The CIP and CDP aligned with these 
guidelines/perceptions. 
 
81 URT, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, Annual Review of Coffee 1986, (Marketing Development 
Bureau: Dar es Salaam, 1986), 4.  
82 UDSM, “Ruvuma Region, Taarifa ya Maendeleo ya Kilimo Mwaka 1974” [Annual Agricultural Report for 1974]. 
83 URT, Ministry of Agriculture, Agriculture Bulletin Crop and Livestock –1978, (Dar es Salaam, June 1979), 2; URT, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, Annual Review of Coffee 1986, 4. 
84 G. Fridell, “Coffee Statecraft: Rethinking the Global Coffee Crisis, 1998 – 2002”. 
85 R. Mukandala, “From Proud Defiance to Beggary: A Recipient’s Tale”, G. Hyden and R. Mukandala, (eds.), Agencies 







The implementation of the programmes coincided with the implementation of a structural change 
in the coffee-marketing system in Tanzania in 1977 when the country moved from a three-tier to a 
single-channel marketing system. The old three-tier marketing system consisted of the Tanzania 
Coffee Board at the top, co-operative unions in the middle, and co-operative societies at the bottom. 
That changed to a single-channel marketing system. Under single channel, the Coffee Authority of 
Tanzania (CAT) was established in 1977 under the Coffee Industry Act of 1977. CAT was 
responsible for promoting, co-ordinating and regulating all aspects of coffee production, processing, 
marketing and export sales of coffee and its products. CAT had three main administrative zones 
and two sub-zones representing the authority that was centred in Moshi. The northern zone 
consisted of Kilimanjaro, Tanga, and the Morogoro regions. The southern zone consisted of Mbeya 
and Iringa. The western zone consisted of Kagera, Mara, the Kigoma regions, and Ukerewe Islands. 
The two sub-zones were Arusha and Ruvuma. The implementation of CIP and the CDP was based 
on the new administrative structure.  
4.5.1. The Coffee Improvement Programme (CIP), 1977–1981 
Between 1977 and 1981, the Coffee Improvement Programme (CIP) was implemented. It sought to 
improve yields by establishing an agricultural extension services network and by providing inputs 
and credit to improve husbandry, and pest and disease control by smallholders. The CIP was 
implemented simultaneously in six regions: Kilimanjaro, Arusha, West Lake, Mbeya, Ruvuma and 
Tanga, covering some 110 000 ha of coffee. The programme primarily aimed at increasing average 
yields and quality. The programme was jointly financed by the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the Tanzanian government. The government contribution of Tshs.211 million consisted 
of TShs. 80 million from internal sources and TShs.131 million to be gathered through the coffee 
levy for the period 1977 to 1981.86 The European Economic Community (EEC) contributed a grant 
 
86 NRC, 570/MD/3/7/1A/Vol.2, Tanzania Coffee Marketing Board Marketing and Sales Reports, Report on Coffee 






through the European Development Fund (EDF) to the CIP. The cost and expenditure of the EDF 
contribution have been summarised in Table 11. 
Table 11: EDF Expenditure Contribution to CIP from 1977 to 30 September 1981 (TShs.’000)87 
Component Expenditure 
Dormitories 1 743 
Factory (Improvement) 10 290 
Vehicle/M/Cycle & Graders 10 975 
Farm Inputs 93 789 
Technical Assistance 9 095 
Total Expenditure 125 892 
At the end of the programme, the total area under coffee production (under the CIP) in all six regions 
increased from 61 770 ha in 1978/79 to 115 377 ha in 1980/81.88 Of this production area, 16 737 
ha was from the Ruvuma region – mainly the Mbinga District. This represented an increase of 9 279 
ha from 7 458 ha in 1978/79.89 The yield of coffee production among the smallholders in the 
Ruvuma region was improved. Between 1974/75 and 1978/79, coffee production in the Ruvuma 
region amounted to an average of 3 498 tons with the mean yield of 290kg/ha.90 In 1980/81, coffee 
production amounted to 6 578 tons with a mean yield of 393kg/ha.91 The mean yield surpassed that 
of the northern zone (Kilimanjaro, Tanga, and Morogoro), which was 305kg/ha in 1980/81. The 
bumper crop in 1980/81 was also attributed to the favourable weather between 1978 and 1980/81 
and the improved husbandry and greater use of coffee production inputs under the CIP. The 
difference between the Ruvuma region and the northern zones was also attributed to the cropping 
system. The northern zone was under intercropping (coffee with banana), unlike the Ruvuma region 
that only focused on coffee. Coffee as a plant when intercropped with taller crops, such as banana 
 
87 NRC, 509/CCU/B/70/17, Coffee Board of Tanganyika, Cost and Expenditure EDF contribution to 30 September 
1981.  
88 URT, Ministry of Agriculture, Price Recommendations for the July 1982, Agricultural Price Review Annex 7 Coffee, 
(Dar es Salaam: Marketing Development Bureau, 1982), 9. The total area under coffee production (national wide) 
consists of both estates and smallholder coffee producers by 1978/79 was 195 514 ha. 
89 Ibid. 







within a close space, tend to reduce its canopy, hence lower yields. While excessive shadow reduces 
the sun to reach the crop for the photosynthesis.92 
 
Figure 4: Mild Arabica Coffee Production 1970/71–1981/8293  
The increased coffee production also brought some challenges in the Matengo Highlands as it 
created demands for land for food crop production. As a result, an internal migration between 
highland and lowlands within the district was experienced. During the interview, one informant 
described that “we migrated to the woodlands (Itutu) to feed the family. The land we used for maize 
and beans cultivation, was converted into coffee farms.’’94 The coffee industry, therefore, moulded 
the landscape, and in some cases, forced people to seasonally migrate while retaining their coffee 
farms in their old homes.  
The implementation of the CIP met with a number of challenges. Its implementation coincided with 
economic shocks for the Tanzanian economy such as the dissolution of the East African Community 
 
92 Interview with Deusdedit Kilambo, Lyamungo Director-Tanzania Coffee Research Institute (TaCRI), 12 November 
2018. 
93 URT, Ministry of Agriculture, Price Recommendations for the July 1982, Agricultural Price Review Annex 7 Coffee, 
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in 197795, the Tanzania-Uganda war of 1978-79, and the oil price shock. These challenges forced 
the government to divert funds to counter the impact of these external events. For instance, about 
$500 million were used for war purposes during the 1978-79 war.96 The cost of imports went up 
due to the increase in oil prices. As a result, government drew money from the foreign reserves 
which declined from US $ 300 million (in early 1978) to US $30 million by the end of 1978.97  
Poorly directed agricultural extension services were also one of the challenges faced during the 
implementation of the CIP. The frequent changes in crop-marketing systems from co-operative 
societies to crop authorities in 1976 were disruptive. The implementation of Ujamaa and 
villagisation policies from the late 1960s to the late 1970s caused unnecessary fear among both 
officials and coffee growers. As a result, it created persistent tendencies of interpreting everything 
as an “order”, including advice from extension officers. This also manifested in the distribution of 
agricultural inputs, including fertilisers, pesticides, and seedlings. It was reported that peasants were 
forced to collect agrochemical inputs and had to pay for it whether they liked it or not.98 Most of 
the agricultural inputs collected were diverted to food-crop production. 
The average price of coffee paid to peasants in the second half of the 1970s did not reflect any 
increase. Except for the 1976/77 coffee season, the price of coffee declined. The main reason for 
the high price in the 1976/77 season was the Brazilian coffee frost of July 1975. The coffee frost 
damage in Brazil caused panic among the coffee importing centres. As a result, most of the buying 
dealers devoted most of their attention to searching for coffee for fear of extensive price increases 
 
95 The East African Community (EAC) was formed in 1967 and consisted of three countries namely Tanzania, Kenya 
and Uganda. During its existence the member countries used to cooperate in various economic activities including 
transportation corporations and industrial developments. In 1977 due to differences in political stance as well as 
economic differences the community collapsed. To replace the collapsed joint economic parastatals, Tanzania 
needed about US$100 million for replacement; Knud E. Svendsen, “Development Strategy and Crisis 
Management”, in Colin Legume and Geoffrey Mmari, Mwalimu: The influence of Nyerere, (Dar es Salaam: Britain 
– Tanzania Society, 1995), 115. 
96 Knud Erik Svendsen, “The Creation of Macroeconomic Imbalances and Structural Crisis” in Jannik Boesen, et al., 
(eds.), Tanzania: Crisis and Struggle for Survival, (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1986), 67. 
97 Ibid.,67. 
98 Interview with Edward Ndunguru, Myangayanga Village, 20 December 2018; Interview with Otmar Mbepera, Longa 






and probable stock exhaustion. Smallholder coffee producers in the Mbinga District responded to 
the price increase by planting more coffee in the 1977/78 season. For instance, as one of the 
informants recalled, “1977 was the last time I planted 2 500 coffee trees that was the largest number 
for me”.99 
Compounding the impact of the Brazil situation was the Angolan pre-independence scuffle between 
rival political organisations, which blocked the smooth flow of coffee exports from this region. The 
competition was extremely lively for both Arabica and Robusta at the coffee auctions. In Moshi, 
two coffee auctions took place in July 1975. Some 48 773 bags were sold at an average of 
TShs.444/- per 50 kg against the previous months (June) average of TShs.378/19 per 50 kg for 
54 305 bags.100 An indication of the sudden change in prices in July was the average price of sale 
29 on 10 July 1975 when coffee was sold for TShs.350/20 per 50 kg, while a fortnight later sale 30 
on 24 July 1975 realised an average of TShs.530/37 per 50 kg coffee bag.101 However, experience 
shows that the early sales fetches higher prices than the later sales. The coffee seasons begin in June 
and July when the northern zone begin to harvest. In the Mbinga District coffee sales begin in early 
September. This was a disadvantage to them. The trend of high prices continued during the new 
season of 1976/77 that commenced early October 1975. It led to a 41% increase in export earnings 
in 1976/1977 compared to 1975. The price of coffee paid to the coffee growers slumped in the two 
years between 1977/78 and 1978/79 before slightly recovering in 1979/80.  
Table 12 shows the trend of the coffee-producer price of mild Arabica coffee parchment I from 
1976/77 to 1985/86.  
 
99 Interview with Pilmin Lupogo, Kindimba Village 9 January 2019. 
100 NRC, 9/CCU/B/70/17/I, Coffee Board of Tanganyika, “Market and Export Report for July 1975”. 







Table 12: Payment Made to Mild Arabica Coffee Growers, 1976/77–1985/86 (Parchment coffee, 
payment TShs/Kg).102 
 
The table above shows the decline of coffee prices between 1977/78 and 1981/82. The downward 
trend became a threat to the survival of the coffee industry in Tanzania and Mbinga in particular. It 
reduced the coffee producers’ incentives to replant and expand the existed coffee-producing areas. 
To reverse the situation, the government first had to subsidise the coffee producers’ price from the 
1982/83 season onwards. This was part of financial assistance of TShs.707 million provided by the 
government to agricultural parastatals.103 A coffee price support subsidy amounting to TShs.140 
million was provided to boost the producers’ purchasing power.104 The remainder was divided as 
follows; Cashew Nut Authority (TShs.150 million), Pyrethrum Board (TShs.15 million), Tea 
Authority (TShs.26 million), Cardamom (TShs.5 million). As a result, the price for mild Arabica 
Parchment I advance instalment increased from TShs. 9.00/kg in 1981/82 to TShs. 12.00/kg in 
1982/83. An increase of 33%.105 Unfortunately, this coincided with the period when Tanzania faced 
budget deficits and was locked in a confrontation with the World Bank and IMF over the need to 
 
102 URT, Ministry of Agriculture, Price Policy Recommendations for the July 1982, Agricultural Price Review Annex 
7 Coffee, (Dar es Salaam: Marketing Development Bureau, July 1982), 24. 
103 Ibid., 18. 
104 Ibid., 2. 

























Advance  6.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 12.00 16.80 23.50 28.20 
Interim  6.00 1.00 0.70 2.00 2.00 2.00 - 3.20 - 8.00 
Final  3.00 0.89 0.37 1.42 1.36 2.90 3.17 2.87 6.18 9.60 






liberalise its economy. To support the declining economy, the National Economic Survival 
Programme was launched (1981-82). The programme aimed to revive export commodities and 
increase industrial capacity. For the agricultural sector, the price subsidy support, as mentioned 
above, was provided for the 1982/83 season.106 Secondly, the government incorporated the Coffee 
Development Programme (CDP) into a Five Years CAT’s Development Plan (1981–1985). The 
following sections describe the implementation of the CDP from 1982 to 1986. 
4.5.2. The Coffee Development Programme (CDP), 1982/83–1985/86 
The CDP coincided with the implementation of a broader economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) in the period 1982–1986.107 The Tanzanian government under Julius K. Nyerere 
aimed at mobilising foreign exchange to revive the failing economy. For the government to obtain 
a loan and foreign aids, they had to meet the demands of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by 
reorganising the internal economic structures. This resulted in the implementation of SAP. SAP 
measures included, among others, the partial liberalisation of the imports, re-introduction of co-
operative movements and the promotion of export commodities. Despite the struggle between 
Tanzania and the World Bank and the IMF, the EEC continued to support the coffee sector 
throughout this period. From October 1982, the Tanzanian government embarked on the Coffee 
Development Programme (CDP). The programme aimed to exploit the considerable potential which 
existed for increased coffee production. The CDP aimed at increasing the quality and quantity of 
coffee production in Tanzania by expanding and consolidating the activities undertaken during the 
CIP. It was implemented in two phases. Phase I covered the period between October 1982/83 and 
September 1983/84. Phase II covered the period between 1984/85 and 1985/86. During the first 
phase, the Coffee Authority of Tanzania (CAT) was responsible for the implementation of the 
programme. A total of Tshs.221 062 000 was allocated for the first two years. The European 
 
106 S. M. Wangwe “Impact of the IMF/World Bank Philosophy, the case of Tanzania”, K. Havnevik, (ed.), The IMF 
and World Bank in Africa, Conditionality, Impact and Alternatives, (Upssala, Seminar Proceedings No. 18, 







Development Fund contributed 13 500 000 ECU equivalent to Tshs.132 707 000 while CAT 
contributed Tshs.88 355 000 from the coffee growers levy (1 ECU=TShs.9.83 in 1982).108  
During Phase I, the focus was on improving husbandry methods for some 210 328 ha of coffee 
growing areas, including 4 920 ha previously excluded from the CIP.109 It included creating 
coffeescapes’ including a considerable complementary investment for infrastructures, such as 
roads, transport, maintenance of workshops, storage, and primary and secondary coffee-processing 
facilities. A long-term research programme was initiated, covering plant breeding, pathology, and 
entomology. The assistance was directed at improving the processing of raw coffee at the farmer’s 
level. Chemical inputs and seedlings were provided for free. The coffee growers had to purchase 
the mechanical farm inputs, such as hand and motorised pulpers, pruning saws and secateurs, spray 
pumps, drying cloth, and coffee tray wires. The chemical inputs included Copper Oxychloride 
50%Cu to control leaf rust, fenitrothion 50%EC for antestia and leaf miner, dieldrin 18%EC for 
white-stem borer and blue copper for Coffee Berry Disease (CBD) control.110  
Furthermore, feeder roads in the Mbinga District were improved. Local funds of Tshs.1 460 000/- 
and TShs. Three hundred sixty-eight thousand from the EDF Fund were allocated for road 
improvement in the Mbinga District. 111. In order to ensure the uninterrupted flow of inputs and 
coffee, the road grader and excavators worked on the following roads during the first year of the 
CDP: Nyoni via Hagati to Langiro (26 km), Mbinga via Kindimba to Litembo (30 km), Tanga via 
Longa to Kipololo and Longa to Mkumbi (39 km), Ndengu via Miyau to Litembo (16 km), Nyoni 
via Mapera to Maguu (25 km), totalling 136 km. As reported in Chapter Three, transport was one 
of the recurrent challenges in the early 1970s. The newly constructed and upgraded roads solved 
the problem to a large extent. The total budget for the CDP Phase I is summarised in Table 13. 
 
108 URT, “Tanzania Coffee Development Programme for 1982-83”, Project No.5100.31.50.010, 11.  
109 Ibid., 3. 
110 Ibid., 22. 






Table 13: CDP Budget 1982/83 – Ruvuma Zone (Value in TShs. ‘000)112 
Item EDF Fund  CAT Fund 
Nursery Costs 184 700 
Staff Training 550 556 
Coffee Inputs 395 39 
Constructions 785 1 681 
Transportation 1 446 1 031 
Feeder Roads 374 1 460 
Processing 5 584 110 
Contingency  932 566 
Total  10 250 6 223 
By the end of the first phase of the CDP, the Tanzanian government had contributed a total of 
TShs.135.8 million consisting of TShs 47.4 million from government revenue and TShs.88.4 
million from the TCMB/CDP levy from coffee sales.113  
The second phase (1984/85 and 1985/86) comprised of the components that received the EDF 
support in Phase I. It expanded the assistance to the activities that were previously not involved in 
the programme. These activities included support for the coffee authority’s extension services and 
staff training facilities, the provision of mechanical and chemical inputs to coffee smallholder 
producers on credit, and improvement of marketing facilities to achieve a higher quality of coffee. 
Furthermore, improving transportation and research programmes, and provision of technical 
assistance for the implementation of the programme were also included. The total costs of the 
programme were ECUs 19.06 million (TShs.247.82 million) of which ECUs 9.77 million 
(TShs.126.98 million) was a grant from the EDF, and the remaining ECUs 9.29 million 
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(TShs.120.84 million) was funded by CAT as levy balances and revenue from the sale of 
agricultural inputs.114  
During the CDP implementation, 285 motorcycles (TShs.7 200 000/-) and 242 bicycles 
(TShs.600 000/-) were purchased and sold to the extension staff on credit in all coffee-growing 
areas. It was repayable by instalment over four and two years, respectively.115 From 1983/84 to 
1985/86, a total of 65 motorcycles (to the value of TShs.139 750/-) were provided to the southern 
zone of which 25 were distributed in the Mbinga District and the remainder to Mbeya. Nine 
motorcycles were distributed in 1983/84, while 16 motorcycles were distributed in 1985/86.116 
Similarly, 25 bicycles (to the value of TShs.29 250/-) out of 106 provided to the southern zone from 
1983/84 to 1985/86 were distributed to extension staff in the Mbinga District.117 Both motorcycles 
and bicycles were funded by the EDF. Availability of both motorcycles and bicycles enabled 
extension officers to visit coffee growers in their coffee fields. On the research aspect, the 
programme focused on the control of Coffee Berry Disease (CBD), Coffee Leaf Rust (CLR) and 
Fusarium by assessing its resistance and extending the control to the southern zone.  
Moreover, there was a general upward trend in coffee production in the Mbinga District in the 
second half of the 1970s. The increase in production can be attributed to the implementation of the 
coffee development programmes from 1977 to 1986. The area under coffee production expanded 
from 7 458 ha in 1978/79118 to 25 696 ha in 1984/85.119 During the first five years of the 1980s, 
however, production targets were not reached. This can be attributed to the delay of the timely 
 
114 ECU stands for European Currency used before 1999 then replaced with Euro (€). URT, “Tanzania Coffee 
Development Programme Phase II, 1985-86”, Project No. 5100 31. 50.027, 2. 
115 URT, “Tanzania Coffee Development Programme Phase II”, 6. 
116 Ibid.,80. 
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118 URT, Ministry of Agriculture, Price Recommendations for the July 1982, Agricultural Price Review Annex 7 Coffee, 
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application of fertiliser and pests and disease-control interventions caused by shortages of foreign 
exchange/currency for the buying of agricultural inputs and pesticides.120  
Table 14: Coffee Production in Mbinga District 1980/81–1985/86 (Tons-parchment)121 
Year  Target Actual 
1977/78 N/A 5 297 
1978/79 N/A 5 812 
1979/89 N/A 5 333 
1980/81 7 997 8 114 
1981/82  6 726  6 002 
1982/83  8 420  8 007 
 1983/84  8 518  6 368 
1984/85   9 167  8 922.3 
1985/86  9 514 7 614. 787 
In the wake of the CDP implementation, the Tanzania Coffee Marketing Board delegated the 
activities initiated by the programmes to the co-operative unions. Coffee growers had to continue 
contributing TShs.3/- to the Coffee Development Levy for every kilogram of coffee sold. In 
1986/87, a total of 765 454 kg was delivered to the TCMB Moshi, which contributed 
TShs.2 296 362 in terms of the coffee levy.122 The money was paid to the Ruvuma Co-operative 
Union (RCU) as a development levy. 
On 30 January 1987, a financial agreement was signed between the government of Tanzania and 
the EEC under the LOME III Convention.123 According to this agreement, the CDP implementation 
was extended to the end of 1988, with the understanding that it would be placed under the 
 
120 NRC, 509/ CCU/B/70/17, Coffee Board of Tanganyika, “Annual plan for 1988/89”. 
121 URT, “Tanzania Coffee Development Programme Phase II”, 77; NRC, 549/5467, Ruvuma Regional Co-operative 
Union (1989) Limited, a letter from Assistant Registrar, Ruvuma Region, Ref. No. UM/UK.UN/121/7, to the 
Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, Dodoma, “Taarifa ya Kiuchumi” [Economic Report], 21 March 1988. 
122 NRC, 509/CCU/B/70/17, Coffee Board of Tanganyika, from General Manager, Tanzania Coffee Marketing Board, 
Moshi, Ref. No. D-1-20, to the General Managers of Co-operative Unions, 4 January 1988.  
123 NRC, 445/CCU/E/169/7, LOME III: Agriculture Sector Support Policy Committee Meeting, Brief meeting held on 
24 May 1989. Apart from supporting coffee industry ASSP focused also on food security in the Ruvuma, Iringa, 






Agriculture Sector Support Programme (ASSP) for a further 30 months after that. The property 
assets accumulated under the CDP programmes were then distributed to the co-operative unions. In 
the Mbinga District, the CDP assets were placed under the TCMB zonal office, which handed them 
over to the Mbinga Co-operative Union (MBICU) (1989) Limited in 1989. As far as the coffee 
industry is concerned, the ASSP focused on the improvement of quality and the development of 
processing facilities. The construction of curing factories in Southern Tanzania was facilitated 
during this period, particularly in Mbinga and Mbozi Mbeya. The EEC contributed a total of TShs. 
710 662 880 (34.60%) out of TShs. 2 053 938 955.35 for the construction of both the Mbinga and 
Mbozi coffee curing factories.124 
4.6. The Re-instatement of the Co-operative Movement in Mbinga District, (1984–1989) 
The implementation of the CDP coincided with an institutional change in the coffee industry in 
Tanzania. Following the re-instatement of co-operative unions in 1984 and the assumption of their 
crop procurement function, CAT reorganised to form the Tanzania Coffee Marketing Board 
(TCMB). The TCMB’s headquarters was located at Moshi. It was established under the Coffee 
Industry Act of 1977 and adapted in 1984. The TCMB was responsible for co-ordinating, promoting 
and regulating all aspects of coffee marketing, processing and export sales of clean (cured) coffee 
and its products. The co-operative unions (as part of the SAP) were re-established and responsible 
for coffee purchases from producers with the support of the primary societies.  
In Chapter Three of this thesis, it was argued that the dissolution of the co-operative societies in 
1976 was a result of the inefficiency of the co-operative societies and marketing boards to deliver 
maximum benefit to both producers and consumers. The operation of the Coffee Authority of 
Tanzania (CAT) between 1977 and 1984, elicited problematic experiences. The coffee producers 
were complaining about the lack of communication and the divide between the villages and the 
Coffee Authority. The absence of co-operative unions created this situation which left coffee 
 







growers isolated. As one of the coffee growers recalled, “there was no one to complain to about our 
dissatisfaction relating to coffee marketing. Confronting CAT was like to confront the state and no 
one was ready to do that since the state has a long arm”.125 This demonstrated the perceptions of 
coffee growers at the village level with regards to CAT. The centralisation of the coffee-marketing 
system through CAT demonstrated the state monopoly over peasant production at the village level. 
As a result, there was a great desire among coffee growers for re-instating the co-operative 
marketing system. 
To the coffee growers, the dissolution of the co-operative marketing system in 1976, brought about 
unnecessary disruptions and created mistrust in government organs. Some coffee growers were 
expecting to be repaid their deposits held by Ruvuma Regional Co-operative Union (RURECU) in 
Mbinga branch before it was dissolved in 1976. For instance, one coffee grower, Francis Damian 
Lupogo from Kindimba Village, wrote a letter to the Prime Minister’s Office in Dodoma to claim 
his deposited money on 31 July 1977. He was not allowed to withdraw his money before the 
liquidation of the union.126 He wrote several letters to the Prime Minister in the period from 1977 
to 1979. In one of his letters, he argued that “… we did not vote for the dissolution …. The co-
operative leaders in the office don’t care about starving coffee growers looking for their peanut 
money. Their silence could be interpreted as an insult to the complainant”.127 On 11 December 
1979, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies replied that “all claims in RURECU are being 
processed. For more information write a letter to the Co-operative liquidator, Songea.”128 Two years 
later, on 6 July 1981, Francis wrote a letter to the Registrar, complaining that each time he wrote to 
the liquidator, he had been told “ngoja ngoja” (wait).129 On 17 August 1981, the Registrar of Co-
 
125 Interview with Pilmin Lupogo, Kindimba Village 9 January 2019. 
126 NRC, 491/2324/II, Ruvuma Region Co-operative Union Limited, A letter from Francis Damian Lupogo-Kindimba 
Village, “Fedha za Amana” (Money Deposits), to the Prime Minister’s Office-Dodoma, 31 July 1977. 
127 NRC, 491/2324/II, Ruvuma Region Co-operative Union Limited, a letter to the Prime Minister’s Office “Fedha za 
Amana katika RURECU” (Money deposits in RURECU), 14 October 1979. 
128 NRC, 491/2324/II, Ruvuma Region Co-operative Union Limited, a letter from the Registrar of Co-operative 
Societies, Dar es Salaam. Ref. No. 2334/II, to Francis Damian Lupogo, 11 December 1979. 
129 NRC, 491/2324/II, Ruvuma Region Co-operative Union Limited, a letter to the Registrar of the Co-operative 






operative Societies replied, “it is a pity for the complainant to be kept waiting for such long time 
without success only to be told “ngoja ngoja”.130 It was learnt that the coffee growers’ deposits were 
in the RURECU’s account at the Songea Branch of the NBC, but due to the existence of an 
outstanding loan in the account, no money could be withdrawn from the account until the loan was 
reimbursed.131 On 15 December 1983, Francis wrote a letter to the Registrar of Co-operative 
Societies requesting a permit to file a case to court demanding justice after waiting for seven years 
(1976–1983) for his money.132 Francis is representative of a number of other coffee growers who 
deposited their money to the co-operative union and become the victims of the abolition of co-
operative societies. He was among the few coffee growers who came out and demanded his money. 
He was a primary teacher, as well as a coffee producer. For this reason, he was among the rural elite 
who could stand up and fight the government. The majority of coffee growers’ deposits were, 
however, liquidated by the bank without public outcry. Although the archival sources do not show 
the amount Francis was claiming (1976–1983), the archival source does show that there were 391 
members of the co-operative societies that deposited their money into the RURECU Mbinga branch 
in 1973. Francis Damian was among the few with a large deposit of TShs.4 153.18. With the interest 
of 3% (TShs.130.44) added, the balance amounted to TShs.4 283.62.133 The interview with Francis 
revealed that his deposit was not recovered, despite being promised to be incorporated into a newly 
re-instated co-operative union in 1984.134 As a result, while some coffee growers supported the re-
instatement of co-operative societies and unions, it reminded others of their impoverishment.  
 
130 NRC, 491/2324/II, Ruvuma Region Co-operative Union Limited, a letter from the Registrar of Co-operative 
Societies, Ref. No. 2324/II/153, to the Auditor and Zonal Supervisor, Songea, 17 August 1981. 
131 NRC, 491/2324/II, Ruvuma Regional Co-operative Union Limited, a letter from the co-operative officer, Songea 
Ref. No. UM/N/II/38, to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Dodoma, “Amana za Wakulima wa Wilaya ya 
Mbinga” [Deposits of the coffee growers], 18 February 1983.  
132 NRC, 491/2324/II/, Ruvuma Region Co-operative Union Limited, a letter from Francis Damian Lupogo, to the 
Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Dodoma, “Fedha za Amana katika RURECU” [Money deposits in RURECU], 
15 December 1983. 
133 NRC, 491/2324/II, Ruvuma Region Co-operative Union Limited, “Annex to Account for the period ended 30 April 
1973”. 






The international corporations also supported the re-instatement of the co-operative unions and 
primary co-operative societies in the 1980s. The Nordic Corporation Project, which was financed 
jointly by Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Iceland, hereinafter referred to as the Nordic 
Government, assisted the co-operative movement in Tanzania under an agreement signed in April 
1984. The project covered the period from 1983 to 1988. It was a continuation of co-operation 
between the Nordic Government and the Tanzanian government in the co-operative movement. 
Previous agreements were signed on 13 December 1971, and on 16 March 1979. The project 
focused on strengthening the Department of Co-operative Development, Co-operative Unions and 
Societies, Co-operative College (Moshi) and its Education Centres. The amount of 203.2 million 
Danish Krone (D.kr.) was allocated for the projects among which 116.0 D.kr. million was allocated 
for 1983–84 while 87.2 million D.kr. was allocated for 1985–88.135 With the exception of the Co-
operative Loan Fund (50 million D.kr.), all funds contributed by the Nordic Governments were in 
terms of grants to the Tanzanian government.136  
The Ruvuma Co-operative Union (1984) Limited (RCU) was established under the Co-operative 
Societies Act of 1982. The RCU had three branches: in Songea (30 co-operative societies), Tunduru 
(13 co-operative societies) and Mbinga (30 co-operative societies). The newly re-established co-
operative societies in the Mbinga District were operated by the RCU between 1984 and 1989. The 
RCU dealt with four main crops, namely maize, coffee, tobacco, and cashew nuts. The amount of 
coffee collected from the Mbinga District during this period, amounted to 23 075 477 kg 
(7 614 787 kg collected in 1985/86; 5 214 327 kg collected in 1986/87; 10 246 363 kg collected in 
1987/88).137  
 
135 NRC, 296/848/XII, Co-operative Union of Tanganyika, Agreement signed on 25 April 1984 (the figure constituted 
upper limits only). 
136 NRC, 296/848/XII, Co-operative Union of Tanganyika, Agreement signed on 25 April 1984. 
137 NRC, 549/5467, Ruvuma Regional Co-operative Union (1989) Limited, a letter from Assistant Registrar, Ruvuma 
Region, Ref. No. UM/UK. UN/121/7, to the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, Dodoma, “Taarifa ya 






On 30 October 1988, the registrar of the Co-operative Societies split the RCU into two co-operative 
unions, namely the Mbinga Co-operative Union (1989) Limited (MBICU) and the Ruvuma Co-
operative Union (RCU) (1989) Limited for the Songea and Tunduru districts. The idea of forming 
the Mbinga Co-operative Union emerged in 1982, following the enactment of the Co-operative 
Societies Act of 1982. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the MBICU merged with Ngoni Matengo 
Co-operative Union and Tunduru Co-operative Union Limited to form the Ruvuma Regional Co-
operative Union (RURECU) in 1972, before the dissolution of all co-operatives in 1976. In 1987, 
the Mbinga District had 45 registered co-operative societies. Therefore, coffee growers had enough 
experience to run a co-operative union. The coffee growers in the Mbinga District demanded to 
have their own co-operative union at district level. During the general meeting in February 1987, 
the majority of the members agreed on the idea of the re-establishment of the MBICU. The MBICU 
inherited the immovable fixed assets, such as buildings, estate, and forest located in Mbinga in 
which some were from the former co-operative unions (MANCU Limited and RURECU). 
4.6.1. Challenges of the Newly Re-instated Co-operatives in Mbinga District, 1984–
1989 
The newly re-established primary co-operative societies and co-operative unions failed to deliver 
the desired benefits to the coffee growers in the Mbinga District as promised with their re-
establishment. The nature of the economic crisis of the 1980s, in tandem with the organisational 
weaknesses of the co-operative societies and unions, were primarily responsible for this situation 
and heralded what became the most challenging phase in the history of the co-operative movement 
in Tanzania.  
The operations of the RCU (1984) Limited was characterised by corruption and economic 
embezzlements of the co-operative union funds in the 1980s. The union manager was accused of 
money embezzlement, and the co-operative union committee gave him six months to rectify the 
situation (from March 1987 to September 1987). As a result, the union was burdened with a debt 






assets.138 The union was, therefore, technically bankrupt. As disciplinary measures, the union 
committee was dissolved, and the union managers, including branch managers (Mbinga and 
Songea), were expelled by the registrar of the co-operative societies. The marketing officer, 
production manager and accountant of the Songea branch were also expelled.139  
Apart from the loss through fraud, the union also had accumulated debts from commercial banks. 
By 1989, during the split of the RCU, the Mbinga branch had accumulated debts on agricultural 
inputs and crop financing amounting to TShs.223 809 604.05 (TShs.48 468 508.35 from the CRDB 
Bank and TShs.175 341 095.70 from the NBC Bank).140 On the other hand, the RCU (Songea and 
Tunduru district) had a total of TShs.619 943 777.50 (TShs.218 968 521.40 from the NBC and 
TShs.400 975 256.10 from the CRDB).141 As a result, payment for coffee sales also proved to be a 
challenge. In the 1988/89 season, until the new coffee season of 1989/1990, some of the co-
operative societies had not yet been paid. By September 1989, the advance payment of 
TShs.94 216 858 to 44 co-operative societies in the Mbinga District for their coffee delivered to 
RCU (1984) Limited were still outstanding.142 With the outstanding loan situation, the co-operative 
union failed to obtain a loan from financial institutions. For instance, in 1988/89, the RCU (1984) 
Limited applied for TShs.900/- million for coffee payments but failed to acquire it due to the 
 
138 NRC, 549/5467, Ruvuma Region Co-operative Union (1989) Limited, “Kushindwa kwa Managementi na 
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accumulation of outstanding loans. As a result, coffee growers were paid TShs.24.50 per kilogram 
as advance payment, which was less than the indicated price of TShs.90/-.143  
Co-operative unions had also acquired loans from banks for agricultural inputs. The TCMB had 
been importing all agricultural inputs, both chemical and mechanical. For the chemical inputs 
(pesticides and fertilisers), there had been the system of deducting it from the final payment for 
coffee growers, while for mechanical inputs, the co-operative unions had to buy it from the TCMB. 
The coffee growers were required to buy mechanical inputs, including sprayers, hessian wires, 
pruning facilities, and pulping and drying materials from the co-operative unions. All these 
activities were supported through financial overdrafts, based on the collateral the unions could 
supply. It was reported during the National Executive Committee on co-operatives on 15 September 
1989, that the co-operative unions in Tanzania had accumulated debt totalling TShs.28.8 billion. 
On this debit side, seven co-operative unions had a total of TShs.18 billion due to outstanding loans 
from the NBC and CRDB Banks.144 Some of the reasons for this accumulated debt have been 
mentioned earlier and included poor management systems due to the presence of unskilled co-
operative officials, logistic challenges, and money and crop theft. Consequently, the financial 
difficulties of the co-operative unions placed a heavy burden on coffee producers. 
Coffee loss in terms of quality and quantity was another challenge the coffee industry faced in the 
Mbinga District. The coffee season of 1985/86 witnessed the loss of about 1 142 tons.145 Most of 
the losses in quantity were attributed to theft. The key suspects were primary co-operative 
secretaries, watchmen of the coffee warehouses, and transporters. Even after convictions had been 
affected, the guilty parties were unable to repay the amount of money for the lost coffee of 
TShs.168 807 567/15, which created a loss to the Co-operative Union and the coffee growers.146 
 
143 NRC, 572/CCD, Malalamiko ya Wakulima wa Kahawa Mkoani Ruvuma Msimu 1985/86 [Complaints of the coffee 
growers in the 1985/86 season]. 
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145 NRC, 572/CCD, Malalamiko ya Wakulima wa Kahawa Mkoani Ruvuma Msimu 1985/86. 
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Between October 1985 and December 1986, eight drivers during 16 different trips were involved 
in coffee theft in the Mbinga District.147 Some of the transporters delivered less coffee at their 
destinations than what they uploaded at the collection points. Further, coffee loss was experienced 
during the transport of coffee from the Co-operative Union (RCU) to the Tanzania Coffee Curing 
Company in Moshi. Some of the cases reported for coffee theft are summarised in Table 15 to give 
an extent of the losses and an indication of the success of the prosecution of the guilty transporters. 
Table 15: A Report on Coffee Theft in the RCU Limited by 23 April 1988148 
Case File No.  Criminal Case 
No. 
Accused name Amount Result 
MAK/IR/629/86 77/86 Oswald Weston 





Jailed 4 years 





Case in process 











E. Komba & C. 
Sawala 
TShs.12 848 
000/- (300 bags) 
Court case in 
process 
MAK/IR/605/87 RMS 36/87 
(MONTION 
13/5/88) 
E. Komba, C. 
Sawala, and O. 
Weston 
TShs.21 045 
433.40 (loss of 
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Above table shows that transporters coffee to the value of TShs.36 191 433.40 between 1986 and 
1987. The convicted people were involved in multiple charges. As shown further, some of the 
imprisoned convicts also had other charges in court. This could be one of the reasons for the 
incomplete rulings. All five criminal cases were reported from the Makambako (Iringa) coffee 
depot.  
Transport continued to be a problem in the Mbinga District, particularly with coffee transportation 
under the RCU. The liquidity problems and bad roads were primarily responsible for the transport 
dilemma. Although road upgrading under the CDP reduced some of the transport challenges, lack 
of all-weather roads, like tarmac roads, continued to challenge the coffee industry during rainy 
seasons. Consequently, by May 1988, there were 4 000 tons of parchment coffee in the district yet 
to be transported to the Tanzania Coffee Curing Company (TCCCO) Limited in Moshi.149 Before 
the construction of the Mbinga coffee curing factory in 1989, all Southern Tanzanian Co-operative 
Unions (Ruvuma, Mbeya and Iringa regions) were responsible for delivering coffee to the TCMB 
in Moshi. The main challenges included the distance from Mbinga to Moshi, which was more than 
1 300 kilometres and coupled with a shortage of vehicles and spares. This affected the quality of 
coffee delivered due to delays in transport logistics. In 1988, the TCCCO refused to process 861 
bags of coffee of the 1987/88 season in Ruvuma for fear of deterioration in the quality.150 As a 
result, the coffee fetched a lower price at the auction. The extended transport times also increased 
interest accumulated on bank overdrafts and increased the risk of coffee loss through theft on transit. 
All these factors had an impact on the coffee growers.  
Another challenge for coffee growers was the lack of consistency in the ratio between the producer 
price and sales price. In the 1980s, CAT and later the TCMB, channelled varying percentages of 
 
149 NRC, 570/MD/3/7/1A/Vol. 2, Tanzania Coffee Marketing Board: Coffee Sales and Marketing Reports, Reports of 
Meeting to review syndication in preparation of meeting with B.T.C.O, 16 May 1988. 
150 NRC, 570/MD/3/7/1A Vol.2, Tanganyika Coffee Marketing Board: Sales and Marketing Reports, “Muhtasari wa 






their selling price to coffee producers. In 1981/82, the producer price was determined at 82,7% of 
the selling price, mainly due to the input support from the EEC through the CIP. In 1982/83 and 
1983/84, the producer price represented 73% of the selling price while declining to 67% in 1984/85 
and recovering to 79% in 1985/86.151 These percentages depended on the marketing costs at both 
the marketing board and co-operatives. The coffee growers were paid after the deduction of the 
expenses of the TCMB and the co-operative unions. The payment was done in two or three 
instalments – as advance, interim and final payments. The advance instalment was paid to the coffee 
growers upon delivery to the co-operative societies (into-store price). After the calculation of the 
actual realisation from the auction, the TCMB paid the interim instalment to the co-operatives. The 
final instalment depended on the finalised trading account. However, in most cases, the third 
payments took a long time and sometimes did not materialise due to the decline of coffee prices on 
the world market. The TCMB marketing expenses included the curing expenses, development levy, 
the TCMB levy, and insecticides and fertilisers. The union marketing expenses included the union 
levy, society levy, interest on bank overdraft, transportation of fertiliser and gunny bags, crop and 
cash insurance, crop transportation, handling charges and storage, district bank charges and 
commission. In addition to the TCMB and co-operative expenses, in 1985/86, the government as 
part of the ‘coffee statecraft’ introduced a price stabilisation fund for which TShs.5 was deducted 
per every kilogram of coffee sold in final payment.152 The development levy (TShs.2.0146/kg) 
which was previously used to facilitate the CIP and CDP programmes were directed to the 
construction of two coffee curing factories in Mbinga and Mbozi Mbeya.153 These deductions made 
coffee growers receive less than what they deserved through their labour. For instance, in the 
1985/86 season, the average coffee sales price for mild Arabica coffee was $2.666/kg (TShs.87.18) 
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compared to the producer’s price of the parchment I of $1.4006/kg (TShs.45.80).154 This makes a 
margin cost (deduction) of $1.2653 (TShs.41.38). Coffee growers complained that they were 
overburdened by the deductions from their coffee sales proceeds.  
4.7. Conclusion  
This chapter joined the debate on the historiography of African peasant production. The existing 
historiography focused on understanding the state, co-operative movement and peasant production 
relationship. However, this chapter expanded the debate on the state monopolies on peasant 
production, focusing on the context of socialist or Ujamaa and villagisation policies in the Mbinga 
District during the post-colonial period. It challenges the existing historiographic model that 
emphasize the state’s top-down decision in implementing Ujamaa policy as one of the reasons for 
its failure in Tanzania. The existing model neglect the role of the ‘coffeescapes’ in shaping the 
policy implementation. It has argued that the trajectory of the coffee industry between 1960s and 
1990 in the Mbinga District, has been mainly influenced by the post-colonial state interventions on 
agricultural production and marketing and this had some impact on the socio-economic aspects of 
the smallholder coffee producers in the district. 
The economic crisis from the late 1970s and the early 1980s forced the state to abandon its socialist 
principles by accepting the Structural Adjustment Programs as stipulated by the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The chapter has demonstrated the increase of coffee tonnage 
and production coverage as a result of the coffee improvement and development programmes as 
part of the ‘coffee statecraft’ from the late 1970s and 1980s. The re-instating of the co-operative 
movement in the early 1980s, was expected to restore the lost autonomy of the coffee producers in 
the control of the industry from the post-colonial state-controlled coffee authority of 1977 that was 
not restored. This however did not materialize. In examining the newly re-instated co-operative 
movements in the early 1980s, the chapter has documented a number of challenges, including 
 






financial debts, corrupt leaders and general economic hardships, which prevented the co-operatives 
from delivering on their promises. It left the smallholder coffee producers with a feeling of being 
overburdened and overtaxed. The next chapter shows how the global wave of economic 
liberalisation forced the Tanzanian government to adopt the free-market system in the 1990s by 
allowing co-operatives to compete with private coffee buyers. The chapter explains the transition 
from the co-operative society’s monopoly in the coffee-marketing system to the co-existence with 






Chapter Five  
Struggle for Survival: Co-operative Societies and Private Enterprises in the 
Coffee Industry, c.1990–2015. 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter explores coffee production and marketing processes from the 1990s to 2015 in the 
Mbinga District, Tanzania. This was a period of economic liberalisation that demonstrated a 
transition from state monopoly to free and competitive marketing. As indicated in Chapter Four, 
the coffee industry was under state monopoly since Tanzanian independence in 1961. The co-
operative societies under the auspices of the Coffee Board were initially responsible for coffee-
marketing processes. Globally, the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) regulated prices through 
a quota system from 1962 to 1989. Following the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement 
in 1989, coffee-producing countries experienced fluctuations and instability in coffee prices. 
Tanzania was no exception. Steps had to be taken to stabilise the coffee economy. Pressures from 
the global economy forced Tanzania to implement economic reforms. Although some reforms had 
been initiated since the 1980s, particularly in food-crop marketing, it was perceived as happening 
at a glacial pace. The 1990s heralded a second phase in agricultural reforms, focusing on export 
crops such as coffee, tobacco, cotton and cashew nuts. It was a phase during which the state 
monopoly was challenged by the private enterprises in terms of the production and marketing of 
export crops, including coffee.  
By focusing on the Mbinga Co-operative Union (MBICU), the chapter demonstrates the transition 
from state monopoly to the private enterprises’ hegemony in the production and marketing of 
coffee. It uses this case study as a lens through which to examine the fluctuating fortunes of the 
coffee industry in Tanzania from the 1990s to 2015. The chapter argues that the transition from a 






coffee industry did not lead to free and fair competition but rather entrenched hegemonic and 
exploitative practices at the expense of the smallholder coffee producers. 
This chapter uses both archival and oral sources. The archival sources were obtained from the 
National Record Centre (NRC) housed in the Dodoma region, and the Tanzania Coffee Board 
headquarters in the Moshi District in the Kilimanjaro region. Oral sources were gathered from the 
officials and coffee producers from the Mbinga District. Some of the officials from both public and 
private enterprises in the Mbinga District, in addition to participating in interviews, were willing to 
provide the researcher with documents that are unavailable in the public domain. The three coffee-
curing companies, namely the Mbinga Coffee Curing Company (MCCCO) Limited, Coffee 
Management Services (CMS), and Dan & Associates Enterprises Limited (DAE) Coffee Curing 
factory counted among these. The MCCCO is a co-operative owned enterprise, while the CMS and 
DAE Limited are private enterprises. From these sources, the theme of the struggle and survival 
strategies adopted by the co-operative union and the private enterprises in the Mbinga District from 
the 1990s to 2015 emerged. 
The chapter starts with a historical overview of the period, followed by contextualising the 
economic situation of the co-operative unions in the early 1990s and the adoption of the economic 
liberalisation reforms in the coffee industry. The chapter also discusses the challenges which led to 
the collapse of the MBICU in the late 1990s. The chapter advances to the survival of the smallholder 
coffee producers through independent co-operative societies and farmer groups between 2000 and 
2015. Moreover, it explains how the MCCCO, as one of the co-operative-owned enterprises, 
struggled and survived in the wake of the introduction of private coffee enterprises. It concludes 
that the competition between co-operatives and private coffee enterprises had led to more confusion 






5.2. Historiographical Issues  
This chapter draws from and critiques on the sometimes-extended debates from various scholars 
who have focused on the development of the coffee industry in the 1990s in Tanzania. It draws 
from economists who focused on the economic reforms and their impact on the coffee-marketing 
systems. These scholars, including Anna Temu et al., focus on the changes in the marketing 
structures after liberalisation, particularly the involvement of private companies (vertically 
integrated exporters) in the marketing processes.1 They pointed out that the increasing share of 
“captive coffee” from zero per cent in 1993/94 to 53% in 1997/98 in Northern Tanzania had led to 
the decline of competition among bidders at the auction level.2 This chapter draws on this analysis 
to examine the competition between private coffee enterprises (both vertically integrated exporters 
and domestic traders) and co-operative unions in domestic coffee marketing in Southern Tanzania.  
Furthermore, Brian Cooksey uses the example of maize, tobacco and coffee, to show how 
liberalisation has failed in Tanzania, specifically in export crops.3 The author argues that 
liberalisation in export crops in Tanzania has failed due to the interferences of bureaucratic political 
class.4 The need for patronage, cronyism and rent-seeking are considered to be the reason for the 
interferences. Furthermore, Stefano Ponte considered the interventions taken on the ground of 
principles such as quality control and social identity.5 The reactions of the state to intervene and 
reverse market reform was termed the “politics of ownership”, meaning that a state defends the 
interest of local business by undermining the domination of “foreign” interest.6 Ponte and Cooksey 
 
1 A. Temu, A. Winter-Nelson, and P. Garcia, “Market Liberation Vertical Integration and Price Behaviour in Tanzania’s 
Coffee Auction”, Development Policy Review, 19, 2, (2001), 205-222. 
2 Captive coffee is the coffee at the auction floor owned by private companies participating in both domestic markets 
and as exporters. A. Temu, A. Winter-Nelson and P. Garcia, “Market Liberation Vertical Integration and Price 
Behaviour in Tanzania’s Coffee Auction”, 219.  
3 B. Cooksey, “Marketing Reform? The Rise and Fall of Agricultural Liberalisation in Tanzania”, Development Policy 
Review, 21 (1), (2003), 67-91. 
4 Ibid., 67. 








contend that economic reforms in the coffee industry failed because the state wanted to protect its 
political space without considering the initial aim of the reform, namely to have a competitive 
market. Despite their political extremism, which made them focus on the failure of economic 
reforms in export crops and ignore some of the successful elements, Cooksey’s and Ponte’s work 
is important for this thesis because they demonstrate the challenges of implementing economic 
reforms in a long-established state-owned co-operative system. This chapter accepts the political 
interference as one of the challenges involved in the implementing of economic reforms in Northern 
and Western Tanzania; however, it will further explore both the success and challenges of the coffee 
industry, particularly in relation to the co-existence of both private coffee enterprises and co-
operative unions in the Mbinga District, Southern Tanzania. 
The 1990s was a period characterised by mixed reactions from the coffee producers. While in some 
parts of the country, the coffee farms had been abandoned, others had been expanding their coffee 
production, irrespective of the decline of the coffee prices in the world market. The chapter also 
draws on the social anthropological study by Sam Maghimbi7 that focuses on the northern coffee-
producing zone, specifically the Kilimanjaro region in the early 2000s. Maghimbi’s study shows 
how coffee producers shifted from coffee production to maize and rice. To him, the weaknesses of 
the co-operative unions and lack of enough land for the expansion of coffee production in 
Kilimanjaro had made peasants turn to maize, rice, and dairy farming.8 However, this was not the 
case in the Mbinga District. This thesis shows that, despite the challenges, people have retained 
coffee production. The evidence shows the expansion of the area under coffee cultivation in the 
 
7 S. Maghimbi, “Recent changes in crop patterns in the Kilimanjaro region of Tanzania: The decline of coffee and the 
rise of maize and rice”, African Study Monographs, Suppl. 35, (2007), 73-83. 
8 The small size of land of less the 0.6 ha as national average size in 2007 compared to 0.73 ha in the 1930s prevented 
the expansion of coffee production in the Kilimanjaro region; S. Maghimbi, Recent changes in crop patterns in the 






Mbinga District from 30 734 ha in 20089 to 35 000 ha in 2012.10 The coffee producers have been 
evolving through various mechanisms to survive the competitive coffee markets. 
This chapter also draws on the argument put forward by David Mhando (2014) on the conflicts of 
interests as a reason for the co-operative societies withdrawing from co-operative unions. Mhando 
argued that “in some cases, large organisations do not meet farmers’ needs. Thus smaller 
organisations with lower operating costs may be needed.”11 The conflicts within the Kilimanjaro 
Co-operative Union in the Moshi District led to the withdrawal of 22 out of 92 co-operative societies 
to form independent associations, generally known as G-32 in 2002/03.12 Building on Mhando’s 
argument, this chapter, however, further explores the emerging independent co-operative societies 
and farmer groups following the collapse of the MBICU in relation to the development of the coffee 
industry in the Mbinga District. 
Moreover, this chapter draws on the work of David G. Mhando13 and Ryugo Korasaki14 who studied 
the impact of economic liberalisation on the coffee market, focusing on the farmers’ coping 
strategies in the Mbinga District. Following the decline of coffee prices in 1992, and the collapse 
of the Mbinga Co-operative Union (MBICU) in 1996 as a marketing organ, coffee farmers adapted 
among other things, by expanding their coffee fields and diversifying their income sources. 
However, the studies are limited in timeframe and geographical scope. They focus on the ten years 
after economic liberalisation (1993–2003), based on the two villages of Kindimba and Kitanda.15 
Apart from being silent on the period before liberalisation and ten years after – something which 
 
9 URT, National Sample Census of Agriculture 2007/2008 Smallholder Agriculture Regional Report-Ruvuma, (Vol. 
VJ), (September 2012), 46. 
10 URT, Tanzania Coffee Industry Strategy 2011–2021, (Amended version), (Tanzanian Coffee Board and Tanzania 
Coffee Association, 2010), 10.  
11 D.G. Mhando, “Conflict as Motivation for change: The case of coffee farmers’ cooperatives in Moshi, Tanzania”, 
African Study Monographs, Suppl. 50, (2014), 139. 
12 Ibid., 143. 
13 D.G. Mhando, “Farmers’ Coping Strategies to a Changed Coffee Market After Economic Liberalization: The Case 
of Mbinga District in Tanzania”, African Study Monographs, 36, Supplementary Issue, (2007), 39-58. 
14 R. Korasaki, “Multiple Uses of Small-Scale Valley Bottom Land: Case of the Matengo in Southern Tanzania”, 
African Study Monographs, 36, Supplementary Issue, (March 2007), 19-38.  






makes it lack historical continuity – their conclusions were based on oral interviews with no backup 
of other historical accounts, such as archival sources. Thus, conclusions do not provide a complete 
picture of the prevailing environment. This chapter will attempt to fill this gap and will also draw 
on the similarities and differences of the coffee-producing area in the Mbinga District in comparison 
with other coffee-producing regions in Tanzania. 
Therefore, diverging from the existing literature that focuses on quantitative analysis of the 
economic impact of the economic reforms on coffee marketing, as well as anthropological studies 
in Northern and Western Tanzania, this chapter contributes knowledge to the agrarian history of 
Tanzania by providing a historiographical analysis of the fortunes of the coffee industry in the post-
reform period in Tanzania. Hence, this chapter draws together archival and oral sources in studying 
the socio-economic impacts of coffee co-operatives and private enterprises on smallholder coffee 
producers in the Mbinga District between the 1990s and 2015. 
5.3. From State Monopoly to the Free-market System, 1990–1994  
The 1980s economic crisis discussed in the previous chapter forced Tanzania to stabilise its 
economy by mobilising the internal resources as well as external aids and loans. Since the pace of 
reform was slow, some of the donor countries threatened to withdraw their assistance from the 
country. For instance, the poor performance of co-operative societies in the late 1980s forced some 
of the external supporters to withdraw from Tanzania. Nordic countries that had supported the co-
operative movement financially since the 1970s, for example, withdrew their support for co-
operative societies in Tanzania from June 1990.16 Most of these co-operative societies were 
functioning so poorly and so uneconomically that supporting them was seen as useless. This was 
expressed in their exit letter which stated “njia pekee ya kuvisaidia vyama vya Ushirika nchini 
Tanzania ni kutovisaidia” translated as “the only way to assist co-operative unions is not to assist.”17 
 
16 NRC, 564/MD/6/1/VOL.II, Co-operative Marketing in Tanzania, a letter from the Nordic Advisory committee, to 
General Secretary, “Washirika”, June 1990. 






The withdrawal of financial support for co-operative societies was intended by the donor to force 
the Tanzanian government to adopt policy reforms. From 1990 to 1993, there was an intense conflict 
between Tanzania and donors, led by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Donors 
withdrew from funding the Open General License (OGL), which was mainly responsible for 
financing agricultural inputs in 1992.18 The main reason was the slow pace of the state in fund 
accountability, especially the payment of the funds from commercial banks to the central banks. 
The coffee sector had to adopt some changes within its institutions. From 1 July 1990, the Coffee 
Board became an agent of the co-operative unions. This went together with the reduction of board 
workers both working in and outside of the headquarters. External workers were reduced from 826 
to 39 and internal workers from 123 to 80.19 The Board reduced its annual expenditure from 
TShs.895 465 182 to TShs.266 136 242.20 In practical terms, the implementation of the agency 
system as set out in 1990, led to little real change in the marketing systems, which continued to be 
a single-channel monopoly system. They were run by the same actors – primary co-operative 
societies, co-operative unions, and the Tanzania Coffee Marketing Board (TCMB) – simply with 
reshuffled responsibilities. In terms of operations, almost nothing changed other than some 
reduction in the TCMB’s staff. As an agent, the TCMB’s activities included preparing the client’s 
coffee for auction (storage, liquoring, paperwork, transport), assisting in setting auction reserve 
prices, arranging the official transfer of products, and handling financial transactions.21 
 
18 Open General License (OGL) was introduced in 1987 by the World Bank, Tanzanian government, the African 
Development Bank, and Bilateral donors. It was aimed to support importation liberalisation by providing foreign 
exchange to importers. In 1991/92 OGL had a total share of financing by WB-56%, Bilateral donors-28%, 
Government-11% and African Development Bank-5%. In 1992/93, donors stopped their finance subject to the 
improvement in the management and sufficiency accounting for the counterpart funds owed by the commercial 
banks to the Bank of Tanzania; D. Mans, “Tanzania: Resolute Action”, I. Husain and R. Faruqee (eds.), Adjustment 
in Africa Lessons from Country Case Studies, (Washington, D.C. The World Bank, 1994), 366-67, 392.  
19 NRC, 564/MD/6/1/VOL.II, Co-operative Marketing in Tanzania, “Maazimio ya Mkutano kati ya Viongozi wa vyama 
vikuu vya Ushirika , bodi za mazao na wizara ya serikali za mitaa, maendeleo ya jamii, ushirika na masoko 
uliofanyika Dodoma kuanzia tarehe 7 hadi 9 Agosti, 1989, [Meeting Resolutions by the chairmen of the co-operative 
Unions, Crop Boards, and the Ministry of Local Authorities, Marketing and Co-operative Development held in 
Dodoma from 7 to 9 August 1989], 62. 
20 Ibid. 
21 NRC, 556/MD/9/1A, Marketing of coffee in Tanzania: Tanganyika Coffee Board, “Coffee Sub-Sector- Marketing 






Tanzania has been under the socialist (Ujamaa) philosophy from the 1960s. As a result, Co-
operative Acts in operation still reflected the Ujamaa principles. Therefore, the transition to the 
free-market system had also to be incorporated into Co-operative Acts. The government decided to 
amend Co-operative Act No.14 of 1982 and enact a new one (No.15) in 1991. The revised Co-
operative Act aimed at allowing the co-operative sector to operate as commercial entities without 
government intervention. The overreliance of co-operatives on the state created room for relaxation 
on debt collection and repayment. As a result, there was an increasing rate of outstanding debts. For 
instance, on 3 January 1991, co-operative unions in Tanzania had a total debt of 
TShs.3 517 621 742.65 ($11 815 995.10) on coffee inputs.22 The MBICU had outstanding debts of 
coffee inputs to the value of TShs.964 063 286/- ($3 238 371.80).23 The new Co-operative Societies 
Act of 1991 demanded that only economically viable co-operative societies be registered.24 
However, the Act also replaced a criterion of compulsory co-operative membership with a voluntary 
one.25 These changes could not guarantee coffee co-operatives to get more members after the 
liberalisation of its market. The Co-operative Union of Tanzania (CUT) was replaced by the 
Tanzania Federation of Co-operatives (TFC) in December 1994 to strengthen the co-operative 
movement. The TFC aimed at representing, promoting and coordinating the co-operative movement 
in Tanzania.26  
In August 1993, the Tanzania parliament passed a bill amending the Coffee Marketing Board Act 
of 1984. The objective of the bill was to amend legislation on the Coffee Board to allow private 
companies and individuals to purchase and sell coffee both in and outside Tanzania. As a result, the 
TCMB was replaced by the Tanzania Coffee Board (TCB) and the marketing structure altered from 
a three-tier single marketing channel, which was established in 1961 and restructured in 1985 (and 
 
22 NRC, 570/MD/3/7/1A/VOL.2, Tanzania Coffee Marketing Board Sales and Marketing Report, “Debt to Unions” as 
of January 1991. 
23 Ibid. 
24 NRC, 416/CCU/C.230/IV, Co-operative Societies: General, 1991. 
25 United Republic of Tanzania (URT), The Co-operative Societies Act No.15 of 1991, Section 22, (1991). 
26 S. Maghimbi, “Cooperatives in Tanzania Mainland: Revival and Growth”, CoopAfrica Working Paper No. 14, 






consisted of primary societies, regional co-operative unions and the Tanzania Coffee Marketing 
Board), to a multi-channel marketing system which commenced effectively in the 1993/94 season. 
The changes brought a shift in policy emphasis from a highly government-controlled marketing 
system to a competitive model incorporating private enterprises. The TCB acted as a regulatory 
organ focusing on the licensing issues, running the coffee auction, and acting as an advisor to the 
government on matters concerning the coffee industry.27 
The directors of regional development were given the responsibility of registering all private traders 
of a crop produced in the region. The registered names were sent to the crop boards to get a buying 
license. Buying licenses were issued annually. Under a newly enacted Act, coffee buyers included 
primary co-operative societies and co-operative unions, farmer’s groups, coffee curing companies, 
individual and private enterprises, and crop boards (coffee boards). The regional, district and village 
authorities identified and recognised the coffee-buying stations, including village offices and co-
operative society centres. The coffee buyers had to pay levies, to which they agreed. The district 
levy was arranged by the district councils according to the district by-laws. A society levy was paid 
to primary co-operative societies whenever societies were involved in providing services, such as 
crop grading, where society committee members were used, the use of co-operative warehouses, 
and scales. The amount of the levy was negotiated between buyers and service providers.  
The private sector has historically been involved in the coffee industry. As explained in Chapter 
Three, before the formation of co-operative societies in the 1930s in the Mbinga District, private 
traders, predominantly Indians traders, were the main coffee buyers. With the introduction of co-
operative societies and unions, private traders were only licensed as coffee buyers for export at the 
coffee auction. Starting with the 1993/94 season, private companies could purchase crops from 
farmers, primary co-operative societies or unions. Traders could opt to sell parchment coffee to the 
curing plant or have their product processed for a fee and sell it in their name at the auction. 
 
27 NRC, 556/MD/9/1A, Marketing of coffee in Tanzania: Tanganyika Coffee Board, “coffee Sub-Sector- marketing 






However, in the Mbinga District, coffee market liberalisation was the beginning of the competition 
between the MBICU and private coffee enterprises.  
5.4. The Struggle and Collapse of the Mbinga Co-operative Union, 1990–2000 
The introduction of the free-market system in coffee marketing since 1994/95, found most co-
operative unions in an already precarious financial position, mostly related to the outstanding debt. 
From the late 1980s to the 1990s, most of the co-operative unions in Tanzania, including the 
MBICU, were highly indebted to various institutions, including banks, crop boards, public 
corporations, and co-operative societies. In 1989, the government formed a committee to investigate 
the economic conditions of co-operative unions. On 15 September 1989, the committee submitted 
their report to the National Executive Council showing that co-operative unions were indebted to 
the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) and the Co-operative Rural Development Bank (CRDB) to 
the total of TShs.28.8 billion.28 
The presence of outstanding loans to co-operative unions in the late 1980s impacted on the financial 
capacity of the unions in the 1990s. As indicated in Chapter Four, the MBICU split from the 
Ruvuma Co-operative Union (1984) Limited (RCU) in 1989. The RCU had an outstanding debt of 
TShs.1.7 billion that was divided between the two unions on 31 January 1989. While the RCU 
remained with TShs.1.2 billion debt, the MBICU was apportioned with TShs.508 million.29 The 
inherited debt of TShs.508/- million increased to TShs.658 610 325.30 ($1 615 032.676) in 1992 
due to bank interests accumulated over the three years.30 In addition, the union had to sustain a sum 
of TShs.409 000 000/-($1 002 942.6) as a debt to the NBC Bank. This resulted from coffee-sale 
“shortfalls” in the 1991/92 season.31 The coffee sale shortfalls in the 1991/92 season, was a result 
 
28 NRC, 425, Taarifa za Madeni ya Vyama Vikuu vya Ushirika 1989 [Report on Co-operative Unions’ Debts by 1989]. 
29 NRC, 589/CCD, Mbinga Co-operative Union (hereafter MBICU) (1989) Limited, a letter from the MBICU to the 
Prime Minister and the first vice president, Dar es Salaam, Ref. No. MBICU/C.B/1/163, “Ukombozi wako kwa 
Wakulima wa Kahawa wa Wilaya ya Mbinga kwa Fedha Zao za Msimu wa 1992/93” [Your support to the coffee 
producers in the Mbinga District on their payment for 1992/93 season] 25 April 1994.  







of the decline of the prices to a very low level compared with the previous years – from $2.6 per kg 
in the 1988/89 season to $1.1 per kg in 1991/92.32 As a result, the MBICU was unable to repay the 
bank debt by end of the 1991/92 season. The 1992/93 coffee sales were used to repay the union 
debts. Apart from repaying a sum of TShs.1 421 000 000 as the overdraft to NBC Bank for the 
1992/93 coffee season and TShs.409 million for the coffee sale “shortfall’ (1991/92 season), the 
bank also deducted TShs.310 302 617.20 as part of the RCU’s inherited debt.33 The RCU’s 
inherited debt was part of the TShs.35.129 billion moratoria granted by the Tanzanian government 
on 16 April 1993 to all co-operative unions due to the high rate of outstanding loans.34 The 
moratorium was excepted to extend the time for repayment. The deduction of the inherited RCU’s 
debt was unexpected. Consequently, coffee producers did not get a sum of TShs.144 000 000/- as 
their second payment for the 1992/93 coffee sales.35 
On top of their accumulating debt and their outstanding debtors, co-operative unions in Tanzania 
also had to contend with declining coffee prices in the first half of the nineties – all contributing to 
most of the co-operative unions in Tanzania operating at a loss. Lack of cash forced some co-
operatives to reduce the amount of money paid to the coffee producers compared to the official 
price announced by the government. For instance, in the 1991/92 coffee season, the government 
announced advanced prices of TShs.230/- for the Mild Arabica per kilogram (parchment I) but due 
to lack of cash, the MBICU paid only TShs.155/- to the coffee growers.36 This decision was made 
during the Union Executive Committee Meeting held on 29 August 1991. Having a total capital of 
 
32 URT, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, Coffee Marketing Review 1993-94, (Dar es Salaam: 
Marketing Development Bureau,1994), 22.  
33 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a letter from MBICU to the Prime Minister and the first vice president, 
Dar es Salaam, Ref. No. MBICU/C.B/1/163, “Ukombozi wako kwa Wakulima wa Kahawa wa Wilaya ya Mbinga 
kwa Fedha Zao za Msimu wa 1992/93”, 25 April 1994. 
34 MBICU was granted a TShs.993 041 391.75 (Shs.613 million debt and TShs.380 041 391.75 interest) moratorium; 
NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a letter from vice chairman of the planning commission and the Minister 
of State (H. Kolimba), to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Dar es Salaam, “Madeni ya vyama vya 
ushirika kuchukuliwa na serikali (MBICU)” [Co-operative Union’s debts taken by the government], 30 April 1994. 
35 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, “Minutes of the 8th General Meeting held at MBICU Hotel’s Conference 
Hall”, 7 – 8 December 1996.  
36 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a Memo from A. Haukelani Coffee Management Unit (CMU), Ref. No. 






TShs.1 438 381 200 for coffee sales, they realised that if they pay producers TShs.230/kg for the 
estimated 9 000 tons of coffee, the union could suffer a loss of TShs.631 618 800. In contrast, by 
paying TShs.155/kg, the union could realise a profit of TShs.43 381 200.37 This was different from 
what other co-operative unions in Mbeya, Kilimanjaro, and Arusha were paying to their coffee 
growers. The financial capacity of the co-operative union had a significant impact on the payment 
to the coffee producers. Consequently, the 1991/92 coffee season experience made most of the 
coffee producers to view the co-operative unions as an exploitative organ. This was because its 
focus or preference was on making a profit at the expense of the coffee producers.  
Table 16: The Sale Price and the Share of Producer Price of Mild Arabica Coffee in Tanzania 
1991–199438 





Share of the 
producer in the 
sales price (%) 
1991/92 242.58 155.00 64 
1992/93 684.00 231.00 34 
1993/94 1000.00 333.00 33 
1994/95 1675.00 932.00 56 
 
The new marketing system created misunderstanding between the MBICU and the co-operative 
societies over the ability to acquire more loans from banks and repay it. This was expressed during 
the meetings held between April and August 1994 for the 1994/95 coffee season. During the 
meeting of the MBICU, held on 11 May 1994, 42 of the 51 primary co-operative societies did not 
 
37 NRC, 583/MD/5/13 (formerly MD/3/1/20), Agricultural Price Review, a letter from the General Manager, Mbinga 
Co-operative Union (1989) limited, Ref. No. MBICU/Z.1/106, to the Chairman and members of the executive 
committee of the co-operative societies, Mbinga, “Bei za Kahawa Msimu wa 1991/92” [the price of coffee in the 
1991/92 season], 31 August 1991. 






support the union to acquire a loan from banks for the 1994/95 coffee seasons.39 Later, on 28 June 
1994, during the general meeting, the union agreed not to acquire a loan for coffee payments.40 
Despite the agreement, the MBICU went ahead and applied for a loan of TShs.300 000 000/- from 
the NBC Bank to facilitate coffee-buying expenses.41 The union (MBICU) did not have enough 
money to pay cash to producers at the beginning of the season and the applied loan took longer than 
expected – five months (July to November 1994) instead of the normal one to two months, resulting 
in a continuation of the tendency of collecting producers’ crops on credit. A total of 
TShs.166 000 000/- was used to pay coffee producers for their coffee sales while the remaining 
money (TShs.134 000 000/-) was used for the coffee collection expenses.42 As a result, by the end 
of the 1994/95 coffee seasons, coffee growers were yet to be paid a sum of TShs.146 000 000/- 
from their coffee sales.43 However, at the end of the coffee buying season, of the 
TShs.300 000 000/- loan acquired from the NBC Bank, a total of TShs.219 000 000 was repaid 
while TShs.81 000 000 remained unpaid.44  
 
39 NRC, 473/5468E, MBICU (1989) Limited: Estimates & MLC (Minutes of Meetings and Limited Liability 
Certificates), 1993-1995, “Muhtasari wa Mkutano Mkuu wa Mwaka wa Sita uliofanyika Tarehe 28 Juni 1994 katika 
Ukumbi wa Mkutano MBICU hotel” [Minutes of the general meeting of the 6th year held on 28 June 1994 at MBICU 
hotel]. 
40 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a letter from the General Manager, MBICU, Ref. No. 
MBICU/2.1/VOL.II/130/ to the Prime minister, “Utaratibu wa Biashara Huria kuhusu mazao asilia” [Free tarde 
procedures on traditional export crops], 23 May 1995. 
41 NRC, 473/5468E, MBICU (1989) Limited: Estimates & MLC (Minutes of Meetings and Limited Liability 
Certificates), 1993–1995, a letter from the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, Dar es Salaam, Ref. No. 5468/E, 
to the Chairman, Mbinga Agricultural Co-operative Union (1993) Limited, “Sheria ya Kuandikisha vyama vya 
Ushirika 1991 fungu la 72 la sheria na kanuni ya 43 amri Na.6- Ukomo wa Madeni” [the Co-operative Societies 
Act, 1991, section 72, Rules and Regulation 43, No.6, Limited Liability], 13 July 1994. 
42 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a letter from MBICU, Ref. No. MBICU/2.1/VOL. II/130, to the Prime 
Minister, Utaratibu wa Biashara Huria Kuhusu Mazao Asilia [Free trade procedures on traditional export crops], 23 
May 1995. A total of TShs.166 000 000/- was distributed as follows: Lundumato TShs.48 000 000/-, KIMULI 
TShs.60 000 000/-, Longa TShs.35 000 000, and TShs.23 000 000/- to the remaining primary co-operative 
societies. 
43 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a letter from the General Manager, MBICU, Ref. No. MBICU/2.1/VOL. 
II/130, to the Prime Minister, Utaratibu wa Biashara Huria Kuhusu Mazao Asilia [Free trade procedures on 
traditional export crops], 23 May 1995. The sources show the unpaid amount of TShs.71 000 000/-.  
44 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, The report of the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, “Taarifa ya 
Safari-Ruvuma” to the Minister of Agriculture, 16 June 1995; NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a letter 
from the Minister of Agriculture [Fredrick T. Sumaye (MP)], Ref. No. KI/C.10/70/MBINGA, to the Prime Minister, 
“Madeni ya MBICU” [Debts of MBICU], 22 June 1995. The error in the figures of the repaid loan from two sources 






Apart from being indebted to the coffee producers, banks and other institutions, the unstable 
financial position of co-operative unions such as the MBICU was also rooted in the practice of 
distributing agricultural inputs and implements to primary co-operative societies on credit. 
Outstanding payments from these debtors contributed to the financial woes of unions. This practice 
had a long history from a previous centrally controlled system which did not chime well with the 
new free-market system. Historically, the Tanzania Coffee Marketing Board (TCMB), through its 
coffee foreign exchange retention scheme, had financed the importation of agricultural inputs. The 
scheme was stopped in the 1987/88 season when the TCMB raised money through the Open General 
License (OGL) for the procurement of agricultural inputs by obtaining seasonal loans from banks 
using coffee as collateral.45 The TCMB distributed the inputs to farmers through co-operative 
unions on loan and recovered the money at the time of making the final coffee payment to 
producers. When the TCMB became a marketing agent in 1990/91, the responsibility to raise funds 
for agricultural inputs shifted to the co-operative unions. Unfortunately, most of the co-operative 
unions defaulted to repay their loans, resulting in more accumulated debts. The total outstanding 
debt of coffee inputs to unions as at 3 January 1991 was TShs.3 517 742.65 out of which the share 
of the MBICU was TShs.964 063 286/-.46 In 1990/91, the unions charged cash for all inputs in order 
to avoid long-term interest charges.47 The practice was unpopular among farmers. To avoid the 
decline in utilisation of agrochemicals on coffee farms, the MBICU decided to distribute inputs on 
credit and deduct it from the coffee sales in 1992/93. Consequently, the “input on credit” was a 
popular culture that made smallholder coffee producers too dependent on the co-operative union.  
The presence of private enterprises in coffee marketing created uncertainty, whereby the MBICU 
became wary of distributing more agricultural inputs to coffee growers. Before the free-market 
system, the MBICU was responsible for ordering and supplying agrochemicals and agricultural 
 
45 NRC, 583/MD/5/13 (formerly MD/3/1/20), Agricultural Price Review, “Agricultural Inputs Revolving Funds”.  
46 NRC, 570/MD/3/7/1A/VOL.2, Tanzania Coffee Marketing Board Sales and Marketing Reports, Dokezo Sabili [clear 
hint], “Debts to unions” 3 January 1991. 







implements to coffee producers on credit. Under the new marketing system, there was no guarantee 
or even a contract that coffee growers would sell their coffee to the union. The free-market system 
for coffee was implemented in the 1994/95 season. In the Mbinga District, the MBICU had to 
compete with private coffee buyers, shifting from collecting producer’s coffee on credit to pay later, 
to cash payment on delivery. The 1994/95 marketing system went smoothly in Songea for tobacco, 
where the Songea Agricultural Marketing Co-operative Union (SAMCU) managed to collect all 
tobacco from producers. This was possible since the free-market system for tobacco in the Songea 
District was adopted in the 1995/96 season.48 In the Tunduru District, 3 380 tons of cashew nuts 
were sold through Tunduru Agricultural Marketing Co-operative Union (TAMCU) out of 6 000 
tons produced in 1994/95.49 The coffee marketing system in the Mbinga District seemed to be more 
problematic. It was easy for crops like tobacco and cashew nuts to get pre-financing from crop 
buyers who were then free to sell the crops wherever they preferred. It was even possible for the 
MBICU to obtain pre-financing for tobacco, which was then sold to Standard Commercial Tobacco 
Limited. The challenge with coffee was that it was sold by auction, at which both collected coffee 
through co-operative unions and private coffee buyers bid for it. In this case, it was the Moshi 
auction under the control of the Tanzania Coffee Board. Uncertainty about the future auction prices 
created difficulties for (financially) weak co-operatives to operate.  
Before the 1994/95 coffee marketing season, coffee producers agreed with the union officials to 
sell their coffee through the co-operative societies system. However, when the time for coffee sales 
arrived, most of the coffee producers refused to sell their products on credit to the union – instead, 
they sold it to the private coffee buyers. The decision of coffee growers to sell their coffee to private 
buyers affected the distribution of the agricultural inputs. For instance, on 11 May 1993, the MBICU 
held a general meeting in which they agreed to distribute agricultural inputs to the coffee producers 
through their primary co-operative societies. From 1993/94 to 1994/95, the union had distributed 
 
48 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a letter from MBICU, Ref. No. MBICU/2.1/VOL. II/130, “Utaratibu wa 







fertiliser and agrochemicals to the coffee growers on credit, expecting to deduct it from the coffee 
sales. A total of 609 056 litres/kilos of Coffee Berry Disease and Coffee Leaf Rust control 
agrochemicals valued at about TShs.1 107 613 440/- ($1 905 407.60) were freely distributed.50 The 
MBICU also distributed a total of 45 155 bags of chemical fertiliser (2257.75 tons) valued at 
TShs.305 606 000/- ($52 582.14) on credit to be recovered from coffee sales during the 1994/95 
season.51 A total of 8 000 tons of agrochemicals were ordered, valued at about TShs.600 000 000/-
($1 032 169.27) in the 1994/95 season.52 The target was to collect a total of about 8 000 tons of 
coffee produced in the 1994/95 season.53 Unfortunately, due to the competition from the private 
coffee traders, only 1 826 tons of coffee valued at TShs.1 435 656 000/- ($2 469 733.35) were sold 
through the union.54 The sum of TShs.1 284 557 560/- ($2 209 801.41) was paid to the coffee 
producers, while a sum of TShs.151 098 434/- ($259 931.93) was deducted for the agricultural 
inputs.55 The payment and deductions applied only to the “honest”56 co-operative members who 
sold their coffee through the MBICU. The failure of the co-operative union to collect enough coffee 
from producers led to the failure to recover the debt on agricultural inputs supplied on credit. The 
MBICU could not deduct the full debt for credited agricultural inputs from the few “honest” coffee 
producers. This was to avoid resistance from the coffee producers for being over-deducted. The 
decline of “honest” co-operative members, therefore, threatened the competitive capacity of the 
MBICU. 
 
50 NRC, 473/5468E, MBICU (1989) Limited: Estimates & MLC (Minutes of Meetings and Limited Liability 
Certificates), 1993-1995, “Muhtasari wa Mkutano Mkuu wa Mwaka wa Sita uliofanyika Tarehe 28 Juni 1994 katika 
Ukumbi wa Mkutano MBICU Hotel” [Minutes of the general meeting of the 6 year held on 28 June 1994 at MBICU 
Hotel]. 
51 Ibid. 
52 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, from CCD (T.J. Mahuwi), “MBICU”, 21 April 1995.  
53 Ibid. 
54 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, The report of the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, “Taarifa ya 
Safari-Ruvuma” to the Minister of Agriculture, 16 June 1995. 
55 Ibid 
56 The “honest” co-operative members referred to those members that did not desert the union for the private coffee 






By the end of the 1994/95 season, the MBICU owed a total of TShs.1 075 000 000/- 
($1 849 303.28) to the coffee producers, Tanzania Coffee Board, and other enterprises, of which 
the largest amount was incurred from coffee producers who collected agricultural inputs to the value 
of TShs.834 000 000/ ($1 434 715.29) but sold their coffee to the private coffee buyers.57 As a 
result, it created difficulties in debt payment to the creditors. For instance, the MBICU had an 
accumulated debt of TShs.428 292 100 ($736 783.24) by the end of the 1994/95 season.58 The total 
debt was divided as follows: NBC Bank (TShs.71 000 000), Bondeni seeds (TShs.113 147 100/-), 
SUKITA (TShs.74 119 000/-), Shavlak Tank (TShs.58 026 000/-), and Fertilizer & Chemicals 
(TShs.112 000 000/-).59  
Having collected only approximately 20% of the production of the 1994/95 coffee season, the 
MBICU only supplied 350 tons of disease and pest control agrochemicals out of 1 000 tons required, 
and 3 500 tons of chemical fertiliser out of 12 000 required tons for the 1995/96 coffee seasons on 
credit.60 Apart from being economically weak, the fear of allowing the private coffee buyers to 
“reap what they didn’t sow”61 dominated the thinking of the MBICU officials. This situation did 
 
57 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, The report of the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, “Taarifa ya 
Safari-Ruvuma” to the Minister of Agriculture, 16 June 1995. The TShs.834 000 000 / consisted of 
TShs.754 507 566 of 1994/95 and TShs.79 492 434 as accumulated debts from the previous years; NRC, 589/CCD, 
MBICU (1989) Limited (1989) Limited, a letter from the General Manager, MBICU, Ref. No. MBICU/2.1/VOL. 
II/130, Utaratibu wa Biashara Huria Kuhusu Mazao Asilia [Free trade procedures on traditional export crops], 23 
May 1995.  
58 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, The report of the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, “Taarifa ya 
Safari-Ruvuma” to the Minister of Agriculture, 16 June 1995. 
59 A total debt to MBICU was Shs.428 292 100/- although the source shows Shs.438 292 100/- [SIC]; NRC, 589/CCD, 
MBICU (1989) Limited, a letter from the Minister of Agriculture, Dar es Salaam, Ref. No. KI/C.10/70/MBINGA, 
“Madeni ya MBICU” [the debts of the MBICU], to the Prime Minister and the first vice president (C.D. Msuya), 
22 June 1995. 
60 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a letter from the General Manager, MBICU, Ref. No. 
MBICU/Z.1/VOL.II/129, “Mashambulizi ya Mheshimiwa Banduka, Mkuu wa mkoa wa Ruvuma yanayohusu janga 
lililoipata Mbinga Co-operative Union Limited (MBICU) Kutokana na Biashara Huria ya Kahawa iliyoanzanza 
msimu wa mazao wa 1994/95” [Ruvuma Regional Commissioners’ attacks on the MBICU over the loss in 1994/95 
season], 23 March 1995. 
61 The term was coined from the saying that “you reap what you sow”, meaning that “future consequences are inevitably 
shaped by present actions”. The tendency of the private coffee buyers to buy coffee from coffee producers whom 






not bode well for the future of the co-operative union and its ability to compete with private buyers 
in the Mbinga District.  
On the other hand, the private enterprises who collected 80% of the produced coffee in the 1994/95 
season, supplied only 24 tons of disease and pest control agrochemicals.62 Private enterprises, 
particularly coffee buyers, were reluctant to supply agricultural inputs on credit. It was difficult to 
recover the debts from coffee producers since there was no guarantee that coffee producers would 
sell their coffee to the private coffee buyers the following season. Also, the system of annually 
licensing the coffee buyers did not guarantee their operations in the next buying season. This 
situation led to a decline in applications for agrochemicals from coffee farms. The illegal money 
lenders (magoma) grasped it as an opportunity to make money. The coffee producers borrowed 
money (before the coffee season) from money lenders to be repaid during the harvesting time. The 
value of the money borrowed was generally less than the value of the coffee to be paid. Although 
the government tried to prevent the operation of magoma, it failed since its operations were 
conducted in secrecy and some of the coffee producers were desperately reliant on the loan. During 
an interview, one coffee producer stated, “I cannot remain poor by letting pests and diseases ruin 
my coffee farm while the rich people can lend money.”63 This reliance was the result of the financial 
inability of the co-operative union to support its members in coffee production, while on the other 
hand, it was due to the unwillingness of private coffee buyers to invest in coffee production and 
instead focusing on coffee buying processes. Table 17 reflects the decline in agricultural supply, 
especially in chemical fertiliser.  
 
62 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a letter from the General Manager, MBICU, Ref. No. 
MBICU/Z.1/VOL.II/129, “Mashambulizi ya Mheshimiwa Banduka, Mkuu wa mkoa wa Ruvuma yanayohusu janga 
lililoipata Mbinga Co-operative Union Limited (MBICU) Kutokana na Biashara Huria ya Kahawa iliyoanzanza 
msimu wa mazao wa 1994/95” [Ruvuma Regional Commissioners’ attacks on MBICU over the loss in 1994/95 
season], 23 March 1995. 






Table 17: Fertiliser Supply in Mbinga District 1990–199764 
Year Demand (tons) Supply (tons) Shortage (tons) 
1990 19 071 6 599.25 12 471.75 
1991 16 409 6 168.25 10 240.75 
1992 8 538 1 877 15 437 
1993 16 834 8 538 8 296 
1994 16 834 9 247.3 7 586.7 
1995 17 406 2 600.3 14 805 
1996 11 327 2 669 8 658 
To reverse the situation, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, in collaboration with the 
Tanzania Coffee Board, Tanzania Coffee Association, and Tanzania Coffee Growers Association 
(TCGA), established the National Input Voucher Scheme in 1997, financed by the European Union, 
under the export earnings stabilisation scheme (STABEX) funds.65 This was a system whereby 
coffee farmers were given vouchers worth 4% of the value of the coffee they sold.66 The coffee 
buyers had to include the voucher value of TShs.50 per kg ($0.075) in their coffee payments.67 With 
the voucher system, coffee farmers were able to collect vouchers during the coffee sale and use it 
to buy inputs from agrochemical stores in the Mbinga township. Unfortunately, the voucher scheme 
did not last long. Most of the input distributors were situated in the township, while the majority of 
coffee producers lived in the remote villages with a poor transport system. As a result, a secondary 
market developed for vouchers whereby poor coffee producers sold their vouchers at a discount to 
the “well to do” coffee producers who could purchase the inputs from the distributors in town. The 
 
64 URT, Ruvuma Region Socio-economic Profile, (The Planning Commission Dar es Salaam & Regional 
Commissioner’s Office Ruvuma, December,1997), 48. 
65 STABEX funding system was established in 1975 under Lome Convention and financed by the European 
Development Fund. It aimed at compensating the shortfalls on export products from Africa, Caribbean and Pacific 
states to European Community countries. STABEX was replaced by Cotonou Agreement signed in June 2000 (in 
Benin’s city) by 78 ACP states and 15 members of European Union; J. Brun, et al., “Stabex versus IMF 
Compensatory Financing: Impact on Fiscal Policy”, Journal of International Development, 13, (2001), 572. 
66 J. Baffes, “Tanzania’s Coffee Sector: Constraints and Challenges”, Journal of International Development, 17, (2005), 
30.  
67 Sokoine University of Agriculture, Bureau for Agricultural Consultancy and Advisory Service (BACAS), Final 






existence of the “black market” in the voucher system was coupled with the decline in the price of 
coffee on the international market, which accelerated scepticism among the coffee traders in the 
voucher system. One of the former agrichemical traders said, “I lost my two houses which I used 
as a collateral at National Microfinance Bank. The Government failed to refund our money as we 
presented the voucher. We were told the coffee price in the world market has declined.”68 As a 
result, the scheme was abandoned in 2000 and agricultural inputs had to be bought in cash.  
The proliferation of private enterprises in the coffee industry in the Mbinga District during the 
1994/95 coffee season, further endangered the continued existence of the MBICU. For instance, in 
the 1994/95 season, the district had a total of ten coffee buyers comprising of one co-operative 
union (MBICU) and nine private coffee buyers. Among the private enterprises, two were African-
owned enterprises, namely Shirika la Uchumi na Kilimo Mbinga (SUKIMBI) translated loosely as 
Mbinga Economic Corporation and Dan & Associates Enterprises (DAE) Limited, while the 
remainder were foreign-owned enterprises. The two African-owned enterprises bought a total of 
876 tons of coffee out of 8 800 produced tons in the Mbinga District, while the MBICU collected 
1 800 tons of coffee (20% of the whole produce) as mentioned earlier.69 Compared to other coffee-
producing regions, the Mbinga District had more private coffee buyers than anywhere in Tanzania. 
For instance, the Mbeya region had four, Kigoma one, Arusha five and Kilimanjaro four private 
coffee buyers.70 In the case of Arusha, for instance, in the 1994/95 coffee season, the five private 
coffee buying enterprises collected only a total of 647 476 kg compared to 2 174 983 kg of coffee 
collected by co-operative unions.71 The main reason for the numerous private coffee-buying 
enterprises in the Mbinga District was the dominance of the smallholder coffee producers in the 
 
68 Interview with Kennedy Ismail, Mbinga Township, 26 December 2018.  
69 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a letter from the General Manager, MBICU, Ref. No. 
MBICU/Z.1/VOL.II/129, “Mashambulizi ya Mheshimiwa Nicodemus Banduka, Mkuu wa mkoa wa Ruvuma 
yanayohusu janga lililoipata Mbinga Co-operative Union Limited (MBICU) Kutokana na Biashara Huria ya 
Kahawa iliyoanzanza msimu wa mazao wa 1994/95” [Ruvuma Regional Commissioners’ attacks on MBICU over 
the loss in 1994/95 season], 23 March 1995.  
70 Ibid.  
71 NRC, 553/KI/C40/34, Coffee Marketing, a letter from the Regional Development Director, Arusha, Ref. No. 
AR/Coop/C.40/8, “Ununuzi wa kahawa katika mkoa wa Arusha kwa msimu 1995/96” [Coffee marketing in Arusha 






district compared to other coffee-producing areas, such as Kilimanjaro and Arusha, where coffee 
estates were prominent. This factor, in tandem with the financial problems of the MBICU, paved 
the way for the private enterprises with capital to penetrate the coffee market in the district.  
It was against the background of these experiences that the 1994/95 season was popularly referred 
to as “Mbinga mbinguni”, translated as “Mbinga is heaven” to both coffee producers and private 
coffee buyers. On the side of the coffee producers, the 1994/95 coffee season was regarded as a 
blessing since it was the first season in which they experienced the payment on the delivery system 
made possible by the introduction of the free-market system. It was well acknowledged by coffee 
producers, coffee buyers, as well as businessmen that the 1994/1995 season in the Mbinga District 
was like “heaven”. The coffee price recovered from its decline following the collapse of the 
International Coffee Agreement in 1989/90 and peaked in the 1994/1995 season. The 1994/95 
higher prices were due to the negative impact of the bad weather (frost) on the production of the 
world’s largest coffee producer, Brazil, and the improvement of the quality of coffee produced in 







Figure 5: Average Coffee Auction Prices in Tanzania, 1986/87–1994/95 ($/kg)72 
The free-market system encouraged efficient coffee buyers and eliminated the inefficient ones. To 
survive the competition, the co-operative unions had to reorganise and become as business and 
market-oriented as their competitors who were increasing their market share at an alarming rate. 
The deteriorating financial position of the MBICU forced them to adopt a variety of survival 
measures, such as rationalisation by closing down projects and retrenching staff, eradicating 
corruption and selling moveable and immovable assets in an attempt to stave off liquidation.73 
In contrast to the “Mbinga Mbinguni” experiences of the coffee producers and private coffee buyers 
of the 1994/1995 season, the mid-nineties represented a continuation of the decline of the MBICU, 
characterised by a chronic shortage of capital for coffee marketing (buying). This shortage was 
compounded by the rapid loss of market share to the private coffee buyers. The 1996/97 coffee 
season was particularly bad for both the MBICU and the coffee producers who sold their coffee 
 
72 Modified from URT, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, Coffee Marketing Review 1993-94, (Dar 
es Salaam: Marketing Development Bureau,1994), 22; Tanzania Coffee Board Office-Moshi, “Coffee Sales and 
Average Prices from 1980/81 to 2018/19”. 
73 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, Muhtasari wa mkutano mkuu wa mwaka wa nane uliofanyika tarehe 7 na 
8 Desemba 1996 katika ukumbi wa mikutano wa MBICU hotel, “Maazimio” [Minutes of the 8th MBICU General 





























through the co-operative union (MBICU). The union was able to collect only 50 tons of coffee out 
of 6 000 tons produced in the district.74 This followed on the decline of the previous season when 
they could only secure 2 500 tons out of 12 500 tons produced in the 1995/96 coffee season.75 The 
union was immersed in outstanding debts to various companies, governmental institutions, and 
coffee producers, which necessitated drastic measures. MBICU projects, such as a hotel, bar, coffee 
estate, and forest were all operating at a loss. Some of the losses were the result of the presence of 
dishonest officials within the MBICU. For instance, there were reported cases of the loss of goods 
from the union’s warehouses. The Board Director, Mr Peter Ndemiwaka, had been charged in the 
Mbinga Magistrate’s Court for stealing 1 600 litres of Bravo coffee fungicides valued at 
TShs.11 200 000/- ($18 114.18).76 As a result, he was suspended from the union board on 22 May 
1996. Theft incidences by the co-operative officials accelerated the loss of trust from the co-
operative members who were the coffee producers. The general manager of the MBICU was 
suspended on 8 August 1996 due to mismanagement of the co-operative resources.77  
Furthermore, during the general meeting held from 7 to 8 December 1996, members agreed to shut 
down the transportation section of the union and to sell the vehicles. While announcing the tender 
for vehicle sales, the court issued a statutory warranty on the MBICU’s properties. The court (at the 
village, district, and regional levels) ordered the claimants to take possession of some of the union’s 
property as compensation for their claims. Some of the coffee producers were ordered to take some 
vehicles as compensation for their unpaid coffee sales as summarised in Table 18. Under the court 
order, Bora Brothers Court Brokers (based in Songea) and the Mbinga Urban Ward Executive 
Officer were allowed to hold and sell six vehicles to raise a sum of TShs.15 506 062.20 
 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid.  
76 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a letter from the Manager, MBICU, Ref. No. MBICU/CONF/P. I/34, to 
the Managing Director, Tanzania Coffee Board, TCB Board Director Mr Peter Ndemiwaka” 25 June 1996. 
77NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Ltd, A letter from the chairman-MBICU, Ref. No. MBICU/PFC/1/7, to Mr B.I. 






($26 633.56) for coffee producers and sales tax.78 One vehicle was sold to Mbinga Coffee Curing 
Company on 14 February 1997 for TShs.11 006 062.20 ($18 904.26) for coffee sales tax to the 
Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA).79 
Table 18: Coffee Producers who were given MBICU’s Property to Recover the 1995/96 debts80 
Name  Amount (TShs.) Vehicle/Property 
Adelina Komba 3 997 800 TZ 98435 Iveco 
Otmar Komba 670 000 TZ 87861 Short chases 
Timothy Komba 1 419 700 TZB 4057 Tractor 
Osmund H. Ndomba 1 166 600 TZ 98416 Iveco 
Aidon Kinunda 1 554 428.20 Photocopy Machine 
(MBICU/GM/CO/01) 
Protas Kinunda 5 971 000 Lister generator KVA.15,5 
No. 2327/08 & Compressor 
Adrian Galus 356 000 Typewriter  
Paul K. Mwingira 5 567 550 Building  
Note: 1$=Tshs.582.2 as per 1995 exchange rate. 
Most of the union assets distributed to the claimants were not in good operating conditions, 
especially machinery, including vehicles, generators, photocopiers and typewriters. This was 
expressed by two of the claimants during oral interviews. They stated, “we were not satisfied with 
the compensation as it was not wealthy enough compared to our coffee sold. For instance, the lorry 
which I was given did not even move an inch. Consequently, I was forced to sell it for less than 2 
 
78 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a letter from Mbinga Agricultural Co-operative Union (1993) Limited, 
Ref. No. MBICU/C/3/16/200, to Attorney General, “kukamatwa kwa magari na mali ya chama kikuu cha ushirika 
Mbinga na Mahakama” [the Court holding of Vehicles and Properties of MBICU], 23 February 1997.  
79 Bora Brothers & Court Brokers sold the vehicle (Nissan Diesel No. TZD 4661) after the Kisutu Magistrate’s order 
(Dar es Salaam) on 13 February 1997; NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a letter from Mbinga Agricultural 
Co-operative Union (1993) Limited, Ref. No. MBICU/C/3/16/200, to Attorney General, “kukamatwa kwa magari 
na mali ya chama kikuu cha ushirika Mbinga na Mahakama” [the Court holding of Vehicles and Properties of 
MBICU]. 
80 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a letter from Mbinga Agricultural Co-operative Union (1993) Limited, 
Ref. No. MBICU/C/3/16/200, to Attorney General, “kukamatwa kwa magari na mali ya chama kikuu cha ushirika 






million ($3 435.24)”.81 This represents only the few coffee producers who had the courage to sue 
the co-operative union in court while the majority of coffee producers remained unpaid. The 
archival source shows that by the end of 1996, the MBICU had other accumulated unpaid debt of 
the second payments to coffee producers since the 1992/93 season, amounting to 
TShs.435 486 481/- ($704 328.77).82 
The union also had a total workforce of 246.83These workers exceeded their capacity to pay salaries 
by far. Following the decision to close down the transportation section, the number of MBICU 
workers was reduced to 56 in 1997 (190 out of 246 were retrenched).84 For instance, the retrenched 
staff consisted of 107 that were sent on leave, six suspended on fraud and theft charges, while the 
remainder were those with different disciplinary misconducts, including alcoholism.85 The 
remaining employees serviced the remaining three projects and were distributed as follows: Central 
Office (22), the MBICU Hotel (27), Ugano Estate (7).86 Despite these measures, it became apparent 
by 1997, that the MBICU could not service all its debts since its assets were less than its debt. The 
assets – the value of the goods in stock (agricultural inputs) was TShs.406 160 000/- and the total 
of outstanding debtors (co-operative societies) TShs.656 038 109/- amounted to 
TShs.1 062 198 109/- ($1 596 090.32). The liabilities amounted to TShs.2 343 760 000/- 
($3 521 803.15). This left the MBICU short of TShs.1 281 561 891/- ($1 925 712.83).87 Therefore, 
 
81 Interviews with Adelina Komba and Otmar Komba, Longa Village, 11 January 2019. 
82 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, “Muhtasari wa mkutano mkuu wa mwaka wa nane uliofanyika tarehe 7&8 
December 1996 katika ukumbi wa mikutano wa MBICU Hotel” [Minutes of the 8th Annual General Meeting held 
on 7 & 8 December 1996].  
83 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a letter from Assistant Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, Ruvuma 
region, Ref. No. UM/C/10/T.2/42, to the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, Dar es salaam, Hali mbaya ya 
Mbinga Co-operative Union Limited [The economic crisis of Mbinga Co-operative Union Limited], 25 February 
1997. 
84 Ibid.  
85 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, “Muhtasari wa mkutano mkuu wa mwaka wa nane uliofanyika tarehe 7&8 
December 1996 katika ukumbi wa mikutano wa MBICU Hotel” [Minutes of the 8th Annual General Meeting held 
on 7 & 8 December 1996] 
86 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a letter from Assistant Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, Ruvuma 
region, Ref. No. UM/C/10/T.2/42, to the Registrar of the co-operative societies, Dar es salaam, “Hali mbaya ya 








it was evident that the MBICU could not repay the debts even after selling all its movable goods 
and retrenching most of its staff. In March 1997, it was suggested that the liquidation of the MBICU 
(1993) Limited be considered as one way of rescuing its properties from creditors and 
misappropriation by dishonest officials.88 As a result, the Ruvuma Regional Co-operative Officer 
(RCO) was appointed as custodian to seize MBICU property pending appointment of a liquidator.89 
The RCO was later appointed as a co-operative liquidator to supervise all the activities concerned 
with the MBICU that was liquidated in 1999.90 The coffee producers in the Mbinga District, 
therefore, suffered a double blow in the 1999/2000 coffee season – the total collapse of the MBICU 
and the decline of coffee prices. The increase in the production of Robusta coffee with the 
emergence of new coffee-producing countries, such as Vietnam, led to a decline in the average price 
for Mild Arabica coffee from $121.80 per 50 kg in 1998/99 to $89.78 per 50 kg in 1999/2000.91 By 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, most of the coffee co-operative unions in Tanzania were in financial 
crisis. Despite the government decision to cancel the accumulated co-operative debts in the early 
1990s, the debt had risen to TShs.17.8 billion ($19 635 962.49) by 2001.92 Most of the co-operative 
unions could not compete with private coffee buyers. For instance, the Kilimanjaro Native Co-
operative Union (KNCU) in the Kilimanjaro region became insolvent in 2001.93 The collapse of the 
MBICU, for the same reason, exposed coffee producers to the competitive terrain of the private 
coffee enterprises with no common voice to defend themselves. 
 
88 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a memo from the CCD (D.M. Mpuya), to the Minister of Agriculture and 
Co-operatives, “Dokezo sabili”, Hali mbaya ya Kiuchumi ya MBICU [MBICU Economic crisis], 13 March 1997. 
89 NRC, 589/CCD, MBICU (1989) Limited, a fax-0635-2005, from the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, to the 
Regional Co-operative Officer Ruvuma, 19 March 1997. 
90 Interview with Henric Ndimbo, Manager-Mbinga Farmer’s Co-operative Union (MBIFACU), 18 December 2018. 
91 Tanzania Coffee Board Office-Moshi, “Coffee sales and average prices from 1980/81 to 2018/19”. 
92 F.F. Lyimo, Rural Cooperation in the Cooperative Movement in Tanzania, (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2012), 
90. 






5.5. A Title Without Power! Mbinga Farmers’ Co-operative Union (MBIFACU), 2000–
2015 
The demise of the MBICU in 1999, gave birth to a new Mbinga initiative – the establishment of the 
Mbinga Farmers’ Co-operative Union Limited (MBIFACU) on 14 August 2000.94 The MBIFACU 
was formed to re-unite coffee producers as it was before the collapse of the MBICU. The main 
objective was to collect crops from producers and sell them to the auction. Due to a lack of enough 
capital to run the coffee-marketing process, the MBIFACU only started to engage in marketing 12 
years later (2012). The MBIFACU initiative was introduced after the president of Tanzania (1995–
2005), by then Benjamin Mkapa, appointed a special committee, herein referred to as the 
Presidential Special Committee of 2000, to investigate ways of reviving the declining co-operative 
unions in Tanzania. The committee found that most of the co-operatives were unable to compete 
with private operators in the liberalised economy due to a lack of funds. The rapidly decreasing 
membership of the unions was ascribed to a lack of opportunities for members to participate in and 
take ownership of the activities and affairs of the unions. Corruption, in the form of 
misappropriation of co-operative properties by dishonest union leaders, also played a role. The 
committee recommended the formation of the Co-operative Development Policy of 2002, which 
led to the enactment of the new Co-operative Societies Act of 2003.  
Despite the intentions of the MBIFACU, they were unsuccessful in collecting coffee from the 
producers, primarily because of competition from the mushrooming private coffee buyers. The 
MBIFACU divided co-operative societies into five zones (Mahenge, Pilakano, Luwaita, KIMULI, 
and Malindindo) for coffee-marketing purposes. KIMULI withdrew from the MBIFACU in 2005.95 
Most of the co-operative societies became agents of private coffee buyers. In 2005, the government 
launched the “Cooperative Reform and Modernizations Program, 2005–2015” to overcome the 
 
94 MBIFACU, Taarifa ya MBIFACU Limited Msimu wa 2018/2019 hadi kufikia tarehe 28/12/2018” [The Report of 
MBIFACU Limited of the 2018/2019 season], 28 December 2018. 






deficiencies and problems facing the co-operative movement.96 The programme was focused on the 
need to establish co-operative societies that were economically viable, strong on governance, and 
in involving members.  
Despite government reforms and initiatives, the MBIFACU could not turn the tide of a progressive 
decline in the share of the coffee production they were able to collect in the Mbinga District. In 
2015/16, out of about 13 000 tons of parchment coffee produced in the Mbinga District, only 
466 971kgs were sold through the MBIFACU. The quantity declined to 164 537 kgs and 
130 165 kgs in the 2016/17 and 2017/18 coffee seasons, respectively.97 This was due to the growing 
hegemony of the independent co-operative societies, farmer groups (pre-co-operative societies) and 
private enterprises that emerged during this period – a development that will be described in the 
following sections. 
5.6. Smallholder Coffee Farmers in the Wake of Private Enterprises Hegemony, 2000–
2015 
The vacuum created in coffee-marketing mechanisms following the collapse of the MBICU, and 
the establishment of the ineffective replacement in the form of the MBIFACU in 2000, pushed 
smallholder coffee producers to depend on private coffee enterprises for coffee marketing. 
Although the collapse of the MBICU was expected to be a victory for private coffee enterprises, 
this was not the case in the Mbinga District. One of the reasons was the long historical experience 
of co-operative movements in the district since the 1930s that was not easy to eliminate. The co-
operative nature, cemented with Ujamaa ideology from the 1960s, made smallholder coffee 
producers rely on “co-operatives” in the Mbinga District. As a result, two initiatives emerged after 
the demise of the MBICU, namely independent co-operative societies and farmer groups.  
 
96 URT, The Cooperative Reform and Modernization Program (CRMP), 2005–2015, April 2005. 
97 MBIFACU, “Taarifa ya MBIFACU Ltd Msimu wa 2018/2019 hadi kufikia tarehe 28/12/2018” [The Report of 






Starting with independent co-operative societies, these were co-operatives operated independently 
from the co-operative union. Some co-operative societies were not satisfied with the newly formed 
co-operative union, since there was no sign of improvement in solving the persistent problems that 
existed in the former co-operative union (MBICU). As one of the oral accounts observed: “If the 
task of the co-operative union was to collect coffee and sell it to the auction, the co-operative 
societies can do the same without placing more burden to the coffee producers.”98 This implies that 
the co-operative union was seen as an intermediary in the coffee-market chain and, by omitting its 
operation, it meant the increasing of payment to the coffee producers. Other coffee-growing areas 
in Tanzania also experienced the emergence of independent co-operative societies. For instance, in 
the Kilimanjaro region, 22 out of 92 co-operative societies under the Kilimanjaro Native Co-
operative Union (KNCU) became independent as in 2002/03.99 Among the reasons for their 
emergence was a conflict of interest, including leadership positions, property ownerships and lack 
of financial transparency in the co-operatives. However, in the Kilimanjaro region, independent co-
operative societies co-existed with the KNCU, while in the Mbinga District, they emerged after the 
collapse of the MBICU and “toothless” reign of the MBIFACU. In line with this, Daniel Jaffe stated 
that the collapse of the Instituto Mexicano del Café (INMECAFÉ) in Mexico in 1989, led to the 
emergence of independent co-operative societies.100 
The emergence of independent co-operative societies was a response to a need for survival in a free 
and competitive marketing economy, in which coffee producers had to create a mechanism that 
could assist them in selling their coffee and improve their livelihoods. Under the independent co-
operative society system, members agreed to sell their coffee through either auction or through the 
direct export system. This was made possible through the passing of the Coffee Industry Act of 
2001, which allowed both private and co-operative societies to acquire a direct coffee export 
 
98 Interview with Ernest Komba, KIMULI Agricultural Marketing Co-operative Society, Utiri Village, 22 December 
2018. 
99 D.G. Mhando, “Conflict as Motivation for Change: The Case of Coffee Farmers’’.  
100 D. Jaffee, Brewing Justice: Fair Trade Coffee, Sustainability, and Survival, (Berkeley: University of California 






license. Later on, the Co-operative Societies Act No. 20 of 2003 allowed the operation of 
independent co-operative societies as section 16 sub-section (1) states, “…where a Primary or 
Secondary co-operative society is unable to join into a Secondary or Apex society, due to its nature 
and/or desire of its members, it may be allowed to become a member of the Federation”.101  
Furthermore, coffee producers were organised into groups commonly known as “Vikundi”, literally 
translated as “farmer groups”. Some farmer groups organised into networks at district level while 
others collaborated with private coffee enterprises or non-governmental organisations from within 
and outside Tanzania. In rare cases, farmer groups were even organised at family level, operating 
independently from the wider networks.102 The network of farmer groups commonly known as 
Mtandao wa Vikundi Vya Wakulima Mbinga (MVIWAMBI), translated as “Network of Farmers’ 
Groups in Mbinga”, was formed in the Mbinga District in 2000. The network liaised within the 
nationwide network known as Mtandao wa Vikundi Vya Wakulima Tanzania (MVIWATA), 
literally translated as “National Network of Smallholder Farmers’ Group in Tanzania”.103 Farmers’ 
networks aimed to bring together smallholder farmers to defend their social, economic and political 
interests through a common voice. Through the MVIWAMBI, coffee producers were able to get 
inputs, agronomy training, and to sell their coffee to the auction without using co-operative unions. 
By 2015, the network operated a total of 57 farmer groups with about 2 000 members in total, 
engaging in multiple crops, in 50 villages in the district.104 The network attracted financial support 
from the NGOs for buying and reselling the agricultural inputs to the members. For instance, in 
2014, the MVIWAMBI acquired a loan of $80 000 from Solidarité internationale pour le 
 
101 The United Republic of Tanzania, The Co-operative Societies Act No. 20 of 2003, (2003). 
102 Interview with Festus Komba, Longa Village, 11 January 2019, the chairman of Kipiti farmers’group formed on 15 
March 2010 by 12 family members. 
103 MVIWATA was registered in 1995 under Society Ordinance Act of 1954 and transformed into Trust Fund in 2000. 
Following the introduction of Non-Governmental Act of 2002, MVIWATA became a Non-profit private 
organization in 2007; www.mviwata.or.tz/annualreports Accessed on 28 March 2020. 
104 MVIWAMBI collapsed in 2017/2018 following the Prime Ministers’ order of “single-channel coffee marketing 
system” that is through co-operative societies in the 2017/2018 coffee season; Interview with Suzo Komba, Mbinga, 






développement et l’investissement (SIDI).105 With the loan, the MVIWAMBI was able to start a 
pilot project on organic coffee farms with eight farmer groups in 2015. The idea was to be certified 
as organic coffee producers for direct export in the speciality coffee markets. Unfortunately, these 
projects did not materialise following the dramatic change in the coffee-marketing systems in 
2017/2018 that forced all members of farmer groups to join co-operative societies.  
The second category of farmer groups was formed in collaboration with the NGOs, including 
TechnoServe106 or/and private coffee enterprises. For instance, in the Kilimanjaro region, in 2000, 
TechnoServe organised about 60 groups which later in 2001 formed the Association of Kilimanjaro 
Specialty Coffee Growers (AKSCG) using KILICAFE as a trading name. KILICAFE operated in 
two other regions, including Mbinga in Ruvuma and Mbeya. In 2002, a total of 22 farmer groups 
in the Mbinga District joined KILICAFE. By 2009, the TechnoServe KILICAFE program had 137 
farmer groups (26 in Kilimanjaro, 35 in Mbeya, and 76 in Mbinga) with more than 11 000 
smallholder coffee producers as members.107 The major difference between the MVIWAMBI and 
KILICAFE was their access to the external markets. Unlike the former, KILICAFE was the first to 
operate in the direct export marketing system in 2004, whereby Peet’s Coffee & Tea Company (US) 
bought about 23 000 pounds of Arabica coffee from KILICAFE.108 Other coffee buyers included 
the Starbucks Coffee Company (US), List & Beisler (Germany), and Volcafé Limited (Japan). By 
2010, KILICAFE had more than 200 farmer groups, among which 159 were in the Mbinga 
District.109  
 
105 SIDI is a French NGO created in 1983, focusing on the provision of both technical and financial support to the 
marginalised in economic development through microfinance institutions, producer organisations and rural 
agribusinesses, and other entities that support community-based finance; www.sidi.fr/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/RA-2015-SIDI accessed on 28 March 2020. 
106 TechnoServe is a non-profit organization focusing on poverty reduction by linking people from developing countries 
to the capital and market opportunities. It uses the slogan “business solution to poverty”; www.technoserve.org. 
107 Interview with Wendo Suday, Project Manager, DAE Limited, 27 December 2018; He worked as an agricultural 
and business consultant with TechnoServe from 2010 to 2015; KILICAFE Business Plan and Report of 
Performance, 2009. 
108 TechnoServe, “Building a Competitive Coffee Industry in Tanzania” in www.technoserve.org accessed on 6 January 
2020. 






The private coffee enterprises were also involved in farmer groups’ agronomy training to transform 
the agricultural practices of coffee, which for many years were transmitted from one generation to 
another through family grooming. The practice of the intergenerational transfer of knowledge and 
skills in coffee production was confirmed in oral interviews with coffee producers. With the 
assistance of agricultural extension officers, coffee farmers were able to obtain knowledge on how 
to produce good coffee for the market. The training was enabled in partnership with various projects 
over time. For instance, between 2008 and 2011, TechnoServe initiated the coffee initiative 
programme in East African coffee-producing countries, including Tanzania, Rwanda, Kenya, and 
Ethiopia. KILICAFE participated in this programme. In 2012, the Coffee Partnership for Tanzania 
(CPT) was introduced in Tanzania and financed by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and three 
other companies, namely Ecom Agro-Industrial Corporation Limited, Armajaro, and Hans 
Neumann Stiftung, to the total costs of $25.5 million.110 The project covered the period from 2012 
to 2016. The project was implemented in all coffee-growing regions in Tanzania. Two private 
enterprises were involved in the Mbinga District since 2012, namely Tutunze Kahawa Limited and 
Coffee Management Services. DAE Limited was integrated into the program in 2014, targeting 
about 10 000 smallholder coffee producers in the Mbinga District.111 The project aimed at 
increasing coffee production to alleviate poverty and improve the livelihood of smallholder coffee 
producers. During the CPT operations, DAE Limited focused on training coffee farmer’s groups on 
how to process and market their coffee. The trained coffee producers were free to sell their coffee 
to any coffee buyer of their choice since there was no contract to bind them to the former. The 
determining factor was usually the price offered by each coffee buyer. 
From 2001 to 2015, several co-operative societies were involved in selling coffee, both through an 
auction in Moshi as well as to direct exporters. KIMULI, Mahenge, and Luwaita AMCOS were the 
three foremost coffee-marketing societies involved with direct coffee export to various coffee 
 
110 www.afca.coffee/wp-content/sites/2/2015/07/ian-lachmund-coffee-partnership-for-tanzania, accessed on 14 
February 2020. 






roasters in European countries. The emergence of the direct coffee export system coincided with 
the growing global demands for the highest quality speciality coffee in the world. Most of the coffee 
buyers were interested in certified coffee – meaning coffee of which they could trace the origin. 
The most popular certification schemes included the Fairtrade Labelling Organisation (FLO), Rain 
Forest Alliance (RFA), UTZ, and 4C. The certification schemes enabled both coffee producers and 
buyers to meet some required standards as stipulated by each scheme. For instance, FLO focused 
on criteria such as environmentally sustainable practices, long-term contracts, public accountability 
and financial transparency, the guarantee of paying minimum prices and social premium prices, 
advance payments to producers, and democratic co-operatives.112 The social premium price was an 
additional price paid to a co-operative society to urge/encourage them to commit to social 
development within a community. 
It was difficult for smallholder coffee producers to penetrate the external markets. It necessitated 
them to develop a trading network with coffee-trading partners. This became a nightmare because 
for many years they had been operating through the co-operative unions and the Tanzania Coffee 
Board. As a result, only a few co-operative societies were able to break the barriers. From oral 
accounts, it appears that the few AMCOS operating in the direct coffee export market got support 
from non-governmental organisations, including churches. For instance, KIMULI and Mahenge 
AMCOS were connected to the external coffee buyers through Fr. Lucas Komba of Utiri Catholic 
Church in Mbinga Diocese working as a co-operator of the Mbinga Diocese Coffee Project.113 This 
demonstrated that network connections with coffee roasters were essential for a mere coffee 
producer to get connected to the external market. Fr. Lucas Komba was able to link them to the 
German companies where he had lived and worked as a Reverend Father.  
 
112 D. Jaffee, Brewing Justice: Fair Trade Coffee, Sustainability, and Survival, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2007), 2.  
113 Interview with Ernest Komba, KIMULI Agricultural Marketing Co-operative Society, Utiri Village, 22 December 
2018; Interview with David Haule, Managing Director-Marketing, Mbinga Coffee Curing Company (MCCCO) 






Another challenge in securing a direct external market was the growing need for organic coffee 
certification in order to get access to speciality coffee markets. The process of certification required 
money which, in most cases, was challenging to raise.114 The certification was to be done every 
three years while auditing was conducted annually. A society could be de-certified if it violated the 
certification standards. In the Mbinga District, by 2015, there were only two Fairtrade Certified 
Agricultural Marketing societies, namely KIMULI and Mahenge. The third AMCOS was 
Nambawala which operated in the current Nyasa District.115 
The attraction of direct export and its accompanying certification system was the promise of higher 
coffee prices and thus higher income for coffee producers. The heightened expectations created by 
this “promise” was, however, not without its challenges. On the side of the coffee producers, there 
were numerous concerns about being underpaid compared to what has been promised as one of the 
advantages of the Fairtrade trading system. The experience of coffee farmers was that there was no 
correlation between the price of the premium quality coffee sold as “direct export” and the price 
paid to farmers. Farmers complained of being underpaid compared with the high grade of the coffee 
produced. From Mahenge AMCOS, one of the coffee farmers complained, “I used to work hard 
and make sure I produce a premium coffee, but I was paid the same amount as others. We have 
been told that our coffee has been sold directly to Germany in dollars, but we get paid in peanut 
shillings.”116 Lack of homogeneity in coffee grades has forced the co-existence of both Fairtrade 
and conventional marketing systems in the certified co-operative societies. This has partly been due 
to the co-existence of both home-processed coffee and Central Pulpery Units (CPUs). It was 
estimated that by 2010, about 90% of Tanzanian coffee was home processed.117 One of the reasons 
for the higher rate of home-processed coffee was the weighing system at the CPUs, where five 
 
114 Although it was difficult to get the previous certification fee costs, the current (2019–2021) costs show that the 
actual fees increased from £2 120 to £2 600 (additional of £515 in 2020). From a private conversation with one of 
the Fairtrade coordinators (Mbinga), 20 March 2020. 
115 Interview with David Haule, (MCCCO) Limited, 3 January 2019. 
116 Interview with Linus Mapunda (not his real name), Mahenge Village, 24 January 2020. 
117 URT, Tanzania Coffee Industry Strategy 2011-2021, (Amended version), (Tanzanian Coffee Board and Tanzania 






kilograms of cherry were equated to one kilogram of parchment coffee.118 Therefore, 250 kg of 
cherry coffee sold at the CPU was equated to a 50 kg coffee bag of parchment. This caused an 
outcry among coffee producers in the Mbinga District because, according to their own weighing 
practices, it should be 68 kg parchment – a difference of 18 kg.119 To get the premium grade coffee, 
required more effort in both production and processing stages. It is undeniably true that a well-
supervised CPU-processed coffee will be of high quality. Hence, most of the certified coffee buyers 
prefer a CPU-processed coffee over home-processed coffee. This does not, however, mean that the 
homemade pulped coffees were necessarily inferior to the CPU-processed coffee when properly 
prepared. These weighing discrepancies and perceptions about homemade coffees led to Fairtrade 
certified co-operative societies being perceived as a continuation of the exploitation of smallholder 
coffee producers as previously was the case with the exploitative co-operative cartels.  
The low prices paid to coffee producers was one of the reasons for the decline in the time and capital 
that coffee producers invested in coffee production. This, in turn, resulted in both low productivity 
and poor quality. The practice of paying an average price to all coffee producers, irrespective of the 
coffee grades produced, was one of the obstacles in fulfilling the coffee buyers’ demand for higher 
grade coffee. One of the coffee producers complained that fair trade was not fair enough to pay 
each one in accordance with the grade of coffee produced. He contended, “how can you call it fair 
trade while I produced the premium coffee which was collected by the co-operative officials for 
direct export only to be paid the same price as the one sold in the conventional market?”120  
Studies in Latin America has shown that coffee producers benefit from Fairtrade price premium 
when they can sell the entire Fairtrade produced coffee to the Fairtrade market.121 When part of the 
Fairtrade-certified coffee was marketed to the conventional market by the co-operative societies, 
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the coffee producers were paid an average price. Since most of the Fairtrade certified co-operatives 
in the Mbinga District could not produce enough high-grade coffee from their CPUs, individual 
producers have been involved.122 Unfortunately, they have been excluded from Fairtrade premium 
prices simply because they did not sell through the CPUs.123  
Despite criticism from the coffee producers of the operation of direct export and the underpayments, 
archival sources revealed a different picture. The statistics of the 2012/13 to the 2015/16 coffee 
season, demonstrated that the coffee sold directly as Fairtrade-certified fetched higher prices than 
auction-sold coffee. The Fairtrade-certified coffee was offered in three price categories, namely 
Fairtrade regular price, minimum price, and Fairtrade social premium prices. While the minimum 
price aimed at protecting producers from market-price fluctuation, the social premium prices aimed 
to assist community development, such as school construction, road maintenance, water supply, 
and health-service improvement. Using Mahenge AMCOS as an example of the Fairtrade-certified 
co-operative societies, during the 2012/13 coffee season, a total of 38 400kg of clean (cured) coffee 
valued at $170 496 was sold. The Free on Board (FoB)124 price was $222.00 per 50 kg compared 
to the regular Fairtrade price of $199.954, Fairtrade social premium price of $26.45, and Fairtrade 
minimum price of $185.186.125 The average price for the mild Arabica coffee sold at the auction in 
Moshi was $156.27 per 50 kg, a difference of $43.684 from the Fairtrade regular price.126  
However, the coffee producers at Mahenge AMCOS did not realise the Fairtrade price in two years, 
2012/13 and 2013/14, due to the payments through a “pool system”. In this system, all payments 
from coffee sold through auction and direct export were pooled together, and producers were paid 
 
122 Mahenge Agricultural Marketing Co-operative Societies (hereafter AMCOS) Limited, “Hoja za FLO” [FLO’s 
Outlines]; Mahenge AMCOS, Minutes of the Co-operative Board, “kukiri kutekeleza hoja za FLO” [admitting to 
implementing FLO outlines], 28 February 2014. 
123 Interview with Zabron Ndunguru (not his real name), Mahenge Village, 24 January 2020. 
124 Free on Board (FoB) meant the coffee exporters (individual farmer, farmer groups, co-operatives, or private coffee 
buyers) were responsible for transport costs from the warehouses to the shipping ports. While Free on Transit (FoT) 
coffee exporters were not responsible for the transport cost from the warehouses to the shipping port. 
125 Mahenge Agricultural AMCOS Limited, Tax Invoice No.001, 25 April 2013; Mahenge AMCOS Limited, “Permit 
of Direct coffee export” Ref. No. TCB/QP/E.340, from TCB to Mahenge AMCOS, 20 February 2013. 






an average price. The price was TShs.4 000/- [$2.3/kg].127 The AMCOS maintained the same 
producer price to the members for three years, regardless of the changes in sales price or the real 
exchange rate. For instance, in 2015/16, the Fairtrade regular price was $4.3/kg [TShs.8 600/- for 
the exchange rate of 1$ = TShs.2 000/-] while the producer price was $2/kg.128 This was different 
from the CMS as a private coffee company working with certified farmer groups. Coffee producers 
were paid a pooled price that resulted from direct export only, and that ranged from TShs.4 800/- 
to TShs.5 200/- per kg [$2.4 to $2.6].129 The low producer price created a sense of mistrust between 
co-operative members and officials to the extent that some decided to sell their coffee to private 
companies, while others withdrew from coffee production. Despite the complaints by coffee 
producers of being underpaid for direct export certified coffee, it was still a better option in terms 
of market prices compared to auction-sold coffee. For instance, in 2015/16, when the coffee 
industry experienced the lowest price compared to the previous seasons, the FLO-certified coffee 
price was $4.3/kg while the non-certified coffee price was $2.6/kg.130 
On the other hand, DAE Limited worked with farmer groups on the marketing aspect by assisting 
them in certifying their coffee under the Rain Forest Alliance from 2012.131 As a result, 26 farmers’ 
groups from the Mbinga District and one from the Nyasa District received certification. Apart from 
working with certified coffee groups, DAE Limited was also involved with 22 non-certified coffee 
farmer groups.132 In its efforts to improve coffee production and quality, the DAE Limited 
embarked on the construction of CPUs in various villages. In 2006, two CPUs were constructed in 
 
127 Interview with Pius Kinunda, Mahenge Village, 24 January 2020. 
128 Interview with Pius Kinunda, Mahenge Village, 24 January 2020. 
129 Interview with Suzo Komba, CMS Limited-Mbinga, 8 January 2019. 
130 Tanzania Coffee Board Office-Moshi, “Coffee sales and average prices from 1980/81 to 2018/19”; Mahenge 
AMCOS Limited, Coffee Sales from 2012/13 to 2015/16 coffee seasons. 
131 Rain Forest Alliance (RFA) was introduced in 1993 and supported by the United Nation Development Programme 
and Global Environmental Facility. It involved certification of both smallholder and estate coffee producers. It 
integrated agricultural production, environmental conservation and human development; it emphasis on the 
conservation of natural trees species as shade trees in coffee farms; R. Ruben and P. Hoebink (eds.), Coffee 
certification in East Africa: Impact on Farmers, Families, and Cooperatives, (Netherlands: Wageningen Academic 
Publishers, 2015), 29. 






Mundeki and Wukiro Villages. The number of CPUs increased to 60 in 2015. Therefore, the 
enterprise was selling to both auctions and as a direct exporter. The major coffee buyer was the 
Schluter SA Company based in Switzerland and the United Kingdom.133 Figure 6 shows the amount 
of coffee sold through direct export, compared to the coffee sold at the auction from 2011/12 to 
2015/16. 
 
Figure 6: Coffee Sales DAE Limited, 2011–2015134 
The figure shows the increasing volume of direct export from 2012 due to the adoption of coffee-
certification schemes. The certification of farmer groups to the Rain Forest Alliance and Coffee and 
Farmer Equality (CAFE) standards in 2012 and 2013, respectively, increased the direct export 
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coffee markets. On the other hand, this could be attributed to the increasing number of CPUs of 
which 28 out of 60 were supported by the CPT from 2012 to 2016.135 
5.7. Mbinga Coffee Curing Company Limited (MCCCO) vs Private Coffee Enterprises, 
1995–2015  
The impact and dominance of the private coffee enterprises in the Mbinga District also manifested 
in other sectors of the coffee industry, such as the coffee curing sector. Most of the curing factories 
in Tanzania were owned jointly by the co-operative unions. Before 1995, the government, through 
the TCB, fully owned both the Mbozi and Mbinga coffee curing factories in Southern Tanzania. 
From 1995, coffee producers who contributed 70% for the construction of the factories owned 
56.54% of the shares through 28 co-operative unions, while the government through the Tanzania 
Coffee Board owned 43.46%.136 By 2015, in terms of shares, this translated into the co-operative 
unions owning 727 750 shares valued at TShs.727 750 220.20 ($352 250.83), while the government 
owned 559 321 shares valued at TShs.559 321 531.50 ($270 726.78).137 The presence of the state 
in the co-operative-owned factory was an obstacle to free and fair competition in the coffee industry. 
There was a direct link between the existence of the co-operative unions and the operation of the 
co-operative-owned coffee curing factories. The collapse of co-operative unions held dire 
consequences for the curing factories and threatened their collapse. The coffee curing companies 
had to diversify their functions within the coffee section, beyond their primary task of curing 
coffees, in order to survive in the free-market economy. The MCCCO Limited further diversified 
their functions after a decision made during the 1996/97 season, namely, to engage in coffee buying 
(cherry) from the smallholder producers in the 1997/98 season.138 This initiative was expanded into 
 
135 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Coffee and Prosperity A Perfect Blend: The Coffee Partnership for Coffee in 
Tanzania, Final Report, (2017), 51.  
136 MCCCO, Taarifa ya Kampuni ya Kukoboa Kahawa Mbinga kwa Mkuu wa Mkoa wa Ruvuma Bilnith Mahenge [a 
Report of MCCCO Limited to the Ruvuma Regional Commissioner], 30 September 2016. 
137 Ibid.  
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the Lake Nyasa Coffee Traders (LANCOT) project covering both the Mbinga and Nyasa Districts. 
The initial objective of LANCOT was to raise more income for the company by buying and selling 
coffee at the auction in Moshi. The project came at a time when Soochack Bush Limited was 
constructing a private curing factory in the district.139 They focused on the construction of ten coffee 
wet mills – generally known as CPUs between 1997 and 2002 – in Manzeye, Mbuji, Maganagana, 
Luwaita, Ilela, Mapera, Lukanzauti, Langiro, Mkoha, and Kipapa to improve coffee quality.140 
Among the private coffee buyers in the Mbinga District, Soochack was the only buyer who could 
pay coffee producers the second instalment when the price was good in the external markets. 
Agricultural inputs were distributed to the coffee producers on credit to be deducted during coffee 
sales. During its operation, they freely distributed coffee seedlings from the nurseries developed in 
every CPU to the coffee growers. However, Soochack factory operated for a two-year period (2001 
and 2002) before transferring the ownership to LIMA (T) Limited that operated it to the 2014/15 
season. Soochack ended their coffee-buying business following the suspension of the license of 
“foreign-owned” enterprises to buy coffee from producers in the 2002/03 season. This created an 
opportunity for a co-operative-owned factory to get more coffee to process while denying the 
majority of the smallholder coffee producers the opportunity to trade with a foreign-owned 
company such as Soochack. 
Further product diversification followed in 2004 and 2007. In 2004, LANCOT subsidised the 
production of ground coffee under the brand name Mbuji.141 In 2007, the first instant coffee was 
 
ukumbi wa MBICU hotel [Minutes of the meeting of the committee of directors of the MCCCO Limited on the 
Coffee-Buying Project, 31 January 1997 at MBICU hotel]. 
139 Interview with Suzo Komba, Assistant Branch Manager and Coffee Producer, Coffee Management Services Limited 
(CMS), 8 January 2019. The curing factory was constructed between 1999 and 2002 later in 2003 was inherited by 
the LIMA Coffee Company Limited to 2013 and then the CMS up to date (2020).  
140 Interview with Angelus Kinunda, DAE Limited, Mbinga, 27 December 2018, an Agricultural Officer formerly 
working with Soochack Bush (T) Limited (2000-2003), LIMA (2003-2007), and from 2008 to date working for 
DAE Limited. 
141 The coffee culture in Mbinga was characterized by low consumption and mainly production for export. Most of the 
coffee producers linked coffee drinking with heart related diseases, and upper-class lifestyles. MCCCO had to 
embark on creating awareness among coffee producers on coffee consumption. Interview with David Haule, 






produced, namely Mbinga Cafe. Ground coffee (Mbinga Cafe) was processed by the MCCCO. The 
processing of the instant coffee was done by the Tanganyika Instant Coffee Company (TANICA) 
situated in the Kagera region, while the packaging took place in the Mbinga District.142 Due to the 
lack of the machinery necessary for producing instant coffee, the MCCCO could not counter this 
instant coffee diversification. The construction of private coffee curing factories by private coffee-
buying companies, therefore, posed a greater threat to the existence of the co-operative-owned 
factories.  
In 2006/07, the MCCCO constructed a minor curing factory in Makambako (MCCCO LTD-
Makambako Branch), equipped with staff, quarters and warehouses. The branch aimed to process 
coffee collected from Songea, Ludewa and Kilolo -Iringa. The operation turned out not to be cost-
effective because the mentioned areas could not produce enough coffee. In 2016, the factory, 
warehouses and quarters were rented to Aviv (T) Limited who operated the coffee estate at Lipokela 
in the Songea District.143 
Apart from coffee buying and curing, the MCCCO also participated in the Central Pulpery Unit 
operations at Ngaka, Kitumbalomo, Lituru, and Makumbukira under Fairtrade certification from 
2011 to 2014. With the support of the MCCCO, these CPUs were able to participate in direct coffee 
export. Eighty per cent of the income went to the coffee producers, and 20% went to the MCCCO.144 
The project did not last long due to a failure to pay the certification fee in 2014/15, which marked 
the end of certification in those co-operative-owned CPUs. The participation of the MCCCO 
Limited in the marketing of coffee with the co-operative-owned CPUs created some tension 
between the smallholder coffee producers on the one hand and the MCCCO officials on the other. 
Coffee producers were complaining about the lack of transparency of the information regarding 
coffee sales, and one producer declared:  
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Those people [MCCCO officials] were not working for the interest of a smallholder producer 
as they claimed. In 2013, we did not get our second payment after the coffee export and we 
were told that our coffee was in poor quality full of defects to get money from the external 
coffee buyers.145  
The evident tension manifested in open protest when the coffee producers from the Ngaka CPU 
blocked the Litembo road at Kindimba village for one of the MCCCO officials146 and demanded an 
explanation as to why they had not been paid.  
Despite these tensions and complaints by smallholder coffee producers and the declining percentage 
of the total annual coffee curing handled by MCCCO (as demonstrated in Figure 7), the company 
remained vitally important in the Mbinga District despite the competition from other coffee curing 
companies. Due to the lack of consistent statistics from other curing companies, Figure 7 shows the 
MCCCO Limited coffee curing trend concerning coffee production in the Ruvuma region from 
1997 to 2015. 
 
145 Interview with Astery Kapinga (not his real name), Kindimba village, 9 January 2019. 







Figure 7: Coffee Curing Trend at MCCCO Limited, 1997–2015147 
From the statistics in Figure 7, one sees that the coffee curing processes in the MCCCO decreased 
following the increasing numbers of private coffee curing companies. The Soochack Bush coffee 
curing factory started operation in 2000. The decline became alarming in 2009. One of the reasons 
was the establishment of the DAE Coffee Curing Factory to increase the number of coffee curing 
factories in the district to three. It secondly reflects the decline in coffee production following the 
2008/09 coffee boom in Tanzania in which a total of 68 576.703 tons were recorded.148 This created 
competition in coffee processing and saved time, hence coffee from Mbinga was able to reach the 
auction without delay. The DAE Coffee Curing Factory had the capacity of processing six tons of 
coffee per hour, but due to the competition and partly due to underproduction, the factory rarely 
reached that capacity.149 Apart from the coffee curing factory, the enterprise also engaged in the 
coffee-roasting business producing “DAE instant and ground coffee” for the internal market.150 To 
counter the underproduction of the factory, the enterprise had 35 hectares of coffee farms 
established in Linda village.151  
 
147 Data collected from Tanzania Coffee Board, Moshi, 2018 and MCCCO Limited, Mbinga, 2019. 
148 Tanzania Coffee Board Office-Moshi, “Coffee sale and Average Prices from 1980/81–2018/19”. 
149 Interview with Alex Tweve, Manager-DAE Coffee Curing Factory, 27 December 2018. 
150 Ibid. 

























State intervention was one of the challenges facing private enterprises in coffee marketing in 
Tanzania. The government, through the TCB, had the power to issue and suspend the coffee-buying 
licenses whenever they found it necessary. However, the state monopoly created an unpredictable 
licensing system. For instance, in the 2000/01 season, licenses of private traders were suspended in 
the Kagera region. The aim was to assist the co-operative unions to repay loans acquired from the 
CRDB Bank.152 This caused a similar demand from all co-operative unions in the country, including 
the Mbinga District. Although it was implemented in the Kagera region for only two seasons 
(2000/01 and 2001/02), it created fear among the private coffee buyers at the domestic level. 
Uncertainty about their licenses made them wary of expanding their businesses and distributing 
agricultural inputs to the coffee producers on credit because of the apparent risk of losing their 
money. Aware of what happened in Kagera, the government took different measures in the Mbinga 
District in the 2002/03 coffee season by suspending the licenses of “foreign-owned” enterprises 
from buying coffee from producers. As a result, some of the enterprises limited their involvement 
to coffee processing, while others decided to leave the district and invest somewhere else. For 
instance, Soochack Bush (T) Limited ended their coffee buying businesses and sold the curing 
factory to LIMA Limited. Tchibo Estate (T) Limited that operated in the district for three years 
(1999–2002), decided to continue with estate-coffee production in Kilimanjaro and Kikuyu 
Kenya.153 However, in 2005, the foreign-owned enterprises were licensed to participate in domestic 
coffee marketing.  
On the other hand, the numbers of “locally-owned” enterprises were not economically viable 
compared to the “foreign-owned” enterprises.154 The financial uncertainty created amongst traders 
undermined the long-term commitments and network development that created the conditions for 
 
152 J. Baffes, “Tanzania’s Coffee Sector: Constraints and Challenges”, 35; S. Ponte, “The Politics of Ownership”. 
153 Interview with Suzo Komba, Assistant Branch Manager and Coffee Producer, CMS Limited (CMS), 8 January 2019. 
From 2003 to 2005, he was taken to supervise coffee estates in Moshi, then in Kikuyu-Kenya for two years.  
154 One of the conditions for the application of the coffee-buying license was for the applicant to have paid-up capital 








the fly-by-night nature of coffee traders. As a result, most of the local enterprises became agents 
for foreign-owned enterprises. Although the number of private coffee enterprises in the Mbinga 
District increased from nine in 1994/95 to 30 in the 2015/16 season, the DAE Limited was the only 
private enterprise that had been able to maintain its involvement in coffee marketing over this 
period. A range of companies such as BAM Contractors (T) Limited, DAE Limited, LANCOT 
under the MCCCO, GOMEES, YODA Co. Limited, LUKITI Trading Company, Mhekela Trading 
Company, and IMAGE Co. Limited operated under these conditions. Most of the enterprises had 
no permanent premises/address as offices. As a result, it created chaos and confusion for coffee 
producers as they did not know whom to trust as most of these enterprises only appeared during the 
marketing seasons. From this experience, therefore, smallholder coffee producers found themselves 
in a dilemma. The marketing system did not guarantee their future coffee economy. 
5.8. Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the struggle and survival strategies deployed by the actors in the coffee 
industry in the Mbinga District from the 1990s to 2015. The struggle within co-operative unions to 
cope with the competition from private enterprises resulted in their decline. As a result, the 
smallholder coffee producers had developed marketing strategies by developing independent co-
operative societies and farmer groups. As this chapter has argued, the coffee producers regarded the 
co-operative union as an exploitative intermediary. The formation of independent co-operatives and 
farmer groups was the strategy to improve coffee income by minimising deductions. The 
interventions of the NGOs and private enterprises made some of the smallholder coffee producers 
realise their potential by growing speciality coffee markets while most of the producers were 
marginalised. Instead of liberalisation levelling playing fields for all coffee actors, it turned to be a 
pitted and selective process.  
The chapter adds to the debate on the role of the state in the coffee economy. It extends the debate 
focusing on the competition between co-operatives, smallholder coffee producers, and private 






liberalised market as due to state interventions through its regulatory bodies, this chapter shows that 
apart from regulating the coffee industry, the state was also a co-owner of the co-operatively owned 
coffee curing factories. The chapter used the “coffee statecraft” concept by Gavin Fridell155 who 
explored the role of the state in the coffee industry during the coffee crisis but did not incorporate 
the private enterprises in the coffee-marketing system. Furthermore, this chapter has added to the 
contention of Stefano Ponte156 who discussed the “politics of ownership” and how the state 
decisions to protect “local companies” in the domestic coffee market had made some private 
enterprises develop affiliated companies to maintain their coffee-buying licenses. The politics of 
ownership also turned some of the “local companies” into agents for the “foreign companies”. 
Finally, this chapter concludes that, due to the limited transparency in financial operations and 
democratic participation in the coffee chains, the participation of private enterprises in the coffee 
industry does not lend itself to providing benefits to the smallholder coffee producers. Smallholder 
coffee farmers have remained passive participants in decision making in the marketing system. The 
lack of smallholders’ voices left them to produce what they could not bargain for in both internal 
and external markets as long as the private enterprise remained the main actor
 
155 G. Fridell, “Coffee statecraft: Rethinking the Global Coffee Crisis, 1998–2002”, New Political Economy, 19, 3, 
(2014), 407-426. 






Chapter Six  
“Is Coffee a man’s crop?”: Women and Coffee Production in Mbinga District, 
Tanzania, c. 1920-2015. 
6.1. Introduction 
Traditionally, in most patriarchal African societies, the land is owned by men. As such, women 
have been considered as food producers for household consumption while men have been regarded 
as the breadwinners. Coffee production has been customarily considered as a “man’s crop”. 
Consequently, women’s participation in smallholder coffee production has been given less attention 
in the current scholarship. Globally, women have been engaging in the coffee economy in the 
production, processing, and exporting in the context of paid and even unpaid labour. Women are 
estimated to provide 70% of labour in coffee production in the world.1 Despite their roles in coffee 
production, women are, compared to men, often excluded when it comes to coffee proceedings and 
decision making. However, this chapter argues that customary patriarchal practices among Matengo 
coffee producers, and the colonial and the postcolonial states have shaped the roles of women in 
the production and marketing of coffee in the Mbinga District. It further argues that, 
notwithstanding the scale of production, the role of women in the coffee economy cannot be 
underestimated. Consequently, women’s responses varied from compliance to ambivalence. This 
chapter explores the women’s role in coffee production in the Mbinga District with a particular 
focus on production and marketing between the 1920s and 2015. The chapter does not involve a 
substantial theoretical debate on gender issues in economic development; rather it maps out the 
women’s involvement in the coffee economy and their responses to the changes in the Mbinga 
District between 1920 and 2015. It uses archival sources and oral interviews. The study found that 
women’s participation in the coffee economy has been shaped by historical forces ranging from the 
cultural norms and practices to colonially contrived historical circumstances. As a result, women 
 






have been regarded as passive actors in the coffee economy throughout the colonial period and only 
became visible during the postcolonial period. 
Furthermore, this chapter addresses the role of women in coffee production and marketing. It 
commences with a historiographical conversation on women’s role in the coffee industry in Africa, 
with particular focus on Tanzania. Combining the seminal approaches by economist Gavin Fridell’s 
“coffee statecraft” framework,2 and anthropologist James Scott’s “weapon of the weak”,3 this 
chapter examines the changes and continuities of the role of women in the Mbinga District over 
time. The following sections discuss the accessibility of agricultural education and coffee markets 
over an extensive period, focusing on the legal and cultural constraints on women’s participation in 
the coffee market from 1920 to 2015, and discussing women’s access to and participation in 
production, marketing and co-operative societies. It demonstrates women’s ‘coffeescapes’ of 
resistance to the control of the coffee proceeds over varying social and political episodes. 
6.2. Historical Overview of African Women in the Coffee Industry 
Studies on African women farmers have attracted scholars from different disciplines, including 
anthropology, economics, history, gender and development studies. However, until the 1960s, 
African women were less visible in economic activities. Most of the studies (mostly by 
anthropologists) regarded women as wives and mothers who took care of the family. The roles of 
women were embedded in the description of kinship, marriage customs, fertility rituals and 
domestic labour. In agricultural aspects, women were associated with food production, preparation 
(cooking), storage and control.4 Although these scholars show the women’s participation in 
 
2 G. Fridell, “Coffee Statecraft: Rethinking the Global Coffee Crisis, 1998 – 2002”, New Political Economy, 19, 3, 
(2014), 407- 426.  
3 J.C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, (London, Yale University Press, 1985). 
4 A.I. Richards, Hunger and Work in a Savage Tribe: A functional Study of Nutrition among the Southern Bantu, 
(London: G. Routledge, 1932); A.R. Radcliffe-Brown & D. Forde, (eds.), African Kinship and Marriage, (London: 






agricultural activities, their perspectives were dominated by the colonial bias regarding pre-colonial 
African societies as “savage”.  
From the 1970s, more scholars started to focus on women participation in economic activities, 
including agriculture, trade, arts, and industry. Most of them were influenced by Ester Boserup,5 
and her study on the role of women in economic activities. By analysing “female farming”, she 
argued that women make a more significant contribution to African agriculture than men.6 
However, Boserup focused on economic separateness in which women were regarded as food-crop 
producers while men were the cash-crop producers. According to Boserup, women were more 
independent under the shifting cultivation system, while the transition to permanent agriculture 
caused the decline of women’s participation in agriculture.7 The decline was associated with the 
introduction of technology, such as the plough replacing the hand hoe. However, some scholars 
emerged as a critique to Boserup’s work, specifically on the decline of women’s status. For instance, 
Jane Guyer,8 focusing on female farming and food production in southern Cameroon, shows the 
flexibility and resilience of women on migration and polygynous marriage in the 19th century, 
colonial agriculture, and the production for the urban market in postcolonial Africa. Candice 
Bradley (1990) associates technological innovation, such as ploughs and tractors, with the 
increasing weeding of the workload on women’s side as it maximises the size of acreage per 
household.9 Despite the criticism, Boserup’s work has remained a crucial work on researching 
women’s role in economic activities.  
The idea of categorising crops into gendered terms as “women’s or men’s” crop has attracted 
scholarly debate from different disciplines. This chapter draws on the work of Paul Sillitoe, 
 
5 E. Boserup, Women’s Role in Economic Development, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970). 
6 E. Boserup, Women’s Role in Economic Development, (with new Introduction by N. Kanji, Fei Tan and C. Toulman), 
(London: Earthscan, 2007), 4. 
7 E. Boserup, Women’s Role in Economic Development, (1970), 32. 
8 J.I. Guyer, “Female Farming and the Evolution of Food Production Patterns Amongst the Beti of 
South-Central Cameroon”, Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 50, No. 4, (1980), 341-356. 
9 C. Bradley, “Women Weeding and the Plow: A Comparative Test of Boserup’s Hypothesis”, African Urban 






anthropologist, who studied the division of crops by using gender categories of wiy (women) and 
hae (men) in the New Papua Guinea.10 Sillitoe’s work demonstrated different crops produced 
separately by either men or women and those produced by both in a Wola community of the 
highlands of New Papua Guinea. Men were producing “erect plant” crops such as banana and 
sugarcane that were regarded as strong, masculine and important. On the other hand, women’s crops 
were “creeping”, such as tobacco and hibiscus and regarded as weak and unimportant. Beans and 
maize were some of the gender-neutral crops attended by both men and women. Sweet potato was 
a creeping crop but was considered a man’s crop because it formed the main/staple diet of the 
community. From this division, Sillitoe argued that “the wiy/hae status and its attendant 
considerations give added meaning and strength to sexual planting distinctions.”11 Since people 
cannot survive without sweet potatoes, it was evident that “women are the producers and men the 
transactors”.12 This chapter draws on the idea of masculinity and manhood to examine the role of 
women in coffee production in the Mbinga District. However, women have been portrayed as 
victims of the system because, despite their dominant role in production and participation in 
marketing, the perception still persists that coffee is a man’s crop and domain. The practical reality, 
however, paints a different picture. 
This chapter also draws on the work of Gisela Giesler,13 a social scientist who questioned the 
validity of conceptualising cash and food-crop production along gender lines by using maize 
production in Eastern Zambia from the 1960s when the hybrid variety of maize was introduced. 
The two crops were produced side by side using family labour. Maize was used as both food and 
cash crop. Therefore, she argued that “what separated food crop from cash crop had in fact nothing 
to do with the nature of the crop or with gender division of labour, fields, or land, but with what 
 
10 P. Sillitoe, “The Gender of Crops in the Papua New Guinea Highlands”, Ethnology, Vol. 20, No. 1, (Jan., 1981), 1-
14. 
11 Ibid., 11. 
12 Ibid., 13. 
13 G. Geisler, “Silences Speak Louder Than Claims: Gender, Household, And Agricultural Development in Southern 






appeared to be a gender division of control.”14 This was determined by the part of the crop 
appropriated by the head of the household (male). Giesler’s analysis is useful to this chapter as the 
way of mapping out the women’s role in coffee production and marketing with a specific focus on 
the control over the coffee proceeds. With this analysis, this chapter will explore the co-existence 
of both men and women as coffee producers in the Mbinga District. However, Giesler’s study 
focuses on the neutral crop that can either be sold or consumed while this chapter will focus on 
coffee as mainly for export.  
This chapter further draws on the work by Martina Padmanabhan, who investigated the relationship 
between the gender division of labour and access to the cultivation of crops in Northern Ghana.15 
In assigning a new crop to a specific gender, Padmanabhan used the cultural idea of a “proper meal” 
whereby women had to bring soup ingredients while men brought the staple food.16 Staple food 
included maize and millet. The introduction of cash crops, such as improved cowpea and onion, 
created a need for the use of agrochemicals. Men secured the cowpea cultivation because of their 
cultural knowledge of medicine. Women were against chemical sprays due to their association with 
spiritual power and the danger of being accused in causing death so to be accused as witches.17 
Consequently, women were excluded, while men dominated the newly introduced crops. 
Padmanabhan’s research, on negotiation between men and women over the new crops, focused on 
the producer’s context by focusing on customs while neglecting external forces, such as the power 
of the state in promoting the gender division of labour for the newly introduced cash crops. Drawing 
from Padmanabhan’s study, this chapter extends the debate by including other forces in the 
inclusion or the exclusion of women in a new cash crop.  
 
14 Ibid., 1970. 
15 M.A. Padmanabhan, “The making and unmaking of gendered crops in northern Ghana”, Singapore Journal of 
Tropical Geography, 28, (2007), 57–70. 
16 Ibid., 61. 






Furthermore, Alastair Orr et al.18 has attributed the naming of the crop to the value of the crop to 
the market. In the eastern province of Zambia, cotton has been regarded as men’s crop because of 
the high market price it fetched. On the other hand, groundnut was regarded as women’s crop due 
to its low value. However, in 2007, the Eastern Province Farmer’s Cooperative was formed to buy 
and sell groundnuts.19 Men were invited to operate shelling machines. The machine increased the 
value of groundnuts. As a result, men developed an interest in groundnuts. The commercialisation 
of groundnuts created conflict over the control of the groundnuts, in other words, whether it was 
“women’s crop” or “men’s crop”. In essence, it was the “gender division of control” for which they 
were fighting. This case study shows the limitation of naming a crop in a gendered way. The study 
was silent on the response of women when cotton fetched high prices. However, this chapter will 
show the women’s resistance in the Mbinga District on the male dominance over the coffee 
proceeds in the 1990s.  
Drawing from Sillitoe, Padmanabhan, Giesler and Alastair Orr et al., this chapter wants to go 
beyond the dichotomy of “men’s and women’s crop” since the naming of the crop depends on how 
a particular society interacts with the crop. For this case, the Mbinga District presents different 
cultural settings in which coffee has been produced. There was a cultural framework that allowed 
some women, albeit a few, to make inroads into carving their niches into the men’s domain. These 
included polygynous marriages and honorary males.20 Moreover, changing political economies also 
presented women with other opportunities, including the ability to resist male dominance. 
Therefore, the men’s-crop-women’s-crop argument must not be overstated. 
Coffee production is a labour-intensive activity. It involves much manual labour, and its calendar 
runs throughout the year, so women play an equally significant role in this economy. Globally, 
 
18 A. Orr et al., “What do we mean by women’s crop? Commercialization, Gender and Power to name”, Journal of 
international Development, 28, (2016), 919-937. 
19 Ibid., 922. 
20 Honorary males were women who were given the status of a man by performing activities believed to be man’s 
activities. It started as a mockery to unmarried women who performed “man’s tasks” being referred to as dume jike 
(male daughter) but with their independent economic power, they regained a respectful status. Interview with 






women have been engaging in the coffee economy in production, processing, and exporting. In 
some cases, they have played an important role in political revolutions through associations and 
unions.21 Also, they have been performing unpaid labour, and even when paid, they earned less than 
men. Despite their role in coffee production, women are often excluded when it comes to producing 
benefits and decision-making. Heather Fowler-Salamini’s study in Veracruz, Mexico, shows how 
women were paid lower wages than men. Women were paid the average of fifty centavos per day, 
which was half as much as male workers earned at the turn of the 20th century.22 Another example 
was in the coffee plantations in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in 1850, where women workers were paid half 
the men’s salary.23  
Furthermore, Elizabeth Dore’s study in Nicaragua explains how patriarchal authority was exercised 
through the debt-peonage system whereby cash was received in advance and in return, one had to 
work in coffee estates during the harvest season.24 Through the debt-peonage system, men could 
use a wife and children as a peonage when signing up the contract with the coffee-estate owner. On 
the contrary, women were not allowed to receive cash and sign contracts without their husbands’ 
permission.25 However, Dore’s study exclusively focused on the coffee estates where labourers 
were employed. This chapter focuses on smallholder coffee production within the family context 
and the different ways in which female labour was used. Although labour relations were similarly 
oppressive to women in Mbinga, they found a variety of ways to manoeuvre or even undermine the 
system. 
The decline of the coffee economy in African coffee-producing countries in the 1980s and 1990s 
created gender conflict over economic control. Studies show that societies were experiencing 
 
21 H. Fowler-Salamini, “Women Coffee Sorters Confronting the Mill Owners and the Veracruz Revolutionary State, 
1915–1918”, Journal of Women’s History, 14, 1, (2002), 34-63. 
22 Ibid., 38. 
23 R. Kurian, “Labor, Race, and Gender on the Coffee plantations in Ceylon Sri Lanka, 1834–1880”, W.G. Clarence-
Smith and S. Topik, (eds.), The Global Coffee Economy, 181. 
24 E. Dore, “Patriarchy from above, Patriarchy from Below: Debt Peonage on Nicaragua Coffee Estates, 1870 – 1930”, 
W.G. Clarence- Smith and S. Topik, (eds.), The Global Coffee Economy, 209-235. 






changes in the role of women and men in coffee production and marketing. For instance, Patrick 
Mbataru26 focused on Nyeri, Kenya and argues that “although the introduction of coffee made 
women’s role in the domestic economy of coffee society redundant, it is their traditional expertise 
in production that women readily reformulated to support their families after the coffee economy 
declined in the 1990s.”27 With no money from coffee sales, men became unable to provide for the 
family. Women were able to obtain money from grain, garden and dairy farming and became “new 
men”. Similarly, in the Santa region of Cameroon, coffee production, which was the primary source 
of family income, was the men’s occupation.28 However, the 1980s economic liberalisation affected 
some changes in the male dominance of cash crops by allowing women to own land (even by 
uprooting coffee trees due to low prices) and carry out the commercialisation of food crops. On the 
contrary, in Tanzania, in the Kagera region, men who were operating on the banana-coffee farms, 
started to produce horticultural products on land tilled formerly by women.29 This chapter draws 
from these experiences in showing how women in the Mbinga District, despite their already referred 
to manoeuvring, failed to exert as much control and alter men’s hold over the coffee economy 
despite the economic crisis.  
Furthermore, this chapter draws from Margareth Msonganzila,30 who focuses on the participation 
of women in co-operative societies in Northern Tanzania in the 1980s. The study examines whether 
women-only or mixed co-operatives were able to empower women and free them from their 
subordinated status. Evidence suggests that women preferred the women-only co-operatives to the 
integrated ones. However, women-only co-operatives were mainly in the activities that were 
traditionally regarded as “women’s work”, such as dairy farming, grain mills, and vegetable 
gardens. Although Msonganzila’s study focuses on Northern Tanzania (Kilimanjaro region), it is 
 
26 P. Mbataru, “Women in the coffee society: the case of Nyeri, Kenya”, Etudes Rurales, 180, (2007), 101-115. 
27 Ibid., 103. 
28 C.L. Forje, “Economic Crisis helps to ‘demarginalize’ women”, Development in Practice, 8, 2, (1998), 212. 
29 A. Tibaijuka, “The cost of Differential Gender Roles in African agriculture: A Case Study of Smallholder banana-
coffee farms in the Kagera region, Tanzania”, Journal of Agricultural Economics, 45, 1, (1994), 69-81.  
30 M.R. Msonganzila, “Women and co-operatives in Tanzania: Separatism or Integration?”, Economic and Political 






useful to this chapter because it shows how the women-only co-operative model failed to empower 
women. This chapter draws from Msonganzila’s work to examine women’s participation in coffee 
co-operative societies in Southern Tanzania, where women-only co-operatives were non-existent 
between the 1920s and 2015. 
African coffee-producing countries have recently participated in various “sustainable” coffee 
production programmes, including Fairtrade, Rain Forest Alliance, and Utz Certification, that put 
more emphasis on the empowerment of women. Eveline Dijkdrenth31, Annamerie Groot 
Kormelinck,32 and Felix Meir zu Selhausen33 examined the participation of women in the coffee 
co-operatives in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda, respectively. In these three countries, women faced 
challenges in becoming members of a co-operative since one of the criteria was that of owning land. 
Social and cultural norms have placed land ownership in a man’s dominion, and this has contributed 
in cementing men’s monopoly over the co-operatives. However, the three studies focus on the co-
operative level and, more specifically, after the introduction of coffee-certification programmes. 
Thus, such studies have paid little attention to the historical involvement of women in coffee 
production in different historical periods. This study traces the historical forces that shaped 
women’s role in the coffee economy in the Mbinga District.  
Studies have shown that in the Mbinga District land is owned by men and the division of labour on 
both food and cash crop are harmoniously divided. The coffee cultivation supports the ngolo system 
to remain economically viable.34 Nives Kinunda focused on the negotiation of women farmers’ 
 
31 E. Dijkdrenth, “Gender Equity Within Utz Certified Coffee Cooperatives in Eastern Province, Kenya”, R. Ruben and 
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labour between women farmers, state, and society.35 Although Kinunda’s study shows the historical 
dynamism of women farmers’ labour-power in the southern highlands of Tanzania in various 
historical epochs, it focuses more on women’s general labour-power with little emphasis on cash 
crops. However, this chapter explores the role of women in coffee production with a specific focus 
on their involvement in production and marketing from the 1920s to 2015. It contributes to the 
literature on understanding women’s role in the coffee industry that challenges the notion that coffee 
is a man’s crop.  
6.3. “Kahawa ya kaka!”: Women, Expansion and Coffee, 1920s–1960 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, in the late 19th century, Arabica coffee was introduced in the 
northern province by the European missionaries in the Kilimanjaro area (Kilema and Kibosho 
mission stations). The African chiefs were among the first coffee growers. The initial introducers 
of coffee farming used traditional leaders in persuading the people to accept this crop. Africans 
easily adopted cash-crop production due to the role that traditional leaders played. For instance, 
Sawaya Mawalla, a counsellor of the chief of Marangu, started coffee cultivation in 1900, and 
Joseph Merinyo, the son of the Chief of Moshi started coffee plantings in 1907.36 The political 
leaders were among the first coffee producers in the Songea District in both Ungoni and Umatengo 
(current Mbinga District) in the 1920s. Examples in this regard are Nkosi Zulu of Ndirima who had 
40 coffee trees in Ungoni in 1928/29; Nkosi Mbonani who had 40 coffee trees planted in 1928/29; 
Nduna Kapungu who had 36 coffee trees in 1928/29; Nduna Nassoro of Mkwera (20 coffee trees), 
and Chrisostomus Makita in Umatengo (550 coffee trees).37 Chrisostomus Makita, the son of the 
chief of Umatengo, was the first African to cultivate coffee in the Matengo highlands in 1926/27.38 
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Makita persuaded the court elders, his relatives, and schoolmates to venture into cash-crop coffee 
farming. Apart from political leaders, the returning migrant labourers were also among the earliest 
coffee growers in the Matengo highlands. Coffee seeds were first given to the leaders and influential 
people to demonstrate to the rest of the Africans. Evidently, men were the first coffee producers in 
the Mbinga District in this period. As a result, by 1929, the Mbinga District had eight coffee growers 
(men), of which six were in Myangayanga and two in Lipumba villages.39  
By the 1930s, the Mbinga District experienced the expansion of coffee production. The colonial 
government, through the Department of Agriculture, initiated the “Grow More Crops Campaign” 
as a response to the impact of the Great Depression of the 1930s.40 By 1935, the number of African 
men who had coffee trees increased to 230 men, and they had planted 17 551 coffee trees.41 Archival 
sources reveal that only men received coffee seeds. At this stage, women formed part of the 
household workforce on the coffee farms since the men represented a household. The success of 
“selling” coffee production as a cash crop can be described, among others, to the portrayal of coffee 
as a man’s crop that needed detailed and constant attention – something that could be given only by 
men. One of the conditions before the issue of coffee seeds or seedlings was that a new grower was 
supposed to be a permanent resident in the area and that the proposed site of both nursery and 
plantation had to be approved by the Department of Agriculture.42 Consequently, women, by virtue 
of the fact that they were to be married, were not regarded as permanent residents and their 
participation in coffee farming was hindered. Women were expected to get married and join their 
husbands on their coffee farms. The establishment of a coffee farm by unmarried women was 
considered as wastage of resources. Women were stereotyped as being incapable of managing 
coffee farms. Conversely, boys were allowed to have their coffee plots adjacent to their fathers’ 
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coffee farms, even before the age of eighteen as training for adulthood. The reason was to assist 
them (boys) through kahawa ya kaka (brother’s coffee) to get experience with coffee-production 
practices before the age of eighteen when they could become independent coffee producers.43 
Possession of a coffee farm was considered an important aspect for a man, before marriage, among 
the Matengo community in the Mbinga District. It was essential training for such young men for 
obtaining breadwinner status – one of the criteria of whether a man would be capable of taking care 
of his family. 
However, the introduction of coffee led to the development of new social constructs among the 
Matengo people. Before the advent of the coffee economy, cattle were used for the bride price. To 
get cattle, one had to exchange items such as iron hoes and grains for cattle from the Nyasa lake 
shore. The introduction of coffee replaced the barter system with cash. Coffee was a means to or 
source of cash which elevated it the symbol for “manhood”.44  
The question of who should be given the coffee seeds, was also influenced by land ownership, 
access, and control. During the pre-colonial period, land, which is the major means of production, 
was owned by the clans and controlled by the clan heads. The head of a clan was the guardian of 
the people’s land and gave permission for the exploitation of unused land. Individuals acquired land 
through inheritance which was passed along patrilineal lines. Following the Imperial Decree of 
November 1895, during the German colonial period, all land, whether occupied or not, was treated 
as owner-free crown land vested in the Empire.45 The customary law of land ownership for Africans 
dominated the British colonial period.46 The power to decide who and how to use land had made 
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men into becoming the owners of the economic crops, such as coffee. Marjorie Mbilinyi termed 
this male domination the “internal gender struggle”. This term examines how men and women 
responded to the changes that were taking place in the political economy as they struggled over 
incomes, labour-power and decision-making in the society while trying to defend their integrity.47 
With the introduction of coffee in the Mbinga District, men gradually withdrew from food-crop 
production and concentrated on coffee production.  
Women were considered food producers, not only in the Mbinga District, but also in other coffee-
producing areas. In Bugufi, Ngara district, in the 1930s, men moved to Uganda as migrant labourers 
on coffee and cotton farms. Women had to take care of the coffee farms as well as producing food 
crops. The Agricultural Officers commented that “the large exodus of men from the district has 
thrown the burden of coffee work on the women, and this way adds to be difficult in the production 
of economic crops since it is unwise to allow such work interfere unduly with the all-important 
production of adequate food crops”.48 Despite being branded as part of the “men’s crop”, coffee 
farming inordinately made use of women’s labour-power, especially as the migrant labour system 
moved the male population out of the villages as is demonstrated by this quotation.  
In addition, colonial education, especially the impartation of agricultural knowledge and skills, 
cemented the exclusion of women from coffee production. In 1935, the Agricultural Department 
established coffee demonstration nurseries in the Mbinga District, placed under Native Authorities. 
Agricultural training in coffee-production practices was provided in both government and 
missionary schools. Gardens in which pupils learnt seed selection, planting, spacing, pruning, and 
other coffee-production practices were established at these schools. In the same year (1935), Roman 
Catholic missionaries established coffee nurseries at 12 schools and 200 seeds were issued to each 
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school.49 These nurseries were subject to the Native Authority Rules and under the control of the 
Department of Agriculture. Most of the schools up to the late 1930s were more for boys than girls. 
One of the reasons was the conservative attitude of high-ranked church leaders towards education 
for girls. Abbot Gallus Steiger, for example, commented that girls should be instructed in practical 
skills for their future role as housewives and mothers.50 Women domesticity was based on Victorian 
notions of family life and gender roles rooted under “civilised domesticity” in the second half of 
the 19th century. Elsewhere, missionaries and settlers in colonial Natal encouraged black African 
men to work on settler farms while women were used for domestic work.51 
The problem with this method of training was that the number of girls enrolled in schools during 
the colonial period was low compared to boys. Therefore, the knowledge of how to cultivate coffee 
could not easily reach girls. Other difficulties with this method had to do with the lack of trained 
agricultural teachers. This caused insufficient planning and supervision of the school farms, and the 
syllabuses lacked flexibility. During the colonial period, only a few Africans in Tanganyika had 
access to education. This was confirmed by a breakdown of 1933 school-enrolment figures: 51% 
were Europeans, 49% Asians and only 1.84% Africans.52 The situation was far worse for African 
girls, especially as these schools were primarily set up for sons of chiefs and headmen.53 These were 
the students who eventually took up leading roles in coffee farming. For instance, Chrisostomus 
Makita, the son of the Matengo paramount chief, pioneered the introduction and expansion of coffee 
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production in the Mbinga District. Makita was educated by Benedictine’s missionary schools that 
enabled him to be trained as a colonial clerk.54 
Education through co-operative societies engendered the exclusion of women from playing a 
decisive role in coffee farming. Archival sources show that women were less involved in the 
agricultural training. During the colonial period, men were able to acquire scholarships through 
their primary co-operative societies for co-operative studies within and outside the country. In April 
1933, the Ngaka Coffee Co-operative Society sent two men, namely Hendrich Limka and Karistus 
Kayuni, to Moshi to be trained as an agricultural assistant and senior African instructor, 
respectively. The government provided a grant-in-aid of £90 for the one-year training.55 They were 
trained on matters concerning coffee, such as the choice of land, seeds, preparation of nurseries, the 
recommended spacing between plants, lining out, holing, shade planting, compost pits, manuring, 
capping, topping, pruning and handling, insect and pest control and the timetable of seasonal work. 
They also learned about the work of African associations in the marketing of coffee. In 1954, Ngaka 
Coffee Co-operative Society paid Shs.2 500 (£125) to the KNCU Coffee School for Boys (June 
1954/55).56 They also sponsored one student from Mhagawa to attend the KNCU Coffee school in 
1954/55 at the expense of Shs.1 200 (£60).57 
Agricultural broadcasts and magazines emphasised modern farming of different crops in the late 
1950 and early 1960s. The Department of Agriculture prepared agricultural talks in schools as a 
method of instruction. In 1956, two series of talks on agricultural methods at middle schools (one 
of six and the other of eight periods) were prepared for inclusion in school broadcasts prepared by 
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Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation.58 They used an agricultural magazine known as Ukulima 
wa kisasa (modern agriculture) to disseminate this message. The magazine focused on simple 
success stories by describing the farmer and the profit he made from his farm. Also, the magazine 
was used for the publicity of the co-operative movement. The radio program was also employed to 
educate farmers. For instance, the program called Maarifa ya Ukulima (agricultural knowledge) 
was broadcasted initially once a week for half an hour and later reduced to a quarter of an hour 
twice in a week.59 The program consisted of two parts: the first part comprised of news and 
interviews collected all over the country, and the second part was a serial play entitled Mzee Simba 
(Mr Lion) describing the day-to-day activities of the average farmer.60  
One of the serial plays featured an Agricultural Officer and Mzee Simba, who visited Umatengo for 
a day trip. The script describes how Mzee Simba and the Agricultural Officer visited Mr Tobias, a 
coffee grower. The visitation enabled the Agricultural Officer to teach and advise Mr Tobias on 
good agricultural practices.61 The survey, popularly known as the “Wilson Report”, conducted by 
the colonial government to determine the impact of the program, found that about 76% of men 
between the age of 24 and 35 were interested in the radio program.62 Women were less interested 
in the radio program, primarily because its broadcasting schedule clashed with their other activities. 
During the interview, one woman complained, “in my twenties (1950s) father used to listen Maarifa 
ya Ukulima while my mother and I were in the kitchen preparing the evening meal”.63 The 
composition of the characters excluded women, and as a result, the play was perceived as focusing 
on men’s work and coffee considered as a man’s crop. These broadcasts, the magazine, and the 
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schools through the way they disseminated their knowledge to men, portrayed coffee and its 
production in a gendered way.  
6.4. “Whose coffee?” Women in Coffee Production in Mbinga District during the Colonial 
Period.  
Coffee producers in the Mbinga District experienced the price falls during the 1930s due to low 
demand for coffee in the world markets barely a decade after the farming of the crop had been 
started. For instance, the coffee price in the Mbinga District declined from 53 cents per kilogram in 
1936/37, and 50 cents in 1937/38 to 40 cents for Grade 1, and 36 cents for Grade 2 in 1938/39.64 
The declining income from coffee production called for crop diversification. The colonial 
government in 1938, through the Department of Agriculture, encouraged coffee growers to 
diversify their economy.65 Low coffee prices reduced the men’s capacity to make money. As a 
result, women were forced to compensate for the loss with various strategies. One of the strategies 
was the adoption of non-agricultural activities, including basketry, pottery, and selling local brews. 
The economic depression and tax demands imposed by the colonial states forced people into the 
migrant labour economy in the northern, coastal, and eastern provinces. The majority of migrant 
labourers were men. Life was more difficult for women during the Great Depression. The wages 
paid to migrant labourers or the return from the agricultural produce was not enough to support the 
family life. For instance, wages for sisal workers went down from Shs.18/- to Shs.36/- before 1929, 
to Shs.10/- to Shs.12/- during the slump.66 The increasing number of male absentees brought about 
an increased burden on women in the Matengo Highlands. The women had to continue growing 
food crops to feed themselves and their children. The upkeep of the family became difficult. The 
government was requested to assist in preventing men from being absent from their wives for a 
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period longer than that agreed upon among the elders. The customary laws gave some sense of 
security to men over women. The laws guaranteed the return of the full bride price in case of a 
divorce.67 Adultery and divorce cases were mainly handled by the council of elders, commonly 
known as wajenga kaya.68  
Labour migration also accelerated marriage disruption in other areas where labour was recruited, 
such as in Ungoni (Songea) and Unyakyusa (Mbeya). Native authorities were responsible for 
dealing with the desertion problem using customary laws. In the Ngoni courts, the stipulation was 
three years as the maximum period for a woman to get a divorce from the deserted husband and 
eighteen months in the Nyakyusa courts.69 The 1930s Great Depression increased both social and 
economic pressure on women. Socially, the society demanded them to remain faithful to their absent 
husbands, while economically, they were required to produce enough food for the survival of their 
family and to generate an income.  
During the Second World War, the Tanganyika territory experienced a shortage of labour to the 
point which it became necessary to introduce conscription. The Secretary of the State gave the 
sanction to meet the labour requirements of the industries producing war priority crops, including 
sisal. The number of absent men in the Songea District (including the Matengo Highlands) during 
wartime (either for employment in the estates or military services) was about 23% of the taxpayers 
between the age of 18 and 38.70 Most of the migrant labourers conscripted for the sisal estates were 
 
67 Tanganyika Territory, Annual Reports of Provincial Commissioners on Native Administration for 1931, (Dar es 
Salaam: The Government Printer, 1932), 57; Interview with Edward Ndunguru, Myangayanga, 20 December 2018, 
the son of Matengo Sub-chief Magnus Ndunguru of Myangayanga under chief Makita (the 1940s); Magnus left his 
pregnant wife in 1938 for wage labour in European coffee estates in Arusha.  
68 Interview with Edward Ndunguru, Myangayanga Village, 20 December 2018. People in rural areas were forcibly 
administered by local authorities consisting of male chiefs, village leaders and household heads empowered to 
control movements of women and youth through a variety of administrative mechanisms. The punishment for the 
“runaway wives”, parents or relatives of the bride was to return a full bride-price in case of a divorce; M. Mbilinyi, 
“‘Runaway Wives’ in Colonial Tanganyika”, International Journal of the Sociology of Law 16 (1), (1988), 1–29. 
69 D.F. Bryceson, “The Proletarianization of Women in Tanzania”, in M. Turshen, (ed.), African Women: A Political 
Economy, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 58-59. 
70 Tanganyika Territory, Annual Reports of Provincial Commissioners for the year 1943, (Dar es Salaam: The 






men. The report from the Labour Office in 1942, showed that there were 15 000 men and 3 000 
women and children employed in the southern province, among which 13 000 men and 2 700 
women and children were employed in the sisal estates.71 Other labourers were recruited to work in 
the Union of South Africa and Rhodesia. For instance, in 1942, 1 292 men from the Lake Nyasa 
area went away to work in the Union of South Africa and Rhodesia.72 From these figures, it shows 
that the majority of the migrant labourers were men. Women were not attracted to join migrant 
labour due to difficulties that emerged following the outbreak of the war. Transport services from 
the estates were difficult due to the shortage of vehicles. Migrant labourers were forced to walk for 
some weeks to their homes. Many of the returned labourers were observed to be suffering from the 
effect of a long journey.73  
The demands for labourers increased in 1947 in sisal estates at Lindi and Mikindani in the southern 
province and outside the province. Attractions, such as free transport, were made available for 
voluntary labourers and their dependents. In most cases, the male members left their wives and 
children behind. The situation was severe in the districts. The figures show that the remaining 
female population was higher compared with that of their counterpart male population. For instance, 
in 1949, the male population in the Songea District was 32 675 compared with 50 385 females out 
of the total population of 154 514.74 This also implied that over 40 per cent of the population in the 
district was absent.  
From the 1950s to 1960, the number of migrant labourers from the Mbinga District declined due to 
the expansion of coffee production and price increases. The situation was the same in Songea 
(Ungoni) due to tobacco production. It became difficult to recruit labourers from these areas since 
they could make more money from coffee, tobacco, and wheat. The number of labourers working 
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outside the district was 1 036 (in the southern province), 3 975 (in other provinces), and 637 (in 
South Africa and Rhodesia).75 
The absence of male coffee producers due to migrant labour and war conscriptions brought about 
some changes in the coffee industry, specifically in terms of the re-organisation of labour. Women 
assumed coffee-production responsibilities previously performed by men. They were able to 
challenge the historical male bias of looking at coffee as a man’s crop regarding production aspects 
but failed to attain control over the marketing aspect. Some of the migrant labourers signed contracts 
for three to six months while the majority were freelancing, which allowed them to control the 
coffee harvest.76 The absence of men overburdened women labourers who also had to respond to 
the needs of their family and other daily chores. The district experienced a move towards an unstable 
agricultural economy with more focus on coffee production at the expense of food crops. Local 
food shortage was experienced in 1949.77 The coffee farms required constant maintenance and 
much attention. Despite the exclusion of women to own coffee farms, their labour-power was 
involved in most of the tasks. The following section describes those tasks.  
6.4.1. Key Roles of Women in Coffee Production in Mbinga District 
Coffee production, particularly Arabica, passed through various stages from nursery preparation to 
marketing. This chapter does not deal with other stages beyond marketing by the coffee producers 
through co-operative societies. Processes such as curing, roasting, or exportation are, therefore, 
excluded. Women played a central role in smallholder coffee production. This had been so in 
various coffee-producing countries, such as Latin America, Asia, and Africa. In some areas, the 
patriarchal social relations shaped the aspects of coffee production between men and women. For 
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instance, in Latin America, men have the privilege of property ownership and income, while women 
are required to work in both the coffee fields and households.78 Despite the labour they had exerted 
to coffee production, women had little or no power in decision-making in the household. Women’s 
roles in coffee production were socially and technically separated from the roles of men. This was 
the case in Oaxaca and Chiapas Mexico.79 Labour in coffee production in Oaxaca was based on 
gender, whereby men and women performed different tasks in coffee production. The women’s role 
was confined to coffee picking, washing, drying, and selection. Men performed mechanised tasks, 
such as pulping and trucking.  
The role of women in coffee production in the Mbinga District can be categorised into seven stages. 
The first stage was the preparation of the nurseries. The Department of Agriculture was responsible 
for the preparation of the nurseries in the 1920s. Coffee growers were instructed to select a place 
with a gentle slope of the ground, enough to prevent excessive retention of water, near an adequate 
supply of water, away from old coffee trees and not under the shade of trees.80 In the Mbinga 
District, women’s role in coffee production during the preparation of the coffee nurseries was 
confined to watering the seedlings while the clearing and planting of the coffee seeds in the nursery 
were performed by men. Men were trained in how to prepare the coffee nurseries, including seed 
selection, landscaping, and spacing under the supervision of the Department of Agriculture.81 The 
second stage was the planting of coffee in the fields. The stage involved the clearing of the suitable 
land approved by the Department of Agriculture and preparing holes for coffee planting. During 
this stage, women were involved in digging holes under the supervision of the men to ensure the 
proper spacing and the size of the holes as recommended by the agricultural officers (2 feet × 2 
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feet).82 For spacing, all trees were to be planted nine feet apart.83 When the task involved the use of 
co-operation (ngokela), women participated in food preparation for the labourers. The third stage 
was the weeding of the coffee fields. Both men and women performed this task that was undertaken 
from January to April.  
The fourth stage was pruning (including capping). This was the most challenging part of coffee 
production among smallholder coffee producers. Pruning had been regarded as “professional work” 
among smallholder coffee producers. During the 1930s to 1940s, most of the coffee producers 
thought that the more the branches were maintained, the more the yields. The Agricultural 
Department, through the Lyamungo Coffee Research Station, between 1930 and the 1940s, 
conducted an agronomic practice which included pruning methods. The most advised system was 
the single-stem capped method. Capping aimed to increase the flow of sap into lateral branches to 
make them strong. The generally advised height for capping included “knee-high, waist-high and 
breast-high”.84 The best period for pruning for the Matengo Highlands was after coffee flowering 
(December). In 1933, the Department of Agriculture recommended that pruning had to be done 
once a year after flowering.85 Pruning was done with secateurs or sharp knives with which all 
unwanted branches were removed, including weak, dried, and multiple shoots. Only men were 
involved in pruning activity. During the interviews, some women admitted that pruning was the 
task that required the most skill, one which only men could perform well.86 Pruning was, therefore, 
regarded as a demanding requiring knowledge and skill and was thus masculinised “men’s work” 
 
82 Interview with Victor Akulumukwa, Ugano Sub-station, Tanzania Institute of Coffee Research (TaCRI), Mbinga, 3 
and 4, January 2019. Victor is an Agricultural Research Officer. He has been working at Lyamungo Coffee Research 
Station in Kilimanjaro region as a Laboratory Assistant in the Plant Nutrition Department since 1985, and from 
2004, at the Transfer of Technology Department at Ugano Sub-station, Mbinga. 
83 In the period between the 1930s and 1940s, the Lyamungo Coffee Research Station focused on agronomics, 
particularly on coffee spacing and fertiliser application. The spacing was calculated by using the formula of 
2.74m×2.74m = 1300 coffee trees per hectare, commonly known as the “one acre 540 coffee trees” slogan; Interview 
with Deusdedit Kilambo, Lyamungo Director-Tanzania Coffee Research Institute (TaCRI), 12 November 2018.  
84 The slogan was commonly used to train coffee producers in the capping of the coffee trees; Interview with Deusdedit 
Kilambo, Lyamungo Director-Tanzania Coffee Research Institute (TaCRI), 12 November 2018.  
85 TNA, 504/9/8, Coffee, Tangazo “Habari za kukata kahawa” [coffee pruning].  







– a tendency that stemmed from the fact that co-operative societies tended to focus on training men. 
As a result, it has been regarded as men’s work throughout the colonial period.  
Pest and disease control were similarly classified as men’s work. This was the fifth stage in coffee 
production. Men were trained in coffee-disease control through the co-operative meetings, 
demonstration farms and field visitations. In the period between the 1920s and 1960s, the common 
coffee diseases were stem borer, coffee leaf rust, antestia bugs, elegant green grasshoppers, green 
scale, white and black stem borers.87 Coffee berry disease (CBD) became a threat to coffee 
production from the 1970s. The Department of Agriculture and the Coffee Research Station, 
Lyamungo, pioneered the control of coffee diseases, specifically with Arabica coffee. The training 
was given to co-operative society members (mainly men). The spraying pumps and agrochemicals 
were provided by the co-operative societies.88 Pest and disease control were classified as men’s 
work. Women participated in providing water for spraying while mixing the pesticides, but spraying 
was regarded as men’s work. Some women complained about the heaviness of the sprayer tanks.89  
The sixth stage was coffee harvesting. Harvesting initially had been done between June and 
December, unlike currently when the harvesting season starts as early as May and ends in 
November. The earlier coffee ripening in the Mbinga District has been attributed to climate change, 
particularly irregular rain seasons and global warming. Studies show that high temperatures 
accelerate the coffee fruit development and ripening.90 The expansion of coffee production to the 
lower altitudes also exposed Arabica coffee to high temperatures compared to higher altitudes with 
cooler temperatures. Most of the smallholder coffee farmers used family labour for coffee picking. 
Casual labourers were used by well-off coffee producers, complementing the small-family labour 
size. Women and children were the most useful labourers during the picking process, a 
 
87 Interview with Deusdedit Kilambo, Lyamungo Tanzania Coffee Research Institute, 12 November 2018. 
88 Interview with Pilmin Lupogo, Kindimba Village, 9 January 2019.  
89 Interview with Josephina Komba, Kindimba Village, 9 January 2019. 
90 M.B.P. Camargo, “The Impact of Climatic Variability and Climate Change on Arabica Coffee Crop in Brazil”, 






characteristic attributed by some scholars to the nimbleness of their fingers.91 The frequent coffee 
picking turned women into coffee-picking masters. The cherry was pulped on the day of picking. 
During the early days of coffee production in the Matengo Highlands, people had no proper pulping 
machines. Women used mortar and pestle for coffee pulping. After the formation of the Ngaka 
Coffee Society in the 1930s, they were able to acquire Gordon’s and Mackinnon’s pulping machines 
through loans from the society. The loans were repaid via deductions from their coffee sales.92 The 
coffee fermenting, washing, drying, and sorting was done by both men and women. The last stage 
was marketing, which consisted of the delivery of the coffee to the co-operative societies and the 
collection of the coffee payment. Although women were involved in most of the stages, after 
delivering the coffee at the co-operative society centre, men were the ones who collected the 
payments.93 Table 19 summarises the participation of women in coffee production. 
Table 19: Labour Division between Men and Women on Coffee Production94 
Activity Men Women 
Preparation of coffee 
nurseries 
✔ ❌ 
Irrigating seedlings ✔ ✔ 
Preparation of coffee fields ✔ ✔ 
Planting of seedlings ✔ ✔ 
Weeding ✔ ✔ 
Mulching ✔ ✔ 
Application of fertiliser and 
manure 
✔ ✔ 
Pruning ✔ ❌ 
Pests and disease control ✔ ❌ 
Harvesting  ✔ ✔ 
Pulping  ✔ ✔ 
Fermenting pulped coffee ✔ ✔ 
 
91 D. Elson and R. Pearson, “Nimble Fingers Make Light Work: An Analysis of Women’s Employment in Third World 
Export Manufacturing”, Feminist Review, 8, (Spring 1981), 87-107. 
92 Interview with Edward Ndunguru, Myangayanga village, 9 January 2019. 
93 Interview with Josephina Komba, Kindimba Village, 9 January 2019. 






Drying ✔ ✔ 
Sorting and grading  ✔ ✔ 
Coffee delivery to the market 
centres 
✔ ✔ 
Coffee Selling  ✔ ✔ 
Payment collection ✔ ❌ 
 
The table shows that women participate in most of the coffee-production activities, except for what 
they termed as “professional” work or tasks, and the collection of money after selling the crop. As 
will be shown in the following section, women’s unglamorous chores in the growing of coffee 
meant that they were side-lined in the collection of payments. 
6.5. Women and Coffee Co-operative Societies in Mbinga District, 1930–1960 
During the colonial period, coffee marketing in the Mbinga District could be divided into two 
phases. The first phase was from the 1920s to 1935. During this phase, the coffee was sold in the 
local markets dominated by the Indian traders and the Benedictine missionaries. It was a kind of 
unregulated market to the extent that no official records of the extent of production exist. From 
1936 to 1960s, coffee marketing was guided by the Co-operative Societies Ordinance of 1932. 
Between 1936 and 1953, coffee from Mbinga was sold through the Ngaka Co-operative Society 
and the Ngoni-Matengo Marketing Co-operative Union Limited (NGOMAT).95 These co-
operatives were men-oriented. From 1954, the Matengo Native Co-operative Union (MANCU) was 
responsible for coffee marketing in the district. By 1960, there were 14 co-operative societies, with 
7 122 members, affiliated to the MANCU.96 The coffee growers collected their advanced payment 
on the delivery of coffee to the co-operative societies from the offices of the headquarters of the co-
operatives. The remaining balance of payments was collected after the coffee auction sales were 
 
95 P.M. Redmond, “The NMCMU and Tobacco Production in Songea”, Tanzania Notes and Records, 79 (1976), 65-
98. Chapter Three of this thesis provides more details on NGOMAT.  
96 Tanganyika Territory, Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioner for the year 1959, (Dar es Salaam: The 






conducted in Moshi and Nairobi. The co-operative society members sold their coffee and collected 
their payments according to their shareholder registers. Consequently, married women were only 
allowed to sell coffee in the name of their husbands (shareholders) but were not eligible to collect 
money from co-operative societies. The co-operative rules confined transactions to co-operative 
members only. 
The decision regarding how to use the money was usually in the hands of men. Women had very 
little say over the income obtained from coffee sales. The men made decisions about the buying of 
household provisions, the establishment of new coffee farms or even whether to invest coffee 
proceeds on livestock. In some cases, men did not disclose the expenditure of the money to their 
wives as one female interviewee confirmed: “Before independence, we could not ask much about 
coffee money, what we wanted was fertilisers and pesticides to apply to our maize field”.97  
Furthermore, men’s dominance in coffee production and marketing was echoed through the process 
of application for the registration of co-operative societies. The application forms were to be signed 
by ten people as required by the Co-operative Societies Ordinance of 1932.98 Although the co-
operative membership did not exclude women, the archival sources show that the application forms 
were signed by men only.99 One of the former co-operative officials confirmed this male dominance 
by stating that, “in Ngaka, men were the ones who established coffee farms in the 1920s and later 
in the 1930s became the founders of the first co-operative society in the district.”100 Consequently, 
coffee co-operative societies became man’s dominion. This was confirmed by women’s voices: “… 
during the colonial period, coffee co-operative societies were men’s affairs. Women did not attend 
 
97 Interview with Maria Ndunguru, Myangayanga Village, 9 January 2019. 
98 TNA, H1/19595/Vol. II, Co-operative Societies Ordinance, The Co-operative Societies Ordinance of 1932, Section 
6 and Section 8, appears at the bottom of every application form No. 1 for the registration of Co-operative Societies.  
99 NRC, 230/646/ Public, Lituru Coffee Growers Co-operative Society Limited, Co-op. Form No.1, Application for 
Registration, 28 August 1959; NRC, 331/719, Kitumbalomo Coffee Growers Co-operative Limited, Co-op. Form 
No.1, Application for Registration, from Kitumbalomo Coffee Growers Co-operative Society Limited to the 
Registrar of Co-operative Societies, 21 July 1960, and all other Co-operative Societies in the Mbinga District during 
the colonial period, the application forms were signed by men only. 






the meetings, and when they attended, they did not give their views. It was considered as 
stubbornness and disrespect for a woman to speak in front of men”.101 
Most complaints and critiques had been directed at the Co-operative Societies Ordinance which 
consists of the co-operative law, rules or regulations governing the application of the law, and the 
by-laws of the co-operative societies. For instance, the by-laws of the Lituru Coffee Growers 
Limited state that “every member of the society must be a native of good character bona fide 
agricultural producer ordinarily resident in the Lituru area or the owner of a plantation situated 
therein.”102 While there was no formal or direct discrimination against admitting women as 
members, informal procedures had a hampering effect. The customary laws and cultural norms of 
property ownership disqualified becoming members of the co-operative societies. This made things 
worse for married women as the coffee farms belonged to the head of the household, who were 
men. The few women who owned coffee farms, owned it by inheritance, following the death of 
their husbands. However, traditionally in the Matengo community, when the head of the household 
died, the coffee farm was divided among the male children during a family meeting. In the absence 
of male children, their coffee farms were given to a male relative assigned to take care of the 
members of the family of the deceased. However, things were not always accepted by the family of 
the deceased. In some cases, the coffee farms were sold to one of the relatives or any of the coffee 
producers. One woman testified that “when my parents passed on, my uncles started to fight over 
coffee farms. To calm the situation, I had to persuade my husband to buy it. The money was divided 
among the family members.”103 In a similar context of a family with only female children, one of 
the women coffee producers testified how she ended up cultivating coffee by saying that her “father 
had three female children. Two had married and passed on. I was the only one who remained to 
carry on the linages.” 104 This shows that, in the absence of a son, female children could become 
 
101 Interview with Josephina Komba, Kindimba Village, 9 January 2019. She is 84 years old, a member of Ngaka Co-
operative Society, a Co-operative with its origin in the 1930s. 
102 NRC, 230/646/Public, Lituru Coffee Growers Co-operative Limited, By-Laws of The Lituru Coffee Growers Co-
operative Society Limited, registered on 28 July 1959. 
103 Interview with Judith Mapunda, Longa Village, 4 January 2020. 






“male daughters”, a concept developed by Amadiume in her study of the Igbo society in Nigeria.105 
The unmarried daughters (in the absence of a son) in the Matengo Highlands were able to create a 
coffee dynasty on their father’s land. They had both power of income control and decision-making 
on matters pertaining to coffee production. 
Moreover, in case of the death of a male member of the co-operative society, the shares or interests 
of the deceased were transferred to the nominated person. In the Mbinga District, especially among 
the Matengo, the nominees were mainly sons of the deceased. The Co-operative Societies 
Ordinance of 1932, section 23 states:  
… on the death of a member a registered society may transfer the shares or interest of the 
deceased member to the person nominated in accordance with the rules made in his behalf, or if 
there is no person nominated to such person as may appear to the committee to be the legal 
personal representative of the deceased member or pay to such nominee or legal representative 
as the case may be a sum representing the value of such member’s share or interest as ascertained 
in accordance with the rules or by-laws.106  
Even where women had been nominated as the next of kin, that did not guarantee their membership 
into co-operative societies as stipulated in the Co-operative Societies Rule of 1932, section 15. It 
stated that “a nominee may become a member only if admitted by the members of the 
committee”.107 A former member of a co-operative committee confirmed that “it was very rare for 
a committee to admit a widow as a member unless there was no grown-up male child or a 
relative”.108 
Consequently, the restriction of women’s participation in co-operative societies denied them the 
opportunity to participate in decisions affecting the socio-economic development of the community. 
 
105 I. Amadiume, Male Daughter, Female Husbands: Gender and Sex in an African Society, (London: 1987). 
106 TNA, H1/19595 Vol. II, Co-operative Societies Ordinance, The Co-operative Societies Ordinance of 1932. 
107 TNA, H1/19595 Vol. II, Co-operative Societies Ordinance, Tanganyika territory, The Co-operative Societies 
Ordinance, 1932 (No. 7 of 1932): The Co-operative Societies Rules of 1932, Rule 15. 
108 Interview with Pilmin Lupogo, Kindimba Village, 9 January 2019; Interview with Otmar Mbepera, Longa Village, 






For instance, section 14 of the Co-operative Societies Ordinance of 1932 states that “each member 
of the co-operative society shall have one vote only as a member in the affairs of the society”.109 
The section excluded the possibility of having two votes from one family since most of the families 
were male-headed households. As a result, men became the dominant members and shareholders 
in the co-operative societies in the Mbinga District. This denied women the opportunity of making 
decisions in the co-operative meetings since they had no vote. Colonial co-operative societies did 
little or nothing to incorporate women on aspects of membership, leadership, and sharing of the 
proceeds. 
6.6. Women in Co-operative Societies in Post-colonial Tanzania  
After the independence of Tanzania in 1961, the country embarked on a socialist policy based on 
the Ujamaa philosophy. The legal restriction and the customary discrimination on women’s 
participation in co-operative societies prevailed even during the postcolonial period. The Co-
operative Societies Ordinance of 1932 was amended in 1963 and revised in 1968 following the 
recommendations by the Special Presidential Committee of Enquiry of 1966. The committee 
recommended changes to the by-laws of the societies to suit the socialist policy. However, the report 
was silent on women’s membership in co-operatives. 
The Ujamaa policy aimed at making people live together, work communally and share the proceeds 
equally. As already debated in Chapter Four, coffee-growing areas, including the Mbinga District, 
operated under co-operative villages. In this kind of village, coffee producers continued to work on 
their farms and sold their coffee through co-operative societies. Although the Ujamaa policy was 
based on equality, the culturally-based discrimination on women’s participation in coffee co-
operatives continued. This was despite the recognition by president Nyerere, of the crucial role of 
women’s labour. His call for gender equality was an important condition for successful socialist 
transformation reiterated:  
 







The truth is that in the villages, women work very hard. At times they work for 12 or 14 hours 
a day. They even work on Sundays and public holidays. Women who live in the villages work 
harder than anybody else in Tanzania. But men who live in villages (and some women in towns) 
are on leave for half of their life.110…if we want our country to make full and quick progress 
now, it is essential that our women live on terms of full equality with their fellow citizens who 
are men.111  
However, the implementation of the Ujamaa policy failed to change the gendered and 
discriminative practices in the co-operative movements. 
The implementation of “Operation Vijiji” between 1973 and 1976, and the Ujamaa Act of 1975, led 
to a distribution of land in newly established villages based on the household in which the heads 
were mainly men. In an exceptional case, women (mostly widows) were given land in newly 
established villages. For instance, in Ilela village, people from the Mhekela area were given new 
land while maintaining their old land. The old land was later subjected to food crops (maize and 
cassava) that were mainly cultivated by women. Therefore, due to the increased distance from the 
new villages to the old food-crop farms, the “Operation” further disadvantaged women.112  
Despite the UN dedication of the period 1975–1985 as the decade of women, there were no 
substantial changes to women’s co-operative membership. The newly enacted Co-operative 
Societies Act No. 14 of 1982 continued to include land ownership as one of the membership criteria. 
As a result, it excluded women from co-operative society membership. Although co-operative 
societies were transformed to be multipurpose societies, women in rural areas could not register 
their women-only co-operatives. The Act prohibited the operation of other rural co-operative 
societies within a village as it stated that “no other society [was] to operate within a village.”113 This 
meant that men continued to dominate leadership positions in the co-operatives. The low number 
of female co-operative members also made most women unable to compete with men. As one 
 
110 J.K. Nyerere, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism, (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968), 30.  
111 Ibid., 109. 
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woman commented, “no one rejected my membership, but I never wanted to be a leader of the co-
operative as we [women] were few in number in the 1980s”.114  
Following the economic crisis in the 1980s, Tanzania had to adopt the Structural Adjustment 
Programs to reform its economy. As discussed in Chapter Five, the coffee sector was reformed in 
the 1990s. Since then, a slow process unfolded that removed statutory barriers to women’s 
participation and attempted to challenge culturally embedded attitudes that inhibited them from 
participation. The Co-operative Societies Act No. 15 of 1991 revised the membership criteria by 
making it open and voluntary as Section 22 states “(2) (i) membership of co-operative society is 
open and voluntary to all those who can make use of its services (ii) the control of society is 
democratic, and each member or delegate has one vote in their various meetings properly 
formed.”115 Although the Act did not mention gender issues, the stipulation on being open and 
voluntary encouraged women to become members of the co-operative societies. This is also 
supported by archival evidence that shows the presence of women as members of the co-operative 
societies in the wake of the legislation. The SILO Rural Primary Co-operative Society had 17 
women out of 190 members in 1993.116 Attendance in general meetings remained a big challenge 
to women. Most of the co-operative meetings were attended by men and where women attended, 
their numbers were low. For instance, in the Kilangajuu Co-operative Society’s meeting in March 
1993, out of 103 attendees, there was only one woman (Oliva Balanzi)117 whom later was revealed 
as a widow. 
The Co-operative Societies Amendment Act of 1997, for the first time, addressed the issue of gender 
directly. Section 10 (a) of the 1997 amendment states “co-operatives are voluntary organisations 
open to all persons able to use their services without gender, social, racial, political or religious 
 
114 Interview with Josephina Komba, Kindimba Village, 9 January 2019. 
115 URT, The Co-operative Societies Act No. 15 of 1991, (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1991), 19. 
116 NRC, 213/RVR 196, SILO Rural Primary Co-operative Society Limited, 1993. 
117 NRC, 319/RVR 175, Kilangajuu Agricultural Marketing Co-operative Society Limited, “Mkutano mkuu wa 






discrimination”.118 This aligned with one of the statements of the 1997 Co-operative Development 
Policy, namely that “the government will encourage women participation in co-operatives by 
removing inhibiting traditional laws, customs values, and other constraints.”119 This was the first 
co-operative policy in independent Tanzania to recognise and acknowledge the traditional and 
customary challenges for women’s participation in co-operatives openly.  
In 1999, the discriminatory customary laws on land ownership were challenged by the passing of 
the Village Land Act No.5 of 1999, that permitted widows to inherit land. Section 36 of the Act 
regulates the regranting of a surrendered customary right of occupancy.120 It placed the widows and 
widowers as the first person legally permitted to inherit land before other dependents. It enabled 
women to inherit their husband’s land. This changed the traditional inheritance stipulations of land 
laws that placed the male children or male relatives of the deceased to inherit land. This process 
was applied to coffee farms as well. The 1999 Land Act came as a relief to widows and female 
children since they could now legally inherit the land that could put them in a better position to 
become co-operative members.  
The recognition by the government of the cultural and legal marginalisation of women’s 
participation in co-operatives, specifically in terms of economic power-sharing, gave them the 
status of a disadvantaged group similar to the disabled and the youth. For that reason, the Co-
operative Reforms and Modernisation Program of 2005 was aimed at ensuring a greater role to 
women in co-operative activities by giving them “equality” with their male counterparts. Among 
the measures taken was creating a conducive environment to enable women to become members, 
developing and implementing gender sensitisation and awareness programs, and encouraging 
women to form women co-operatives.121  
 
118 URT, The Co-operative Societies Amendment Act of 1997, (Dar es salaam: Government Printer, 1997), 89. 
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120 URT, The Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999, (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1999), 182 -184.  






Apart from customary and legal constraints, men’s and women’s attitudes toward coffee production 
contributed to the low participation of women in the co-operative societies. As stated before, coffee 
was regarded as a man’s crop – a perception that also dominated in the Mbinga District. Coffee was 
one of the crops that has been associated with cultural and ideological traits. As it was with tea as a 
national beverage to the English identity in the 19th century, 122 so coffee was associated with men’s 
identity. Women were not willing to participate in the study about coffee production referring to 
men as the owners of the crops. As one commented, “how can you ask a woman about coffee? You 
should ask them about maize and beans for family consumption. They know nothing about 
coffee.”123 Women have been accustomed to economic and social subordination and 
discouragement to associate themselves with coffee co-operative societies. Consequently, some 
women have adopted passive means to participate in the co-operatives. The stereotype on women’s 
incapacity to produce coffee was also noted among married women and widows.  
The masculine attitude attached to the coffee-production tasks has caused widows to complain 
about the decline of coffee outputs from their farms following the death of their husbands. Angelina, 
a widow and a mother to five children, lost her husband in 2008. Since then, it has been difficult 
for her to take care of the coffee farms. Consequently, the farm has been infested with white stem 
borer that affected coffee production. She then joined a women credit and savings group called 
Amani na Upendo (peace and love) to sustain the family livelihood. The group has 30 women – the 
majority being widows. Through the group, a member deposits TShs.10 000 (c. $ 4.3) as entry fee. 
Membership entitled women access to a loan of TShs.10 000 at an interest rate of 25%.124 Since 
coffee-disease management has been regarded as men’s work, the absence of a man in a family 
could lead to the decline of coffee outputs. This was observed among widows, divorced, and 
unmarried women. In many cases, for married women who had a coffee farm, it was rather symbolic 
than practical ownership. Their husbands continued providing coffee-maintenance practices, such 
 
122 J.E. Fromer, “Deeply Indebted to the Tea-Plant”, Representations of English National Identity in 
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as pruning, spraying and fertiliser application. In the household, men have also continued to be the 
only shareholding members of co-operative societies. As a member of a co-operative society, men 
were able to get agricultural inputs on credit. As a result, coffee from women’s farms was sold in 
the husband’s name. In one of the interviews, a coffee producer explained, “I bought a coffee farm 
from someone who migrated from this village [Kindimba] to Kitanda village in 2000. I gave it to 
my wife, but I am the one taking care of all inputs. We sell it as a family coffee while providing her 
with the proceeds from her farm.”125 His wife responded: “Most of men allow their wives to own a 
coffee farm when they noticed signs of women withdrawal from the coffee production. For that 
reason, they will keep the co-operative membership for themselves.”126 This indicated that married 
women only had a slim chance of becoming a member of the co-operative societies despite owning 
coffee farms.  
A different dynamic seemed to exist in a polygamous family. Married women considered coffee as 
economic security for their children in case of the death of one of the parents. Co-wives, therefore, 
attached increasing importance to owning a coffee farm and co-operative society shares. Judith was 
married in 1994 as a second wife in a coffee-producing family. After having her children, she 
decided to establish her coffee farm with the support of her husband. In 2013, she had 1 057 coffee 
trees. Before 2013, she never attended any co-operative society meetings. Having considered the 
age gap with her husband, she decided to register co-operative membership of Longa Agricultural 
Marketing Co-operative Society. She motivated as follows: “I am still young (46 years) compared 
with my husband (71 years). My children would like to have the property of their own. I joined the 
co-operative for the sake of my children”.127 From this, it was clear that reproductive capacity 
shaped the involvement of women in the coffee industry.  
Apart from customary and legal constraints, some women in most of the coffee producing countries 
also lacked time to participate in co-operative societies. Studies in Latin America and Uganda show 
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how a lack of time prevented women from participating in coffee organisations.128 This was also 
the case in Mbinga. As mentioned before, coffee production is tedious work that requires care 
throughout the year, as shown in  
Table 20. The coffee producers also produced other crops for consumption, such as maize, cassava, 
wheat and beans. Women participated in both coffee and food crops and at the same time, took care 
of their household chores. This overburdened their agricultural life. The geographical 
characteristics of the Mbinga District as a mountainous area limits the use of mechanised 
implements like tractors for tilling and harvesting crops. As a result, they rely on hand hoeing for 
cultivation. Hard back-breaking work peaked during coffee-harvesting seasons from June to 
November. During the same period, women were also required to harvest beans (June), maize (July 
and August), and wheat (September and October). The working burden caused women to consider 
participation in the co-operatives as an extra, third burden. 
Table 20: Coffee Annual Management Calendar129 
Month January February March April May June 
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Some women, however, overcame these constraints and were able to participate in coffee 
production and co-operative societies actively. Adelina and Josephina, both unmarried women, are 
examples in this regard. Adelina was born in a family of three female children in 1955. At the age 
of 22 years, she was married, but her father asked her to divorce since he had no male child to take 






approximately 5 000 coffee trees.130 As a member of Longa Co-operative Society, she has been 
attending all co-operative meetings and agricultural training offered by the Tanzania Coffee 
Research Institute (TaCRI)-Ugano Sub-Station. She continued selling her coffee though co-
operatives, even after the introduction of the free-market system in the 1994/95 season. As 
discussed in Chapter Five, in the 1995/96 coffee season, Adelina was the only woman out of eight 
coffee producers who went to court demanding their payments for coffee sales when the MBICU 
was in a deep financial crisis.131 With the coffee farms, Adelina was able to exercise power over 
coffee production and income. From her coffee income, Adelina was able to pay tuition fees for her 
son up to university level. 
On the other hand, Josephina is from a family with both male and female children. She never 
married and had no children. Her father gave her land on which she planted 3 500 coffee trees since 
1967.132 She has been a member of the Ngaka Co-operative Society even after the collapse of the 
MBICU in the late 1990s. The reason was the availability of agricultural inputs on credit to be 
deducted in the second payment. As she says, “although private coffee buyers had cash at hand, I 
prefer selling my coffee to Ngaka where I have been a member for more than fifty years. I can get 
inputs by credit, agricultural extension services and sense of co-operation with my fellow old 
men.”133 Here, Josephina expresses the sense of togetherness in co-operative societies. She 
considers coffee as her “husband” to depend on as it provides an income for her.  
 
130 Interview with Adelina Komba, Longa Village, 11 January 2019. 
131 NRC, 589/CCD, Mbinga Co-operative Union (1989) Limited, a letter from Mbinga Agricultural Co-operative Union 
(1993) Limited, Ref. No. MBICU/C/3/16/200, to Attorney General, “kukamatwa kwa magari na mali ya chama 
kikuu cha ushirika Mbinga na Mahakama” [the Court holding of Vehicles and Properties of MBICU], 23 February 
1997. 







6.7. “Mbinga mbinguni” Women and the Coffee Free-market System, 1994–2015 
6.7.1. Women’s “Coffeescapes” of Resistance  
From the 1994/95 coffee season, the coffee-marketing structure changed to free marketing. This 
was a result of the amendment of the Coffee Marketing Board Act of 1984 in August 1993. These 
changes also impacted on the gender dynamics in Mbinga and solicited reactions from women. As 
mentioned in Chapter Five, the Mbinga District experienced an influx of private coffee enterprises 
in 1994/95. The presence of many marketing options in the district created the situation commonly 
referred to as Mbinga mbinguni [Mbinga is Heaven]. Mbinga mbinguni was used metaphorically, 
giving it different meanings among different groups of people. In other words, what Mbinga 
mbinguni meant to coffee traders and businesspeople was different for men, women or the youth. 
For the coffee traders and business community, Mbinga mbinguni meant the place to make more 
profits generated by the coffee industry. For the youth, Mbinga mbinguni meant the ability to get 
money even without engaging in the coffee production. The presence of private coffee buyers 
enabled most of the youth to be employed as agents in buying coffee from producers. On the other 
hand, Mbinga mbinguni was used as a warning to the youth and general public of the high 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the 1990s in the Ruvuma region, the Mbinga District having the most 
cases. The increasing numbers of the diagnosed cases from 45 in 1987, when the first cases were 
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Table 21: HIV/AIDS Prevalence by 1996 in Ruvuma Region.135 





Rate of AIDS 
per 100 000 
population 
Mbinga 1 055 633 297 
Songea Urban 454 272 414 
Songea Rural 712 427 212 
Tunduru 291 175 131 
Total  2 512 1 507 245 
For men, Mbinga mbinguni meant the ability to sell their coffee to private buyers and to receive 
immediate payment on delivery. The high prices of the time created high income among coffee 
producers. Apart from the general economic improvement, some men took advantage of the 
increased income to have more wives and to engage in extra expenditure without their wives’ 
consent. People witnessed the escalation of marital conflicts, including divorce, during this period. 
Evidence from wives confirmed this trend. Maria was one of the victims of free trade in the 1990s: 
My husband collected money from the co-operative society headquarter and hide some in our 
house. He used to take some amount to spend in town without my knowledge. One day I found 
the remaining amount and then hid it somewhere else. I was attacked and threatened with 
divorce. I showed him the money but refused to hand over to him until when he agreed to open 
a joint account at National Microfinance Bank (NMB) Mbinga Branch.136 
Maria was representative of women who resisted men’s dominance in income control. She was able 
to offer sound advice on how to spend the coffee proceeds.  
The presence of private coffee buyers also created opportunities for women who were not members 
of the co-operative societies to sell their coffee. The opportunities did not go unchallenged, 
particularly by men. The free-market system became a threat to men who claimed to own the coffee 
proceeds alone. Men complained about the ongoing coffee theft at a family level. The theft occurred 
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on two levels: the first level was during coffee picking and the second level was during the drying 
stage. Women were the main suspects. To women, this was a way of protesting the labour 
exploitation by men in coffee production and sharing the proceeds. Women used the free market to 
sell coffee to private buyers clandestinely. During coffee picking, women used to hide some amount 
of coffee at an easily recognised point to the collector. Signs like big trees, fruit trees, or big stones 
were used to direct the coffee collectors. Most of the collectors were agents of private coffee buyers 
(for both cherry and parchment coffee), and Central Pulpery Units (CPUs) – operators for cherry 
coffee only.137 The collection was done in the late evening or even at midnight. In some instances, 
intermediaries were involved during the theft process. In a rare incident, the parchment coffee was 
even exchanged with intermediaries in buckets in kitchens or at the water fetching points so that no 
one would become suspicious. The use of gendered geographical coffee landscapes enabled women 
to challenge male power over coffee. It was from these landscapes the researcher developed the 
term “coffeescapes”, and because these “coffeescapes” were used to resist male dominance in 
coffee economy, hence “coffeescapes of resistance”. When coffee was collected by coffee-buying 
agents, the parties in the exchange usually knew each other. When intermediaries were used, the 
first participants usually did not know the final buying agents. The first actor did not know the 
weight of the stolen coffee. They, therefore, accepted any amount of money given by the final actor 
(agent) directly or through intermediaries. In some instances, the intermediaries might not pay the 
first actor. One of the women involved in this theft network narrates, “I used to sell my coffee 
through Neema (not her real name) for many years. One day I gave her about ten kilograms. She 
never gave me the payment. I couldn’t complain since it was a stolen coffee from my husband. I 
decided to use coffee-buying agents”.138 While the first actors were women, other actors were both 
women and men. During the interviews, most of the male coffee producers complained about coffee 
theft that occurred from the 1994/95 to the 2015/16 coffee seasons.139 Women were not satisfied 
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with the outputs obtained from their labour contribution to coffee production. Women’s resistance 
over men’s power to control coffee proceeds, have created the situation which the researcher termed 
“women’s coffeescapes of resistance”. This consisted of the use of gendered geographical spaces 
and landscapes, such as water points, kitchens, trees, rocks and gendered tasks, such as coffee 
picking and washing. However, such gendered coffee struggles reveal that women were 
participating in a weak position. A sociological study by Roser Manzanera-Ruiz et al. 140 in Northern 
Tanzania shows the theft occurred during the coffee-washing and drying process and was 
exclusively by women. However, both areas (Northern Tanzania and the Mbinga District) show 
that the unequal distribution and division of income from coffee sales was the major reason for 
coffee theft.  
Apart from stealing coffee during coffee harvest, women also withdrew their labour from coffee 
farms and directed their energy into food crops. The withdrawal was a means of protesting against 
the men’s use of income from coffee farms. One of the coffee producers commented, “when I spend 
most of the income in agricultural inputs, I noticed my wives turn their back on coffee production. 
Although they did not tell me, most of the time they were in maize and wheat farms.”141 The extent 
of withdrawal in the coffee industry varied from partial to complete withdrawal. It was partial when 
women spent more time on food-crop production than on coffee, and a withdrawal when they 
stopped attending coffee farms. Women’s labour was essential for coffee production, although 
mostly unrecognised.  
Furthermore, the tendency of men to collect money from money lenders, commonly known as 
Magoma, escalated the women’s labour withdrawal and coffee stealing. Following the removal of 
agricultural inputs, subsidies and the collapse of the Mbinga Co-operative Union (MBICU) in the 
late 1990s, the coffee producers failed to procure enough agro-inputs to maintain coffee production. 
The illegal money lenders (mostly businessmen) took advantage of the situation to lend money to 
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them and collect coffee during harvesting time. When money was borrowed without the knowledge 
of their wives, women became reticent to continue working on the coffee farms in the next coffee 
season, knowing that the products will be collected by money lenders. In some cases, these illegal 
creditors visited the coffee farms of the debtors with their workers to harvest the coffee themselves. 
One woman complained, saying “after tedious work for the whole season my husband brought a 
truck accompanied by a businessman [mentioning his name] to collect coffee just to be told ‘I owe 
him’”.142 In scenarios like this, women were discouraged from offering their labour in coffee farms; 
instead, they directed their labour to food crops where they had more control over the rewards. 
The resistance by the women from Mbinga was not unique, and studies show that women’s 
withdrawal from cash crops indeed harmed the production outputs. Dorthe Von Bülow and Anne 
Sørensen,143 show how women’s withdrawal in tea-contract farming in Kericho, Kenya, led to the 
decline in tea production in the 1980s. The study by Marjorie Mbilinyi144 shows the impact on the 
household when women and children collectively withdrew from tea-picking labour because the 
husband did not pay them wages. Unlike what happened in Rungwe tea farming, women in the 
Mbinga District did not use collective resistance; instead, they applied what James Scott named 
“weapons of the weak”. 
6.7.2. “A Changing Wave”: Coffee Initiatives and Women Participation 
From the late 1990s to 2015, the Mbinga District, like any other coffee-producing area in Tanzania, 
experienced an increasing awareness among women of their role in coffee production. The period 
was dominated by the implementation of coffee initiative programs. Following the fourth 
international women conference in Beijing, governments, donors, and NGOs adopted the gender 
equality agenda into various developmental projects. In reaction, the Tanzania Coffee Industry 
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adopted a gender-equity strategy to promote coffee production and markets, including sustainable 
coffees. This was one of the strategies in the Tanzania Coffee Development Strategy 2011/2021. 
The aim was to improve gender equity and participation of women at all levels of the coffee value 
chain.145 
One of the programs was a collaboration between TechnoServe and Farmer Groups as mentioned 
in Chapter Four. From 1998, TechnoServe collaborated with KILICAFE that originated in 
Kilimanjaro to improve coffee processing and to create links with markets. Women’s participation 
in coffee production and marketing received little attention. In 2008, Technoserve was funded by 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to implement the coffee Initiative Program in East Africa. 
In addition to the coffee processing and marketing, the coffee initiative focused on increasing 
production at the farm level. This was the level where women were the important participants, 
though unrecognised. A two-year agronomy training (field training or shamba darasa) was 
introduced in 2009. Women’s participation in these courses were less than those of men due to the 
belief that “coffee is man’s crop”.146 Gender-awareness perspectives were incorporated in the 
recruitment of women to participate in agronomy training as participants and trainers in order to 
turn this around. By the end of 2012, women comprised 40% of farmer trainers and 38% of coffee 
initiative staff throughout East Africa.147  
From 2012 to 2016, the Tanzania coffee industry implemented the Coffee Partnership for Tanzania 
(CPT). The CPT aimed at empowering both male and female coffee farmers, a sustainable increase 
in coffee production, and improving the livelihood of the coffee farmers in Tanzania. More about 
the CPT was explained in previous chapters. The focus here is on how the project contributed to 
women’s participation in the coffee industry in the Mbinga District.  
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Apart from attending agronomy training, women were encouraged to attend training sessions on 
harvesting, primary processing, and pest and disease identification. One of the project-trainers 
testified that “women were more attentive to coffee harvest; they only pick matured cherries. They 
were good coffee sorters in Central Pulpery Units (CPUs) in improving quality.”148 Dan and 
Associate Enterprise Limited (DAE Limited) in the Mbinga District insisted on women’s 
participation in training to improve coffee quality processed in the CPUs. As a result, by 2014/2015, 
women’s attendance increased to 28% and coffee quality increased with a coffee cupping score of 
77%, while in the 2015/16 season the attendance increased to 51% with the coffee cupping score at 
87%.149 To encourage more women’s participation, DAE Limited recruited female trainers to 
motivate their fellow women to participate. Village leaders were also consulted to sensitise them to 
the importance of women engaging in coffee production. Women were consulted to suggest the 
appropriate time for them to participate in order to solve the issue of the limited time women had 
to engage in coffee production.150  
Women became leaders in Farmer Groups during the CPT implementation in the Mbinga District. 
For instance, in ten successful groups under the DAE Limited, eight were led by women in which 
six were mixed, and two were women-only groups. The Amkeni women group was formed in 
November 2015 in Mkinga Village. This was the first women-only group engaging in coffee 
production in the district. Being committed to improving their incomes, they started to participate 
in saving schemes by monthly contributions. The saving schemes enabled the group to open a group 
bank account at the Rural Development Bank (CRDB), Mbinga branch, in 2016, with a total of 
Tshs.4.7million ($2 000).151 Farmer Groups under the Coffee Management Services (CMS) also 
noted improvement in women’s participation in leadership positions. Although the CMS had no 
 
148 Interview with Wendo Suday, a former TechnoServe Project coordinator and current Project Manager-DAE Limited, 
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women-only groups, women were able to lead some of the groups successfully. For instance, Akiba 
Nyasa Matengo Farmer Group in Kingirikiti village was one of the most reckoned groups lead by 
women. Denisia Mbunga, a coffee farmer in her own right, who owned approximately 5 000 coffee 
trees, was a chairperson of the group.152  
Coffee certification schemes, such as the Rain Forest Alliance (RFA) and Fairtrade, required coffee 
producers to comply with a certain standard, including non-discrimination, equal pay for equal jobs 
and encouraging women participation in co-operatives. Studies in Mesoamerica show women’s 
participation in certified coffee production has increased their access to income, land, and co-
operatives.153 The increase has been linked to the increase of women coffee operators. This was 
caused by the decreasing number of male coffee producers due to immigration from rural to highly 
paid urban labour. This implies that women will only benefit from coffee certification if they have 
direct control of the coffee income and participation in decision making processes on all levels.  
Several studies show how women have increased their incomes through Fairtrade-certified 
economic activities that traditionally are owned by women. The Shea butter in Burkina Faso,154 and 
handicrafts in Bangladesh,155 are some of the many examples that show the increased income for 
women. However, despite the efforts to encourage women’s participation in the coffee industry, 
their roles still have been mostly confined to labour. Except for the independent coffee producer 
(unmarried and widows), married women are too dependent on their husbands for coffee-input 
supply and coffee-farm management. This was the same in leadership positions in coffee-farmer 
groups or co-operative societies. One of the male co-operative society leaders commented that “the 
women came into a leadership position as a requirement of Fairtrade and RFA. They are three in a 
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154 D. Greig, “Shea butter: connecting rural Burkinabé women to the international market through Fair Trade”, 
Development in Practice, Vol.16, No.5, (2006), 465-75. 
155 A. Redfern, and P. Snedker, “Creating Market opportunities for small enterprises: Experiences of FairTrade 






committee of ten people.”156 With the utilisation of premium prices of coffee, women have also 
been able to benefit through the improvement of health centres, water supply, and infrastructures, 
such as roads and education services. This has been the case in Mahenge AMCOS and Kimuli 
AMCOS in the Mbinga District. 
6.8. Conclusion 
The role of women in coffee production in the Mbinga District during both the colonial and 
postcolonial period was shaped by historical forces. The patriarchal farming and land-tenure system 
among the coffee producers had excluded women from participating actively in coffee marketing 
and enjoying the fruits of their labour. The colonial state also cemented the patriarchal domination 
in coffee production and marketing, particularly through the migrant labour economy and co-
operative societies. The patriarchal nature of coffee production made men dominate the industry. 
Consequently, women had remained as passive actors in the smallholder’s coffee economy 
throughout the colonial period. 
The postcolonial state has continued to exercise patriarchal control over the coffee sector through a 
co-operative marketing system. The introduction of the coffee free market in the 1990s has made 
women exercise the power they have been denied for years. Research has proved that opportunities 
to “steal and sale’ demonstrated the inequalities of income control and distribution between men 
and women in the Mbinga District. Although coffee has been regarded as “men’s crop”, the 
participation of women in various stages of its production has proved otherwise. This was 
confirmed by independent women coffee producers. However, the international and national 
initiatives of closing the gender gap between men and women in the coffee sector in the Mbinga 
District have been impeded by land contestation in the Matengo Highland (the coffee-growing area) 
that has left women with little option to open new coffee farmlands of their own. Therefore, this 
chapter has argued that, notwithstanding the scale of production, the role of women in the coffee 
 






economy cannot be underestimated. The chapter has contributed to the literature on understanding 
agrarian changes, specifically on gendered crops, including coffee, by mapping the women’s 







Chapter Seven  
Conclusion 
This thesis has researched the socio-economic history of coffee production in the Mbinga District, 
Southern Tanzania. It has examined the foundation, development, fortunes, and socio-economic 
impact on the smallholder coffee producer between 1920 and 2015. It has traced the role of the 
colonial state on the introduction and development of coffee production in the district from the 
1920s to 1945. Secondly, it has explored the co-operative movements and its dynamic relationship 
with and broader impact on the smallholder coffee producers in the district, particularly from the 
1930s to 1976. It has also explored the influence of the postcolonial state on the coffee industry 
under Ujamaa ideology from 1962 to 1990. It has examined the competition between private coffee 
enterprises and co-operative unions and societies and their impact on the smallholder coffee 
producers. Finally, it has assessed the role of women in coffee production in the district between 
the 1920s and 2015. 
The thesis contributes to the historiography on agrarian change, gender and the coffee industry by 
integrating aspects of economics, ecology, politics, and society. This study has attempted to fill the 
existing gap in economic and agrarian studies on the coffee industry in Tanzania which, to date has 
only focused on the emergence of African peasants, their protest to the colonial state and the unequal 
relationship between state, estate, and peasants in North and North-Western Tanzania1 while paying 
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little attention to the smallholder African coffee producers in the Mbinga District, Southern 
Tanzania.  
The thesis has argued that the colonial state in the foundations of the coffee industry, the formation 
of the Ngaka Coffee Co-operative in the 1930s, the strained relationship between the NGOMAT 
and the Ngaka Coffee Co-operative Society between 1939 and 1945, the merging and eventual 
dissolution of the co-operative movements in 1976, the postcolonial state policies, including 
Ujamaa and villagisation, between the 1960s and 1980s, the coffee free-market system in the 1990s 
and mid-2010s have influenced the socio-economic livelihood of smallholder coffee producers in 
Southern Tanzania. The thesis has engaged both colonial and postcolonial historiography in 
Tanzania. Unlike the existing studies that largely focused on either the colonial or postcolonial 
period, this thesis has confirmed the historical continuity and integrated the aspect of gender in the 
study of the production and marketing of coffee in colonial and postcolonial Tanzania. 
Furthermore, this thesis extends the debate on the management of co-operative marketing in the 
liberalised economy. The co-operative section under the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operative 
Development has been the most problematic and difficult section regarding agricultural 
development in Tanzania. Problems like corruption, misappropriations and embezzlement of the 
co-operative property and farmers’ crop proceeds have been haunting the co-operative sector. These 
problems have made co-operative movements prone to frequent staff changes, as well as changes 
in the marketing structure. Therefore, by examining the coffee industry within the agricultural 
sector, this thesis contributes to the historiography of agrarian change in Tanzania regarding coffee 
production and marketing. The thesis adds to the existing historiography, such as produced by 
Kenneth Curtis,2 Susan Rogers3 Andrea Eckert.4  
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To demonstrate the fortunes of coffee production in the Mbinga District, this thesis engaged with 
the approaches of “coffee statecraft” by Gavin Fridell5 and “weapons of the weak” by James Scott6. 
“Coffee statecraft” was useful in examining the role of the colonial state in introducing and 
developing the coffee industry in the district amid the initial failure by traders and missionaries. 
Indigenous people in the Mbinga District, on the other hand, played an important role in introducing 
and developing the coffee industry. According to the coffee statecraft approach, state and market 
are inseparable as it is the state that formulates regulations and manages and regulates the marketing 
system. In the Mbinga District the state has been regulating coffee marketing since the 1930s 
through co-operatives and coffee boards. The postcolonial state had been regulating the coffee-
marketing system even during the free-market period in the 1990s. On the other hand, the “weapons 
of the weak” approach has been useful in assessing the responses of the smallholder coffee 
producers to the state and marketing system throughout the study period. Therefore, this thesis 
explored the fortunes of the coffee industry of Tanzania, using the Mbinga District as a case study. 
The study shows the transition from low production of fewer than five tons in the early 1930s to 
more than 10 000 tons in 2015, from one coffee co-operative society (Ngaka) in 1934 to more than 
45 in the 1990s.  
In tracing the role of the state in the introduction of coffee in the Mbinga District, this thesis 
demonstrates that the introduction of coffee in the 1920s in the district was an attempt of the colonial 
state to generate state revenue by reducing tax defaulters and promoting the production of export 
crops. Chapter Two has shown that, while in the northern and north-western parts of Tanzania 
commercial coffee production during the late 19th and early 20th centuries was started earlier by 
missionaries, European planters and a few Africans, coffee production started much later in the 
Mbinga District. The early attempts to introduce a cash-crop economy by the German colonial state 
was confined to the coastal areas while the southern part of the country was earmarked as a labour 
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reserve for the sisal plantations and coffee estates in the northern province. The few experiments 
conducted by the colonial government, such as cotton and sisal production along the shore of Lake 
Nyasa were abandoned. Missionaries and traders were among the earlier people who participated 
in the introduction of cash crops in the district.  
The British colonial attitude towards smallholder Arabica coffee producers in the 1920s was to 
discourage peasant coffee producers in favour of the settler farmers. However, in the 1930s, the 
Great Depression forced the colonial state to change attitudes towards promoting the production of 
more export crops. Through the “Grow more crops” campaign, the Department of Agriculture was 
able to expand the production of Arabica in the 1930s. This thesis showed that by 1933, the 
Department of Agriculture collaborated with the Matengo Native Authority and passed rules and 
regulations to guide the expansion of Arabica coffee production. As a result, by 1935, coffee 
production had grown in terms of the number of growers as well as coffee trees. This thesis, 
however, has shown that the coffee industry faced the challenge of a decline in the demand on the 
world markets. With the Ottawa Agreement in 1932, the UK was able to secure markets for the 
Empire coffee through the preferential tariff treatments among commonwealth nations. In the 
colonies, the Department of Agriculture, in co-operation with the Native Matengo Authorities 
revised the 1933 coffee rules in 1938 to prevent the withdrawal of smallholder coffee producers 
from the coffee production, following the decline of the prices of coffee in the late 1930s.  
The thesis has explored the state control over peasant production by forming the Coffee Control 
Board in the 1940s. There were centralisation and colonial state monopoly of the coffee-marketing 
system during the Second World War. This study found that, through these actions, the state was 
not only supervising coffee production but also acted as an instrument of political reproduction by 
promoting the domination of European companies in the coffee-marketing system. The state control 
was extended to food crops through the introduction of the minimum acreage in 1942 to promote 
both food and cash-crop production in the Mbinga District. The colonial state continued to use 






On the marketing of coffee, this thesis has shown that the colonial state exercised its control of 
peasant production through the Ordinance of the Co-operative Societies of 1932. The Ngaka Coffee 
Co-operative Society was formed to market Matengo coffee. The government placed Ngaka Coffee 
Co-operative Society under the NGOMAT from 1936. Between 1936 and 1947, the Ngaka Coffee 
Co-operative Society made several unsuccessful attempts to register. Under the auspices of the 
NGOMAT, the relationship with the Ngaka Coffee Co-operative Society was strained. As a result, 
the NGOMAT refused to handle coffee marketing between 1942 and 1945. The delay of registration 
and the strained relationship with the NGOMAT discouraged coffee producers from producing and 
from using the co-operative marketing system.  
To reverse the situation, however, the thesis has shown the growth of the co-operative movements 
in the post-war period in the Mbinga District. The expansion of coffee production in the 1950s 
enabled the formation of more coffee co-operative societies under the Matengo Native Co-operative 
Union (MANCU). However, co-operative societies faced the challenge of logistics, corruption and 
the lack of skilled human resources. The thesis has also shown an increase in protest against the co-
operative union and societies in the late 1950s and 1960s. The coffee industry also faced an increase 
of anti-co-operative movements in the Mbinga District. Some of the co-operative societies protested 
against the co-operative union. The thesis has also shown the increasing number of the co-
operatives with poor financial management and how that burdened coffee producers. Consequently, 
the Tanzanian government dissolved all the co-operatives in 1976. 
Moreover, this thesis has shown the influence of the postcolonial state on the coffee industry, 
particularly the implementation of Ujamaa and villagisation policies between 1960 and the 1980s, 
through the coffee authority of Tanzania, 1977–1983, and the reinstatement of co-operative 
movements from 1984 to 1990. Chapter Four demonstrated the responses of the coffee producers 
to the state interventions, specifically on the implementations of Ujamaa and villagisation in the 
Mbinga District. It has argued that the trajectory of the coffee industry between the 1960s and 1990 
in the Mbinga District was mainly shaped by the postcolonial state’s interventions in agricultural 






producers in the district. The idea of a dual residence, for example, was developed by coffee 
producers to retain coffee as their means of income.  
The European Economic Community (EEC) grant and the coffee growers levy were responsible for 
the expansion of the coffee industry in the Mbinga District between the late 1970s and late 1980s.7 
This thesis has verified the increase of the coffee cultivation areas and coffee tonnage. 
Unfortunately, the economic crisis from the late 1970s and the early 1980s forced the state to 
abandon its socialist principles by accepting the Structural Adjustment Programs as stipulated by 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In reviving the coffee economy, the 
Tanzanian government reinstated the co-operative movements in 1983. The Mbinga Co-operative 
Union (MBICU) under the Ruvuma Co-operative Union operated between 1984 and 1989. The 
newly established co-operatives failed to operate as economically viable co-operatives due to 
persistence of fraud, theft, debts and the general economic hardships Tanzania experienced in the 
1980s. From 1989 onwards, the MBICU started to operate independently in the Mbinga District. 
From the 1980s, Tanzania embarked on economic reforms in most of its economic sectors. In the 
agricultural sector, it started with food crops in the late 1980s. In the 1990s, the focus was on 
“traditional export crops”, such as tobacco, cashew nuts, cotton and coffee. As part of these reforms, 
a free-market coffee system was implemented from 1994/95. Private enterprises were permitted to 
participate in buying coffee from the coffee producers. In exploring the role of private coffee 
enterprises in the coffee industry, this thesis has demonstrated the transition from the state-
monopoly coffee marketing system to the coffee free-market system in the 1990s. As this thesis has 
argued in Chapter Five, the transition from a strict state-controlled marketing system under co-
operative societies to co-existence with private enterprises in the coffee industry did not lead to free 
and fair competition but rather entrenched hegemonic and exploitative practices at the expense of 
smallholder coffee producers. As this thesis has shown, the Mbinga Co-operative Union collapsed 
 
7 URT, “Tanzania Coffee Development Programme for 1982–83”, Project No.5100.31.50.010; URT, “Tanzania Coffee 






as a result of administrative mismanagement and the failure to compete with the private coffee 
enterprises. The vacuum created by the demise of the MBICU has made coffee farmers organize 
into farm groups for the marketing of the coffee. This thesis has demonstrated that the state, through 
“coffee statecraft”, had been controlling the coffee market despite the transition to the coffee free-
market system.  
This thesis explored the role played by women in coffee production and marketing over an extensive 
period in Tanzania and Mbinga in particular. It demonstrated the complexity of defining a crop 
based on gender. As this thesis discussed in Chapter Six, women have been participating in most of 
the activities in coffee production, but most of them have been excluded from the control of the 
coffee proceeds. The legal and cultural constraints on women’s participation in the coffee market 
have side-lined women in most of the decision-making bodies. Hence, coffee primarily remained a 
man’s domain. This thesis goes against the current scholarship on gendered crops who emphasise 
separateness and place women in the weaker position. In proving the complexity of “women’s and 
men’s crop” categorisations, this thesis has applied the “coffee statecraft” approach by political 
economist Gavin Fridell8 to demonstrate the role of the state and its apparatus in shaping women’s 
role in the coffee industry. By analysing the resistance of women over male dominance in the 
Mbinga District, this thesis has applied the “weapon of the weak” approach of anthropologist James 
Scott.9 This thesis argued that, notwithstanding the scale of production, the role of women in the 
coffee economy cannot be underestimated. It has demonstrated resistance in terms as 
“coffeescapes” of resistance against oppressive and exploitative male dominance in the coffee 
industry. This study makes a meaningful contribution to the current debate on the attempts by the 
International Coffee Organization (ICO) to bridge the gender gap in the coffee industry. 
In terms of possible future research, there is still room to engage with the control of coffee pests 
and diseases and the pesticides usage and how these practices evolved. In Chapter Two, this thesis 
 
8 G. Fridell, “Coffee Statecraft: Rethinking the Global Coffee Crisis, 1998 – 2002”. 






demonstrated the perceptions of the settler farmers to African smallholder coffee producers on the 
spread of coffee pests and diseases from African farms to the white settlers in the northern province. 
Coffee diseases had been used as a tool to discourage Africans to produce Arabica coffee in the 
1920s. The Tanzania Coffee Research Institute propagated new varieties of coffee with the focus 
on productivity, climatic resilience and disease-resistant strains. However, more research has to be 
done on the indigenous understanding of coffee pests and diseases, focusing on the cultural 
practices in managing coffee diseases. Exploring the use of traditional remedies in controlling 
diseases and the circumstances that force them to resist the use of agrochemicals and favour the 
traditional remedies, need further exploration. This can bring new insights and a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between smallholder coffee producers and the authorities 
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